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Abstract 
Institutional shareholder participation has long been considered as vital to good 
corporate governance in the UK, and increasingly recognized as, at least potentially, 
an important part of Chinese corporate governance too. But its potential does not yet 
seem to have been realised. The reasons for that are undoubtedly complex, and this 
thesis seeks to understand that complexity, and to offer some (modest) proposals to 
promote greater shareholder engagement. 
At the core of the thesis’ explanation of shareholder activism is the model it seeks to 
develop to explore the factors that determine institutional shareholders’ propensity for 
activism. This model is built up in several stages, running across the whole thesis.  
The first ‘setup’ stage is composed of a two-step analysis. It first elaborates the 
collective benefits of activism as a means of achieving managerial accountability. The 
second step switches to the individual level of analysis, asking whether and when 
shareholder activism is individually rational i.e. rational for any individual 
shareholder. The thesis considers two inquires as essential to determine engagement 
for individual institutional investors: whether the temptation to free-ride that faces an 
individual shareholder can be overcome and whether a shareholder’s individual 
benefits from action exceed its individual costs. 
The model suggests that, in working out the strength of the temptation to free-ride, 
and the balancing of costs against benefits – much will depend upon the governance 
or regulatory environment, upon the type of institutional shareholder concerned, and 
upon the form of activism being undertaken. This thesis adds in as much empirical 
knowledge as can reasonably be currently gathered about these three variables both 
for the UK and for China. 
The application of the model explains the remarkable contrast in respect of the level 
of institutional shareholder involvement between the UK and China. The small 
presence of institutional investment and the lack of awareness of the importance of 
institutional shareholder activism are considered as two of the most relevant 
contributory factors to the comparatively passive institutional shareholder 
involvement in China. Moreover, besides working as an explanatory model, 
identifying those factors which contribute most significantly to the form and level of 
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shareholder activism, the model also allows prescriptions to be developed  for 
improving the environment for shareholder activism primarily (although not 
exclusively) in China.   
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Part I A Model for Shareholder Activism: In Outline 
Introduction  
0.1 Research Background  
The ultimate goal of the thesis is to offer a comparative analysis of the UK and China 
in respect of shareholder activism. 
Institutional shareholder activism1 appears to have come of age, both within the UK 
and China. In the past few years, institutional shareholders – those who pool large 
sums of money from clients and invest those sums in securities, real property and 
other investment assets for their clients,2 seemed to have begun to work in an effort to 
strengthen their voice within the corporation by seeking to enhance managerial 
accountability.  
In the UK, the failed acquisition of AIA Insurance by Prudential Insurance, for 
example, is reported to have prompted some of its own institutional shareholders to 
have sought the replacement of its chairman.3 Other recent high-profile examples of 
shareholder activism in large UK companies have included HSBC (by Knight Vinke 
Asset Management lobbying for changes to HSBC's strategy and management 
structure), 4  Vodafone (by Efficient Capital Structures lobbying for a change in 
 
1 We shall have to say much more to define shareholder activism below, including developing a 
typology of activism. For now, however, we might describe it as ‘the use of power by an investor either 
to influence the processes or outcomes of a given portfolio firm or to evoke large-scale change in 
processes or outcomes across multiple firms through the symbolic targeting of one or more portfolio 
firms’, see L V Ryan and M Schneider, 'The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism' (2002) 27 
Academy of Management Review 554, 555. I will look at the term of ‘shareholder activism’ in more 
detailed in Chapter 3. 
2 P Davis and B Steil, Institutional Investors (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 2001) 12. A fuller 
treatment of the organizations that are typically included in the class of institutional shareholders is 
provided in Chapter 3.2. below. 
3 P Davies and K Burgess, ‘Pru Investors Turn Focus on McGrath’, Financial Times (London 16 June 
2010) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/987c085e-7984-11df-b063-00144feabdc0.html> accessed 23 June 
2010.  
4  The process of how Knightvinke engaged with the HSBC is disclosed on its website: 
<http://www.knightvinke.com/track_record/> accessed 21 June 2010. 
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strategy),5 Marks and Spencer (by its own institutional investors lobbying for the 
separation of CEO and board chairman roles).6 
In China, there is also a growing trend for institutional shareholders in listed 
companies to make their voice known. Recent notable cases of shareholder activism 
have included China Merchants Bank (by eight funds lobbying for withdrawal of a 
new share plan),7 Vanke (by 23 funds lobbying for altering of article)8 and Shanghai 
3F New Materials (by institutional investors lobbying for a fair share structure reform 
scheme).9 
However, it must be admitted that the full potential for shareholder activism has not 
been realized. Against the examples of activism described above, we must 
acknowledge that some British institutional investors have rightly been criticized as 
behaving as ‘absentee landlords’ of their investee companies.10 The recent banking 
crisis has exposed the passivity of some institutional shareholders – many of whom 
appear to have chosen to sell their stakes in the banks rather than intervene or 
challenge the board when they realised the strategies followed by the banks were 
excessively risky.11 Institutional shareholders’ role to scrutinise and monitor the 
decisions of boards and executive management in the banking sector is considered as 
 
5 E Judge, ‘Auction Rekindles Fears over Vodafone's US Strategy’, Timesonline (26 January 2008), 
<http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/telecoms/article3254338.ece> 
accessed at 12 June 2009. 
6 K Burgess, ‘Questions Raised over Combined Role Move’, Financial Times (London 10 March 2008) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9175be7c-eef0-11dc-97ec-0000779fd2ac.html> accessed 10 September 
2009. 
7  P Wang, ‘Jijin Fandui Zhaohang Faxing Baiyi Kezhuanzai Rongzi’ [Funds Disagreed China 
Merchant Bank’s Bond Offer Plan] Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao [Chinese securities journal] (29 
September 2003). 
8 M Jin, ‘Jijin Gaodiao Banyan ‘Jiji Touzizhe’’ [Funds Acted as ‘Active investors’], Zhongguo 
Zhengquan Bao [China Securities News] (9 May 2005). 
9 See, for example, ‘San’aifu Gugai Liuchan, Farengu Jiezheng Renu Jijin’ [3FShare Structure Reform 
Miscarried, Legal Person Share Problem Annoyed the Funds], 21 Shiji Jingji Baodao [21st Century 
Economic News] (19 December 2005); ‘San’aifu Gugai Yaozhe, Yinhua Jijin Pilu Yuanyin’ [Yinhua 
Fund Explained Why 3F Share Structure Reform Aborted], Shanghai Zhengquan Bao [Shanghai 
Securities News] (15 December 2005). Share structure reform in China will be introduced in Chapter 9. 
10 Lord Myners, Speech to the NAPF Investment Conference in Edinburgh on March 12, 2009, 
available at < www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/speech_fsst_120309.htm> accessed 14 July 2009. 
11 Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate Governance and Pay in the City, Ninth 
Report of session 2008-9, 64.   
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a failure, resulting in the phenomenon of ‘ownerless corporations’, as described by 
Lord Myners. 12  Similarly, some institutional shareholders have not played a 
contributory role in monitoring corporate managers in Chinese listed companies, as 
reported in a survey conducted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007.13  
The reality regarding whether there is truly an increase in institutional shareholder 
involvement appears to be mixed. But it at least suggests that shareholder action is not 
widely practiced by every individual institutional investor. Appreciating this 
complexity requires us to ask the central question that will be addressed in this thesis: 
Why and when institutional shareholder activism is likely to occur? The exploration 
of these issues is timely and vital to both the UK and China.  
Firstly, the concept of active institutional share ownership has become central to the 
regulatory framework for the governance of listed companies. Policymakers in both 
countries view institutional shareholder engagement as a means of improving 
corporate governance practice in listed companies and have issued a variety of 
guidelines to promote greater institutional shareholder monitoring. A recent 
groundbreaking movement in the UK framework is the newly-issued ‘Stewardship 
Code.’ In July 2010, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), a regulatory body that 
oversees corporate governance standards in the UK, launched the world’s first 
‘Stewardship Code’, to require UK institutional investors to engage with the 
companies in which they invest. 
The FRC’s Stewardship Code, which sits alongside the UK’s newly revised Corporate 
Governance Code 14  for companies, comes off the back of the 
Government-commissioned Walker Review into corporate governance during the 
 
12 Ibid, 65. 
13  Shanghai Stock Exchange, China Corporate Governance Report 2007, 36, available at 
<http://static.sse.com.cn/sseportal/webapp/datapresent/SSEDisquisitionAndPublicationAct> accessed 
14 December 2009. 
14 The UK Corporate Governance Code is available at  
<http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/ukcgcode.cfm> accessed 12 March 2010. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code, which updates the previous ‘Combined Code on Corporate Governance’, grew out 
of: Financial Reporting Council, Financial Reporting Council, ‘2009 Review of the Combined Code: 
Final Report’ < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/reviewCombined.cfm > accessed 10 March 2010, 3.76. 
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financial crisis.15 The Stewardship Code sets out the best practice for institutional 
investors in their stewardship of UK listed companies with a view to  
‘enhancing the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies 
to help improve long-term returns to shareholder and the efficient exercise of 
governance responsibilities.’16 
Unlike previous codes which were voluntary in nature, the Stewardship Code has a 
more mandatory weight on institutions. UK institutional investors must abide by the 
Code to make public disclosure of their voting and engagement activity, or explain 
why they do not comply with the Code.17  
Similar pressures are starting to build in China. China’s own Code of Corporate 
Governance, issued in 2002, is mandatory for Chinese listed companies. It explicitly 
states: 
‘Institutional shareholders shall play a role in the appointment of company directors, the 
compensation and supervision of management and major decision-making processes.’18  
In the recent ‘split share reform’, 19  institutional investors are expected by the 
Government to ‘take active part in the share reform, and defend the rights of investors, 
especially public investors, as well as sustained development of the market.’20 
Secondly, corporate governance is of critical importance to a country’s financial 
market stability and economic growth, because it helps to provide a degree of 
confidence and credibility that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market 
 
15 D Walker, ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities: 
Final Recommendations’ (2009) <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> 
accessed 16 January 2010, Recommendation 16. 
16 Stewardship Code, Preface. 
17 The implementation of the Stewardship Code in practice remains to be seen. For a good evaluation 
on aspects of the Code in operation, See I Macneil, 'Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders 
in UK Listed Companies' (2010) Capital Markets Law Journal 1, 17-20. 
18 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies s 11. 
19 For an account of this reform, see infra; Chapter 6.  
20 Guidance Opinions on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies, issued by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission in September 2005, s 14. It will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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economy.21 The significance of studying the role of institutional shareholders in 
corporate governance lies in the fact that (a) institutional investors collectively hold a 
very large portion of the equities of the UK listed company sector, and an important, 
growing increase of Chinese securities; and (b) domestic listed companies, in turn, 
account for a vital part of the economy in both the UK and China. 
With regard to (a), institutional ownership of the listed UK equity market has 
increased substantially since the 1960s. While in 1963, individual investors owned 54%
of shares, and institutions owned 24%, by 2008, there is a dramatic reverse: the level 
of share ownership by individuals dropped to only 10%, and accordingly, institutional 
ownership accounted for 40% of UK equities.22 The proportion of the listed China 
equity market owned by institutions has also increased enormously, although not to 
the extent seen in the UK mainly due to the presence of non-tradable shares in 
Chinese listed companies. By 2009, institutional ownership accounted for more than 
half of tradable Chinese equities.23 With the on-going split share reform, institutional 
shareholder will be likely to replace the State or local governments to become major 
shareholders in many listed companies and thus, their significance is far-reaching in 
the future.  
Regarding (b), there were 2,179 domestic companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange by 2009, with a combined market capitalization of £1.8 trillion, equally 
more than 128% of UK’s GDP.24 In China, there were 1,700 companies listed on its 
domestic stock exchanges, with a total domestic market capitalization of RMB 23 
trillion (roughly ￡2.3 trillion), accounted for more than 101% of Chinese GDP.25  
 
21 OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, Paris 2004) Preamble. 
22 Office for National Statistics, ‘Share Ownership Survey 2008’ 
 <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/share0110.pdf> accessed 17 August 2010. For a full analysis of 
UK institutional share ownership, see Chapter 3.1. 
23 See a detailed analysis in Chapter7.1. 
24 World Bank, Listed Domestic Companies, Total and Market Capitalization of Listed Companies (% 
of GDP), 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS/countries/1w-CN?display=default> 
accessed 12 August 2010. 
25 Ibid. 
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As institutional investors become increasingly powerful in the corporate arena, it will 
be accordingly critical for both researchers and practitioners to understand the 
heterogeneity of this enormous investor class.  
0.2 Research Questions 
The questions that the thesis intends to examine are: 
1. Is activism by shareholders rational? What factors determine the extent of 
institutional shareholder activism? Can these factors be ordered so they form a 
coherent model of shareholder activism? 
2. What empirical evidence is there about the strength of these factors in the UK and 
China?  
3. What can be done to overcome factors that weigh against institutional shareholder 
activism, or to strengthen factors that encourage more shareholder activism?  
4. Comparatively, questions 1, 2 and 3 will be addressed for both the UK and China.   
0.3 Research Design and Structure 
Clearly, at the core of these four research questions is the model of activism that the 
thesis develops (and then seeks to ‘prove’ by reference to the current empirical extent 
of activism in the UK and China). Developing this model has been an admittedly 
complex and difficult task, reflecting the complexity of understanding shareholder 
activism itself. The model is built up in three stages, running across several of the 
chapters of the thesis, and it will accordingly be useful to foreshadow the way the 
argument will develop.  
Chapter 1 seeks to offer a framework showing the factors that explain when 
shareholder activism will occur. At this first, ‘framework’, stage, the analysis involves 
two moves. The first is to explain how collective action by shareholders can be 
beneficial (to shareholders). In doing so, it in part notes the positive benefits of 
7 
 
activism, in part rejects some of the counter arguments against activism and in part 
looks at the empirical evidence on the collective benefit of activism. The second move 
is to explain whether, and when, this collective benefit might be translated into 
individually rational activism by shareholders. In other words, it intends to show how 
individual shareholders might go about deciding whether they ought, individually, to 
be active. This chapter suggests that the move from collectively beneficial activism to 
individually rational activism involves a two-step analysis. The first step is to 
determine whether the free-riding problem that faces any collective action can be 
overcome. This thesis suggests four factors that can, in some circumstances, 
undermine the likelihood of free-riding. They are: the decisiveness of large individual 
institutional holdings, the possibility of concerted action, what I shall call ‘in process’ 
benefits and a normative obligation to act.  
If free-riding can be avoided, the second step involves a calculation: are the 
institution’s individual benefits likely to exceed its individual costs? This chapter 
suggests that the benefits include the shareholder’s share of the total gains to the 
corporation from the activism in question, plus any individual ‘in process’ benefits it 
secures through its own activism. It also offers a classification of ‘costs’ based on 
direct costs and indirect costs. Chapter 1 notes that the precise functioning of these 
factors – the impact they have on the decision-making process of any given 
institutional shareholder will – depend upon the type of institutional shareholder 
concerned and the form of activism they take.  
Subsequent chapters (4 onwards) will then develop this model, but before doing so, it 
is essential to attend to some background information necessary for this analysis to 
make sense. Chapter 2 therefore provides an overview of some fundamental elements 
of UK listed companies and the corporate governance framework that is crucial for 
understanding the micro-environment of shareholder activism. It is followed by 
Chapter 3 which outlines and surveys the extent and features of major market 
participants in the UK institutional investment landscape. With this grasp on the 
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reality of UK corporate governance and institutional investment, Chapter 4 takes a 
more theoretical turn to develop the model established in Chapter 1. It enriches the 
model of activism by ‘feeding in’ some of the relevant findings about the type of 
institutional shareholders involved in the activism. (It is worth nothing here that since 
Chinese institutions share many of the same features as the UK institutions, 
concerning the way they manage investment, some findings in Chapter 4 can also be 
applied in the Chinese landscape, although I will subsequently note in Chapter 9 when 
differences are observed.) 
Chapter 5 intends to ‘prove’ the explanatory model of activism developed in Chapter 
1 by adding in empirical material in respect of shareholder activism in the UK. The 
first section identifies a typology of shareholder activism, including private meetings, 
proxy voting, submitting proposals, and derivative actions. It then explores the current 
extent and level of each form of activity that has taken place in the UK. Based on such 
empirical evidence, Chapter 5 applies the model to show how factors contained in the 
model are ‘in play’ when they come to different types of activism. It concludes with a 
list of recommended reforms for more active shareholder engagement in the UK. 
Chapters 6 to 9 move the thesis on to research on shareholder activism in China, 
which are conducted under a similar structure to that is used in the previous study of 
the UK. Chapter 6 lays the background knowledge of the Chinese corporate 
governance system and Chapter 7 explores the extent and features of Chinese 
institutional investors.  
In order to explore the level of shareholder activism in China, Chapter 8 presents an 
empirical study I undertook of a total sample of 30 Chinese listed companies. After 
outlining the overall approach taken in the empirical study, this chapter surveys and 
analyzes the research results according to the ‘typology of activism’ developed in 
Chapter 5 (namely, private meetings, submitting proposals, proxy voting and 
derivative actions). The study finds that Chinese institutional shareholders have 
presented a much lower level of activism in corporate governance than their UK 
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counterparts. To ‘prove’, in relation to China, the model established in Chapter 1, 
Chapter 9 puts these empirical findings into the activism model to show how all this 
empirical knowledge is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.  
Building upon the discussion in previous chapters, Chapter 10 ties the threads of this 
study together and offers policy implications for China. It begins with a brief 
discussion to justify why and how this thesis deals with the issue of borrowing a 
country’s experience by another. By comparatively indentifying how these factors 
driving activism play out differently between the UK and China, the analysis of 
Chapter 10 moves up to the essential questions of what China can learn from the UK’ 
s approaches and how these proposals can be implemented in China.  
The Conclusion of the thesis provides a summary of research findings and offers 
avenues for future research.  
0.4 Research Method 
0.4.1 Library Search 
This thesis is conducted primarily through a library-based research approach. It 
consists of the literature review from diverse sources, such as books, journals, 
magazines, newspapers, and websites of both Western and Chinese origin. It involves 
a process more complicated than accumulation of the materials; furthermore, it also 
integrates different arguments systematically and develops new thoughts about the 
theories in a creative way. 
A note on sources: Late appearance of the Stewardship Code – the thesis tried to 
include its norms and applications in analysis, but unfortunately, little has been 
written about it so far26 and no empirical evidence on its effectiveness.  
 
26 There are exceptions, for example, see Macneil (n 17); Brian R Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s 
Achilles’ Heel’, 73 The Modern Law Review 1004; A Reisberg, ‘The Notion of Stewardship from a 
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0.4.2 Empirical Study 
In the UK, there is considerable evidence available for the investigation concerning 
the level of institutional shareholder participation in listed companies. However, in the 
Chinese context, despite institutional investment having gained increased popularity 
over the last few years, empirical evidence exploring the role of institutional 
shareholder in corporate governance is rare. To fill the gap, this thesis employs an 
empirical research method to probe the level of shareholder activism in China.  
The study aims to achieve a twofold purpose. First, it intends to provide empirical 
evidence on the overall level of shareholder activism in Chinese listed companies. 
Secondly, the study compares data between companies with different levels of 
institutional share ownership and corporate governance standards, with an interest in 
how and to what extent shareholder activism varies between these different types of 
company.  
For the research purposes above, a total of 30 companies were selected from the 
Chinese top 100 largest listed companies as the sample. The study selected the top 10 
Chinese listed companies with largest investment funds’ shareholding (categorized as 
Group A);27 the top 10 companies which scored with best corporate governance 
performance (categorized as Group B);28 10 companies were randomly selected from 
the top 100 listed companies which are excluded by Group A and Group B 
(categorized as Group C). 
Company Law Perspective: Re-Defined and Re-Assessed in Light of the Recent Financial Crisis?’, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1661011, accessed 10 March 2011. 
27 The largest institutional holding in Chinese listed companies by the end of 2009 is summarized by 
Hexun.com, a large financial securities website in China. The data only covers the proportion of 
securities investment funds (SIF)’ holdings and the actual holding of total institutions is estimated 
higher than this data. However, since SIF’ investment accounts for about 80% of all institutional assets, 
this ranking could still reflect the shareholding of institutions in Chinese listed companies.  
28 The assessment of corporate governance is conducted by Institute of World Economic and Political 
in Chinese Academy of Social Science in its 2009 nia Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi 100 qiang gongsi 
zhili pInjia [Corporate Governance Assessment Report on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 
2009],available at http://www.iwep.org.cn/, accessed 14 September 2009. The assessment is based on 
six criteria: rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure 
and transparency, board responsibility, and supervisory board responsibility.  
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The data required for the present study were hand-collected from companies’ websites, 
annual reports, quarterly announcements, as well as the announcements of the 
relevant governmental-institutions and stock exchanges. Through an analysis of data 
obtained, the study provides valuable evidence on the extent to which institutional 
shareholder in China monitor their portfolio companies.  
0.4.3 Comparative Study 
The thesis develops a comparative study between the UK and China in order to (1) 
explore the current level of institutional monitoring activities, survey developments 
and identify challenges institutions face in each country; and (2) observe and explain 
the differences and similarities between these two countries and explore whether the 
future development of institutional shareholder activism in China can be inspired by 
the UK’s experiences.   
The comparison between the UK and China is chosen based on the following 
considerations. First, the level of institutional shareholder engagement in UK listed 
companies has shown to be higher than of other countries. A survey on the 
implementation of the United Nation Principle for Responsible Investment, found that 
UK asset owners presented higher scores than peers from other countries and the total 
number of engagements reported by UK signatories far exceeded that of other 
countries.29 Partly because of the higher level of institutional shareholder engagement, 
UK enjoys the reputation of being a leader in the area of corporate governance, scored 
as the top of 49 studies countries by a survey conducted by the World Bank.30 By 
contrast, as we will see later, institutional shareholder activism is still relatively a new 
and rare phenomenon in China and Chinese corporate governance systems only 
ranked 44 out of 49 studied counties. Given the remarkable differences above, it is 
 
29 Report on implementation of the UN Principles for Responsible Investment cited in FRC (n 14) 
3.73. 
30 World Economic Forum in 2003, results cited in Q Liu, 'Corporate Governance in China: Current 
Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional Determinants' (2006) 52 CESifo Economic Studies 
415,452. 
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therefore interesting for us to inquiry what factors contribute to a more active role that 
institutional shareholders are currently playing in the corporate governance of 
investee companies in the UK. 
The exploration of this issue is critical to the future development of Chinese corporate 
governance. In a system of concentrated shareholding such as China’s, the purposes of 
institutional shareholder engagement is two-fold. The first and foremost task is to act 
‘in a supervisory capacity’ to ensure effective monitoring and disciplining of 
controlling shareholders.31 Second, as the same role that institutional investors play in 
the UK, they are expected to hold the board accounts. This role will become 
increasingly important in China when current concentrated share ownership is 
gradually diluted by virtue of the on-going program of split share reform in China.  
For the above reasons, an in-depth survey on the UK’s approaches to ensure greater 
institutional shareholder engagement will merit the attention of Chinese legislators 
and academics who wish to learn more about how shareholder involvement can be 
promoted. The shareholders’ activism taking place and efforts made by the 
Government and academics in the UK would stand out as valuable experience to 
inspire the future development of shareholder engagement in China. 
The second reason for the UK-China comparative study lies in the fact that the extent 
of shareholder involvement in the UK is not perfectly satisfactory as a result of a 
variety of economic and regulatory obstacles. As institutional shareholder activism is 
in its infant stage in China, identification of challenges UK institutions currently face 
would caution Chinese institutions that similar problems might emerge in future.  
While good reasons exist for considering a comparative analysis on how institutional 
shareholders’ activities take place in the UK and China, the presence of differing 
culture, legal systems and market conditions must be considered. The thesis therefore 
carefully takes these differences into account when measuring institutional 
 
31  B Cheffins, 'Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto ' 
(1999) 10 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 5, 40. 
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shareholder activism in these two countries. The potential risks involved in a 
comparative study will also be addressed in Chapter 10. 
Chapter 1 A Theoretical Framework for Shareholder 
Activism  
This chapter addresses what is really the most fundamental, core, question in my 
thesis: is activism by shareholders rational? I wish (unsurprisingly) to answer this 
affirmatively. And to develop this positive assessment of shareholder activism, I need 
to move in two stages. The first stage seeks to show that shareholder activism is 
collectively beneficial: it is part of a good corporate governance system that generates 
greater collective benefits than the (collective) costs it creates. The second move 
switches from the collective to the individual level of analysis. I wish to show the 
circumstances in which it is now, and could (with an appropriate regulatory 
framework) even more often be, in the individual interest of (at least many) individual 
institutional shareholders to engage in activism.  
1.1 Is Collective Action by Shareholders Beneficial? 
Is, then, shareholder activism collectively beneficial; are the collective benefits of 
some bout of activism likely to be greater than the collective costs? Or is the 
management of companies best left to managers, with minimal interference by 
shareholders? This clearly goes to the heart of the question whether shareholder 
activism is something to be encouraged and celebrated. In this section, I shall attempt 
to argue that activism can be beneficial to companies and therefore to their 
shareholders. I shall do so by confronting the arguments of those who criticize 
shareholder activism.  
The starting point suggesting that shareholder activism can be beneficial is the agency 
problem stemming from a divergence between the interests of shareholders and 
14 
 
managers inherent in the corporate form of firm organization. This problem is well 
explained by Fischel: 
‘As residual claimants on the firm’s income stream, shareholders want their agents-
the firm’s managers-to maximize wealth. Because managers cannot capture all of 
the gains if they are successful, and will not suffer all of the losses should the 
venture flop, they have less incentives to maximize wealth than if they themselves 
were the principals. Rather, managers have an incentive to consume excess leisure, 
perquisites and in general be less dedicated to the goal of wealth maximization than 
they would be if they were not simply agents.’1 
The agency problem imposes, in economic terms, ‘agency costs’ on shareholders.2 
Kershaw suggests that agency costs comprise of ‘direct transfers of value’, such as 
self-dealing, senior management remuneration, and ‘indirect agency costs’, including 
shirking and incompetence. 3  Shareholder activism is collectively beneficial, then, 
insofar as it reduces agency costs by monitoring the agent’s actions to ensure that he 
does not misbehave and to sanction him if he does, in both the UK and China. 
In addition, institutional shareholder activism in Chinese listed companies provides a 
source of discipline on the controlling shareholders, ensuring that they are acting in 
the best interest of the minority shareholders.  As one will see in following chapters, 
in contrast to the UK’s ‘outsider/arm’s-length’ system,4 China has a ‘insider/control-
                                                 
1 D R Fischel, 'The Corporate Governance Movement' (1982) 35 Vanderbilt Law Review 1259, 1262-3. 
This problem is also pointed out by Adam Smith in A Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Everyman, 
London 1977) 700. 
2  M C Jensen and W H Meckling, 'Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and 
ownership structure' (1976) 2 Journal of Finance Economics 305, 308-9. 
3  D Kershaw, Company Law in Context (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 169-71. 
4  A ‘outsider/arm’s-length’ system suggests that the listed company has a widely dispersed share 
ownership and is  run by a small group of managers who typically own no more than a small portion of 
the corporations’ shares. For a discussion, see C Mayer, 'Financial Systems and Corporate Governance: 
A Review of the International Evidence' (1998) 154 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
144, 145-47, 159-60. There is a massive literature examining the ownership structure of UK listed 
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oriented’ system of ownership and control, where listed companies typically have a 
‘block holder’ – the State, which owns a sufficiently sizeable fraction of the voting 
shares to exercise considerable control over management.5  As a result, apart from 
contributing towards managerial accountability, institutional shareholder activism can 
also achieve the benefit of reducing the majority-minority agency costs.  
1.1.1 A Controversial Question Side-stepped 
Having introduced the fundamental issue of agency costs, I must now note, but leave 
aside, one argument against the benefits of activism. This argument is put by some 
proponents of what is variously termed ‘stakeholding’, or ‘corporate social 
responsibility’. 6  For these critics of shareholder activism, the objective of the 
company should not be understood in terms of single-minded loyalty to the interests 
of shareholders (by maximizing the profits available for distribution to shareholders, 
maximizing the wealth of shareholders, or so on). Rather, the very objective of the 
company is to be understood as involving some balancing of the interests of 
shareholders with the interests of a company’s other stakeholders, or with the 
company’s obligations to operate in a socially responsible way. And on this view of a 
company’s objectives, the disadvantage of collective shareholder action is not that it 
may harm the interests of shareholders. Rather, it may sadly be all too effective in 
improving the position of shareholders, but it is likely as a result to harm the position 
                                                                                                                                            
companies, Cheffins provides a good summary in B Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: 
British Business Transformed (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 11-6.  
5 It is important to make clear here, that the state does not fall into the category of institutional investor. 
The  role of the state in a company is significantly different from that of an institutional investor. They 
have very different objectives to each other. Institutional investors are normally bound by various 
fiduciary duty towards their clients while the state is not but it is always oriented by political purposes. 
For a fuller discussion of the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies, see Chapter 6.  
6  There is a rich literature discussing the stakeholding theory. Generally, see articles in D McBarnet, A 
Voiculescu and T Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability:Corporate Social Responsibility 
and the Law (Cambridge University Press, New York 2007); A Crane and others (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (Oxford University Press, New York 2008).  
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of the company’s stakeholders, or to undermine the prospects of a company acting in 
a sufficiently socially responsible manner. 
In this thesis, I am, however, assuming that the objective of those running companies 
is indeed to ‘promote the success of the company for the benefit of its member’ (as 
section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 puts it).7 I accept that this view is not, as the 
previous paragraph acknowledges, universally held. However, due to constraints of 
space I shall not endeavour here to defend this (orthodox) view of the company, but 
will take it simply as an assumption for the arguments that I do wish to deal with. 
So, what arguments against shareholder activism are put by those of its critics who 
nevertheless share my assumption that the purpose of companies is indeed to promote 
the interests of the company’s members? 
1.1.2 Objections to Shareholder Activism 
Among other things, I shall consider claims that shareholder activism is detrimental to 
corporate value because of undermining board authority, because of information 
asymmetry and shareholders’ the lack of expertise, because of shareholder short-
termism and the special interests by which shareholders might be motivated; that 
other corporate governance mechanisms provide sufficient accountability; and that 
there is not sufficient empirical evidence supporting shareholder activism. After 
reviewing all these claims, I conclude that they do not, individually or collectively, 
form a sound basis against institutional shareholder activism.  
                                                 
7 For a general discussion of section 172 of CA 2006, See J Loughrey, A Keay and L Cerioni, ‘Legal 
Practitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value and the Shaping of Corporate Governance’ (2008) 8 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 79; P Omar, ‘In the Wake of the Companies Act 2006: An 
Assessment of the Potential Impact of Reforms to Company Law’ (2009) 20 International Company 
and Commercial Law Review 44; A Keay, Directors’ Duties (Jordan, Bristol, 2009) 118-20; A 
Keay, ‘The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is it Fit for Purpose?’  
< http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662411> accessed 3 September 2010.  
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1.1.2.1 Adverse Effects on Shareholder Value (Damaging the 
Effectiveness of Central Board System) 
1.1.2.1.1 Director Primacy Model 
In a series of articles e.g. Director Primacy: the Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 8  and one recent challenging monograph: The New Corporate 
Governance in Theory and Practice, 9  Bainbridge applies Arrow’s theory in The 
Limits of Organization 10  to argue the necessity of a centre of power capable of 
exercising fiat within the corporation. A central authority is often the only way to 
process information and to make collective decision for many thousands of members 
within a large organization.11 Bainbridge therefore contends that the decision-making 
authority of a corporation shall be vested in a single, central organ – the board.12 
Bainbridge also agrees with Arrow that there is a need to maintain a trade-off between 
authority and accountability in an effective organization. 13  However, while he 
proposes a variety of mechanisms, including self-regulation, board internal dynamics 
and the use of market mechanism, as means of ensuring managerial accountability, he 
rejects the idea that shareholder activism should play a role.14 
Bainbridge views shareholder activism as being detrimental to the board’s authority. 
Encouraging shareholders to ‘review management decisions, step in when 
                                                 
8  S M Bainbridge, 'Director Primacy: the Means and Ends of Corporate Governance' (2003) 97 
Northwestern University Law Review 547. 
9 S M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2008). 
10 K J Arrow, The Limits of Organization (Norton, New York 1974). 
11 Ibid, 68-69; Bainbridge, 'Director Primacy: the Means and Ends of Corporate Governance' , 557-58. 
12 S M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, (n 9) 10; Also See S M 
Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics (Foundation Press, New York 2002) 
13 S M Bainbridge, 'Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors' (2005) UCLA School of Law, 
Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-20 <http://ssrn.com/paper=796227> accessed 13 December 2008  
14 S M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, (n 9) 100-04, 55, 112, 113, 
123, 151-52, 197-98. 
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management performance falters, and exercise voting control to effect a change in 
policy or personnel’ will ‘shift some portion of the board’s authority to them’ and 
ultimately undermine the optimality of the ‘director primacy model’.15  
Might shareholder activism damage board authority as Bainbridge fears? No. 
Shareholders do, and indeed should, have some ability to intervene in corporate 
management. The scope of power they have, however, is limited. As argued by 
Mcdonnell when he considers Bainbridge’s director primacy model, shareholders 
would, as a matter of law, have restrained power to interrupt board authority.16 Most 
of them only get one chance a year to question the board at the annual shareholders’ 
meeting, and the agenda of that meeting is often usually controlled by the board. It is 
beyond the shareholders’ legal power to intervene on most particular business 
decisions, and that will continue to be so even though shareholder are more actively 
participating in activism.17 Instead, the board, if they want, can step in to make every 
decision within the corporation. Hence, shareholder activism helps to achieve board 
accountability but does not result in the board losing a substantial amount of its 
authority that Bainbridge fears. It therefore fits quite well with Arrow’s position.  
One way of examining the objections examined in the following sections is that, if 
they were correct, it would not be necessary for shares to be attached with votes at all. 
People who agree that it is important to let shareholders have a say on their own assets 
are unlikely to accept Bainbridge’s objections set out above. 
In addition to retaining authority, Bainbridge has two other subsidiary (and, I would 
suggest, less original) reasons to support his objections to shareholder activism. He 
                                                 
15 S M Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, (n 9) 234. 
16 B H.McDonnell, 'Profeesor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of The New Corporate 
Governance in Theory and Practice' (2009) 34 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 139, 164-166. 
17 Ibid, 165.  
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claims that some investors may misuse their power to advance their private interests 
which  conflict with those of other shareholders. And he also argues that a variety of 
other mechanisms (instead of shareholder activism) will sufficiently hold the board 
accountable. These two points will be discussed separately in sections 1.1.2.1.4 and 
1.1.2.2 below.   
The following section will first deal with a common argument against shareholder 
activism: information asymmetry and lack of expertise. 
1.1.2.1.2 Information Asymmetry and Lack of Expertise                             
A main objection to shareholder activism is grounded on the informational and 
competence disadvantages that shareholders are likely to have vis-à-vis 
management.18 Opponents contend that, firstly, unlike managers, shareholders neither 
have time to gather information nor have full access to inside information of a 
corporation or business; and secondly, if they gained information, they do not 
specialize in making ‘sound decisions on either operational or policy questions.’19 
The argument goes, by virtue of those constraints, shareholder could make poor and 
wrong choices that might be detrimental to the interests of the company.20 However, 
as the following counterarguments suggest, this viewpoint does not obviate the strong 
need for institutional shareholder engagement.  
First, whether information is sufficient for a shareholder should be judged by the way 
he intends to use it. It is essential to bear in mind the objective or form that activism 
might take. Much activism will be concerned not with management of the company 
                                                 
18 M Lipton and S A Rosenblum, ‘A New System of Corporate Governance: the Quinquennial Election 
of Directors’ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 187. 
19 S M Bainbridge, 'Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors', (n 13) 6. 
20 J N Gordon, 'Shareholder Initiative and Delegation: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach 
to Corporate Law ' (1991) 60 University of Cincinnati Law Review 347, 353-55. 
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but with its internal governance arrangement. Making a decision as to whether a 
governance arrangement is problematic commonly does not turn on company specific, 
inside information or professional ability. Consider, for example, the decision whether 
to separate the role of CEO from the chairman in a board structure. For UK investors, 
it is already a recommendation set out in the UK Corporate Governance Code.21  Any 
company which does not adopt such a practice will be easily viewed as not-in-
compliance with the Code. If the company offers an explanation, shareholders will 
determine whether the reasons given by the board of directors are acceptable and such 
decisions are unlikely to rely on inside information that corporate managers have but 
shareholders lack.  
Even if shareholders gathered relevant information they need, the second argument 
mentioned above contends they lack expertise to process and respond to the 
information they obtain. This difficulty may be an obstacle to activism by individual, 
small shareholders. However, it is less of a problem for institutional shareholders who 
are professionally trained or equipped with specialists in corporate governance so as 
to detect and respond to managerial hazards more quickly and efficiently when the 
company’s performance lags.22 
In some cases, institutional shareholders devoting resources to specific concerns will 
be in even better positions to deal with governance issues than companies’ executives. 
They encounter similar questions in many companies, and they will soon gain 
experience how to address such questions. Consider one example, to which I shall 
return in detail later, drawn from shareholders’ ‘Say on Pay’.23  Davis found that 
                                                 
21 A.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code provides that ‘the roles of chairman and chief executive 
should not be exercised by the same individual.’ 
22 See Chapter 3.4. 
23 Chapter 5.2.2.2.3 will look at this issue in more detail. 
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feedback from those institutions helps management to modify their plan, for example, 
in the remuneration report, ‘to revise plans, better anticipate and perhaps pre-empt 
resistance, and/or manage risks of opposition’.24 They are, as reported by Grundfest, 
also better able to identify a sub-optimal governance structure than are incumbent 
boards.25  
In addition, however, the question is not whether managers or shareholders have 
information advantages. The fact that management might sometimes have superior 
information does not necessarily suggest they also have sufficient incentives to make 
the right decision, given the divergence of interests between the manager and 
shareholders. By virtue of the agency problem, without shareholder monitoring, 
decision-making that is left to a small group, even if it has information advantage, 
might be poorer if that informational advantage is outweighed by weaker (or self-
interested) incentives. Suppose, the argument that shareholders might make poor 
decisions is right, it may still be far less detrimental than misconduct of self-interested 
directors because the board can intervene in any particular management decision 
much more easily than can shareholders. 
1.1.2.1.3 Short-termism 
Shareholder activism might also be opposed on the ground of short-term horizons. 
The danger of short-termism is that some shareholders interested in gaining the 
                                                 
24 S Davis, 'Does 'Say on Pay' Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation Accountable' (2007) 
Millstein Center for Corporate Governance, Yale School of Managment 
<http://millstein.som.yale.edu/Davis_Say_on_Pay_Policy_Briefing.pdf> accessed 16 September 2009 
25 J A Grundfest, 'Advice and Consent: An Alternative Mechanism for Shareholder Participation in the 
Nomination and Election of Corporate Directors' (2003) Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working 
Paper No. 274 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=481021> accessed 12 May 2010 It 
is worth noting that Grundfest contends that institutional investors have a comparative advantage in 
identifying suboptimal governance structures, but that incumbent boards have a comparative advantage 
in rectifying those shortcomings, provided that the incumbents concur that the shortcomings are 
material. 
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maximum possible return in the shortest possible time might produce changes that are 
harmful to the long-term value of the corporation.26 Again, however, several counter-
arguments can be put. 
Firstly, this contention that institutional shareholders are inevitably short-term 
investors is not supported by the evidence available. A study conducted by 
McConnell and Servaes found that the percentage of institutional ownership is 
positively related to a firm’s Tobin’s Q (ratio of market value to book value of a firm). 
It suggests that institutions are predominantly owners of firms with high-growth, low 
dividend where the investment payoff is far in the future.27  Brav et al. also found that 
activist hedge funds28 continue to hold for relatively long periods of time after an 
undervalued targeted company’s share were restored, indicating that their activism is 
long-term in nature.29 
Secondly, Black suggests, surely plausibly, that short-term institutions are the least 
likely to engage in monitoring, because the return from improvement is often long-
term.30 So, for example, one of the goals of much of the activism is to increase the 
independence of the board. Although it is likely to appoint more independent directors 
in a relatively short time, the increased value from such activism takes time to be 
realized.  
                                                 
26 S M Bainbridge, 'Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment' (2006) 119 Harvard Law 
Review 1735, 1754-55; R Romano, 'Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered' (1993) 93 Columbia Law Review 93 . 
27 J J McConnell and H Servaes, 'Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value' 
(1990) 27 Journal of Financial Economics 595. 
28  Hedge funds will be introduced in Chapter 3.2.4.  
29  A Brav and others, 'Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance ' (2008) 63 
Journal of Finance 1729, 1766. 
30 B Black, 'Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice' (1992) 39 UCLA 
Law Review 811, 863. 
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Thirdly, as Macey puts it, rational institutional shareholders will support any long-
term value-enhancing decisions by companies even if those decisions will take many 
years for companies to receive payoff because ‘the expected future cash flows’ will 
have an immediate impact on company’s share price.31  The expected future cash 
flows will be discounted to present value by the market and reflected in a company’s 
current share prices. 
1.1.2.1.4 Special Interests 
Opponents of shareholder activism question whether some investors will act in the 
best interests of the corporation, or will instead advance their particular self-
interests.32 Some shareholders, it might be argued, have their special interests, such as 
social, environmental, or others at play and might consequently favor changes that 
serve their own agenda but not the long-term corporate value. 33  This concern, 
however, does not undermine the strong case for shareholder activism.  
Considering this argument we should repeatedly bear in mind that all resolutions shall 
be approved with a minimum 50% of votes cast at shareholders’ meetings. Most 
shareholders will embrace issues that enhance the overall value of the corporation, or 
those which a broad range of shareholders otherwise find important. 34  Changes 
proposed by investors who seek to advance their own self-interests are not likely to 
gain the support of other non-special shareholders.35  
                                                 
31  J Macey, Corporate Governance:Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J. 2008) 266. A point is important to be noted here. This thesis is not suggesting that share 
market perfectly/fully values future improvements, only that it sometimes does so.  
32 M Lipton and S Rosenblum, 'Election Contests in the Company's Proxy, An Idea Whose Time Has 
Not Come' (2003) 59 Business Lawyer 67, 82-83. 
33 Bainbridge, 'Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment' (n 26) 1754; Bainbridge, The New 
Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (n 9) 202-09.  
34 S J Schwab and R S Thomas, 'Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor 
Unions ' (1998) 96 Michigan Law Review 1018, 1041-42. 
35 Schwab and Thomas, ibid, 1035-36 (noting that labor initiative cannot succeed without the support 
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The mutual checks and balances amongst shareholders could work more strongly in 
the institutional shareholder community since it is relatively small and closed. Short 
and Keasey, for example, found that institutional investors in the UK form a highly 
concentrated network, often operating in the ‘confines of the (London) Square Mile 
with a well-developed history of relationships and communication’.36  Institutional 
investors may therefore know a lot about one other. Black compared shareholder 
voting to a repeated game without a final period and those players who cheat will 
invite retaliation, which creates incentives not to cheat.37 Another likely reason for a 
stronger mutual monitoring amongst institutional investors lies in the professional 
ability they own. They are enabled to make efficient and quick judgments on others’ 
proposal whether it is in the best interests of the corporation.  
Indeed, a similar point has been raised by Bainbridge himself, but in relation to 
directors, when he argues that board members will monitor each other.38 He contends 
that mutual monitoring among board members, ‘enforced through peer pressure and 
reputational sanctions’, will provide important constraints on behavior, making it 
much harder for a director to pursue self-dealing when she is part of a group.39 Whilst 
resisting some of the other arguments Bainbridge puts forward, this point seems 
correct. And, crucially, it can be applied to the group of institutional shareholders. For 
the reasons above, institutional investors may impose some discipline on each other. 
It must, to be sure, be conceded that if many shareholders do not vote their shares at 
the meeting, the self-interested shareholders might win their proposals. However, this 
                                                                                                                                            
of other shareholders); also L A Bebchuk, 'The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power' (2005) 118 
Harvard Law Review 833, 883. 
36  H Short and K Keasey, ‘Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance’ in K Keasey and M 
Wright, Corporate Governance: Responsibilities, Risks and Remuneration (Wiley, Chichester; New 
York 1997) 23, 34. 
37 Black (n 30) 861. 
38 Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (n 9) 100-04. 
39 Ibid. 
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issue is better addressed not through discouraging all activism, but instead through 
encouraging more voting to ensure that the collective interests of shareholders prevail. 
Moreover, even accepting that some funds do sometimes have different special 
interest concerns, often their interests will not conflict with those of other 
shareholders. In the UK and China, as we will see later, institutional investors have 
often been focused on questions of procedure and/corporate governance, such as pay 
for performance, independent directors, board structure and compliance of corporate 
governance codes. In the US, Bebchuk and Mcdonnel found that the types of proposal 
that were most common and received the highest percentage of votes were those 
calling for de-staggering the board, pay for performance and independent board 
chairs. 40  Thus, broad corporate concerns, as opposed to personal interests, are 
prominent in institutional shareholders’ agendas for engagement. It seems hard to see 
that these issues would lean heavily to special shareholder interest.  
Finally, although, as we shall concede, shareholders do suffer weaknesses as 
controller of executives, nevertheless it is crucial to note that they do enjoy one 
overwhelming advantage in their favor: they have the strongest incentives to exercise 
effective control. If anyone has an interest to make decisions that would always be at 
the best interests of shareholders, the shareholders, by definition, do.  
1.1.2.2 Other Corporate Governance Devices  Provide Sufficient 
Accountability 
Some opponents of shareholder activism believe that institutional shareholder 
monitoring is not necessary because there are sufficient alternative, and effective, 
                                                 
40 L A Bebchuk, The Case For Increasing Shareholder Power, (n 35) 884; McDonnell, (n 16) 178. 
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mechanisms to ensure the board’s faithfulness. 41  These alternative mechanisms 
include: 1 market forces such as the market for corporate control; 2 executive 
remuneration; 3 monitoring by non-executive directors; and 4 independent audit of 
the preparation of financial statements. 
These mechanisms all pose some constraints on the agency problem. However, as I 
shall argue below, they all have their own weaknesses and thereby individually, and 
collectively, they fail to build a perfect monitoring framework on the board. As such, 
there is much need for shareholder monitoring. Black has eloquently explained this 
point: 
          ‘The case for institutional oversight, broadly speaking, is that (other mechanisms, 
such as) …….corporate control market constraints on managerial discretion are 
imperfect, corporate managers need to be watched by someone, and the institutions 
are the only watchers available.’42 
The general point I wish to make here is that shareholder activism can and should be 
viewed as one strand in the web of mechanisms to constrain agency conflicts, rather 
than arguing that shareholder activism is alone sufficient, or even necessarily superior, 
to the others. It fits into a broad range of monitoring devices as mentioned above and, 
complements and strengthens those mechanisms to reduce the divergence between the 
interests of managers and shareholders. As we will see in later chapters, monitoring 
by institutional investors is already a significant element to facilitate other devices, 
such as remuneration and board structure, and a growing but less significant part of 
the Chinese scene. 
                                                 
41 Bainbridge, 'Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment' (n 26) 1741. 
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1.1.2.2.1 A Summary of Alternative Monitoring Mechanisms 
In order to understand the necessity of shareholder activism, it is important to 
consider both the advantages and limits of these mechanisms, and also how 
shareholder activism can, in fact, itself actually strengthen each of them.43 It is worth 
emphasizing that the discussion here is relatively brief; my intention is to summarise 
the limits of these alternative mechanisms and to point the reader to further relevant 
literature, rather than providing an exhaustive analysis of their precise effectiveness.    
1. The Market for  Corporate Control 
Many economists and scholars accord an essential role to the market for corporate 
control in enhancing managerial accountability.44 The theory believes that the threat 
of takeover can provide management with an incentive to perform diligent on the 
behalf of shareholders. The incumbent management who do not actively seek to 
maximize shareholder-return will fail in the market and be replaced by others through 
a hostile takeover.45  
While the market for corporate control can be seen as a disciplinary instrument to 
reduce agency costs, it is, nonetheless, imperfect and has become increasingly weak 
in recent years.46 Takeovers occur only for companies that perform quite badly – a 
situation that leaves a lot of room for ‘slacking off in board performance’.47 Coffee 
                                                 
43 For an extensive study on corporate governance, see, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘A Survey of 
Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 737. 
44 H G Manne, 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control' (1965) 73 Journal of Political Economy 
110, 112; see also F H Easterbook and D R Fischel, ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer’ (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 1161, 1169. 
45 E F Fama, 'Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm' (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288. 
46 S Sudarsanam, Creating Value Through Merger and Acquisitions: The Challenges, an Integrated and 
International Perspective (FT Prentice Hall, Harlow 2003); J Barnard, ‘Narcissism, Over-Optimism, 
Fear, Anger, and Depression: The Interior Lives of Corporate Leaders’ (2008) 77 University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 405. 
47 L A Bebchuk, 'The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise ' (2007) 93 Virginia Law Review 675, 714. 
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observes that ‘the hostile bidder, as an external monitor, is unlikely to be the first to 
detect or respond to managerial inefficiency.’48 Moreover, it is a very expensive way 
of changing management, either mounting a takeover or defending against it, and thus 
results in controversy about whether this mechanism is in fact beneficial for the 
economy and shareholders.49 Furthermore, as evidenced in the recent financial crisis, 
the market is not always reliable, for it encouraged managers to make irrational risk-
taking decisions. 50  Also there is much empirical evidence that doubts how far 
corporate performance improves after takeovers.51  
Last but not least, in any case in a market like China, the hostile takeover has rarely 
been an effective mechanism for corporate governance because of the over-
concentration of share ownership in most listed companies.52  
2.  Remuneration  
Properly designed remuneration such as the use of profit related pay and equity-based 
compensation can help to align the management’s interests with those of 
                                                 
48 J Coffee, 'Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's 
Role in Corporate Governance' (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1202. 
49 See generally A Peacock and G Bannock, Corporate Takeovers and the Public Interest:report of an 
inquiry conducted for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation by the David Hume Institute (Aberdeen 
University Press, Aberdeen 1991); L Stout, ‘Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth- 
The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem’ (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 845; J Gordon, ‘The Rise of 
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices’ 
(2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1465, 1522. 
50 R Tomasic, ‘Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk Taking in Northern Rock: Part 2’ (2008) 29 
Company Lawyer 330. 
51 A Singh, Singh, Alaka and B Weisse, 'Corporate Governance, Competition, the New International 
Financial Architecture and Large Corporations in Emerging Markets' (2002) Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 250 <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP250.pdf> 
accessed 25 March 2010, 29; J Franks and C Mayer, 'Hostile Takeovers in the UK and the Correction 
of Managerial Failure' (1996) 40 Journal of Financial Economics 163; W Schwert, 'Hostility in 
Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?' (2000) 55 Journal of Finance 2599 (The same conclusion was 
made in respect of the USA). 
52 H Huang, 'China's Takeover Law: A Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform' (2005) 30 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 145, 153; J Chiou and Y Lin, ‘The Structure of Corporate 
Ownership: A Comparison of China and Taiwan’s Security Markets’ (2005) 6 Journal of American 
Academy of Business 123; Lay-hong Tan and J Wang, ‘Modelling An Effective Corporate Governance 
System for China’s Listed State-owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in A Transitional Economy’ 
7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2007) 143, 153. 
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shareholders.53 However, concerns about excesses in executive remuneration and the 
‘insufficient sensitivity of management’ compensation to performance’ have cast 
doubt on the effectiveness of remuneration to discipline management.54   
First, Bebchuk and Fried observed that most highly compensated managers have 
essentially been able to set their own pay through their domination of the board.55 
Coffee also found that incentive schemes may stimulate some executives to hide the 
company’s loss or reduction of profits for the purpose of avoiding the drop of their 
income.56 Moreover, a number of studies have shown that there is only a very weak or 
sometimes no link between compensation and firm performance or shareholder 
wealth.57 
3. Board Structure (non-executive/supervisory board/independent directors) 
Another way in which agency costs can be reduced is by increasing the role and 
importance of monitoring independent directors on the board. The thrust of the 
argument is that those independent directors can monitor and control effectively the 
activities of the executives on the board, on behalf of shareholders. However, there 
has been considerable debate over the effectiveness of those independent directors. 
                                                 
53 J Donald H. Chew and S L Gillan (eds), Corporate Governance at the Arossroads: A Book of 
Readings (McGraw-Hill, Boston 2005) 189. 
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Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press London 2006. 
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Executive Stock Options’ (2007) 105 Michigan Law Review 1597, Schipani and Narayanan found that 
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First, whether non-executive directors are truly independent from corporate 
management is often a matter of controversy. Jensen argued that ‘outside directors 
with little or no equity stake in the company could effectively monitor and discipline 
the managers who selected them has proven hollow at best.’58 Doubts also centre on 
whether independent directors have sufficient professional ability to monitor 
managerial behaviours.59 Moreover, there is some empirical evidence showing that 
the link between board composition and firm performance is not significant or even 
negative. 60  Similar conclusions have been drawn in respect of China, where the 
system of independent directors is considered as being of more symbolic than 
practical value. Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence both suggest that the 
independence of these directors is often limited.61 
4. Audit 
As it names indicates, the role of the audit is to check and examine the information 
relevant to corporate management and its operation. Again, there are also problems 
with auditors as monitors of management performance. Concerns have been raised 
                                                 
58 M C Jensen, 'Eclipse of the Public Corporation ' (1989) October Harvard Business Review 61, 64; 
Also see C Elson, ‘The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform’ (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law 
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Problems between Managers and Shareholders' (1996) 31 Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
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of Corporate Law 125; JinXin Securities Research Institute, 'Xianzhuang Diaocha: Duli Dongshi 
Zenmeyang Le? [A survey of the current independent director system]' Zhengquan Shibao [Securities 
Times] (August 2003); J Shan and S Zhang, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Independent Directorship and 
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China (Law Press, Beijing 2005) 48-72; Tan and Wang (n 52) 157-9. 
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that auditors sometimes ‘work for’ management rather than ‘work with’ management 
to play their monitoring roles.62  In China, studies have doubted whether auditing 
system could truly contribute to enhanced managerial accountability in practice.63 
1.1.2.2.2 The Role of Shareholder Activism in the Web of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
The above discussion suggests that other corporate governance mechanisms are all 
deeply imperfect and thus do not obviate the need for shareholder monitoring. 
Shareholder activism will strengthen and maximize the effects of these mechanisms 
and together work in conjunction with them to maintain managerial accountability.64  
When the market for corporate control fails to be the first to detect managerial 
problems, shareholders activism can work as ‘an earlier tripwire’ to respond to 
managerial inefficiency and help management to improve corporate performance 
before an expensive takeover comes. It monitors the design of remuneration contracts 
that managers currently make for themselves, assuring linkage to performance over 
prolonged periods of time. 65  For example, in the UK, recent studies suggest that 
investors are willing either to withhold their votes or to vote against the board’s 
remuneration plans.66 Institutional shareholder engagement is proven to be effective 
                                                 
62 D J Hatherlya, 'The Future of Auditing: the Debate in the UK' (1999) European Accounting Review 
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in mitigating ‘rewards for failure’ at companies with controversial CEO compensation 
practices through enhancing the link between pay and performance.67 
Whether the system of board structure could function effectively depends clearly on 
the independence of these monitoring directors. The corporate governance system 
needs active shareholders to ensure that the board remains strong and independent – 
as in the following example, through replacing the Chairman if needs be. 68  The 
aborted bid for AIA Insurance by Prudential Insurance, for example, has prompted 
some of its own institutional shareholders to call for a new, strong independent 
chairman.69  It is a good example of how the monitoring board probably works best 
when it works in conjunction with shareholder activism. 
To facilitate the system of audit to function more effectively, institutional shareholder 
activism can monitor the independence of auditors, reducing at least a little the risk of 
auditors being affected by strong executives. Meanwhile, the audit system will 
provide necessary information for shareholders to evaluate the work of managers. 
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To recapitulate, the disciplinary framework contains a number of mechanisms and 
they all provide some constraints on agency problems. However, a brief examination 
of some major control devices has revealed that there are flaws to constrain their 
effectiveness. The above also suggests that they will probably function best when they 
work in conjunction with shareholder activism. As such, there is still much room for 
institutional shareholder activism and it remains an essential link in the web of 
mechanisms for managerial accountability.  
1.1.3 Is there Empirical Evidence to Support the Collective 
Benefit of Shareholder Activism? 
Thus far I have argued, theoretically, that shareholder activism can play an effective 
role in corporate governance, producing value-enhancing improvement in corporate 
behaviour (recall that I am still concerned with the benefits of collective action: I am 
not yet asking whether, for an individual shareholder, activism can be ‘rational’). It is 
a fair question to ask: is there any empirical evidence to prove shareholder activism 
certainly yields positive share returns. Unfortunately, current evidence is inconclusive, 
providing conflicting results. Some empirical studies suggest activism has indeed 
produced value creation on the corporation, 70  while some studies suggest that 
shareholder activism has little or no link to share value and earnings.71 
However, a careful examination of these results tends to cast doubts on the relevance 
of their findings. First, some studies used ‘share prices’ as a ‘surrogate’ for improved 
                                                 
70 See, for example, S Wahala, 'Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance' (1996) 31 Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1; and J M Nelson, 'The "CalPERS effect" Revisited Again' (2006) 
12 Journal of Corporate Finance 187. 
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performance but the share market might not accurately reflect economic changes after 
shareholder activism. Measuring the impact of shareholder activism alone is always 
difficult – there may be too much ‘background noise’ to measure the outcome of 
activism alone.72 Shareholder activism may only account for a bit of the picture of a 
corporation as lots of other things also are happening at the same time which could 
potentially overwhelm the impact of shareholder activism on corporate value. 
Suppose, in an attempt to elect an independent director in the board, nine institutional 
shareholders of British Airways (BA) formed a coalition and successfully won the 
support of a majority of votes. However, soon after the election, the cabin crew of BA 
started strikes in a dispute over pay and staff levels, and the share price of BA fell 
sharply. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to ascertain what, if anything, the 
activism of electing an independent director contributed to that change in share price.  
Second, some studies measure the effect of shareholder activism through the stock 
market returns around the announcement of such activism or voting outcomes on the 
proposals. But these are short-term reactions. It may be the case that improvements 
resulting from shareholder activism are long-term. Here, take the example of 
independent director again. While we can observe there are more independent 
directors, the benefits from enhanced monitoring often take a long time to be realized. 
As noted earlier, the market does sometimes value future benefits, however, it cannot 
perfectly capture improvements achieved by shareholder activism.73   
Thirdly, most of those studies are concerned with the link between market 
performance and shareholders proposals, while this type of activism, as one will see 
later, is not often used by institutional investors in both the UK and China.74 In an 
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attempt to avoid public confrontation, much institutional shareholder activism in these 
two countries is conducted through private meetings ‘behind the scenes’. This causes 
difficulty for outsiders to investigate such virtually invisible activity and thus, not be 
included in most studies.75 Therefore, the effect of shareholder activism might not be 
accurate if the full set of shareholder activism is not observed.76  
Lastly, some of the studies that found no link between activism and corporate 
performance come from the US.77 But these could merely reflect the legal obstacles to 
activism in the US. As the governance mechanisms in the US are distinct from, and in 
many ways more restricted than, those in the UK and China, the studies on the impact 
of shareholder activism would also be different. For instance, the US often adopts the 
plurality voting system, which allows directors to be elected by the highest number of 
supporting votes, not necessarily the majority of votes.78 Moreover, many votes on 
the management of a company at shareholders’ meetings are indicative instead of 
binding. Thus, scholars point out that such system hampers the ability of shareholder 
activism to have a positive influence on corporate value creation.79 Under UK and 
Chinese corporate laws, as one will see later, shareholders are granted a considerably 
larger scope to exercise their rights over corporations. Therefore, as several US 
scholars have noted, the governance conditions in the UK provide a more favorable 
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environment for activism, increasing the likelihood that such activism will yield 
positive corporate returns.80 
Taken together, existing studies present unclear results because of the difficulties 
above to measure accurately the impact of shareholder activism on corporate value. In 
spite of that, there is nevertheless some positive evidence to support my position that 
shareholder activism is value-enhancing.  
A recent study, for example, conducted by Becht et al. on a UK-based fund – Hermes 
– found a high correlation between enhanced corporate value and shareholder 
activism on the part of institutional investors. In 1998, Hermes launched the UK 
Focus Fund with a mandate to invest in under-performing companies, but with the 
declared aim of working in co-operation with management through exercising 
shareholders’ rights to increase share returns.81 Becht et al.’s study, based on data that 
is not in the public domain, including fund’s letters, presentations, transcripts and 
recording of telephone conversations, and client reports, found a high correlation 
between increased share return and shareholder engagement by Hermes.82 Hermes’ 
intervention has generated annual raw returns net of fees of 8.2% or 4.9% if measured 
by the abnormal returns against the FTSE All-Share Index over the period 1998-
2004. 83  Impressively, 90% of such returns are attributable to its engagement 
activism.84 
In the Chinese context, studies that explore the link between shareholder activism and 
corporate governance are sparse. However, the evidence available also shows a 
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positive relation between institutional ownership and various measures of corporate 
performance. Yang and Wang investigated 901 companies listed in Chinese stock 
exchanges over the period of 2000 to 2005 and concluded that overall, institutional 
shareholders play a positive role in improving firm performance.85  
Taking them as a whole, the empirical evidence is regrettably inconclusive, but there 
is certainly some evidence supporting the argument that shareholder participation 
would enhance managerial accountability, curb misuse of authority and decrease the 
amount of misconduct. This increased accountability, then, should result in a 
reduction of agency costs and translate into increased share value.  
1.2 Understanding Individual Shareholder Activism 
Suppose, then, that some action by shareholders will indeed be beneficial to the 
interests of shareholders collectively. Does it follow that it is in the interests of each 
individual shareholder to be active too? If it did so follow, then we would expect 
shareholder action to be widely practiced. However, whether individual action is 
likely to happen depends upon the motivations that drive individual investor action. 
Perhaps the dominant explanation for individual action in recent years has been an 
economic one, and it is with that I shall begin. 
On this approach, an individual investor (including institutional shareholder) will take 
part in some shareholder action where it is in its own interests to do so. And since 
institutional shareholders are assumed to be essentially financial institutions, this boils 
down to whether it is in the shareholder’s financial interests to undertake some 
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instance of activism. The individual shareholder will calculate the costs and the likely 
benefits of its acting, and will either act, or not, according to that calculation. 
Now, it might seem from the foregoing that this calculation should proceed as follows.  
A shareholder will calculate the total benefits to the company as a whole secured by 
some collective action. It will then work out what proportion of that total benefit the 
individual shareholder will secure, where that proportion is the same as the proportion 
of the company’s shares the shareholder holds (so an institution holding, say, 5% of 
the company’s shares will thereby keep 5% of the total corporate benefit earned by 
some collective action). Finally, the shareholder will then calculate its individual costs 
of participating in the collective action. And only if its share of the total collective 
benefits outweighs its own individual costs of action will the institution bother to act.   
However, the position is yet more complex than this, for it raises the ‘problem’ of 
collective action (sometimes also called the ‘free-rider’ problem), to which I turn next.   
1.2.1 The Logic of Collective Action 
The so-called collective action problem was famously identified by Olson in his 
classic The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.86 The 
problem that Olson identifies is not just that the individual shareholder will capture 
only a small fraction (equivalent to the proportion of the company’s total share capital 
the shareholder owns) of the total gains accruing to the company from the collective 
action, and that this small fraction may be less than the individual shareholder’s costs 
of action. Worse than this is the fact that the individual shareholder’s own 
contribution to the success of the collective action is unlikely to be decisive. 
                                                 
86  M Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard 
economic studies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass 1965) 14. 
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Accordingly, each shareholder will reason as follows. Either enough other 
shareholders will participate in the collective action to ensure it is successful, so that 
my contribution is unnecessary. Or so few others will participate that, even if I join in 
the action, it will still fail. Moreover, any positive return from monitoring/activism 
will go to all shareholders regardless of whether or not they have participated, or 
contributed to the monitoring/activism. My own participation, then, will either be 
unnecessary (the action will succeed anyway, and I’ll still be able to free-ride on 
others’ efforts and share the gains they have generated) or it will be ineffective. Either 
way, logically, I should not join in. Another way of expressing this seems to be that 
whatever the benefits of the collective action may be, the benefits of my own 
participation will be nothing. On this view, it does not really matter what the costs of 
the shareholder’s actions may be: given a zero benefit from my action, then any costs, 
however small, make my own action irrational, economically speaking.  
How can we respond to this analysis? How can we explain any individual institutional 
activism in the face of this apparent barrier of the logic of collective action/free-riding? 
I wish to argue that this logic can indeed (sometimes) be overcome for individual 
shareholders, but that it entails a more complex analysis of shareholder activism.  And, 
in particular, it in turn requires a two-step analysis. First, we must show that, for an 
individual investor, its own activism will indeed make a difference to the outcome of 
a collective action. Thus, it will perceive that ‘free riding’ is not an option; were it to 
sit back and do nothing, then it would either mean that some collective action would 
fail (meaning that no one would benefit), or that the inactive shareholder would be 
denied some individual benefits – that some individual benefits would be secured only 
if it individually took action. That first step, then, suggests that individual action will 
be necessary for an individual shareholder to gain some benefits.  The second step 
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proceeds to ask whether, for the shareholder in question, its individual benefits would 
still be greater than its individual costs. In the following section, I shall deal with the 
‘first step’: when is free-riding not an option, so that a shareholder would think it must 
act in order to gain some individual benefits? I shall suggest four factors that can 
make free-riding an individually irrational policy for some shareholders.  
1.2.2. Step 1: Overcoming Free-riding 
1.2.2.1 The Decisiveness of Large Individual Institutional Holdings 
First, voting in a company differs fundamentally from a political election where no 
one voter is ever likely to make a difference to the outcome of the election. The size 
of some shareholders’ holding may be sufficiently large to ‘tip the balance’ between 
failure and success. Of course, a shareholder, even one with 3 or 4 or 5 etc. per cent of 
the company’s shares, cannot be sure that its own holding will be sufficient to change 
the outcome of, say, a contested vote, or a private meeting where a change in 
corporate policy is demanded. But the point is that the larger the shareholder’s 
holding, the greater the chance that its votes may be decisive (a likelihood that never 
really arises in a one person-one vote political election). And this is one reason (but 
not the only reason) why we would expect to find that the larger a shareholder’s 
holding of shares, the greater the likelihood that it will indeed be active. Mallin, for 
example, notes that there should be a positive correlation between the proportion of 
shares held in a company and the propensity to vote those shares. 87  Taking the 
Prudential as an example, of its total disclosable interests,88 only 5.6% are in the 
companies with the lowest level of voting, while the largest proportion of Prudential’s 
                                                 
87 C Mallin, ‘Investors’ Voting Rights’ in Keasey and Wright (n 36) 160. 
88 A substantial holding of 3% or 5% in a company is required to be disclosed in the company’s annual 
report, in the UK and China, respectively. See UK Financial Services Authority Handbook, Disclosure 
and Tranparency Rules 5.1.2.R., and Chinese Securities Law 2005 s 86. 
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disclosable interests (28%) are in companies with voting levels of 35-40%.89 That 
suggests that institutional investors will vote their shares in the companies in which 
they have sufficiently large shareholdings.  
1.2.2.2 The Possibility of Concerted Action 
Second, the Olson logic assumes that those who decide whether to act do so ‘in 
isolation’. A potential actor (shareholder) is assumed not to agree with others that she 
will act if they will also do so. In that respect, it is modeled as a ‘Prisoner’s 
Dilemma’.90 However, if shareholders can explicitly agree with others that each will 
join in an action if the others will do likewise then, together they may have enough 
votes to tip the balance. The practicality of such coalitions by agreement are, as we 
shall see later, significantly increased to the extent that share ownership is more 
concentrated, so that fewer shareholders need to agree to act together in order to 
constitute a decisive block of shares.91 And indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 5, there 
are many cases where institutional shareholders have formed coalitions to take actions.  
Generally, one or more of the large institutional investors will take the lead to 
organize other institutional shareholders to join the collective action. This was well 
illustrated in the ditching of Michael Green, who had been earmarked as the chairman 
of the new ITV plc., a merger of broadcast companies Carlton and Granada. Fidelity 
International took the lead and effectively mobilized other institutional investors and 
                                                 
89  Mallin, ‘Investors’ Voting Rights’ (n 87) 161. 
90 For a detailed discussion of Prisoner’s Dilemma, see R Hardin, Collective Action (Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore 1993) 23. 
91  R Crespi and L Renneboog, ‘Is (Institutional) Shareholder Activism New? Evidence from UK 
Shareholder Coaliations in the Pre-Cadbury Era’ 18 Corporate Governance: An International Review 
274. They found shareholder coalition has been an effective corporate governance mechanism for 
several decades in the UK, even before the first code initiated by the Cadbury committee. 
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signalled that 35% of Carlton's shareholders wanted Green out. Consequently, this 
coalition blocked Green's appointment by resolutely arguing against it.92 
Moreover, as one will see later, shareholder collective actions in the UK are often 
facilitated by industry representative associations, such as the Association of British 
Issuers.93  Those associations will organize their institutional members and use their 
combined weight to bring pressure on companies to follow corporate governance 
good practice. 
Under these cases, when the collective action is organized by one large institutional 
shareholder or by representative associations, other institutional investors, even where 
they do not join a formal coalition, are likely to act in the same way as those taking 
the lead. 
Both these first two factors – the decisiveness of individual holdings and the 
possibility of concerted action – depend, clearly, upon the pattern of share ownership 
amongst institutional holders. Are individual institutions acquiring sufficiently large 
holdings in some companies that, individually, they perceive they can make a 
difference?  Are small groups of institutions, collectively, holding enough shares in 
some companies that they are likely to think that by joining together they can make a 
difference? This thesis explores the pattern of share ownership amongst institutions in 
much greater detail in chapter 3. But we might note for now that over recent decades, 
institutional ownership of stock has indeed rapidly increased in many countries, 
including both the UK and China. In the UK, institutions have become the most 
important holders of company shares, collectively owning some 40% of UK equity.94 
                                                 
90 J Randall, 'Why Michael Green Had to Go' (2003) BBC News 
< http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3210372.stm> accessed 20 December 2008. 
93  For the discussion of trade associations see Chapter 3. 
94 More detailed discussion is in Chapter 3. 
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In China, the rise of institutional ownership has lead to nearly half of the total tradable 
shares controlled by institutional investors. 95  
One might argue that although institutional shareholding as a whole has increased in 
listed companies, still few institutions will have sufficient shares to counterbalance 
the power of the incumbent management. However, they will have if small groups of 
them collectively constitute a significant block. With regard specifically to the 
possibility of ‘concerted action’, or what Scott termed a ‘control through a 
constellation of interests’,96 Scott argued over two decades ago that the growth of 
institutional holdings had led to 20-30% of shares typically being concentrated into 
the hands of the top 20 or so shareholders.97 A more recent study conducted by Mallin 
found that 88% of the Top 250 companies in 1994 had disclosable interests, that is, 
had a shareholder owning 3% or more holdings. (Fifty percent of the companies had 
disclosable interests totaling 13.5% or less.) The mean disclosable interest was about 
18.5%. As data suggested, few or no individuals or group hold sufficient shares to 
exercise control, however, the largest shareholders have substantial shares and 
collectively, they represent an important group that the board cannot disregard. The 
thesis will return to this issue in more detail in Chapter 4. 
1.2.2.3 ‘In process’ Benefits 
The third factor that controls free-riding is that some benefits to individual 
institutional investors may come not from improvements to the company’s own 
performance, but rather from the process of engagement itself. Activism, for example, 
may be a marketing policy for the institutional shareholder that makes its own fund 
                                                 
95 In China, shares in a listed company can be divided into non-tradable and tradable shares. Only 
tradable shares can be circulated in the public. It will be discussed in Chapter 6.1.3. 
96 J Scott, Corporations, Classes and Capitalism (Hutchinson, London 1985), 49. 
97 Ibid, 81. 
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more attractive to its potential beneficiary/investors. This possibility is confirmed in 
Hendry et al.’ study, in which they found that institutional investors are sometimes 
motivated by the need to maintain their own competitive position to take action.98 As 
they suggested, clients of institutions expected them to exercise a certain level of 
responsibilities in respect of governance matters, and that fund managers had had to 
‘follow suit in order to pitch for, gain and retain their business.99 As such, some 
institutions might actively engage in activism just in order to promote their brand 
image and receive reputational benefits.  
Moreover, Macneil, and Macey, each observes that shareholder intervention in one 
investee company has the potential to provide some level of deterrence against 
potential managerial abuses in the other companies of his portfolio.100  The other 
companies, even if they are not the target of shareholder activism, will feel that they 
are under attack in much the same way as they would be if they were performing 
badly in corporate governance. This, in turn, creates strong incentives for institutional 
shareholders to engage in activism as a way of improving the overall portfolio value.  
Finally, ‘in-process’ benefit is perhaps more important, and evident for those funds 
whose business strategy is precisely to profit by engaging with underperforming 
investee companies. They rely heavily on an engagement investment strategy to 
attract clients. One of the leading examples in the UK is that of ‘Hermes’, which we 
shall address in Chapter 3.   
                                                 
98 J Hendry and others, 'Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and the New Shareholder Activism' 
(2004) ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 297 . 
99  Ibid. 
100 I Macneil, 'Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies' (2010) 
Capital Markets Law Journal 1,10; Also Macey (n 31) 250. 
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1.2.2.4 A Normative Obligation to Act? 
Fourthly, we might now move beyond the previous strictly ‘economic’ analysis to 
suggest that there may be demands for action that compel shareholders to entertain 
action without strictly calculating on whether they need to do so to make it succeed. 
And here one can differentiate demands that emanate from legal requirements to act, 
through to codes of practice that seek to encourage action, and even beyond to a more 
general ‘cultural’ expectation that institutions ‘do their bit’ towards a collective 
endeavour. The extent to which they force institutional shareholders to take action 
will vary as between different types of activism and will be covered in detail 
below.101 However, it might still be helpful to give a brief account here. For example, 
legally, UK Companies Act 2006 grants reserve power to the Government to make 
rules requiring certain types of institutional shareholders to disclose how they have 
voted shares which they own or in which they have an indirect interest.102 A desire to 
avoid intervention by compulsion prompted major institutional investors to increase 
the level of engagement with their investee companies. 103  Moreover, regulatory 
guidelines generated a normative obligation on institutional shareholders to vote their 
shares and accordingly, the voting levels of UK listed companies have been steadily 
increasing over the last decade.104 Driven by these normative demands, as one can see 
later, in many cases, shareholders’ propensity for active engagement does not rely 
solely on a precise calculation of whether or not they need to act to ensure success. 
Nevertheless, even where some shareholders do perceive there to be a positive 
obligation to join in a collective action, it seems unlikely that, for these financial 
                                                 
101 See Chapter 4. 
102 CA 2006 ss 1277-1280. 
103 Cheffins (n 4) 386. 
104 Goergen, Renneboog and Zhang (n 75) 56. Regulatory rules regarding voting and voting levels will 
be discussed in Chapter 5.3. 
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institutions, they would act on this obligation entirely regardless of the balance 
between the benefits and the costs of action. One might suggest, for example, that 
some shareholders will feel that it is wrong to free-ride on the efforts of others, and 
that they should contribute towards a collective action (regardless of whether they 
need to do so in order to enjoy its benefits), but nevertheless feel this obligation exists 
only in so far as the institution’s own benefits will still outweigh its own costs.  
This, then, leads us onto the ‘second step’ in my model. But to summarize, so far, we 
have seen how the ‘free-rider’ problem can be overcome amongst institutional 
shareholders, for at least four reasons – the decisiveness of (sizeable) institutional 
holdings, the possibility of concerted action, the existence of ‘in process’ benefits and 
a normative obligation to join in collective actions.   
1.2.3 Step 2: Balancing Benefits and Costs 
Even if the above analysis for step one is accepted, this only takes us to the second 
step in the model. Whilst the above shows that sometimes individual action may be 
necessary (and appropriate) to secure individual benefits for any given shareholder, it 
is likely that each shareholder will still only think this action worthwhile if its own 
individual benefits outweigh its own individual costs. This thesis has suggested that 
calculating the benefits of action requires us to look more widely to see the full range 
of benefits that a shareholder may secure. And this thesis has suggested that some 
institutional shareholders may accept they must play their part in collective actions 
(even where they might not strictly have to do so in order to ensure the success of 
some action, or to secure their share of the benefits). But nonetheless nothing argued 
above suggests that shareholders will still act even where their anticipated benefits are 
less than their anticipated costs.   
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Thus, my model for understanding individual institutional activism sees the first step 
as an absolute ‘hurdle’ – the collective action/free rider problem – that must be 
overcome. If it is not overcome, then no action is likely to take place. If it is overcome, 
then the second step involves a calculation: are the institution’s individual benefits 
likely to exceed its individual costs?   
This thesis shall address these costs and benefits in greater detail in subsequent 
chapters. However, we can say here a little more about the categories of benefits and 
costs that institutions will consider as they work out whether activism is likely to pay.   
Starting with benefits, this thesis suggests that these might be divided into two types.  
First, each institution will capture a proportion of the collective gains that are earned 
by any instance of collective activism. The size of this benefit thus depends upon the 
size of the collective gain, and the proportion of the company’s total share capital that 
the institution holds. Put simply, an institution holding 1% of a company’s shares, and 
which predicts that some bout of activism will increase the company’s value by £1 
million, expects to secure £10,000 of benefits. Second, as suggested above, some 
institutions will also secure ‘in process’ benefits merely from being active.  Clearly, it 
is much more difficult to put a precise figure on the likely magnitude of these gains 
but, as far as the model I am putting forward is concerned, we must assume that 
institutions try to quantify these, however difficult it might be to do so accurately.   
What, now, about the costs of activism. Again, this thesis would divide these into two 
types.  First, there are what we might call the ‘direct costs’ of action, such as expenses 
of monitoring companies in order to identify when action might be necessary, the cost 
of  voting or arranging meetings with corporate managers, and so on. Secondly, there 
are ‘indirect costs’ – consequential losses that an institution might suffer if it chooses 
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to engage in a form of activism. Clearly, there are very many such ‘knock on’ losses 
that might be suffered, but I shall focus on three which particularly feature in the 
literature.  These are losses suffered as a result of institutional conflicts of interests, 
potential liability for insider dealing and potential losses that arise as a result of not 
being able to trade ones shares.  
This final cost deserves a few extra words here. Logically, when explaining 
institutional activism we must, as Rock notes,105 show not only that benefits exceed 
costs, but also that the magnitude of this overall gain is greater (or the loss smaller) 
than alternative courses of action. The main alternative is what Hirshmann calls ‘exit’ 
(in contrast with the exercise of ‘voice’), i.e. simply to sell ones shares and leave the 
company.106 But as we shall see later, growing institutional ownership will make it 
increasingly costly for institutional shareholders to solve problems through selling 
their positions, and accordingly, can make engagement less costly. The costs come 
from their size which makes it hard to offload blocks of unwanted stocks without 
depressing the market value, and from ‘fiduciary behavior that has encouraged them 
to use indexing as an investment strategy.’ 107  Hence, when large institutional 
                                                 
105 E Rock, 'The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism' (1991) 79 
Georgetown Law Journal 445, 455. 
106 A Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1970). 
107  J P Hawley and A T Williams, 'The Emergence of Fiduciary Capitalism' (1997) 5 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 206, 209. The difficulty of ‘voting with feet’ is well explained 
by the following quotation.  At the SEC Routable, Richard H. Moore, The treasurer of the State of 
North Carolina and the trustee of the ninth largest public pension plan in the US, reaffirmed this 
observation when commenting on the famous Wall Street rule: ‘I'm often told by my friends who are 
directors of large companies, “Well, Mr. Treasurer, why don't you just vote with your feet?’ And I 
think this point has been made. We no longer can vote with our feet. And I want to give you just some 
very quick statistics… Twenty-five years ago, the State of North Carolina had a $433 million equity 
portfolio. We had two managers. They were both actively-managed accounts. The managers could vote 
with their feet… Today, we have a $35 billion domestic equity portfolio. But here's the interesting part 
of it. Only 22 percent of it is actively managed. And I think these are representative statistics of all 
public pension funds. So in 78 percent of the time, we cannot vote with our feet.’ U.S.Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 'Roundtable Discussion on Proposed Security Holder Director Nominations 
Rules' (2004)  <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations.htm> accessed 18 March 2010 
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shareholders’ ability to exit is limited, ‘they have to care. And to care is to 
monitor.’108  
In sum, this two stage model suggests that very many factors are relevant to 
understanding when and why shareholder activism is likely to take place. So, activism 
seems to depend upon the type of institutional shareholder, and the type of activism 
that is being contemplated. The degree of shareholder concentration is clearly relevant, 
as is the regulatory and governance framework that supports or undermines activism. 
The following chapters of the thesis explore these various factors in the context of the 
UK.    
1.3 Conclusion 
As the first stage of the thesis, this chapter has laid the foundations for the discussion 
of shareholder activism in subsequent chapters. It has done so by suggesting a model 
that seeks to explain the circumstances in which institutional shareholders are likely to 
engage in activism. Since the model is crucial to the subsequent chapters, it is worth 
summarizing its structure. It suggests a two stage process in understanding 
shareholder activism. The first stage concerns the collective benefits of collective 
action. Here, I argued that collective action can indeed produce collective benefits by 
reducing agency costs and thus can be beneficial to the overall value of the 
corporation. My argument involved, in part, noting the positive benefits of activism, 
and in part rejecting some of the counter arguments against activism. I also looked at 
the (inconclusive) empirical evidence.   
                                                 
108 Hawley and Williams, ibid. 
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The second stage of my model turned from collective to individual benefits. And this 
second stage in turn involved two distinctive steps. The first step is a hurdle that faces 
any collective action. Why bother taking part, if one can simply free-ride on the 
efforts of others? I suggested four factors that can, in some circumstances, undermine 
the likelihood of free-riding. They were: the decisiveness of large individual 
institutional holdings, the possibility of concerted action, ‘in process’ benefits and a 
normative obligation to act. 
The second step asks: assuming free-riding can be avoided, nevertheless is activism 
individually ‘profitable’ for any given shareholder? Will that shareholder’s gains be 
greater than its costs? I suggested that the ‘gains’ include the shareholder’s share of 
the total gains to the corporation from the activism in question, plus any individual ‘in 
process’ benefits it secures through its own activism (for example by attracting more 
funds because of its reputation for activism). I also offered a classification of ‘costs’ 
based on direct costs and indirect costs, the latter in turn split up into the costs of 
conflicts of interest, of insider dealing liability and of inability to trade.   
Having identified when and why shareholder activism is likely to take place, Chapters 
4 and 5 of the thesis develop this model of institutional activism further. Chapter 4 
enriches the model of activism by ‘feeding in’ the variables of different shareholder 
types. Chapter 5 completes this process by applying this enriched model to the 
different forms that activism can take. First, however, we need to say more about the 
landscape of institutional share ownership (Chapter 3) and, next (Chapter 2), explore 
the background to all forms of activism by looking at the UK’ framework of corporate 
governance. 
 
 
Part II Shareholder Activism in the UK 
Chapter 2 The Framework of UK Corporate Governance 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the UK’s corporate 
governance framework as a background for later discussion of UK institutional 
shareholder activism. It begins in 2.1 with a brief overview of UK companies, 
including the type of company in which institutional shareholders are invested, the 
class of shares that institutional shareholders hold and the role of the UK’s stock 
exchange. Section 2.2 deals with the regulatory framework for company law and 
corporate governance in the UK. It is multi-layered, consisting of private ordering, 
legislative rules and self-regulatory guidance. Section 2.3 turns to examine what we 
might call the internal corporate governance mechanisms in UK companies. Section 
2.4 concludes with a brief summary. 
2.1 Data on UK Companies 
2.1.1 Typology of Companies 
In the UK, as in other countries, there are different types of company incorporated 
under corporate law. Generally, the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) makes a 
distinction between public limited companies and private companies. The primary 
difference between those two types of company is that only a public company is 
eligible to make a general offer of its shares to the public at large.1 Public companies 
are therefore more suitable for running a business in which a large number of people 
are invited to become investors. Members’ liability to contribute to their assets is 
limited to the amount outstanding (if any) on their shares. Its name ends with PLC.2 A 
                                                 
1 CA 2006 s 155, s 755. 
2 CA 2006 s 58(1). 
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private company is suitable for inviting investment by small numbers of people and 
its name ends with ‘Ltd’.3 
Furthermore, a private company and a public company are subject to different 
minimum capital requirements. A private company is allowed to provide a trivial 
amount of contributed capital, such as £1, while a public company has a minimum 
share capital requirement of £ 50,000.4  
In fact, most public companies start their lives as private companies and then covert 
themselves to public companies when they can satisfy relevant requirements.5 Only a 
small fraction of companies incorporated in the UK are registered as public limited 
companies.6 By April 2010, data from Companies House show that of 2,634,917 
companies registered in the UK, only 10,541(0.4%) are incorporated as public limited 
companies.7 Nevertheless, from a corporate governance perspective, they are of 
primary importance. 
In the UK, pubic companies that have their shares quoted for trading have been 
admitted to the Official List maintained by the Stock Exchange and are known as 
‘listed companies.’8 A listed company has to meet various conditions to be traded on 
stock exchanges and is obliged to comply with the Listing Rules issued by the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), which will be introduced later in detail.9 Through 
subscription of shares in a listed company, an institutional investor becomes the 
shareholder of that company and can exercise owner rights attaching to the shares. For 
                                                 
3 Ibid. Assuming it is a limited private company, over 99% of private companies are limited. See, 
Companies House, Company Register Statistics for April 2010 
< http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/about/businessRegisterStat.shtml> accessed 5 June 2010. 
4 CA 2006 s 763.(Of which at least 1/4 must be paid up) 
5 B G Pettet, Company Law (2nd edn Longman law series., Longman, Harlow 2005) 13.  
6 P Davies, Gower&Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2008), 
13. 
7 Companies House, Company Register Statistics for April 2010 (n 3). 
8 Pettet (n 5) 14.  
9 See Chapter 2.2.1.3.1. 
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the purpose of the study, the company where institutional shareholders activism 
occurs only refers to the type of public listed companies. 
As of 30 April 2010, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) has 2,747 listed companies, 
with a combined market capitalization of £1.8 trillion.10 Of them, more than 1,000 
companies have an equity market value over £50 million.  
Although the number of listed companies only accounts for a small proportion of total 
companies registered in the UK, they are a crucial part of the UK economy. For the 
period 1999-2003 the ratio of the stock market capitalization11 to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is 157.7, being nearly three times the global average and the ratio of 
equity issued by newly listed companies to GDP is 5.47, being nearly four times the 
global average.12 By 2009, due to the financial crisis, the ratio of the stock market 
capitalization to GDP has dropped to 128 but undoubtedly, listed companies sector is 
still a vital part of the UK economy.13 
2.1.2 Classes of Shares 
Section 629(1) of the CA 2006 provides that for the purposes of the Companies Acts 
shares are of one class if the rights attached to them are in all respects uniform.14 A 
UK company may be permitted either in its articles of association or in its 
                                                 
10 World Federal Exchange, Statistics: Number of Listed Companies& Domestic Market Capitalization, 
available at <http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/ytd-monthly> accessed at 5 June 2010. Of all 
2,747 companies, 2144 are domestic UK companies, while the remaining 603 are foreign companies. 
11 Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of shares 
outstanding. 
12 B Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008) 1. 
13 The World Bank Data, Market Capitalization of Listed Companies (% of GDP), 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?display=default> accessed 23 May 
2010. 
14 CA 2006 s 629 (1).  
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memorandum to issue different classes of shares.15 Obvious examples of shares in 
different classes are ordinary shares, preference shares, convertible shares, non-voting 
shares and employee shares. Here, since voting is one of the major forms of activism 
being taken by institutional shareholders to monitor corporate governance, the thesis 
is only concerned with the class of ordinary shares which grant shareholders voting 
rights. In order to present a complete picture, other classes of share will therefore be 
mentioned only very briefly.  
Usually, in companies’ constitutions, ordinary shares are the default category of share. 
They entitle holders to participate in companies’ distributable profits after the fixed 
dividend has been paid to the preference shareholders (if any). In terms of voting, 
ordinary shareholders have the right to vote in the general shareholders’ meeting 
under the principle of one vote one share. In the UK, the vast majority of companies 
have only one class of ordinary share. 
Apart from ordinary shares, investors can invest in other classes of shares, such as 
preference shares and non-voting shares. Preference shares carry preferential rights, 
entitling holders to receive fixed preferential cumulative dividends and a return of 
capital on a winding-up in priority to the ordinary shareholders. Preference 
shareholders’ voting rights are usually restricted so they cannot vote in the general 
shareholder meeting, except in some circumstances, such as if their dividends are in 
arrears.16  Some companies have a class of share which gives holders rights to 
dividend and to share in surplus assets like ordinary shares but do not entitle holders 
to vote at shareholders’ meeting. In practice, these so-called non-voting shares are 
rarely used in the UK.17 Whilst not expressly prohibited in legislation, they are 
                                                 
15 See further L Sealy and S Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008) Chapter 9; A Dignam and J Lowry, Company Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2010) Chapter 9. 
16 Dignam and Lowry, ibid, 167.  
17 See, e.g., ‘Error Deprives Schroders of FTSE 100 Place’ (15 March 2007) Financial Times. 
(‘Unusually for a UK company, Schroders has voting and non-voting shares.’). Also see Cheffins (n 12) 
32. 
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strongly discouraged by the LSE.18 As one will see later, these non-voting shares are 
usually purchased by large overseas institutions, especially Sovereign Wealth 
Funds.19  
2.1.3 The London Stock Exchange 
In the UK, the LSE is the public share exchange for trading securities of companies 
and government bonds.20 The LSE is itself a registered listed company called London 
Stock Exchange PLC, and is accordingly itself subject to the related listing 
regulations. It is the world's fifth largest stock exchange by market capitalization and 
third largest by value of shares traded.21 
The primary roles that the LSE undertakes are to provide markets to let issuing 
companies sell their shares to the public (primary market) and to let buyers and sellers 
of existing shares deal with each other (secondary market). The LSE runs a number of 
markets for the listing and trading of equity, debt and other securities. Among these, 
the three most significant markets are: (1) the Main Market – for those large, 
high-performance companies; (2) the Alternative Investment Market – for smaller 
growing companies; and (3) the Professional Securities Market – specifically for 
listed debt and depository receipt securities.22 
In addition to its listing function, prior to May 2000 the LSE had an important 
regulatory role to play, for it was nominated as the ‘listing authority’ in the UK. 
Where a company’s shares were to be listed on the Stock Exchange, that company 
                                                 
18 D French, S W Mayson and C Ryan, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (25th edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2008) 158. 
19 See Chapter 3.2.5. 
20 Most information concerning LSE comes from the website: 
 <http://www.londonstockexchange.com/home/homepage.htm> accessed 12 August 2009. 
21  Data from <http://www.world-exchanges.org/files/statistics/excel/WFE09%20final.pdf> accessed 
24 April 2010. 
22 See (n 20). 
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had to meet the ‘Listing Rules’ developed by the LSE.23 The rules-commonly referred 
as the ‘Yellow Book’ – set out a number of conditions to be fulfilled by an applicant 
company. 24  The promulgation of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA 2000) ended the LSE as the listing authority and transferred its regulatory role 
to the FSA. The LSE’s Yellow Book became the Listing Rules issued by the FSA, 
although the content of the rules remained much the same.25 
Apart from the Listing Rules and other relevant rules issued by the FSA, to gain a 
listing in the LSE, companies have to meet with the LSE’s own admission and 
disclosure standard and are subject to ongoing obligations which apply to all listed 
companies.26 The principle index in LSE is the FTSE 100, a market capitalization 
weighted index representing the performance of the 100 largest companies in the UK 
or approximately 82% of UK equity market.27 The FTSE 250 is an index of medium 
size companies that constitute the largest 250 companies in the UK outside of the 
FTSE 100 index and representing about 14% UK equity market.28 The FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 are combined to form the FTSE 350.   
2.2. The Regulatory Framework in the UK: An Overview  
A theme of this thesis is that the legal environment within a country has a significant 
bearing on the level of institutional shareholder activism. A regulatory framework 
with many legal supports for shareholder activism will lead to more institutional 
shareholder involvement than will a system imposing legal constraints on shareholder 
                                                 
23 Dignam and Lowry (n 15) 68. 
24 J Dine and M Koutsias, Company Law (Macmillan law masters, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
2009) 92. 
25 Ibid.  
26 For example, Rules of the London Stock Exchange, available at  
< http://www.londonstockexchange.com/traders-and-brokers/rules-regulations/rules-regulations.htm > 
accessed 12 March 2010. 
27  Data from <http://www.londonstockexchange.com/home/homepage.htm> accessed 28 October 
2009. 
28 Ibid. 
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engagement. That is because, firstly, the influence that institutional investors have on 
corporate governance rests critically on the power that the background rules of 
legislation grant them, and secondly, an effective regulatory framework empowers 
and enfranchises institutional shareholders by enabling them more easily to engage in 
corporate governance.  
By contrast, if we pause here for a moment to consider the US, legal scholars such as 
Pound, Coffee, Black and Roe, have argued that legal barriers have increased the cost 
for shareholders seeking actively to influence management.29 Notably, Black pointed 
out that ‘shareholder passivity may be part of a function of legal rules.’ The evolution 
of early shareholder activism in the USA is illustrative to that point. American 
financial institutions were active participants in corporate governance as early as the 
1900s.30 However, over the next three or four decades, securities laws passed with the 
aim of limiting the power of financial intermediaries also limit their roles in corporate 
governance.31 Thereafter, shareholder activism was not often seen until the SEC 
introduced a rule in 1942 that first allowed shareholders to submit proposals for 
inclusion on corporate ballots.32  
Coming up to date, a comparative study of shareholder activism between the UK and 
the US conducted by Black and Coffee is helpful to explain the influence of legal 
rules. They compared the role of institutional shareholders in corporate governance in 
the US and UK. They argued that UK institutions were more active in participating in 
corporate governance than their US counterparts since the legal regime in the UK 
                                                 
29 J Pound, 'Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight' (1988) 20 Journal of 
Financial Economics 237; J Coffee, 'Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate 
Monitor' (1991) 91 Columbia Law Review 1277 ; B Black, 'Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of 
Institutional Investor Voice' (1992) 39 UCLA Law Review 811; and M Roe, Strong Managers, Weak 
Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press Princeton 
1996). 
30 S Gillan and L Starks, 'The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States ' (2007) 19 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 55, 57. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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makes it a better setting for shareholder engagement.33 A similar point was made by 
Macneil, who stressed the powers of shareholders in the UK conferred by the 
legislative framework.34 He found that UK shareholders are granted a wide range of 
decision-making powers to facilitate their intervention. By contrast, in the US, the 
ability of shareholders to overturn board decisions, and the area in which shareholders 
can be involved, are very limited.35 For example, in the US, it is usually not possible 
for shareholders to change the original charter without board approval.36 That is not 
the case in the UK.37 
In light of the importance of legal rules on shareholder activism, the section below 
sketches out the main elements the UK regulatory framework. A more detailed 
discussion of the specific rules that facilitate (or occasionally limit) activism will be 
given in Chapter 4 and below. The UK’s corporate governance framework is 
multi-layered, and consists of private ordering, legislative mandatory rules and 
self-regulatory guidance.  
2.2.1 Private Ordering 
It is often easy to forget that UK company law is, in many respects, a ‘permissive 
regime’38 in that it allows companies to determine for themselves many of their 
internal governance rules by which they will be bound. This is most obviously true of 
the ‘articles of association’, the contents of which the shareholders decide.39 It forms 
                                                 
33 B Black and J Coffee, 'Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior under Limited Regulation' 
(1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 1997. 
34 I Macneil, 'Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies' (2010) 
Capital Markets Law Journal 1, 4-5.  
35 L A Bebchuk, 'The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power' (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 833, 
843-850. 
36 Ibid, 844.  
37 See discussion in section 2.3.3.  
38 There is a rich literature discussing the role of private ordering regime in corporate law; B Cheffins, 
Company law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997), especially Part I and 
Part II, provide a good analysis.  
39 Dignam and Lowry (n 1516) 147. 
59 
 
the basis for much of the way the directors, the shareholders and the company interact. 
As one will see, the extent of such private ordering serves to distinguish the UK 
corporate framework from the Chinese counterpart, where the latter relies extensively 
on mandatory rules to specify the governance system of listed companies.40  In 
practice, model sets of articles, provided under the CA 2006 as the default set of rules 
are generally adopted with some slight amendments subjected to the conditions of 
individual companies.41 Changes in the articles of association can be made by a 
special resolution that requires a supermajority of 75% shareholders.42  
2.2.2 Legislation  
2.2.2.1 Companies Act 2006 
The next element in discussing the governance framework in the UK is the system of 
company law itself. It is now largely a statute-based law, further developed through 
common law and equitable principles established by the court. At its heart are the 
relevant provisions of the Companies Act 2006(CA 2006). The CA 2006 contains 
rules governing the creation, and financing of companies, shareholders’ rights, 
directors’ duties and other issues concerning the management of companies. The 
discussion below will briefly introduce recent development in the CA 2006 as some 
of its changes are particularly relevant in the context of shareholder activism.  
The CA 2006 was passed in November 2006 and fully came into force by October 
2009. It replaced, revised and sought to modernise previous corporate legislation. The 
aim of the Act, as stated by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, was to  
‘create an effective corporate statute to ensure shareholders are informed and involved, 
                                                 
40 See Chapter 6. 
41 Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229). 
42 CA 2006 s 21(1). 
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to promote a good understanding and effective shareholder engagement between 
company and investors and thus to enhance company long-term performance.’43  
The CA 2006 introduces a number of rules to ensure greater opportunity for 
shareholders to play a role in company business. Thus, it: 
1. Enhances the rights of proxies and makes it easier for a company to empower 
indirect investors in their shares. These will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4; 
2. Removes old company law requirements for the use of paper system and 
allows companies to use electronic communication with shareholders as the 
default position. The thesis will return to this point in Chapter 5;  
3. Codifies common law and equitable rules relating to directors’ duties and 
introduces statutory statements to clarify directors’ responsibilities and makes 
the law more accessible;44 
4. Introduces a statutory footing for derivative claims which helps shareholders 
to exercise the company’s rights where directors have breached their duties. 
This development will be covered in Chapter 5;  
5. Relaxes those rules which prevent auditors from limiting their liability, while 
introducing rules to improve the quality of the audit.  
Particularly with regard to institutional shareholders, the CA 2006 contains provisions 
giving the Secretary of State or the Treasury power to make regulations requiring 
institutional shareholders to disclose how they have voted their shares which they own 
or in which they have an indirect interest.45 
                                                 
43 There are some other objectives, such as, 1, ensure better regulation and think small first; 2 make it 
easier to set up and operate company; 3, provide flexibility for future. See Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry, Companies Law Reform Bill-White Paper 2005 (TSO, Norwich 2005). 
44 Before CA 2006, the general duty directors owe to company could only be found in case law. 
45 CA 2006 ss 1277-80. 
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It is worth noting that case law has a significant impact on the development of 
corporate governance, particularly in the area of directors’ duties. However, as 
mentioned above, some important common law and equitable principle are now 
codified into the CA 2006. These principles now, therefore serve as an interpreting 
role. For example, it is stated in the CA 2006 section 170 that ‘the general duties of 
directors have developed from certain common law rules and equitable principles and 
thus, they shall be interpreted in the same way as those rules and principles.’46 
2.2.2.2 Implementation of EU Directives 
As a result of the European Communities Treaty 1972, the UK is subject to the law of 
the European Union. Part of this law includes EU Directives, which member states 
have an obligation to implement into their domestic legislation. In the corporate 
legislation area, three Directives are particularly relevant to the subject of corporate 
governance. There are: the Takeover Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC), the 
Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC) and the Directive on the Exercise of 
Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies (Directive 2007/36/EC) 
(Shareholders’ Rights Directive).  
2.2.2.2.1 Takeover Directive 
The Takeover Directive aimed to remove barriers to takeovers in the EU. It set out 
requirements with regard to takeover activities of companies and stipulated rules for 
shareholder protection in the event of a takeover. The Directive was implemented in 
Part 28 of CA 2006. Perhaps the most significant change the implementation brought 
on to UK corporate law is that it introduced a statutory framework to the old regime. 
Before the implementation, the takeover regulation was overseen by the Takeover 
Panel on a non-statutory basis with the support by the Takeover Code or so-called 
City Code. Now, sections 942 and 943 of the CA 2006 authorise the Panel to be the 
body to make rules and act as supervisory body for takeover activities. However, as 
                                                 
46 CA 2006 s 170. 
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one will see in Chapter 4, some provisions in the current law which originated from 
the Takeover Directive, have the potential to create an impediment to shareholder 
engagement due to their uncertainty and ambiguity.  
2.2.2.2.2 Transparency Directive 
The second relevant Directive is the Transparency Directive, which dealt with 
information which companies are required to make available to the public. As is 
well-known, shareholders rely on public disclosure information provided by the 
company to play their roles as monitors of the company management. Adequate 
information disclosure is therefore significant for shareholder activism. The Directive 
set out rules on periodic financial reports and required issuers to disclose major 
shareholdings in companies.  
The CA 2006 served as the opportunity to implement the Directive in Part 43. It 
appointed the FSA as the competent authority to supervise transparency obligations 
and make rules with regard to shareholder notification. The rules are mainly 
implemented in the FSA Handbook Disclosure and Transparency Rules Regime 
(DTR).47 
2.2.2.2.3 Shareholders’ Rights Directive 
The Shareholders Rights Directive, implemented by the Companies (Shareholders’ 
Rights) Regulations 2009,48 intended to address the exercise of basic shareholders’ 
rights, as well as solving problems in the cross-border exercise of such rights, 
particularly voting rights.49 
It brings a number of changes to the UK regime, for example, it requires ‘traded 
companies’ to answer any question put by a member at general meetings unless one of 
                                                 
47 FSA handbook is available at < http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/handbook/> accessed 12 May 2009. 
48 Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/1632). 
49  Explanatory Memorandum to the Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009 (SI 
2009/1632). 
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the reasons for not giving an answer applies,50 it enables shareholder to cast votes 
attaching to different shares in different ways,51 and it reduces the threshold for 
calling a meeting to 5%.52 More detail on the resulting changes the Directive will be 
given in Chapter 5. 
2.2.2.3 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
Another key statute in the corporate regulatory framework is the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000). Its authority covers a wide range of institutions 
in the financial services industry, including banking, insurance, and listing companies. 
In particular, the law relating to public offers of shares and listing can be found in Part 
VI of the FSMA 2000. 
Part VI authorizes the FSA to act as the UK listing authority (UKLA) and sets out its 
general duties and responsibilities in that capacity, as well as outline framework 
governing the listing process and the mechanisms for its enforcement.53 The FSA was 
established in 1985 in the legal form of an independent non-governmental company 
limited by guarantee and is operationally independent from government, and entirely 
financed by the firms it regulates.54 However, it is accountable to the Treasury 
Ministry and through her to Parliament. The board members of the FSA are appointed 
by the Treasury.   
The range of responsibilities of the FSA is enormous, regulating financial service 
firms, and supervising exchanges and listed companies in the UK.55 In particular, as 
the listing authority, the FSA has an obligation to monitor the listing process, evaluate 
issuers’ eligibility and ensure the compliance of its rules. In order to exercise the 
                                                 
50 Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/1632) 12. 
51 Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/1632) 2. 
52 Ibid. 
53 FSMA 2000 s 72(1). 
54 More information about the FSA can be found in the website <www.fsa.gov.uk>accessed 12 August 
2009.  
55 Dine and Koutsias (n 24) 106. 
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power under the FSMA 2000, the FSA has a number of possible sanctions such as 
public censure, fines, injunctions, restitution orders and to verify or cancel investment 
authorisation.56 
2.2.2.3.1 Delegated Rule-making 
Rules issued by the FSA take the form of high-level principles, detailed rules, 
guidance and supporting material. These rules supplement and support statutory 
legislation with detailed requirements and standards. 
Rules relevant to listing issued by the FSA are contained in the FSA Handbook, in 
particular Listing Rules, Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules (DTR) and a Code 
of Market Conduct. As said earlier, to get listed, a public company shall satisfy the 
requirements in Listing Rules, for example, companies intended to be listed in the 
Main Market shall have a minimum 25% of its shares in public hands and a minimum 
market capitalisation of £700,000.57  
Officially listed companies are subject to certain continuing obligations under the 
Listing Rules (LR). The best-known examples are listed companies must state how 
they have complied with the principles set out in the UK Corporate Governance 
Code58 – must confirm compliance with the Code or indicate and explain areas of 
non-compliance,59 and must report directors’ remuneration policies and packages.60 If 
the FSA considers that an issuer of listed securities or an applicant for listing has 
breached LR, it can impose a financial penalty.61 
                                                 
56 Dignam and Lowry (n 15) 84. 
57 London Stock Exchange, A Guide to the Main Market (LSE, London 2007). For a good evaluation 
on the enforcement of the FSA and its action, see I Macneil, 'The Evolution of Regulatory Enforcement 
Action in the UK Capital Markets:A Case of 'Less is more'' (2007) 2 Capital Markets Law Journal 345. 
58 The UK Corporate Governance Code will be addressed below, see section 2.2.3.1. 
59 Listing Rules 9.8.6, 9.8.7 A R, the UK Corporate Governance Code will be introduced in 2.2.3.1. 
60 Listing Rules 9.8.8. 
61 FSMA 2000, s 91 (1). 
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The DTR, as discussed earlier, implement the Transparency Directive and set out 
rules to address disclosure requirements for listed companies. The Code of Market 
Conduct is relevant as it provides guidance as to the sort of conduct which will 
amount to market abuse and insider dealing. To undertake shareholder activism, 
institutions shall be careful that their activities do not breach these relevant rules. We 
shall return to see the potential impact of this on shareholder activism in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
2.2.3 Codes 
Whilst the UK’s formal body of legal rules and regulations is important in defining 
the nature of corporate governance standards and obligations, much of governance 
relies heavily on less formal bodies of rules, such as upon reports, guidance or rules 
issued by various bodies. Chief among these bodies are the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC), a number of institutional investors’ trade associations, institutional 
investors themselves and various bodies representing industry professions. Provisions 
issued by these organizations may take the form of recommendations, guidance, and 
code of practice. Here, this broad range of provisions will be generally referred to as 
‘Codes’. Such Codes are not a mandatory set of rules; rather they provide a set of 
recommendations as to good practice. This approach is intended to permit flexibility, 
so that companies or investors subject to the guidance, can, in appropriate 
circumstances, choose not to comply, and explain why if required. 
The initial development of this Codes system started in the 1990s as a response to 
financial scandals at that time, such as the collapse of BCCI and the Robert Maxwell 
pension scandal, both in 1991.62 A series of recommendations – known as the 
Cadbury Report – was soon issued in 1992 to address issues such as the establishment, 
composition, and operation of key board committees, chairman and chief executive, 
and the role of non-executives. Since then, there have been a series of reports dealing 
                                                 
62 Financial Reporting Council, The UK Approach to Corporate Governance (FRC, London 2006) 3. 
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with particular aspects of corporate governance over the last decade or so in the UK. 
The following outlines the more important ones: 
(1) Cadbury Report, 1992 – issued by the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance. It has been regarded as the foundation for a best practice 
system of corporate governance;63 
(2) Greenbury Report, 1995 – issued by the Greenbury Working Group, which was 
mainly concerned with the directors’ remuneration;64 
(3) Hampel Report, 1998 – issued by the Hampel Committee and emphasized the role 
that institutional shareholders could play in corporate governance;65 
(4) Combined Code, 1998 – combined the recommendations of the Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel reports;66 
(5) Turnbull, 1999 – prepared by the Turnbull Committee which was established by 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. It focuses on the 
internal control;67 
(6) Higgs, 2003 – focused on the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors; (Turnbull 1999)68 
(7) Smith, 2003 – focused on the role of audit committee;69 
(8) Paul Myners’ reports – commissioned by the Government, Paul Myners was 
concerned with the investment and voting activities of institutional shareholders. 
                                                 
63 Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance(Gee&Co.Ltd, 
London 1992).  
64 Sir R Greenbury, Directors' Remuneration (Gee&Co.Ltd, London 1995). 
65 Sir R Hampel, Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (Gee&Co Ltd, London 1998). 
66 Combined Code, Combined Code, Principles of Corporate Governance (Gee&Co Ltd, London 
1998). 
67 N Turnbull, Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, London 1999). 
68 D Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (Department of Trade 
and Industry, London 2003). 
69 R Smith, Audit Committees Combined Code Guidance (Financial Reporting Council, London 2003). 
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His reports include 2001 Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom;70 2004, 
2005 and 2007 Reviews of the Impediments to Voting UK shares;71 
(9) Walker’ Review: A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other 
Financial Industry Entities – commissioned by the Government, Sir David Walker, 
lead an independent review of corporate governance in the UK banks and other 
financial institutions.72 
Apart from Codes commissioned (or strongly encouraged) by the Government, there 
are also a number of guidelines issued by institutional trade associations and 
institutions themselves. These organizations and their guidance will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3.  
These Codes were originally proposed by non-government institutions to issue 
statement of best practice, but some of their recommendations have been recognized 
or adopted by legal norms.73 The remuneration vote under the CA 2006 is an example 
of how self-regulation can move into legislation.74   
2.2.3.1 UK Corporate Governance Code 
Currently, the UK Corporate Governance Code (formally the Combined Code, 
hereinafter the UK Code) is probably the most influential one in the UK since it is 
explicitly referred to in the DTR regime.75 It is now maintained and periodically 
                                                 
70 P Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (2000). London: HM Treasury. 
71 P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2004); (2005); (2007). London: 
Shareholder Voting Working Group.   
72 D Walker, ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities: 
Final Recommendations’ (2009) <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> 
accessed 16 January 2010. 
73 K Johnstone and W Chalk, ‘What Sanctions Are Necessary?’ in K Rushton, The Business Case for 
Corporate Governance (Law practitioner series, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: New York 
2008) 169. For example, some recommendations in Paul Myners’ report, such as when calculating 
notice of meeting, non-working days shall not be included, have been put into legislation. 
74 CA 2006 s 459. 
75 DTR 7.2.5. 
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revised by the FRC – an independent regulator responsible for corporate governance 
and reporting.76 The most recent version was issued in May 2010 (when it was also 
renamed as the UK Corporate Governance Code.)  
Perhaps one of the best-known features of the UK Code is its enforcement approach – 
‘comply or explain’. All registered UK companies listed on the main board of LSE 
under the listing rules are required state how they apply the UK Code in their annual 
reports and accounts.77 There is no punishment for non-compliance but if a company 
chooses not to comply with the Code, it must provide an explanation to shareholders. 
Instead of prescriptive regulation, it leaves the compliance with the UK Code to the 
scrutiny of the market and shareholders.  
The core principle of this approach is to let shareholders enforce governance 
standards. It is based on the belief that shareholders have incentives to maximise their 
investment and want companies they own to be successful.78 Once they find directors 
are not complying, they will exercise their rights as owners to force companies to 
comply with the UK Code.79 In extreme cases, shareholders will dispose of their 
shares as a punishment.80  
                                                 
76  FRC is a ‘light-touch, market-led’ regulator, which derives its funding equally from listed 
companies, the accountancy profession and government. See Company Law Reform Bill-White Paper 
2005, (n 43). 
77 DTR 7.2; Also in Listing Rules 9.8.7 A R. 
78 For a more detailed discussion of this approach, see generally, I MacNeil and L Xiao, 'Comply or 
Explain: Market Discipline and Non-compliance with the Combined Code' (2006) 14 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 486 (They found that there is a strong link between share price 
performance and investors’ tolerance of non-compliance with the Combined Code in FTSE 100); R 
Tomasic, ‘Towards A New Corporate Governance After the Global Financial Crisis’ in The Prospect of 
Structural Reform of Corporate Legal System (The 21st Century Commercial Law Forum-Tenth 
International Symposium 2010) 213 (arguing that this ‘light touched’ approach has failed to place an 
adequate check upon companies in financial sector as revealed in the recent financial crisis). 
79 Further discussion on how shareholders can exercise their rights will be provided on the following 
section.  
80 A Dignam, 'Capturing Corporate Governance: The End of the UK Self-regulating System' (2007) 4 
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 24, 26.  
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The UK Code identifies best corporate governance practice which is not covered in 
the legislation. It contains principles of good practice relating to issues such as the 
role of directors, board composition, directors’ remuneration, accountability and 
audit.  
Previously, the UK Code contained a separate section (Section E) that set out a 
number of recommendations addressed to institutional shareholders, including that 
they should enter into a dialogue with companies based on the mutual understanding 
of objectives, evaluate companies’ governance arrangements and make considered use 
of their votes.81 However, recognising the importance of these matters, they have now 
been taken out and form part of a new, separate so-called ‘Stewardship Code’.  
2.2.3.2 The UK Stewardship Code 
Starting from July 2010, a new Stewardship Code82 for institutional shareholders 
takes effect in the UK, as recommended by Sir David Walker following his review of 
Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities (Walker 
Review).83  
In the wake of the financial crisis in the UK banking industry, Sir David Walker, was 
commissioned by the Government to carry out a review of corporate governance in 
UK banks and other financial institutions in 2009. One of the purposes of the review 
was to examine the role of institutional shareholders in engaging effectively with 
companies and in monitoring of boards’.84 The ‘Stewardship Code’ is the outcome of 
the recommendation made by Sir David Walker that the earlier Code on the 
Responsibilities of Institutional Investors, prepared by the Institutional Shareholders’ 
Committee, should be ‘ratified’ by the FRC and implemented on a comply-or-explain 
                                                 
81 Combined Code 2008, E1 E2 E3. 
82 It is available at < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/investorgovernance.cfm > accessed 4 July 2010. 
83 D Walker (n 72). 
84 Ibid, 5. 
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basis.85 After some amendments, the Stewardship Code came into effect in July 2010 
with objectives to ‘enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors 
and companies and to help improve long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient 
exercise of governance responsibilities.’86  
The Stewardship Code represents the most detailed attempt to date in the UK to 
address institutional shareholder engagement in listed companies. Institutional 
investors are encouraged to disclose in their reports or websites if and how they have 
applied the Stewardship Code. The FRC will retain a list of those investors who have 
published a statement on their compliance or otherwise with the Stewardship Code. 
The good practice in respect of shareholder engagement recommended by the 
Stewardship Code and its influence on shareholder activism will be covered in 
Chapters 4 and below.  
  
2.3 The Internal Corporate Governance Structure of UK 
Listed Companies 
The above sections have shown the source of the different rules and norms that make 
up the governance system of listed companies. How do these rules and norms 
translate into the structure and operation of listed companies? 
2.3.1 Division of Power 
Generally, the articles of association vest the authority to operate the business in the 
hands of the board of directors and allocate power to shareholders to decide who they 
                                                 
85 D Walker, ibid, Recommendation 17; Stewardship Code, Preface; The ISC and its guidance will be 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
86 Stewardship Code, Preface. 
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wish to sit on the board.87 As such, UK listed companies contain a model involving 
two organs: the board of directors and the general meeting. The legal regime creates a 
clear division of power between managers and owners. Under the Model Articles for 
Public Companies, for example, the division of power is stated as: 
‘(3) Directors’ general authority 
 the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business, for 
which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company. 
(4) Shareholders’ reserve power 
a. The shareholders may, by special resolution, direct the directors to take, or 
refrain from taking, specified action. 
b. No such special resolution invalidates anything which the directors have done 
before the passing of the resolution.’88 
 
2.3.2 The Board 
UK companies adopt a unitary board structure, in contrast to the dual-board system in 
Chinese listed companies.89 A board typically comprises of both executive directors, 
responsible for the management and performance of the company, and non-executive 
directors, who play a monitoring role over executive directors. Instead of running 
day-to-day corporate decision-making, the board typically delegates its powers to 
individuals to carry out managerial matters, pursuant to a clause in the articles of 
association. 
Under the UK Code, the board is required to maintain an appropriate combination of 
executive and non-executive directors (and, in particular, independent non-executive 
                                                 
87 CA 2006 s 160. Section 168 also authorizes shareholders to remove directors before his or her term 
has expired. 
88 Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229), Schedule 3, 4.  
89 For discussion of Chinese board system, see Chapter 6. 
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directors).90 Also, the UK Code set up a ‘senior independent director’ system to 
improve board-shareholder communication. The senior independent director is 
expected to communicate with shareholders ‘if they have concerns which contact 
through the normal channel of chairman, CEO or executive directors has failed to 
resolve or for which such contact is inappropriate’. 91  The role of the senior 
independent director will be discussed in Chapter 5.92  
To ensure the board works effectively, sub-committees are recommended, namely, a 
remuneration committee, audit committee and nomination committee.93 The Walker 
Review recommended a ‘risk committee’ to facilitate risk control of investment in 
listed companies.94 
2.3.3 Shareholders 
Delegation of directors to run the company does not mean that shareholders lose all 
powers over the company. A characteristic of the UK corporate legislation system, as 
observed by Nolan, Davies, Rickford and Macneil, is the wide range powers that are 
reserved to the shareholders to act collectively as controllers and monitors of the 
company.95 So, for example, CA 2006 confers on shareholders:  
1. power to change the company’s constitution; as said earlier, changes in the articles 
of association can be made by a ‘special resolution that requires a supermajority 
of 75% of votes at a shareholders’ meeting;96 
                                                 
90 UK Corporate Governance Code, B.1. 
91 UK Corporate Governance Code, A.4.1.  
92 See Chapter 5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.6, 5.2.2.1. 
93 UK Corporate Governance Code, B.1. 
94 Walker (n 72). 
95 R C Nolan, 'Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the Company?' (2003) 3 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 73, 75; P Davies and J Rickford, 'An Introduction to the New UK Companies Act: Part 1' (2008) 
1 European Company and Financial Law Review 48, 57; and Macneil (n 34) 4. As wide as these 
powers may be, they are still dwarfed by those reserved to shareholder in Chinese Governance; see 
Chapter 6 below. 
96 CA 2006 s 21(1) 
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2. power to remove directors;97 
3. power to call a special meeting and to submit proposals.98 
4. In a number of cases, the approval of shareholders is required to certain 
managerial actions, such as the award of long service contracts to directors,99 and 
substantial property transaction with directors.100 
Moreover, to hold directors accountable to shareholders, the legislation lays down 
directors’ duties and responsibilities and the legal consequences if directors breach 
their duties. Under the CA 2006, a director of a company has duties to act within 
powers, to promote the success of the company, to exercise independent judgement, 
to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence and to avoid conflicts of interest.101 
Shareholders in turn are expected to take action where they believe that the directors 
breach their duties, and the law provides them with voting and other rights, as said 
above, to enable them to enforce directors’ duties. The issue of how shareholders 
exercise their rights will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
2.4 Conclusion 
The above has offered an overview of the corporate governance regime in the UK. As 
we have seen, it ranges from private ordering through legal norms and self-regulatory 
codes of practice. The Government’s stated ambition is that this regime will be ‘a 
modern robust system to enhance shareholders’ protection, to promote company 
long-term performance and to stimulate investment.’102  
How far this ambition is realised will be analysed in later chapters. For the moment, 
however, we might note that it is now generally recognized that UK plays something 
                                                 
97 CA 2006 s 168. 
98 CA 2006 s 303, 314. 
99 CA 2006 s 188. 
100 CA 2006 ss 190-6. 
101 CA 2006 ss 171-177. For detailed discussions, see Dignam and Lowry (n 15) Chapter 14; D 
Kershaw, Company Law in Context (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) Chapters 9-15.  
102 Companies Law Reform Bill-White Paper 2005, see (n 43). 
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of a pioneer role in corporate governance. This success, undoubtedly, is partly 
attributable to its regulatory system. Meanwhile, there is evidence indicating UK 
regulatory framework appears to be having a positive impact in corporate governance 
practice. In January 2006, the FRC published the report on their review of 
implementation of the (then) Combined Code.103 The review shows that the Code has 
improved the quality of corporate governance among listed companies, and created a 
better investment environment for listed companies. The total number of new flotation 
companies on the LSE increased from 167 in 1999 to 576 companies in the 2006.104 
The number of new foreign listings increased to 32 in 2006.105  
However, as noted, whether the regulatory framework on shareholders’ engagement is 
effective cannot simply be concluded from the above evidence, and requires the more 
detailed analysis of later chapters. Before proceeding to do that, Chapter 3 will first 
provide a further overview, this time of the institutional landscape in the UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 Discussed in S Lowe, ‘Is the UK Model Working?’ in Rushton (n 73) 224. 
104 Ibid, 225. 
105 Ibid. 
Chapter 3 The Landscape of UK Institutional Investment  
The way in which the model of shareholder activism, put forward in Chapter 1, will 
apply to UK shareholder activism can only be understood by reference to the basic 
features of different types of institutional investors. Chapter 3 therefore surveys UK 
institutional ownership and explores characteristics of major UK market participants. 
Section 3.1 examines the extent of institutional share ownership to highlight the fact 
that institutional shareholders have the potential to participate in corporate governance. 
Section 3.2 investigates the four major types of institutional investors that are likely to 
engage in shareholder activism in the UK. They are: pension funds, insurance 
companies, mutual funds and hedge funds. Sections 3.3 to 3.7 identify a range of 
other interested parties in institutional investment and shareholder activism, including 
industry trade associations, fund engagement staffs, Hermes, securities lending 
participants and proxy voting agencies. Section 3.8 concludes.  
3.1 The Growth of Institutional Share Ownership in the UK 
Over recent decades, a notable change in equity ownership in UK listed companies is 
the growth of institutional shareholdings. Share ownership has moved away from 
individual investors to become concentrated in the hands of a relatively few powerful 
institutional shareholders – see Table 3.1.1   
Table 3.1 Summary of main categories of share ownership in the UK, 1963–2008 
Type of investor 1963 (%) 2008(%) 
Individuals 54 10.2 
Insurance Companies 10 13.4 
Pension Funds 6 12.8 
Unit Trusts 1 1.8 
                                                 
1 For what are included in the category of institutional shareholders, see section 3.2 below. 
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Investment trusts 1.3 1.9 
Other financial institutions 0 10 
Overseas 7 41 
Source: Office for National Statistics, ‘Share Ownership Survey’.2  
As Table 3.1 shows, institutional shareholders (including insurance companies, 
pension funds, unit trusts, investment trusts, banks and other financial institutions) 
accounted for 39.9 per cent of the UK ordinary shares. These represented a combined 
value of £462.4 billion.3 Of these, the largest holders were insurance companies 
(£154.9 billion) and pension funds (£148.8 billion). Overseas shareholders 
(themselves predominately institutional shareholders) own 40%, 4  and individual 
ownership of UK listed shares fell to just 10.2%.  
Whilst by no means universal, it is not uncommon for individual institutional 
shareholders to hold more than 3% of any given listed company’s issued shares. In 
this regard, consider the ownership structure of Marks and Spencer Plc, as set out in 
its 2009 Annual Report. These data reveal that while the number of retail investors 
account for super-majority of the total number of shareholders, they own 
comparatively few shares: 19% retail investor ownership as against 81% institutional 
investor ownership. 72% of ordinary shares are owned by 0.09% of shareholders by 
number. As such, equities are concentrated in a relatively small group of institutional 
investors. Elsewhere Marks and Spencer Plc’s 2009 annual report reveals that there 
are five shareholders with a greater than 3% shareholding: three of them with 5% or 
above.5 
                                                 
2 Office for National Statistics, ‘Share Ownership Survey’ 
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/share0110.pdf> accessed 17 August 2010. 
3 Ibid, 3. 
4 These overseas institutional shareholders may also be ‘traditional’ (but foreign) institutional investors 
of the type discussed in the thesis. Alternatively, an increasing number may be so-called ‘sovereign 
wealth funds’, see below, section 3.2.5. 
5 See Table 4.1 in Chapter 4.1.1. 
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Table 3.2 Marks and Spencer Plc Shareholders (Ordinary shares) as of April 2010 
 
 
Source: Marks and Spencer, Annual Report and Financial Statement 2010, 117. Available at 
<http://annualreport.marksandspencer.com/downloads/M&S_AR10.pdf> accessed 11 April 2010. 
Compare this data with information on Prudential Plc’s and Vodafone Plc’s 
ownership structure. Both Prudential and Vodafone have a similar shareholder 
structure involving a significant number of individual investors and a small number of 
institutional investors owing most of the shares in the company.6  
These ownership structures are representative of large UK listed companies, as 
suggested by Goergen and Renneboog. In a sample of FTSE 250 Index listed 
companies, they observed that the largest institutional shareholding averages 5.5% in 
                                                 
6 Prudential Plc, 2010 Financial Report 
<http://www.prudentialreports.com/2010hy/files/pru_hy10_report_AdditionalInfo.pdf >available 12 
July 2010; Vodafone Plc, 2010 Annual Report 
<http://www.vodafone.com/static/annual_report10/additional_information/shareholder_information.ht
ml > accessed 12 July 2010. 
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UK listed companies.7 This thesis will bring on more evidence concerning the size of 
individual institutional shareholdings in Chapter 4.  
Myners and Cheffins argue that the primary reason for the rise of institutional share 
ownership in the UK is tax privileges for institutions.8 For example, pension funds are 
exempt from capital gain tax, and contributions to such funds by their beneficiaries 
are made out of pre-tax income.9 Moreover, the increase in private retirement savings, 
in the form of pension schemes and insurance, is another reason pushing the growth 
of institutional investment in the UK.10 Collective investment through institutions 
also allows individuals to spread (indirectly) their investment amongst a much wider 
range of companies, thereby reducing their exposure to the risk of a catastrophe 
should any one such company collapse. And individuals may reason that institutions 
will be more expert in picking the best companies in which to invest their holdings.11 
3.2 The Institutions 
The main types of UK institutional investors that I cover in the thesis are pension 
funds, insurance companies, mutual funds (including unit trusts and investment trusts) 
and hedge funds. This section introduces and describes each of them, including their 
size, organizational structure and investment arrangement and other features I believe 
will be relevant to applying the model that I developed in Chapter 1.There is an 
important point to be made here: investments of different types of institution are not 
                                                 
7 M Goergen and L Renneboog, ‘Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK’ in F 
Barca and M Becht. (eds), The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 
259, 270. 
8 P Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (London 2001), 27; B Cheffins, 
Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2008) 346-49. 
9 Ibid. 
10 P Davies, Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom (1993) In  1993) D D Prentice and P R G 
Holland (eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (Clarendon Press New York) 69-96. 
11 D Hobson, The National Wealth: Who Gets What in Britain (HarperCollins, London 1999) 1035-42. 
For an evaluation of how capitalism has changed over time, see, C Clark, 'The Four Stages of 
Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises' (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 561. 
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separate but often overlap. Insurance companies both hold shares in their own right 
and also manage the investment of other institutions, such as pension funds. Pension 
funds and insurers are often the large clients of mutual funds. Meanwhile, many funds 
are typically managed by external fund management companies, who simultaneously 
manage money business for a number of different institutions.  
3.2.1 Pension Funds 
Pension funds form a large category of institutional shareholder in the UK. They 
collect, pool, and invest assets contributed to provide for the future pension 
entitlement of beneficiaries.12 Pension funds’ investments have shown strong increase 
historically. Over the period 1963 to 2008, pension funds’ shareholding in the UK 
equity market increased from 6% to 12.8%.13  
Pension schemes can be broadly divided into ‘unfunded’ and ‘funded’. Most 
unfunded schemes are in the public sector. They are operated on a Pay-As-You-Go 
basis, financed solely ‘from the current contributions of the employers and of existing 
employees or from other revenues on a year-to-year basis.’14  Pensions that are 
financed from a reserve or fund which has been built ‘up over a period of years by 
investing accumulated contributions in earning assets’ are funded schemes.15 Most 
occupational pension funds in the UK are operated on a ‘funded’ basis. This thesis 
only focuses on funded schemes because it is this type of pension scheme that 
purchases stakes in listed companies. 
Almost all pension plans are organized in the form of a trust which makes pension 
schemes separate entities from their sponsoring company. 16  In making funds 
                                                 
12 P Davis and B Steil, Institutional Investors (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 2001) 15. 
13 See Table 3.1. 
14 D Blake, Pension Schemes and Pension Funds in the United Kingdom (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1995) 293. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Myners (n 8) 6. 
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investment, fund trustees are required to follow a ‘prudent person’ approach.17  
According to the fiduciary duty established in case law, a trustee must: 
‘exercise, in relation to all matters affecting the fund, the same degree of care and 
diligence as an ordinary prudent person would exercise in dealing with property of 
another for whom the person felt morally bound to provide and to use such 
additional knowledge and skill as the trustee possesses or ought to possess by reason 
of the trustee’s profession, business or calling.’18 
As one will see later, the ‘prudent person rule’ differs from the Chinese quantitative 
limitation approach, granting trustees more discretion over investment asset 
allocation.19 
Funded pension schemes are either defined benefit (or salary-related) schemes, where 
the value of the pension is related to the employee’s salary (usually at, or close to, 
retirement) and the length of service, or defined contribution (or money-purchase) 
schemes, where the value of the pension is determined by reference to the value of the 
members’ own fund.20 This will depend upon the money paid in, and the performance 
of the investments purchased with the money in the fund. For both defined benefit and 
defined contribution funds, the liability tends to be long-term, as the objective of asset 
management is to attain a high replacement ratio at retirement.21  
Previously, most pension funds were set up in the form of defined benefit schemes. In 
recent years, there has been a continuation of the sharp decline in the number of 
defined benefit schemes, from 17,900 in 2000 to 2,240 in 2007.22 Many defined 
benefit schemes have closed to new members because of the increased costs to 
                                                 
17 Pension Act 1995 s 35. 
18 Bartlett v Barclays Bank (No.1) [1980] Ch 515 at p.531, per Brightman J. See also the discussion in 
Pension Law Reform. The Report of the Pension Law Review Committee, HMSO, 1993, para 4.9.7. 
19 Chapter 7.2.3. 
20 Davis and Steil (n 12) 15. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Office for National Statistics, ‘Occupational Pension Schemes Survey’ (ONS, London 2007). 
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employers of providing defined benefits for their employees.23 For example, BP, as 
one of the last remaining FTSE 100 companies to provide a defined benefit scheme to 
new employees, announced that it will close the scheme from April 2010 so as to 
avoid the financial burden resulting from sharp rises in life expectancy.24 The defined 
contribution scheme has taken its place and is expected to gain further development in 
the future.25 
3.2.1.1 The Structure of Pension Fund Investments 
There are a number of different ways in which the investment of a pension fund can 
be managed. It is important to explain these approaches clearly here because as one 
will see, these approaches vary in the strength of conflicts of interest (and, as this 
thesis noted in Chapter 1, such conflicts represent one of the costs in my model of 
shareholder activism).26  
First, most large pension funds are self-insured or self-administered. The fund trustee 
is the registered beneficial owner of the fund assets in investee companies. They may 
be managed by the trustees themselves (in house management), or managed directly 
through an appointed fund manager, or indirectly through external financial 
intermediaries, such as an investment bank.27  
The majority of pension funds in this type contract out management functions with 
fund managers to perform the investment task. These external fund managers thus 
play a fundamental role in institutional arrangement for pension schemes. They 
perform a range of activities in accordance with their contracts, such as portfolio 
analysis, portfolio adjustment and risk management.   
                                                 
23 Myners (n 8) 29. 
24 N Cohen and E Crooks, ‘BP Ends Final Pay Pension for New Staff’, Financial Times (2 June 2009) 
London.  
25 Office for National Statistics, ‘Occupational Pension Schemes Survey’ (n 22). 
26 See Chapter 4.2.2.2.1. 
27 Blake (n 14) 366. 
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Investment decision-making for pension funds can be further divided into two 
principal management approaches: balanced mandate model and customised bench 
mark. Under the balanced mandate model, the fund trustee ‘entrusts the assets of the 
fund to one or more fund management companies, leaving both strategic asset 
allocation and security selection to them’.28 Within the alternative customised bench 
mark, instead of entrusting all fund assets to a fund manager, the fund trustee will 
delegate stock selection decisions to a fund manager while retaining the power to 
make the strategic assets allocation.29   
Second, small pension funds often choose to have their portfolio managed by 
insurance companies. The insurance companies, rather than fund trustees, are both the 
registered and beneficial owner of the underlying assets.30 In such case, voting rights 
rest in the hands of the insurance company.  
Third, sometimes funds are pooled. Under this arrangement, all contributions from a 
number of different pensions are pooled together and invested as a single sum. Pooled 
funds are typically operated as either unit trusts which are established under a trust 
structure or managed pension funds which operate under insurance contract. Unit 
trusts will be discussed separately. In a managed pension fund, the fund simply 
purchases units of a diversified investment from insurance company. This kind of 
fund is also called insurer-administered pension fund. In 2007, the 
insurer-administered pension funds accounted for 45% of all pensions, with £2,420 
billion assets.31 In this way where pension schemes invested in pooled funds, the 
insurance company which manages the fund is the beneficial owner of the assets and 
thereby has the right to exercise voting rights. Pension schemes purchasing funds own 
just their insurance policies.32  
                                                 
28 Myners (n 8) 8. 
29 Ibid. 
30 G Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Clarendon, Oxford 1996) 22. 
31 ABI, Money in Funded Pensions in 2007 (ABI, London 2008). 
32 Stapledon (n 30) 22. 
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3.2.2 Insurance Companies 
The second type of institutional investor the thesis addresses are insurance companies. 
They are large equity holders in the UK, collectively controlling 13.4% of investment 
in the UK stock market in 2008.33 The UK insurance industry accounts for 11% of 
total worldwide premium income, (compared to just 3% of that insurance industry in 
China.)34 
Within an insurance contract, an individual pays a sum to an insurance company and 
the company, in turn, pays the policy-holder a specified sum if an insured event (such 
as death) occurs, or in some cases at the end (term) of the insurance contract.35 To 
help ensure that clients’ needs are met, UK insurance companies invest in stocks, real 
property and other investment sources to maximum return. 
The UK insurance industry is dominated by life business and other term long-term 
insurance contracts, controlling 93% of the total assets, as opposed to their general (i.e. 
household, casualty, health, etc.) insurance funds.36 Most of the equity investments of 
insurance companies are in life insurance and this thesis will thus be more concerned 
with this type of insurance company.37   
Life insurance companies can be broadly divided into linked investment, where the 
amount invested is linked directly to the investment performance, and non-linked 
where policyholders receive an annual bonus and a discretionary terminal bonus 
decided by the insurance company. Like pension funds, insurance companies are 
                                                 
33 ABI, UK Insurance-Key Facts (ABI, London 2010). 
34 ABI, Ibid, 4 
35 Davis and Steil (n 12) 15. 
36 ABI, UK Insurance-Key Facts ,(n 33) 3.  
37 For a detailed introduction on insurance management, see, S Zenios and WZiemba (eds) Handbook 
of Asset and Liability Management, Volume 2: Applications and Case Studies (North Holland, Oxford 
2007) 543-705. 
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long-term institutional investors, mainly subject to prudential person regime to handle 
investment in ‘due diligence’ on the behalf of their clients.38 
A large majority of insurance assets are managed in house, by asset management 
subsidiaries on behalf of parent groups’ insurance companies, or have a large 
insurance component with the group.39 The British insurance industry is concentrated, 
with 80% of the business written controlling by the top ten of life insurance and 
pension insurance groups.40 For example, in 2007, 26% of all insurer-administered 
pension funds are Legal & General managed. The top five companies altogether 
accounted for 57% of all insurer-administrated pension funds.41  
As discussed above, insurance companies are closely linked to pension funds, as they 
often act as external fund managers for pension funds, or offer annuities for 
guaranteed pension benefits.42   
3.2.3 Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds pool the assets of individuals or other funds for investment purposes. In 
the UK, mutual funds offer short-term liquidity on pooled funds, either via direct 
redemption of holdings (open-end fund), or via the ability to trade shares in the funds 
on exchanges (close-end fund).43  
Open-end funds, including unit trust and open-ended investment companies (Oeics) 
have grown rapidly to the third-placed group of institutional shareholders in the UK. 
Their total assets have increased 141% over the five years from 2002 to 2007 when 
                                                 
38 P Davis, ‘Portfolio Regulation and Life Insurance Companies and Pension Funds’ 2001 The 
Pensions Institute, Working Paper No. PI-0101, 25; M Bijapur and others, ‘An Empirical Analysis of 
European Life Insurance Portfolio Regulation’ 2007 FSA Occasional Paper Series 21, 8. 
39 ABI, UK Insurance-Key facts (ABI, London 2008), 31. 
40 Ibid, 6. 
41 Ibid, 5. 
42 Ibid, 16. 
43 Davis and Steil (n 12) 17. 
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funds assets were £ 468 billion. 44  A majority of open-end funds’ clients are 
institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds, owing 76% of 
total assets under management.45 
Unit trust and Oeics are similar in nature but differ in the way they are constituted. 
Unit trusts are set up under the terms of a trust deed and issue units. They can be 
authorised, or unauthorised (only the former can be promoted to the public), but most 
are authorised unit trusts.46 Oeics are organized in the form of a company and issue 
shares.  
Authorised unit trusts and Oeics are regulated by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) under the terms of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000). 
They must conform to the FSA rules for authorised investment funds as set out in the 
FSA ‘COLL’ handbook.  
Unit trusts and Oeics are typically managed by fund managers. A total of 2,178 unit 
trusts and Oeics in 2007 were managed by about 110 fund management companies.47 
Amongst them, the top ten companies control about 45% of total industry asset by 
2007, indicating the relatively concentration of the asset management industry.48 Unit 
trusts and Oeics’ asset split is heavily geared to equities, with 70% of total assets held 
in the UK and other equities in 2007.49  
Close-end investment funds in the UK mainly refer to ‘Investment Trusts’. Despite 
their name, they are not trusts in the legal sense at all: they are public companies 
subject to company law.50 Their assets are fixed at the start by issuing a set number of 
shares. They invest in a wide range of assets such as shares, private equity, property 
                                                 
44 IMA, Asset Management in the UK 2007 (IMA, London 2008) 50. 
45 Ibid, 30. 
46 Stapledon (n 30) 23. 
47 Ibid, 55.  
48 Ibid, 55.  
49 Ibid, 51.  
50 Stapledon (n 30) 23; Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (n 8) 37. 
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and bonds. Each investment company has a board of directors who appoint fund 
managers to make day-to-day decisions about investment selection. The great 
majority of investment trusts are managed by external fund management companies.51  
There are major differences between mutual funds in their portfolio strategies. A key 
distinction is between actively managed, and passive or ‘index funds’. Active 
management seeks to identify and purchase misvalued securities, assuming that ‘the 
market is inefficient and that not all relevant information is present in securities 
market’.52 Active management thus attempts to make profit by trading securities. 
Passive management assumes returns are maximized by ‘holding the shares’.53 Index 
funds seek to reproduce or replicate the behaviour of a market index.54 In doing so, 
costs are minimized by keeping portfolio switches to a minimum. Determined by their 
investment strategy, active managed funds tend to be more short-term, while the latter 
two manage long-term assets. 
3.2.4 Hedge Funds 
In addition to the above ‘mainstream’ institutional investors, one recent emerged type 
of institution – hedge funds – have, as Amour and Cheffins, and Macneil show, the 
potential to be an important player in the corporate governance arena.55 As of March 
2010, total assets under management by global hedge funds are estimated to be $1.5 
trillion.56  
                                                 
51 Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (n 8) 36. 
52 Davis and Steil (n 12) 58. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, 445. 
55 J Armour and B Cheffins 'The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds' (2009) 
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 136/2009 
 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1489336> accessed 10 August 2010; I Macneil, 
'Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies' (2010) Capital Markets 
Law Journal 1, 7. 
56 Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index, 'Q1 2010 Hedge Funds Update: Staying the Course' 
(2010)  <https://www.credit-suisse.com/us/hedge_strategies/en/> accessed 10 August 2010. 
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Despite an absence of agreed definition, hedge funds distinguish themselves from 
other traditional institutional investors in their organizational structure and investment 
strategies. First, hedge funds are usually organized as limited partnerships managed 
by a general partner.57 The investment of funds is subject to minimum requirements – 
usually between $ 1 million to $ 10 million.58 Due to the high investment minimum, 
in contrast with traditional institutional arrangement, most funds are open exclusively 
to wealthy high net-worth institutions or individuals.59 Investors of hedge funds are 
limited partners or members. Contracts governing investment in hedge funds typically 
lock up investor’s capital for six months, although a first-time investor often cannot 
withdraw for at least one year. In an effort to produce strong returns, some funds are 
now moving towards a longer lock-up term – two years or longer.60  
Secondly, in terms of investment strategies, hedge funds are generally said to pursue 
investment strategies of identifying ‘pre-existing value inherent in market 
inefficiencies and pricing anomalies’. 61  Ganshaw finds that the four most 
commonly-used investment strategies are:62  
1. Long-short equity: funds adopting this strategy buy in long equity positions to 
short sales of securities or shares index;63  
2. Global macro: funds who take this approach will invest in a broad range of 
                                                 
57 J Macey, Corporate Governance:Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J. 2008), 242. 
58 Ibid. 
59 A Brav and others, 'Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance ' (2008) 
63 Journal of Finance 1729, 1735. 
60 I Kishner and K Foster, 'The New Masters of the Buyout Universe' (2005) 243 New York Law 
Journal 11, 11. 
61 F J Blassberg (ed), The Private Equity Primer: The Best of the Debevoise & Plimpton Private Equity 
Report (Debevoise and Plimpton, New York 2006) 3. 
62 T Ganshaw, Hedge Funds Humbled: the Seven Mistakes that Brought Hedge Funds to Their Knees 
and How They will Rise Again (McGraw-Hill,, New York 2010) 8-9. 
63 For a detailed discussion of this approach, see Deutsche Bank Research, ‘The Role of Long/Short 
Equity Hedge Funds in Investment Portfolios’ (August 2004)  
< http://www.trendfollowing.com/whitepaper/long_short.pdf> accessed 1 August 2010. 
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financial instruments, including currencies, commodities, sovereign securities, and 
seek to capture value by changes such as, governmental policies, economic 
growth and other country-specific issue; 
3. Relative value: funds pursuing this strategy take advantage of differentials, such 
as liquidity and maturity, between given financial instruments. Fund mangers will 
simultaneously buy and sell, for example, securities to generate returns from the 
relative value of the two securities; 
4. Event-driven: funds seek to profit from pricing inefficiencies created by actual or 
anticipated corporate events, such as mergers and acquisitions. Activist funds 
engaging in shareholder activism are within this category. In fact, only a small 
portion of hedge funds assets,  as found by Kahan and Rock, are devoted to 
shareholder activism.64 They will first find and invest in ‘undervalue’ securities, in 
expectation of generating strong returns through shareholder activism, to restore 
share prices. The research focus of hedge funds is on this type of activist hedge 
funds. 
Most hedge funds are based in the US and shareholder activism by hedge funds 
remains largely, as pointed out by Armour and Cheffins, a US phenomenon.65 In the 
UK, Hermes is a typical type of hedge fund, pursuing an event-driven strategy, to 
generate returns through shareholder engagement. I will give a detailed discussion of 
the approach Hermes adopted in section 3.5. Following Armour and Cheffins, hedge 
fund activism will be termed ‘offensive activism’, in contrast with the ‘defensive 
activism’ in which institutional shareholders have traditionally engaged.66 This will 
be discussed in Chapter 5.1. 
                                                 
64 M Kahan and E Rock, 'Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control' (2007) 155 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1021, 1028. 
65 Armour and Cheffins (n 55) 36. 
66 Ibid. 
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3.2.5 Overseas Institutions: Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Although the thesis is only concerned with domestic UK institutional investors, given 
the large portion of overseas institutions, it would be helpful to have a brief look at 
this type of investor. Among the group of overseas investors, most are institutions, 
such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds and they often share the 
same features as the UK institutions.  
However, there is a distinct type of fund that deserves a specific mention here – 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). It is defined by the U.S. Treasury as ‘government 
vehicles funded by foreign exchange but managed separately from foreign reserves.’67 
Although they are by no means a recent phenomenon (the first fund – the Kuwaiti 
Investment Board – was established in 1953), they have attracted increasing recent 
attention as they doubled in size since 2000 from $ 1.5 trillion to $ 3.8 trillion in 2009, 
and are anticipated to swell to $ 12 trillion by 2015. Table 3.3 lists the 10 largest 
SWFs and their estimated assets.  
Table 3.3 Estimated Size of Sovereign Wealth Funds by 2006 (In billions of 
U.S.Dollars) 
 Country Fund Name Lunch Year US (Billion) % of 2006 
GDP 
UAE (Abu 
Dhabi) 
ADIA 1976 625.0 520.7% 
Norway Governmental 
Pension 
Fund-Global 
1990 322.0 102.6% 
Singapore GIC 1981 215.0 169.0% 
                                                 
67 C Lowery, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and the International Financial System’. Remarks at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s Conference on the Asian Financial Crisis Revisited. 
Washington: US Treasury, 21 June 2007, 1. 
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Kuwait Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority 
1953 213.0 268.7& 
China China 
Investment 
Corporation 
2007 200.0 8.0% 
Russia Stabilization 
Fund 
2004 127.5 14.2% 
Singapore Temasek 1974 108.0 84.9% 
Qatar Qatar 
Investment 
Authority 
2005 60.0 185.3% 
US(Alaska) Permanent 
Reserve Fund 
1976 40.2 0.3% 
Brunei Brunei 
Investment 
Authority 
1983 30.0 309.4% 
Source: G Lyons, ‘State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds’ Standard 
Chartered Bank, 15 October 2007. 
The main financial sources of SWFs come from reserves, natural-resource payments 
and the like.68 The sudden emergence and growth of SWFs as big players in the 
global capital markets are due to the spike in world oil prices, which has brought 
massive revenues to oil exporters such as Norway’s Government Pension Fund, or the 
large amount of foreign-exchange reserves by Asian central banks, such as China’s 
State Foreign Exchange Investment Corporation.69  
                                                 
68 The Economist, ‘The World's Most Expensive Club’, May 24 2008  
<http://www.economist.com/node/9230598?story_id=9230598> accessed 30 June 2010. 
69 R J Gilson and C J Milhaupt, 'Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist 
Response to the New Merchantilism' (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1345, 1358. 
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Typically, SWFs are established with a primary focus on one or more of the following 
aims: macroeconomic stabilisation (to smooth short- and medium-term fluctuations, 
higher returns (to increase investment return), future generations (create a reserve of 
fund for future) and domestic industries (to restructure and encourage domestic 
industries).70  
To reach those aims, the vast majority of SWFs structure their holding to maximize 
investment return. They have conservatively invested heavily in safe products, such as 
U.S.Treasury and other national government bonds.71 Recently, some of them have 
begun to shift their investment strategy to some higher-risk/higher-return investments 
in equities or corporate acquisitions.72  
Although it is difficult to track how SWFs invest their assets, recent high-profile deals 
enable us to have a look at their investment scale. As shown in Table 3.4, the largest 
SWFs have all acquired minority (but significant) stakes in large U.S., British, or 
European companies. They are, therefore, become important shareholders of those 
financial institutions.  
Table 3.4 Recent Major Acquisitions by Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
                                                 
70 B J Balin 'Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Critical Analysis ' (Johns Hopkins University School of 
Advanced International Studies, 2007). 
71 Gilson and Milhaupt, (n 69) 1347. 
72 Ibid. 
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Source: B J Balin, Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Critical Analysis (Johns Hopkins University. 
School of Advanced International Studies, 2007) 7. 
Until now, there is no completed and comprehensive study investigating the impact of 
SWFs on corporate governance of their portfolio companies. However, some evidence 
indicates that those funds have no or little incentives to get involved in their investee 
companies. Some of them tend to avoid public scrutiny of their investment and keep 
their secrecy through purchasing non-voting shares. An example of their passive 
strategy is the deal by the Chinese Investment Corporation and U.S. Blackstone 
Group, where Chinese SWF forfeited its voting rights in the Blackstone Group.73 In 
2009, Qatar and Chinese Investment Corporation invested in Canary Wharf with 
£880m bail-out of Songbird Estates Plc, but the shares subscribed by those two SWFs 
are non-voting and non-preferential.74  
The purchasing of non-voting shares may well become more common in the future as 
there are calls for more regulations on the investment of SWFs.75 Many SWFs have 
provided low levels of transparency, raising a fear that SWFs may be motivated by 
strategic intentions, instead of an investment purpose, to control the investee 
companies through their large purchase. One proposed policy is to require SWFs with 
low levels of disclosure to buy only non-voting shares in companies as a means of 
controlling their influence over investee companies.76 Some SWFs funds, for example, 
China Investment Corporation declared their willingness for taking non-voting shares 
                                                 
73 Balin (n 70) 9. 
74  Graham Ruddick, ‘China Invests in Canary Wharf with £880m Bail-out of Songbird’, 
Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/6107221/China-invests-
in-Canary-Wharf-with-880m-bail-out-of-Songbird.html, accessed at 30 June 2010. 
75 For example, see Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 27 February 
2008 – ‘A common European approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds’ [COM/2008/ 115 final)  
< http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/sovereign_en.pdf > accessed 30 June 2010. 
76 Gilson and Milhaupt (n 69) 1362-1345. 
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and restricted stakes, although they might take positions on boards.77 Hence, such 
self-restriction may further weaken the role of SWFs in corporate governance in their 
investee companies. 
3.3 Industry Trade Associations 
Each type of institution has its own industry trade association: the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the Association of British Insurers (ABI), the 
Investment Management Association (IMA), and the Association of Investment 
Companies (AIC). These four associations are collectively represented by the 
Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC). These organizations are said to serve the 
role of pioneers for their members in corporate governance.  
The NAPF is made up of 200 fund members and represents the interests of nearly 
1,200 pension schemes and 400 businesses providing essential services to the pension 
sector.78 The ABI was established in 1985 to represent the collective interests of the 
UK’s insurance companies. It has around 400 members, which between them account 
for about 94% of domestic insurance services sold in the UK.79 The IMA is the 
representative body for the UK investment management industry. Its members 
collectively manage over ￡3 trillion of assets in the UK.80 The AIC was formed in 
1932, to represent the closed-ended investment company industry. It has some 300 
members, which between them account for approximately 77% of the sector by 
assets.81 
In 1973, these four trade associations agreed to create the ISC as a body to 
collectively represent institutional investors in the UK. Its role is to allow ‘the UK’s 
                                                 
77 D K Das, 'Sovereign-Wealth Funds: the Institutional Dimension ' (2009) 56 International Review of 
Economics 85, 99. 
78 See <http://www.napf.co.uk/> accessed 16 January 2007. .  
79 See <www.abi.org.uk> accessed 16 January 2007. 
80 See <http://www.investmentuk.org/factsheets/ima/cb.pdf> accessed 16 January 2007. 
81 See <www.theaic.co.uk> accessed 16 January 2007.  
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institutional shareholding community to exchange views and, on occasion, coordinate 
their activities in support of the interests of UK investors.’82 
It should be borne in mind that the creation of the ISC did not replace the roles of its 
members, NAPF, ABI, IMA and AIC. Although the range of institutions has acted as 
one through the ISC, each trade association will sometimes act separately based on 
the different features and demands of their members.  
These industry trade bodies have all, to varying degrees, been active in promoting 
institutional shareholder engagement in corporate governance. Their efforts are 
mainly reflected in three areas. 
First, they play a traditional role of lobbying government on behalf of their members. 
They have liaised with and or lobbied with institutions including governmental 
departments, the London Stock Exchange and the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of England and Wales on matters such as executive share-option, large transaction 
and management buy-outs.83 In addition, they are also represented in some important 
bodies, such as the Takeover Panel and the Stock Exchange’s Investors Advisory 
Group.84 Moreover, these associations are invited to give their opinions on the UK 
corporate governance framework. For example, they have issued many responses to 
governmental-related bodies, such as FRC, who requires comments on various aspects 
of corporate governance.85 
Second, UK industry associations have produced and promoted statements of, and 
guidance on, best practice in areas such as institutional investment, tax and share 
schemes. In the area of corporate governance, such statements include ISC’s A 
Statement of Principle on the Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and 
                                                 
82  See <http://www.institutionalshareholderscommittee.org.uk/library.html>, accessed 16 January 
2007. 
83 Stapledon (n 30) 133. 
84 Ibid. 
85 For example, NAPF issued its response to the FRC Combined Code Review in 2009.  
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Agents (Statement of Principle), ISC’s Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional 
Investors and NAPF’s 2009 Corporate Governance and Voting Guidelines86 and 
Responsible Voting – a Joint ABI – NAPF Statement in 1999. They will be discussed 
later in Chapter 4.2.2. All the above guidance is voluntary but those associations call 
on institutions to state publicly how they apply the principles. 
Third, industry associations serve as nexus between their institutional members and 
their investee companies to deal with their concerns or problems.87 For example, 
when there is concern over either corporate governance issues or strategic matters of 
the company, these associations sometimes assist members holding large number of 
shares to form ‘case committees’ to meet with the board and typically negotiate their 
concerns. These case committees were active in the late 1980s and 1990s. As reported 
by Stapledon, the ABI formed about 200 case committees annually.88 However, 
thereafter they were less seen until 2003 when NAPF was reported as reviving its case 
committee. The case committee is kept non-public and the meetings are conducted in 
a behind-the-scene way.  
Some associations, such as the NAPF and ABI, help their members to monitor their 
investee companies through their voting-information services. Their monitoring 
services will test listed companies’ compliance with relevant corporate governance 
                                                 
86 NAPF, ‘Corporate Governance Policy and Voting Guidelines’ NAPF,'Corporate Governance Policy 
and Voting Guidelines' (2009) 
<http://www.napf.co.uk/DocumentArchive/Policy/Corporate%20Governance/20090207_NAPF%20Co
rp%20Gov%20policy%20and%20voting%20guidelines%20-%202009%20updated.pdf> accessed 20 
May 2009. 
87 A good example is the institutional shareholders-management row over the CEO’s pay in Sainsbury 
plc in 2004. The NAPF met with the chairman of Sainsbury plc’s Remuneration Committee and 
recommended its members to vote against the management’s proposal. See J Finch, ‘Sainsbury's 
Facing Pay Defeat’ (10 July 2004) Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2004/jul/10/executivesalaries.executivepay> accessed 12 
December 2007.  
88 Stapledon (n 30) 137. 
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guidance, such as the UK Corporate Governance Code, and make voting 
recommendations on behalf of their subscribers.89  
In addition, industry associations have conducted surveys to examine the extent to 
which members are complying with good practice and engage with investee 
companies to act as responsible investors. They cover fund managers’ monitoring of 
investee companies, voting their shares, interacting by other means and informing 
their clients of their policy and engagement. These surveys are important sources of 
evidence in the thesis to investigate the level of shareholder engagement.90  
In sum, UK industry trade associations play an important role in promoting good 
corporate governance among institutional shareholders and facilitating shareholder 
engagement with their investee companies. As one will see later, the increase of 
shareholder activism in recent years in the UK is to some extent driven by these 
associations.91 
3.4 Corporate Governance Personnel 
An institutional shareholder, as its name indicates, is an institution with its own 
internal organization. To deal with corporate governance engagement, they have 
adopted a variety of administrative arrangements. Some institutions delegate to fund 
manager’s responsibility for both investment and handling of corporate governance 
engagement. Some institutions set up separate departments comprising of dedicated 
teams of governance analyst. Some investors outsource engagement activity to a 
corporate governance agency. This section introduces the first and second approaches. 
The delegation of authority to outside agencies will be discussed in the section 3.7.  
First, for some institutional investors, dealing with corporate governance issues is 
treated as part of every fund managers’ job. In addition to managing investment, they 
                                                 
89 See section 3.7. 
90 See surveys conducted by the NAPF, ABI and IMA, cited in Chapter 5. 
91 See Chapter 4.1.2 and 4.1.4. 
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need to closely monitor and research the companies they invest in and make decisions 
on whether to intervene when there are contentious issues regarding investee 
companies. Their roles as investment decision-makers and corporate governance 
monitors often overlap, because corporate governance is sometimes an important 
indicator for fund managers to assess a company, and shareholder engagement would 
potentially increase investment returns. Since nowadays corporate governance has 
increasingly become an important issue, research shows that fund managers devote 
more resources to engagement with investee companies than before.92 The advantage 
of this approach is cost-saving. Moreover, in some circumstances, fund managers, 
who get involved in investment process, are more likely to make accurate decisions 
on whether and how to engage in corporate governance. However, fund managers 
have traditionally performed their portfolio management duty and due to the special 
knowledge required for engaging corporate governance, they may sometimes not be 
well-suited for shareholder engagement. 
The second and now more common approach to handle engagement is to establish a 
separate corporate governance team, composed of governance specialists. A survey by 
IMA shows that only two of 32 firms appointed fund managers to manage shareholder 
engagement, while the rest of firms dedicated particular specialists to corporate 
governance.93 The increasing popularity of this approach may be partly in response to 
increasing pressure on institutional shareholders to take an active role in corporate 
governance, partly because of the importance of corporate governance in institutional 
investments, and partly because of the need for specialist knowledge to handle 
corporate governance issues.  
                                                 
92 NAPF, Pension Funds’ Engagement with Companies Survey 2007  
 <http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary.aspx> accessed 23 December 2008 
93 Investment Management Association, Survey of Fund Managers’ Engagement with the Companies 
for the Year Ended 30 June 2008 < http://www.investmentfunds.org.uk/news/press_centre/default.asp> 
accessed 23 August 2009. 
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The costs of developing specialist knowledge are likely higher, but this approach has 
a clear advantage in that specialists equipped with related knowledge would lead to a 
more effective shareholder involvement. These specialists play a single role of dealing 
with engagements but sometimes, they will provide advice to fund managers if 
information with regard to a company’s corporate governance is needed. They decide 
the way in which institutions approach investee companies, attend meetings with 
corporate managers and vote in the shareholders’ meetings. Under some 
circumstances, these specialists would work in conjunction with outside advisors to 
make decisions. 
Generally, whichever approach institutions have adopted, empirical evidence from the 
IMA suggests that the number of staff devoted to engagement rose by 10% in the year 
to 2005, having already risen by 10% in the previous year.94  
3.5 Hermes UK Focus Fund 
In the UK, Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecom Pension Scheme, 
operates a UK Focus Fund who pursues shareholder engagement as its investment 
strategy. The Hermes UK Focus Fund (HUKFF) invests in underperforming 
companies on the expectation that by engaging with underperforming investee 
companies, if necessary, using their ownership rights, it may achieve corporate 
governance improvements that they consider will ultimately lead to a higher value of 
investee companies. Due to its distinctive investment strategy, free-riding is not an 
option for the HUKFF (nor does the free-riding of others seem to be a threat to its 
own activism). I will return to this issue in Chapter 4. This section will first provide 
an introduction of the HUKFF’s activism approach and corporate governance 
principle it follows.   
3.5.1 The HUKFF Activism Approach95 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
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The HUKFF’s approach can be broadly divided into two stages: investment stage and 
engagement stage. At the investment stage, the HUKFF selects a list of companies 
that have consistently underperformed in the market as a result of structural or 
strategic governance weakness but have the potential to be remedied by shareholders 
engagement. It applies three criteria when evaluating which portfolio company to 
target, asking (1) whether the target is underperforming; (2) whether the fund believes 
it can engage the company successfully; and (3) whether the fund expects to achieve 
at least a 20% increase in current share price. If all three criteria are satisfied, the 
Fund will decide to include the company into its portfolio. 
The HUKFF begins engagement process with a meeting of the company at which it 
outlines proposals to improve corporate governance. If it gets a positive response 
from the board, the HUKFF will monitor and assist board in implementing decisions 
that are taken. If the response is negative, the Fund will meet with the independent 
board members and other major shareholders, to convince the board to make changes. 
The HUKFF will choose to threaten companies by taking public action, such as 
calling an EGM if there is no change made by the board.  
Once the changes have been taken, the HUKFF will continue to hold the shares and 
wait the changes to be released to the market, so that the market can re-evaluate the 
shares. Typically, it will take two to three years for an engagement to be successfully 
completed.  
3.5.2. Hermes’ Principles of Corporate Governance 
Hermes has issued a series of well-known statements in regard to corporate 
governance. They are: 
                                                                                                                                            
95 Information with regard to Hermes focus funds are obtained from <www.hermes.co.uk>. 
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a. Corporate Governance and Performance – was published in 2005.96 It provides an 
updated review and assessment of the evidence for a link between corporate 
governance and performance. The statement concludes that active shareholders’ 
engagement will lead to enhancement of shareholder value in the long term in 
investee companies.  
b. Corporate Governance Principles – was published in 2006. The Principles form the 
basis of its engagement with companies in which it invests. It contains two parts: the 
Global Principle and the Regional Principle. The former is formulated on the basis of 
International Corporate Governance Network(ICGN)’s Statements on Institutional 
Shareholder Responsibilities, 97  whilst the latter is produced by local market 
participants or regulators, taking into account specific needs in different regions.  
3.6 Securities Lending 
There is no doubt that institutional shareholders are the owners of investee companies’ 
shares and thus are entitled to exercise rights attached to the shares. However, under 
some circumstances, shares may be temporarily transferred to others for certain 
reasons. Securities lending, which is widely undertaken in the UK equity market, is 
one of the main activities contributing to this temporary share transfer. Before going 
to discussing how securities lending affects shareholder activism in detail, it is 
necessary to give some relevant background information about securities lending.  
In fact, the term ‘lending’ is somewhat misleading. The ‘lender’ and ‘borrower’ enter 
                                                
into a contractual relationship whereby beneficial ownership of the shares is 
transferred by the former to the latter. The borrower pays a contractual fee98 to the 
 
96 Hermes, Corporate Governance and Performance (Hermes, London 2005).  
ership organization of 97 The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) is a global memb
around 450 leaders in corporate governance based in 45 countries with a mission to raise standards of 
corporate governance worldwide. More information can be found at <http://www.icgn.org/> accessed 
29 December 2007.  
98 Cowell suggest fees range between about 5 basis points (5/100 of 1per cent) and 400 basis points, 
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lender for the loan of the shares, and agrees to return an equivalent number of shares 
back to the lender at the end of the contract.99 The borrower of the shares may retain 
them during the period of the loan, but equally may sell them on, or re-loan them. 
Because beneficial ownership of the shares passes from the lender to the borrower, the 
borrower will, as owner of the shares, become entitled to dividends payable on them. 
However, the terms of the loan transaction will usually stipulate that the borrower is 
to provide the lender with (or ‘manufacture’) an amount equivalent to the dividend 
paid.100 Likewise, the borrower will also be entitled to exercise the votes attaching to 
them.101 It is this consequence of share lending, in particular, that gives rise to 
concern about the governance implications of the practice, a point to which I return in 
Chapter 5.3.2.2.2.2.   
To protect the lender, share loans are usually ‘collateralised’, with the borrower 
providing security to the lender against a default by the borrower in returning the 
shares to the lender at the end of the loan agreement. The security may be cash or a 
variety of other forms of property, such as government or corporate bonds, letters of 
credit or other shares owned by the borrower. Where the borrower provides cash as 
security, the lender will usually pay interest thereon to the borrower, but typically at a 
rate lower than that which the lender should be able to earn by itself investing the 
                                                                                                                                            
see M Cowell, Stock Lending: A Perspective (2005) 
 <http://www.makinson-cowell.co.uk/mak/publications/insights/2005> accessed 12 August 2008. 
whilst Spitalfields advisors quote fees between 8 and 100 basis points, see, Spitalfields Advisors, An 
Introduction to Securities Lending (Third edn Spitalfields Advisors limited, London 2006) The level of 
fee depends on a number of factors, including supply of, and demand for, loans of the shares in 
question, the size of the issuing company (the smaller its capitalisation, the higher the fee), and the 
likelihood that the lender will seek to recall the shares.    
99 Spitalfields Advisors, ibid, 13. 
100 Nevertheless, the dividend will, as a matter of tax law, be treated as earned by the borrower, not the 
lender. This may entail a more advantageous tax treatment of the dividend from the point of view of the 
parties to the loan agreement, and provides the motivation for some share lending deals.   
101 The entitlement depends upon the borrower having been registered as the new owner at the ‘record 
date’ specified by the company. 
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cash.102   
At a macro-level, securities lending has grown considerably in recent years. It now 
represents a substantial part of the total number of day-to-to securities transactions.103 
The market in lent securities is estimated to be around $6 trillion, with about $22 
trillion available for loan and around $100 trillion in issue, according to Data explore 
Consulting.104  Nearly 50% of large firms’ shares in the Financial Times Stock 
Exchange 100 Index are estimated to be generally borrowable. 
The main lenders are those institutional shareholders with sufficiently large holdings 
to enjoy economies of scale in the making of loans. A survey carried out on behalf for 
the ICGN105 in 2004, amongst its institutional investor members, found that 29 out of 
39 respondents ‘frequently’ engaged in share lending, whilst a further 2 did so 
‘sometimes’.106  Almost two thirds of respondents lent, on average, upwards of 10% 
of their portfolios each year. A more recent survey carried out jointly by Pensions 
Week and Data Explorers Consulting also suggested the practice of share lending to 
be prevalent amongst institutional investors,107 with some 68% of fund managers 
found to offer for lending the shares of the institutions whose investments they 
managed. Loan transactions are recognized as a growing source of additional and 
                                                 
102 Indeed, this ability to earn a positive return on the collateral may be yet a further reason for the 
lender entering into the loan agreement in respect of the shares in the first instance.    
103 Section 5.2 of the European Commission’ consultation document of the Services of the Internal 
Market Directorate General: Fostering an appropriate regime for shareholders’ rights. 
104 D Rule, 'An Overview of the Securities Lending Market' (2008) Canadian Investment Review 
<http://www.investmentreview.com/archives/2008/fall/onloans.pdf> accesse 20 December 2009, 
quoted data from Spitalfields Advisors. Spitalfields Advisors has been rebranded as Data Explorers 
Consulting in 2009.  
105 In respect of this organization, see introduction in (n 97). 
106 Lintstock, Share Lending vis-à-vis voting: A Report Commissioned by the ICGN, 28 May 2008.  
107 Pensions Week and Data Explorers, ‘UK pension Fund Securities Lending Survey Results’ 
(October 2009),  
<http://www.dataexplorers.com/sites/default/files/Data%20Explorers%20Consulting%20UK%20Pensi
on%20Fund%20Survey%202009.pdf> accessed 10 December 2009. The survey, undertaken during 
August and September 2009, was addressed to the ‘top’ 50 UK pension funds, and claimed a response 
rate of 50%.  
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relatively low risk, income for lenders. So, it has been estimated that 47.1% of funds 
under Pension Week’s survey have obtained revenue of between £1 million to £5 
million from securities lending in 2008, a significant contribution to their overall 
profit.108  
In the UK, the conduct of stock lending should be carried on as a regulated activity 
under the FSMA 2000 (regulated activities) order 2001, and would have to be 
authorized and supervised under that Act. Those involved in the lending of securities, 
such as lenders, borrowers and agents will also abide by the provisions of the FSA 
Handbook, including the Market Conduct sourcebook and the Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook. The commonly used agreement for securities lending in the market is the 
Global Master Securities Lending Agreement which issued by the International Stock 
Lending Association.109  
Faulkner suggested that the most common reason behind the borrowing of securities 
is to cover a short position-settling an outright sale of securities.110 Short-selling 
allows borrowers to sell borrowed securities on the expectation that they can 
re-purchase those securities back at a cheaper price at some future date.  
Second, securities lending may also arise for tax arbitrage. Securities owners are 
subject to withholding tax on dividends or interest. But some investors can be free of 
withholding tax and they could use their tax position to borrow securities, receive the 
dividend free of tax and obtain rewards from the lenders via a large fee or large 
‘manufactured’ dividend.111  
A third motive for share borrowing is that some shareholders may be offered a choice 
of taking a dividend or reinvesting in additional securities at a discount to the market 
                                                 
108 Pensions Week and Data Explorers (n 107). 
109  International Stock Lending Association, Global Master Securities Lending Agreement, 
<http://www.isla.co.uk/uploadedFiles/Gmsla%202000%20version.pdf> accessed 23 August 2009.. 
110 Spitalfields Advisors (n 98) 10. 
111 For example, where the borrower pays or ‘manufactures’ an amount equal to, or larger than, the 
dividend back to the lender. 
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price. But some funds may be unable to take the dividend opportunities because their 
holding would exceed the permitted amount under investment guidelines. For the 
latter investors, they could borrow guaranteed dividend alternatives and sell the shares 
to the market. They will profit from the price difference between the discounted share 
and market share and also, they can share profits with the lenders via a larger fee or 
larger manufactured dividend. 
Finally, securities lending may also be driven by other financial considerations. For 
example, lenders may seek to obtain cash in exchange for the lent securities, and can 
use trading strategies such as buy/sell backs or cash collateralised securities lending. 
The reason why securities lending is relevant to this thesis, however, is that once 
securities have been lent, absolute title transferred between the parties and the new 
owner are entitled certain rights, including voting in the annual meeting.112 As a result, 
securities lending has a large impact on the exercise of share rights by institutional 
shareholders with particularly regard to voting. This will be returned to below, in 
section 5.3.2.2.2.2. 
3.7 Proxy Voting Agencies 
As shareholder activity has become both more important and more complex, it 
demands for sufficient time and resources from institutional investors. However, few 
institutional shareholders, even large investors which may be able to assign dedicated 
staff members to assess corporate governance issues, have adequate resources to 
consider every issue in shareholders’ meetings and investigate every company in their 
portfolio each year around the world. To remedy this, many institutions employ one 
of the proxy advisory services to discharge their duty to ultimate beneficiaries to vote 
their shares. Those proxy voting agencies become one of the participants in the voting 
process and have the potential to facilitate more effective shareholder activism. For 
example, they help institutions to overcome restraint from conflicts of interest and 
                                                 
112 Spitalfields Advisors (n 98) 5.  
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their professional opinion can lead to more efficient monitoring activities. It is 
therefore, necessary for this thesis to introduce some major advisors. More discussion 
of their roles in corporate governance is in Chapter 5.113 
In the UK, there are three major agencies offering proxy advisory services: the 
Institutional Voting Information Service (IVIS), the Research, Recommendation 
Electronic Voting (RREV), the Pensions and Investment Research Consultants 
(PIRC).  
3.7.1 Institutional Voting Information Service (IVIS)  
The IVIS is operated by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) since 1993.114 It is 
one of the largest proxy advisory providers, and has been subscribed to by the top 15 
investors in the UK FTSE All share index. Its services assist institutions to evaluate 
companies’ compliance with corporate governance best practice, to review 
companies' executive remuneration and all other proposed resolutions. It makes 
voting recommendations and issues reports based on the corporate governance 
standards set out in the ABI’ guidance and in the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
The monitoring targets of the IVIS include all UK FTSE ALL Share Index 
companies. 
A notable feature of the service provided by IVIS is its colour coding system, It uses 
different colours to highlight areas of concern: (a) Blue top indicates companies 
comply with ABI guidance and the UK Corporate Governance Code; and (b) amber 
top indicates concern; (c) red top indicates that non-compliance with guidance or 
corporate governance best practice and suggests members abstain or vote against in 
the meeting; and (d) green top indicates that there was previously non-compliance 
issue but it has been resolved.   
                                                 
113 See Chapter 5.3.1.8. 
114 Information come from IVIS’ website <http://www.ivis.co.uk/ > accessed 10 August 2008. 
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3.7.2 Research, Recommendation Electronic Voting (RREV) 
The second widely used proxy service is RREV which was launched jointly by the 
NAPF and American RiskMetrics (previously known as Institutional Shareholder 
Services) in 2004.115 Prior to 2004, the NAPF operated it own agency – Voting Issue 
Service from the beginning of 1993. The subscribers of RREV can also access 
RiskMetrics’ voting recommendations on more than 22,000 companies in about 80 
countries.  
Its monitoring services cover all companies in the FTSE All-Share and selected UK 
companies not included in the FTSE All-Share Index. The voting recommendations 
and corporate governance research reports are based on guidelines issued by the 
NAPF.   
The scope of its recommendations of best practice mainly include governance and 
financial performance, board structure, remuneration, auditing and accounting 
disclosure, and shareholder relations.   
3.7.3 Pensions and Investment Research Consultants (PIRC) 
Similar to IVIS and RREV, PIRC, which was established in 1986, offers research and 
advisory consulting services to institutional shareholders.116 It provides research on 
all shareholders’ meetings held by companies in the UK FTSE All Share Index and 
below, and issues proxy voting services to institutions. In addition, it has a 
shareowner engagement service, providing subscribers with ‘advice on engagement 
strategies and priorities’ and ‘facilitation of coalition-building among investors’.117 It 
has also established its own benchmark for good corporate governance – proxy voting 
guidelines and Shareowner Voting Guidelines.  
                                                 
115 More information can be found at <www.rrev.co.uk> accessed 10 August 2008. 
116 More information can be found at< www.pirc.co.uk> accessed 10 August 2008. 
117 More information can be found at <www.pirc.co.uk/services> accessed 10 August 2008. 
107 
 
108 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the institutional share ownership landscape in the UK. We 
have seen the rise of that ownership, as well as the different types of institutional 
shareholder, and the structures they employ to make, and to manage, their investments. 
We have seen the distinctive role played by one particular investor, Hermes, and the 
pervasive reliance on shareholder voting agencies. 
There are two important points that can be drawn from these observations. First, we 
found that the institutional investment market is mainly dominated by long-term 
institutions, including pension funds and insurance companies. Second, institutional 
shareholders in the UK are supported by institutions, such as association organizations 
and proxy voting services, to participate in corporate governance. As one will see in 
Chapter 4, these features have significant implications for applying the model that I 
have developed in Chapter 1. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 7, they serve to 
distinguish UK institutional investment from their Chinese counterpart. 
With this firm grasp on the empirical reality of UK institutional investment, the 
discussion in Chapter 4 now takes a more theoretical turn. In particular, we can now 
begin to develop the model sketched in Chapter 1 by ‘feeding’ into relevant findings 
about the UK governance framework (drawn from Chapter 2) and the landscape of 
institutional share ownership (drawn from this chapter).  
 
Chapter 4 Developing the Model for Institutional Investor 
Activism 
To properly understand shareholder activism, this thesis sought to develop a model in 
Chapter 1 to explain whether and when institutional shareholders might decide, 
individually, to take action. Recall that it suggests a two-steps process in 
understanding activism for individual institutional shareholders. The first step deals 
with the free-riding hurdle that faces an individual shareholder. This thesis suggested 
that under some circumstances, free-riding on the efforts of others is not a rational 
option for an individual shareholder. This thesis suggested four factors are relevant: 
the decisiveness of large individual institutional holdings, the possibility of concerted 
action, ‘in process’ benefits and a normative obligation to act. 
The second step proceeds to ask whether, for the shareholder in question, its 
individual benefits from action would still be greater than its individual costs. I 
suggested that the ‘gains’ include the shareholder’s share of the total gains to the 
corporation from the activism in question, plus any individual benefits it secures 
through its own activism. I also offered a classification of ‘costs’ based on direct costs 
and indirect costs of activism.    
In dealing with the first stage of the model in Chapter 1, this thesis emphasized that 
the precise functioning of these factors – the impact they have on the decision-making 
of any given institutional investor – will depend upon the governance or regulatory 
environment, upon the type of institutional shareholder concerned, and upon the form 
of activism being undertaken. This chapter develops the model by feeding in some 
relevant issues about the governance/regulatory environment and the type of 
institutional shareholder involved in the potential activism. Chapter 5 turns to feed 
into the model the different types of activism.  
109 
 
4.1 Step 1: Overcoming Free-Riding 
4.1.1 Individual Shareholding 
As I said in Chapter 1, one of the factors which might overcome the ‘free-riding’ 
problem is where a shareholder’s stake in the company is sufficiently large that the 
shareholder calculates that stake will be decisive in changing corporate behaviours. 
(Moreover, the size of individual shareholding is also relevant to the cost-benefit 
analysis as well, as we shall see in section 4.2.) 
So, are large institutional investors’ shares big enough to be decisive? The accepted 
norm is that UK listed companies have a dispersed shareholder base by international 
standards.1 However, it is certainly now arguable that they are not as widely dispersed 
as has commonly been assumed. 
 
Recall, by way of illustration, the shareholding of major investors in Marks and 
Spencer PLC.2 As we can see in Table 4.1, the largest shareholder own 6.57% of total 
shares. This is large in absolute terms. Moreover, in practice, when it comes to, for 
example, voting, its power could be even larger since not all shareholders would cast 
their votes at shareholders’ meeting. If we calculate based on the average voting level 
in UK – 60%3 – the largest shareholder controls 10.9% of total votes cast at the AGM, 
which may well be decisive to take action. 
Table 4.1: Major shareholder of Marks and Spencer PLC 
                                                 
1 See generally, A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 Journal of 
Finance 737. 
2 See Chapter 3 Table 3.2. 
3 See Chapter 5.3.1.2. 
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Source: Marks and Spencer, Annual Report and Financial Statement 2010, 73. 
Similarly, Prudential has four shareholders with a greater than 3% shareholding: one 
with 3.08%; one with 3.87; another holding 6.39% and another with 13.018%.4 There 
are two shareholders with a disclosable shareholding in Vodafone: one with 5.74% 
and the other with 4.03%.5 Clearly, for these large shareholders, the collective action 
problem is surely not as significant as has been traditionally assumed. 
Recent research conducted by ISS Europe in mid-2000s looked at the share ownership 
structure of 20 large UK listed companies and 20 recently listed companies and found 
that share ownership in these companies was much less widely dispersed than 
commonly thought. 6  15% of large UK companies and 45% of recently listed 
companies have one or more significant shareholders owning at least 20% of the share 
capital.7 Those large shareholders clearly have potential to be decisive in taking 
action. 
                                                 
4 Prudential Plc, 2010 Financial Report 
<http://www.prudentialreports.com/2010hy/files/pru_hy10_report_AdditionalInfo.pdf >available 12 
July 2010. 
5 Vodafone Plc, 2010 Annual Report 
<http://www.vodafone.com/static/annual_report10/additional_information/shareholder_information.ht
ml > accessed 12 July 2010. 
6 ISS European, European Corporate Governance Institute and Shearman& Sterling, Report on the 
Proportionality Principle in the European Union, (2007) 
 <http://www.ecgi.org/osov/documents/final_report_en.pdf> accessed 10 April 2010. 
7 Ibid. 
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We should not, then, be too quick to assume that individual shareholders in the UK, 
can never reasonably think their actions will be decisive. Nevertheless, nor should we 
go too far in the opposite direction and assume individual shareholders will often be 
decisive. The UK does, in comparison to many other countries (including China), 
remain one characterised by comparatively dispersed ownership. Given that, it 
remains relevant to ask whether UK listed companies should move towards even 
greater concentration of share ownership. 
4.1.1.1 The Impracticality of Significantly Greater Concentration  
There are two reasons for doubting that greater concentration would be likely or 
desirable. The first is the attitude of institutions towards risk. The second is legal 
norms favouring diversification.  
First, institutional shareholders, as custodians of others’ assets, want to handle risk 
appropriately by diversifying their investment portfolios.8 This has created a bias 
against concentration.9 To maintain diversification, institutional investors imposed 
upon themselves limits on the maximum percentage of equity they would own in a 
single company.10 A 2 or 3% stake will represent a very large proportion in any UK 
public listed companies. In HSBC, for example, a 3% stake would be ￡3.5 billion, 
or roughly 10% of the assets of the Universities Superannuation Scheme.11 Any 
further increase in investment in HSBC would suggest a large size of their holding for 
                                                 
8 There is a rich literature discussing this issue. For a detailed discussion on portfolio theory, see W F 
Sharpe Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets (McGraw-Hill, New York 1970); R Dobbins and S F 
Witt, Portfoliot Theory and Investment Management (Robertson, Oxford 1983); D Blake, Pension 
Schemes and Pension Funds in the United Kingdom (Clarendon Press Oxford 1995) 487; A L Tucker 
and others, Contemporary Portfolio Theory and Risk Management (West Publishing, New York 1994); 
E J Elton and others, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis (Wiley, Hoboken 2009). 
9 J Coffee, 'Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor' (1991) 91 
Columbia Law Review 1277, 1355-7. 
10 P Davies, 'Institutional Investors: A UK View' (1991) 57 Brooklyn Law Review 129, 140. 
11 C Riley, N Ryder and N Stansbury, ‘A submission to the Walker Review’ (2009), on file with the 
author.  
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a scheme. It would be therefore risky for institutions to increase their concentration of 
share ownership in listed companies and the cost to sacrifice liquidity for more 
control is unacceptable.12 The traditional way in which fund managers had been 
trained further enhances their preference for diversification over concentration. Many 
fund managers have ‘grown up with modern portfolio theory, in which securities are 
fungible, characterized by risk and return and no more.’13 Diversifying their portfolio 
to reduce investment risk is worthwhile, while attempting to improve performance by 
monitoring governance is not recommended.14 
Secondly, this portfolio investment strategy to spread risks is supported by legal 
restrictions. Some institutional investors are not free to purchase shares as large as he 
wants in a single listed company. For example, authorized open-ended investment 
funds cannot invest more than 5% of their scheme property in transferable securities 
or approved money-market instruments of a single issuer.15 Nor may such institutions 
control more than 10% of transferable securities of a single issuer.16  Although 
pension funds are not subject to such regulatory restrictions, they must operate under 
a ‘prudential model’ which requires managers to undertake investment with minimum 
risks.17     
Moreover, larger holdings also trigger potentially more onerous disclosure obligations. 
A shareholder is obliged to notify the FSA if his interest in a company is in 3% or 
more of the issuer’s voting rights.18 Once a shareholder has reported his major 
                                                 
12 Coffee (n 9). 
13 B Black, 'Shareholder Passivity Reexamined' (1990) 89 Michigan Law Review 520, 563. 
14 M Goergen, L Renneboog and C Zhang, ‘Do UK Institutional Investors Monitor their Investee 
Firms’ 8 Journal of Corporate Studies (2008) 39, 43. 
15 FSA Handbook, COLL, 5.2.11.R. 
16 FSA Handbook, COLL, 5.2.29.R. 
17 Pension Act 1995 s 35. 
18 FSA Handbook, DTR 5.1.2.R. 
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holding, every change in that holding must be notified when the percentage of voting 
rights reaches or crosses every 1% threshold up to 100%, going up or down.19 
Similar observations have been expressed in respect of the US.20 In summary, both 
economic concerns and legal rules are likely to deter institutional shareholders from 
moving towards significantly greater concentration of share ownership.  
4.1.2 The Possibility of Concerted Action 
Given that it is likely to remain comparatively rare for any single individual 
institution’s holding to be decisive, the more likely and practical way in which 
free-riding will be overcome is if concerted action by a relatively small group of 
investors is feasible. The practicality of such coalition, as I have suggested in Chapter 
1, significantly increases to the extent that share ownership is more concentrated, so 
that fewer shareholders need to agree to act together in order to constitute a decisive 
block of shares. 
In Chapter 3, we have seen a significant shift in the ownership of UK listed 
companies from individual investors to institutional investors. A significant portion of 
shares is now concentrated in a small group of institutional investors, suggesting that 
a collective action amongst institutional shareholders will more often constitute a 
decisive block of shares.  
So, how many institutional investors are likely to need to be involved to form an 
effective coalition? By way of illustration, in Marks and Spencer, as Table 4.1 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 For example, Black suggested that US ownership restrictions on institutional investment, make a 
single institution hard to own a large portion of shares in a single company than it would otherwise be. 
See B Black, 'Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice' (1992) 39 UCLA 
Law Review 811,822. Similarly, Roe contends that mutual funds ‘could have been a conduit of 
shareholder power’ but for regulations and ownership restrictions. See, M Roe, 'Political Elements in 
the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry' (1991) 139 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1469, 
1470. 
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suggests, the collective shares of top five shareholder amount to 24% of Marks and 
Spencer’ total equity and they control approximately 40% of the votes cast when the 
voting level of the meeting is around 60%.  
Writing in 1985, Scott argued that a group consisting of 10-20 institutional investors 
would typically represent 20-30% of the issued share capital of the company 
concerned.21 Since then, institutional share ownership appears to have become yet 
more concentrated. So, under Stapledon’s research, a coalition consisting of 2-6 large 
institutional investors can represent 20-30% of the shares of the company.22 Goergen 
and Renneboog showed that, in a sample of FTSE 250 Index companies, a coalition of 
the top three shareholders in 250 UK listed companies would own 27.7%, and all 
large shareholdings combined would come to about 40%.23 This evidence suggests 
that it might not be difficult to organize a collective action in UK listed companies as 
the number of shareholders needed to act together in order to constitute a decisive 
block of share is comparatively small.24  
Moreover, the likelihood of coalitions is further increased by the facilitation of 
industry associations. As we have seen in Chapter 3, trade associations, such as the 
NAPF, IMA and ISC, play an important role in organizing collective actions amongst 
institutional shareholders. For example, when their member institutions have concerns 
over investee companies, those industry associations can establish ‘case committees’, 
comprising members holding the largest shares in the companies, to meet with the 
executives/board. When large institutional investors in Prudential reacted angrily to 
                                                 
21 J Scott, Corporations, Classes and Capitalism (Hutchinson, London 1985) 49. 
22 G Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Clarendon, Oxford 1996) 126. 
23 M Goergen and L Renneboog, ‘Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK’ in F 
Barca and M Becht. (eds), The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 
259, 270. 
24 R Crespi and L Renneboog, ‘Is (Institutional) Shareholder Activism New? Evidence from UK 
Shareholder Coalitions in the Pre-Cadbury Era’ 18 Corporate Governance: An International Review 
274. They found shareholder coalition has been an effective corporate governance mechanism for 
several decades in the UK, even before the first code initiated by the Cadbury committee. 
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the aborted bid for AIA, the managers of Prudential have to meet with the NAPF to 
seek its help.25  
Therefore, the concentration of institutional holdings in UK listed companies and the 
facilitation of trade associations, undermine the likelihood of free-riding by making it 
easier for institutions to form a coalition to counterbalance the power of the 
incumbent management. On the other hand, we have to consider whether some 
aspects of the legal framework make concerted action more difficult. Of most 
relevance here are first disclosure rules and second takeover rules. 
4.1.2.1 Legal Impediments to Acting in Concert 
Institutional shareholders who act together to form a decisive block of stakes face 
legal risks of being identified as ‘acting in concert’ and triggering disclosure or 
takeover obligations. As one will see later, despite regulators having issued statements 
to confirm these rules are not intended to conflict with shareholder collective action, 
these rules still might constrain shareholder coalitions as the rules lack the clarity and 
certainty for which institutions might have hoped.  
4.1.2.1.1 Takeover Rules 
In the UK, the activity of acting in concert is currently regulated by the Takeover 
Code. The term ‘acting in concert’ is defined under the Takeover Code as where 
‘persons coordinate with the offeror or the offeree company on the basis of an 
agreement, whether formal or informal, aimed either at acquiring control of the offeree 
company or at frustrating the successful outcome of a bid.’26  
                                                 
25 P Davies and K Burgess, ‘Pru Investors Turn Focus on McGrath’, Financial Times (London 16 June 
2010) < http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/987c085e-7984-11df-b063-00144feabdc0.html > accessed 23 June 
2010. 
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If shareholder collective action towards a company is deemed to be ‘acting in concert’, 
relevant investors have to face the choice: to make a mandatory bid on the target 
company or place themselves in breach of the Takeover Code.27 
4.1.2.1.2 Disclosure rules 
As noted in section 4.1.1.1, a shareholder is obliged to notify the FSA if he has an 
interest in holdings of 3% or above of the issuer’s voting rights. Moreover, he must 
seek pre-approval from the FSA for acquisition of controlling levels of shareholdings 
and voting power in a company.28 The FSMA 2000 further provides that in certain 
situations, when calculating a person's percentage level of voting power, it is 
necessary to aggregate that person's holdings with another's, to decide if together they 
are large enough to trigger these obligations.29 These circumstances include, for 
example, where those persons have concluded an agreement which obliges them to 
adopt ‘by concerted exercise of the voting power they hold, a lasting common policy 
towards the management of the undertaking in question’.30  
In 2007, the FSA issued guidance in its publication, Market Watch Number 20, which 
warned that, if several shareholders acted together to build stakes with the intention of 
avoiding market disclosure requirement that would otherwise be required if the shares 
                                                                                                                                            
26 Takeover Code, C1 definitions; This rules further provide that The afflicted persons are all deemed 
to be acting in concert with each other. ‘The control of a company’ means 30% or more of the voting 
rights are concentrated in the hand of shareholders in collective action. 
27 Takeover Code, Rule 9. 
28 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Controllers) Regulations 2009 (SI 2001/3495) s 178. 
And s 422 (2) provides that ‘controller’ means (1) a person holds 10% or more of the shares or voting 
power in the authorised firm or a parent undertaking of the authorised firm; or (2) is able to exercise 
significant influence over the management of the authorised firm by virtue of its holding of shares or 
voting power in the authorised firm or a parent undertaking of the authorised firm.  
29 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Controllers) Regulations 2009 (SI 2001/3495) s 422 
(3).  
30 The FSMA 2000 (Controllers) Regulations 2009, 422 (5)(a)(i). 
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had been bought by one investor, they may be at risk of committing market 
manipulation.31  
4.1.2.1.3 Statements from the FSA and the Takeover Panel 
While these rules aim to protect the interests of public, in the context of shareholder 
activism, they are considered by many investors as ambiguous and fail to distinguish 
between collective action aimed at achieving a degree of control on target companies 
and collective action which is not designed to seek control but to promote good 
corporate governance. For example, when the public criticises institutional 
shareholders for their being passive in dealing with banks during the banking crisis, 
some shareholders claimed that they were afraid to break the 2007 guidance from the 
FSA.32 Being afraid of breaking rules on acting in concert, instead of taking concerted 
action with other investors, Knight Vinke, an activist group, attacked HSBC by 
outlining its view on a quarter-page advertisement in the Financial Times.33 Robert 
Jenkins, chairman of the IMA, said that when institutions join forces for change at 
specific companies they should be exempted from the rules.34 
These concerns have been noted by Sir David Walker in his consultation report for the 
Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Institutions.35 
The consultation emphasized the importance of shareholder activism as a means of 
promoting good corporate governance and pointed out that current regulations are not 
specific enough to allow institutions to join forces on governance issues. He 
                                                 
31 FSA, Markets Division: Newsletter on Market Conduct and Transaction Reporting Issues, Market 
Watch Issue 20, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/newsletters/mw_newsletter20.pdf accessed 25 
May 2009. 
32  See ‘FSA Spells Out Rules for Activist Investors’ Financial Times (August 19 2009) < 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac934b4a-8cbd-11de-a540-00144feabdc0.html> accessed 21 August 2009 
33  See ‘Knight Letter Targets HSBC Investors’Financial Times (7 September 2009) < 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3fa8c3d6-5d6a-11dc-8d22-0000779fd2ac.html > accessed 21 August 2009.  
34 L Norman and M Foster, 'FSA Says Rules Won’t Hurt Shareholder Activism ' Wall Street Journal 
(August 20 2009)<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125072471082144583.html> accessed 2 November 
2009. 
35 Available at < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/walker.cfm> accessed 15 October 2009. 
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suggested the regulators, including the FSA and Takeover Panel, ensure ‘there are no 
regulatory impediments, real or imagined, to effective dialogue.’36 
Building on that recommendation, on August 2009, the FSA sent an open letter to the 
ISC to explain how shareholders can work jointly to promote effective corporate 
governance without triggering obligations of being identified as acting in concert.37 In 
the letter, the FSA clarified how its rules on market abuse, disclosure of major 
shareholding and changes in control interact with collective shareholder activism. 
Such clarification is, however, restricted to specific ad hoc corporate issues. 
Institutional shareholders should remain vigilant that long-term agreement to vote 
together may constitute market abuse. Moreover, they must not trade in investee 
securities based on the information they obtain while working together.38 
Following close on the FSA’ statement, the Takeover Panel also issued a Practical 
Statement to allay institutional shareholders’ concern that collective action may be 
constrained by the rules of acting in concert and mandatory offer requirements.39 
The statement deals with the way in which it normally interprets and applies certain 
provisions of the Takeover Code in the context of shareholder activism. It sets two 
tests, both of which must be satisfied before a mandatory offer will be triggered: 
‘·those shareholders requisition a general meeting to consider a “board 
control-seeking” resolution or threaten to do so; and 
·after an agreement or understanding is reached between the activist shareholders 
that a “board control-seeking” [emphasis added] resolution should be proposed or 
threatened, those shareholders acquire interests in shares such that the shares in 
                                                 
36 Ibid, 5.43. 
37 FSA, ‘Shareholder Engagement and the Current Regulatory Regime’, a Letter to Keith Skeoch, 
Chairman of ABI <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/shareholder_engagement.pdf> accessed 25 
December 2009. 
38 More detailed discussion on this issue is provided in Chapter 5.2. 
39 The Takeover Panel, Practice Statement No.26 Shareholder Activism, 2009.  
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which they are interested together carry 30% or more of the voting rights in the 
company (or, if they are already interested in shares carrying 30% or more of the 
voting rights of the company, they acquire further interests in shares).’40 
In determining whether an action is ‘board-control seeking’, the Panel will assess a 
number of factors listed in the Statement. These are mainly: 
‘·Whether there is significant relationship between the proposed directors and the 
shareholders proposing them or their supporters 
·The number of directors to be appointed or replaced compared with the total size of 
the board 
·The board position held by the directors being replaced and to be held by the 
proposed directors 
·The nature of the mandate 
·Whether the activist shareholders will benefit as a result of the implementation of 
the proposal, other than through their interests in shares in the company 
·Relationship between the proposed directors and the existing directors and/or 
between the existing directors and the activist shareholders’ 
 
In particular, the Panel confirms three common situations which will not lead the 
Panel to conclude a concert party had come together. They are: 
 
‘·Discussions between shareholders about possible issues which might be raised 
with a company’s board;  
·Joint representations by shareholders to the board; and  
·The agreement by shareholders to vote in the same way on a particular resolution at 
a general meeting.’  
 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
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Undoubtedly, these statements have produced a greater degree of certainty and clarity 
over the application of provisions on acting in concert, and thus to some extent 
mitigate institutional shareholders’ concern. As Danka Starovic, policy adviser on 
regulation at the ABI, noted ‘this time, the Executive has produced a very worthy 
effort to go the extra mile, and …..the FSA…also provides encouragement for the 
members of the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee.’41  
However, these statements have not gone far enough in providing clarity or regulatory 
certainty. There are some issues which remained unaddressed. First, in the FSA’ letter, 
it simply comments that ‘a lasting common policy towards the management of the 
issuer through the exercise of their voting rights’ is unlikely to ‘include the kind of ad 
hoc discussions and understandings which might be reached between institutional 
shareholders in relation to particular issues or corporate events’.42 However, it does 
not go further to give an explanation on what constitute a lasting common policy. 
Again, as observed by Slaughter and May, ambiguity arises as to what would fall into 
particular issues or corporate events.43 For example, would jointly voting for a change 
of board member constitute ‘particular issues’ and not break the rules? Explanations 
illustrating what kind of corporate issues are likely to fall on each side of the line are 
required.  
Second, as McQuay noted, uncertainty remains as to what will constitute board 
control-seeking proposal under some circumstances.44 A particular concern arises 
when the board refuses the shareholders’ proposal and the institutions want to take 
further action. Institutional shareholders must be careful not to fall on the wrong side 
                                                 
41 M McQuay, ‘Shareholder Activism: A Modicum of Reassurance’ (2009) Practical Law Company 
<http://fs.practicallaw.com/9-500-3174> accessed 20 October 2009. 
42 FSA (n 37). 
43 Slaughter and May, 'Shareholder Activism-A Call for More Extensive Guidance from the FSA' 
(2009)  
<http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/848084/shareholder_activism_call_for_more_extensive_gui
dance_from_fsa.pdf> accessed 20 October 2009. 
44 M McQuay, 'Shareholder Activism: a Modicum of Reassurance' (2009) Practical Law Company 
<http://fs.practicallaw.com/9-500-3174> accessed 20 October 2009.                                       
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of the line set up by the Panel when they inform the board about their further action. 
According to the Panel’s statement, if the activist shareholders make it known that, if 
their initial proposal fails, they will put forward a ‘board control-seeking’ plan, this 
may lead the Panel to conclude that the initial proposal is ‘board control-seeking’ and 
that a concert party has arisen. Thus, what institutions tell the board is crucial. If 
institutional shareholders are not careful enough, their action would cross the line 
accidentally. Moreover, when institutions plan an agreement which would oblige 
them to adopt a consistent voting policy in the next general meeting, this risk of 
constituting a long-lasting policy under the FSA’s letter emerges again. 
In short, statements from regulators have provided some welcome reassurance as to 
their attitude towards collective shareholder actions. They give institutional 
shareholders safe harbours when they team up for lobbying changes for management 
at investee companies. With these clarifications, it is likely that the level of collective 
voting activism will increase. In the future, it is hoped that the regulators can provide 
further certainty and clarity in respect of collective shareholder actions if possible. 
4.1.3 ‘In process’ Benefits   
Some institutional shareholders, as argued in Chapter 1, may regard engagement itself 
as a way of gaining profits and thus, have incentives to forego free-riding to gain 
these ‘in process’ benefits. Perhaps the leading example in the UK is that of the 
Hermes UK Focus Fund (HUKFF), which I have introduced in Chapter 3. Hermes has 
actively engaged in shareholder activism to improve the corporate governance of 
investee companies. To be sure, part of the benefit of doing this is an anticipated rise 
in the value of its investee companies. Recently, researchers from the London 
Business School examined the investment and shareholder engagement approach 
adopted by HUKFF over the period 1998-2004 and found that its engagement is 
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ultimately value increasing. 45  During that period, the HUKFF invested in 41 
companies, and engaged with 30 of them. It had meetings with chairmen, CEOs, 
divisional managers, head of investor relations and with non-executive board 
members.46 It also contacted other institutional shareholders to seek their supports for 
its efforts.47 
The research found that the fund’s engagement approach was highly successful. It 
generated annual raw returns net of fees of 8.2%, or 4.9% if measured by the 
abnormal returns against the FTSE All-Share Index over the period 1998-2004.48 90% 
of such returns are attributable to its engagement activists. 49  Information from 
Hermes’ own publication, Corporate Governance and Performance also confirms  
that its HUKFF outperformed the FTSE all shares Total Return Index by 3.9% on an 
annual basis since its inception in 1998.50 
However, this thesis would argue, besides hoping for (and achieving) a rise in the 
value of its investee companies, part of Hermes’ gain from its policy of engagement is 
an in process gain, namely a positive reputation. Engagement has become a 
reputational issue which could help institutional shareholders to maintain competitive 
position in the market. 51 Hendry et als found that the institutions’ main clients – 
normally the pension fund trustees – had become increasly preoccupied with 
corporate governance.52 Those clients would therefore request institutions to pay a lot 
                                                 
45 M Becht and others, 'Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the 
Hermes UK Focus Fund' (2009) 22 Review of Financial Studies 3093. 
46 Ibid, 3095. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Hermes, Corporate Governance and Performance (Hermes, London 2005). 
51 P Montagnon, ‘The Role of the Shareholder’ in K Rushton(eds), The Business Case for Corporate 
Governance (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008 ) 81. 
52 J Hendry and others, 'Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and the New Shareholder 
Activism' (2004) ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 
297. 
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of attention to corprorate governance.53 As such, institutional investors’ failure to 
ensure good corporate governance in portfolio companies will be seen by potential 
investors as an inability to manage their management properly. This creates incentives 
for institutional investors to make sure that their portfolio companies are well 
monitored. Such demand is stronger on large institutional investors as their activities 
are more easily observed: ‘If you’ve got 5% in a company and it goes wrong, then 
there’s a risk to our reputation.’54 
Moreover, as a result of the implementation of the Stewardship Code, this kind of 
reputational benefit is likely to become an even more relevant factor when institutions 
determine whether to take action. As Macneil observes, the Stewardship Code is more 
focused on disclosure, such as of shareholders’ engagement policy, than the process 
for activism.55 This implies that motives for greater shareholder monitoring after the 
implementation of the Stewardship Code are more likely to be driven by the public 
and funds’ clients. Institutional investors who often free-ride on others’ efforts face 
the shame threat and the risk of losing their clients.  
4.1.4 A Moral/normative Obligation to Participate 
As said in Chapter 1, there may be occasions when shareholders do not calculate in 
the economic way, accepting an obligation to act regardless of whether they could 
free-ride on the efforts of others. This obligation may derive from a regulatory norm, 
or institutions’ fiduciary duty towards their clients, or a moral or social obligation to 
act. The strength of these obligations is, as we shall see, likely to vary between 
institutions and between different situations. 
4.1.4.1 Regulatory Demand 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 I Macneil, 'Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies' (2010) 
Capital Markets Law Journal 16.  
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Institutional shareholder engagement has long been regarded as vital to the corporate 
governance system in the UK and there has been much regulatory pressure from 
various bodies to encourage institutional shareholders to engage more actively in 
corporate governance. Firstly, since 2006, the Government took power under the CA 
2006 to require institutional investors to disclose how they have voted their shares.56 
While it is stated that the government will use this power only if a voluntary regime 
were to fail to improve disclosure, it is threatening and forces institutional investors to 
consider their responsibilities to be responsible owners of investee companies for the 
interests of their beneficiaries and public.  
Secondly, successive governance guidance in the UK, from the Cadbury Report in 
1992, through the Greenbury, Hampell, Turnbull and Higgs reviews in the mid 1990s 
to early 2000s, and on to the current UK Corporate Governance Code (UK Code), all 
emphasized the importance of institutional shareholders’ monitoring in enhancing the 
accountability of corporate management. The UK Code, for example, previously 
contained a separate section (Section E) that set out a number of recommendations 
addressed to institutional shareholders.57  
The Stewardship Code can be considered the culmination of this long process of 
addressing institutional behaviour. In 2000, Paul Myners was commissioned by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to carry out a review of institutional investment. His 
Report (Myners Report) was first published in 2001, and reviewed in 2004, 2005 and 
2007.58 The Myners Report sets out principles for investment decision making for 
pension fund trustees, including a recommendation on incorporating shareholder 
activism into fund management mandates.59  
Meanwhile, a variety of representative organizations all issued statements or 
                                                 
56 CA 2006 ss 1277-1280. 
57 Combined Code 2008, E1 E2 E3., See introduction in Chapter 2. 
58 P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2004); (2005); (2007). London: 
Shareholder Voting Working Group. 
59 P Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (2000). London: HM Treasury. 
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guidelines to push institutional shareholders to use their considerable governance 
power for both beneficiaries and the companies in which they invest. The most 
influential guidelines include the following: 
4.1.4.1.1 ISC’s A Statement of Principle on the Responsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders and Agents60 (Statement of Principle) – was first issued by 
ISC in October 2002 and the latest version was published in 2007. The 
Statement of Principle was formed as a response to the Government’ 
argument that institutional investment industry can develop a voluntary 
approach to ensure their considerable power is being used responsibly. The 
Statement of Principle outlines best institutional investor practice, and 
identifies the responsibilities of institutional investors in respect of the 
companies in which they invest. In particular, institutional investors are 
required to: (1) set out corporate governance policy; (2) monitor investee 
companies’ performance; (3) intervene, where necessary; and (4) evaluate 
and report how they discharged their responsibilities to their clients.61 The 
Statement of Principle was revised in 2009 and renamed as the Code on 
the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors.  
4.1.4.1.2 ISC’s Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors 62 – was 
published on 16 November 2009. It sets out best institutional investor 
practice with regard to monitoring companies, dialogue with company 
boards and voting at general meetings. The Code is now adopted by the 
FRC as the Stewardship Code for institutional investors.  
4.1.4.1.3 NAPF’s 2009 Corporate Governance and Voting Guidelines 63  and 
Responsible Voting – a Joint ABI – NAPF Statement in 199964 – both 
                                                 
60 It is available at <http://www.institutionalshareholderscommittee.org.uk/library.html> accessed 19 
August 2009. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 NAPF, ‘Corporate Governance and Voting Guidelines’  
< http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary.aspx >accessed 19 August 2009. 
64 Ibid. 
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statements set out guidance to their members on how to responsible vote 
their shares in investee companies. As shown in Chapter 5, these 
guidelines become the voting guidance for the voting services provided by 
the NAPF and ABI.  
Finally, the Stewardship Code, made on the basis of the ISC Code on the 
Responsibilities of Institutional Investors, contains seven principles which institutions 
should respect, namely:65 
1. publicly disclose their policies on how they will discharge their stewardship 
responsibilities; 
2. have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation to stewardship and 
this policy should be publicly disclosed; 
3. monitor their investee companies; 
4. establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their activities as a 
method of protecting and enhancing shareholder value; 
5. be willing to act collectively with other investors where appropriate; 
6. have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity; 
7. report periodically on their stewardship and voting activities. 
 
Although the practical effect of the Stewardship Code remains to be seen, there is 
some empirical evidence suggesting previous regulatory calls seem at least partially 
effective. For example, Cheffins and Goergen et al., suggested that institutional 
shareholders activism stepped up a gear after the Myners’ Report in 2001.66 Williams 
and Conley also pointed out that many institutional shareholders started to increase 
their engagement level with investee companies as a result of the desire to avoid 
                                                 
65 Stewardship Code, available at < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/investorgovernance.cfm > 
accessed 4 July 2010. 
66 B Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008) 386 (summarizing cases of institutional shareholder activism after Myners’ report 
in 2001); M Goergen, L Renneboog and C Zhang, ‘Do UK Institutional Investors Monitor Their 
Investee Firms’ 8 Journal of Corporate Studies (2008) 39, 56. 
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legislative intervention.67 Moreover, as we will see later in Chapter 5, many large 
institutional investors incorporated the ISC’ Statement of Principle into fund 
managers’ contracts as a guidance for engagement.68 
4.2 Step 2: A Cost-benefit Analysis 
Once the free-rider problem is overcome, my model suggests activism by an 
individual institution is likely if a second step is satisfied, namely if that shareholder’s 
benefits outweigh its own costs. The benefits and costs of activism depend in part on 
the type of institutional shareholder and it is the purpose of the part below to work out 
how different types of institutional shareholder will calculate his costs and benefits. 
4.2.1 Benefits 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the benefits of activism mainly come from (1) share of 
total gains to the company; plus (2) any personal gains (e.g reputational). 
4.2.1.1 Share of Total Gains to the Company 
Generally, successful shareholder activism will generate more benefit to larger 
institutional shareholders with long-term investment horizons than it will to small, 
short-term, institutional investors. 
First, the overall size of shareholding is clearly one of the factors influencing the 
amount of benefits secured from activism. Larger institutional investors have more 
incentive for activism because they receive greater return from activism than smaller 
institutional shareholders. A good example is activist hedge funds. In order to have 
sufficient leverage over the management of investee companies, activist hedge funds 
invest a large portion of their funds only in a small number of companies. HUKFF, 
                                                 
67 C A Williams and J M Conley, 'An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the Anglo-American 
Shareholder Value Construct ' (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 493, 540-41. 
68 See Chapter 5.3. 
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for example, invested only forty-one companies between the beginning of 1999 and 
the end of 2004.69 The size of their holdings allows them to receive more of the 
financial benefits of intervention than do smaller investors. Thus, they are more 
willing to take action for great return. 
The second characteristic that can affect institutional shareholders’ incentives for 
activism is their shareholding time horizon. The length of investment held by 
institutions is positively linked with the size of benefits secured from activism. As 
needs for liquidity vary, there are different equity holding terms among institutional 
shareholders. For example, pension funds and insurance companies have traditionally 
held more equity in the UK with long-term time horizons. In contrast, mutual funds 
have to maintain a high diversification of their portfolios. Fund managers’ 
performances are annually reviewed and if they are found to lag behind others, clients 
can easily shift from one fund to another or withdraw their funds on short notice.70 As 
a result, mutual funds with shorter investment horizon tend to rely on market forces 
rather than engagement as a means for improving fund performance. 
Institutional shareholders with long-term investment horizons will receive more 
benefits than those with shorter term investment. Firstly, longer investment offers a 
good opportunity for institutions to develop long-term relationships with investee 
companies to increase those institutions’ influence over the company and to secure 
more accountability from the board.71 It has been argued that a close relationship 
between institutional investors and corporate management would facilitate the board 
to adopt a longer-term investment to the strategy of their companies by reducing the 
                                                 
69 Becht and others (n 45) 3097. 
70 Coffee (n 9) 1318.  
71 I A Millstein, ‘The Responsibility of the Institutional Investor in Corporate Management’ in A W 
Sametz and J L Bicksler. (eds), The Battle for Corporate Control: Shareholder Rights, Stakeholder 
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possibility of managerial short-termism.72 Moreover, investors with longer investment 
time horizons institutions with long-term horizons tend to receive more gains in the 
sense that many benefits of activism take long time to be realised.73 For example, in 
Hermes case, Herms anticipates it can take two to three years for its activism to result 
in a sufficient increase in the company’s stock price.74 
4.2.1.2 Personal Benefit 
I have already discussed the possibility of some institutions enjoying in-process, 
personal benefits in section 4.1.3 and need not repeat that discussion here.  
4.2.2 Costs 
4.2.2.1 Direct Costs 
Direct costs will to some extent vary depending on the type of activism, so will be 
discussed mainly in Chapter 5. Here, in Chapter 4, I address some general issues 
about costs (or cost reduction) that apply to all forms of activism.  
4.2.2.1.1 Empowering Indirect Investors: Information Rights 
Direct costs of activism will depend partly on legal regulation. As I have noted in 
Chapter 2, in an effort to enhance shareholder engagement, CA 2006 has introduced 
new provisions to empower shareholders’ rights in corporate governance. One 
                                                 
72 Research on managerial incentives frequently found that managers tend to focus on the short-term 
and ignore the long-term impact of their investment. For example, see J Robert, The Modern Firm: 
Organizational Design for Performance and Growth (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 271. 
73 Admittedly, this presumes that stock market is ‘insufficient’ in pricing up a company’s shares-that 
stock market do not instantaneously build into a company’s present share price. All the future gains 
that will be enjoyed as a result of today’s bout of activism. But this presumption of market inefficiency 
seems reasonable, and the opposite presumption–the so-called Efficient Capital Markets 
Hypothesis-seems unreasonable. For a detailed discussion see, E Fama and K French, 'The 
Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns ' (1992) 47 Journal of Finance 427. 
74 See Chapter 3.1.2.3. 
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significant change is to address the problem of those who own company shares but are 
not registered as the legal holders. Some other reforms such as electronic voting and 
‘Say on Pay’ will be discussed later. 
In the UK, it is a common practice that shares in the company in which the 
institutions have chosen to invest are registered in the name of a custodian nominee 
company for prudential reasons.75 Thus, it is the name of the custodian nominee that 
appears on the company’s register. As a registered owner, the nominee has all the 
powers and rights attaching to those shares as against the issuer, even it has little 
economic incentive to use those rights and engage in monitoring the company. There 
may be some contractual arrangements in place between the custodian and 
institutional shareholders in respect of the way shareholders’ rights can be exercised. 
However, as discussed in detail in Chapter 5.3.1.1, as indirect share owners, 
engagement process for institutional shareholders is often complex, time-consuming 
and costly. It can be argued that the engagement process would be more effective if 
institutional shareholders can directly communicate with the company or going 
further, if they can exercise some of governance rights attached to the shares.76 
Prior to CA 2006, institutional shareholders or so-called indirect investors had few 
rights and unless they were appointed as proxies by registered owners. To empower 
them, CA 2006 has introduced new provisions to expand those indirect shareholders’ 
rights and made it easier for them to participate in the running of companies.   
The reform is mainly contained in Part 9. It allows a registered shareholder to 
nominate one or more indirect shareholders to enjoy information rights.77 It enables 
institutional shareholders to receive information directly from the company. The 
                                                 
75 R C Nolan, 'Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in the Company?' (2003) 3 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 73, 75; Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares 2004 (n 58) 14; P Davies and 
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76 Davies and Rickford (n 75) 243. 
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information includes all communication which the company sends to its shareholders 
generally, for example, the annual report and accounts and notices of meetings. The 
information can be provided by hard copy or electronically as requested. If an address 
is not provided, the company can satisfy its obligations through website publication. 
Moreover, institutional shareholders who are nominated by the registered owner must 
be informed, when they are sent a notice of meeting, that they may have a right under 
an agreement between them and the registered holder to be appointed as a proxy or 
give instructions as to the exercise of voting rights.78  
The direct transfer of information between institutional shareholders and the company 
avoids any delay which would occur in the process, helping to reduce direct costs for 
institutional shareholders when they wish to exercise shareholders’ rights. 
4.2.2.2 Indirect Costs 
Indirect costs incurred by engaging in shareholder activism can be mainly split up into 
the costs of conflicts of interest, of insider liability and of inability to trade. The 
sections below will discuss each of these in turn. 
4.2.2.2.1 Conflicts of Interest 
The indirect cost incurred from conflicts of interest is certainly one of the factors that 
affects institutional shareholders’ propensity for activism. Unlike retail investors, 
institutional investors are business institutions that have to get involved in multiple 
business relationships with many financial corporations. If they vote against 
management, it is likely that they have to bear the costs of losing business 
relationships with investee companies. Accordingly, they might be more concerned 
with their private interests than with maximizing shareholder returns.79 In order to 
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understand fully the conflicted interests of institutional shareholders, or of their fund 
managers, each type of institution must be discussed separately, as follows.  
4.2.2.2.1.1 Pension Funds 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, pension funds often employ external fund managers to 
undertake investment management and delegate authority to them to exercise 
shareholders’ rights. Shareholder engagement will sometimes give rise to conflicts of 
interest when fund managers are part of large financial groups, which want to keep 
good business relationship with companies in a fund managers’ portfolio. In such case, 
prior to taking action, fund managers have to take the interests of the affiliated group 
into account since an activist reputation may have an adverse impact on the group’s 
other areas of business. Suppose, a fund manager, who is part of large financial group 
C Plc, invest pension funds’ assets in B Plc. Meanwhile, C Plc also provides 
insurance services to B Plc. If the fund manager does not vote in favour of B’s 
management, B may threaten to change insurance services to other companies. 
Therefore, the fund manager has to consider C and B’s banking contracts when he 
makes decisions on whether and how to engage in B’s corporate governance affairs.  
Secondly, shareholder engagement may be conflicted with fund managers’ personal 
interests. In the UK, a majority of trustees in pension schemes are directors or former 
directors of the company.80 They are less likely to welcome a fund manager having an 
anti-manager reputation, for it may be detrimental to their wide business relationships. 
Even those doing well on shareholder activism might be a danger to companies’ 
future interests. As such, fund managers may tend to behave ‘modestly’, if not 
passively, to secure their future positions in labour market.81  
Moreover, a fund manager’s previous performance is a one of the crucial criteria 
when potential employers judge their investment ability. In some cases, even though 
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shareholder engagement will lead to better investment values, returns from improved 
corporate governance tend not to be a quick or obvious result for assessment. For 
those fund managers who want to impress their future potential employers, a slow 
return from corporate activism will not help them to outperform competitors.  
4.2.2.2.1.2 Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies offer a wide range of products against various risks, such as life, 
health, property or casualty policies to customers, including their investee companies. 
They compete in insurance market by selling these policies. 82  Developing and 
retaining good business relationships with their clients is important for them to 
maintain an advanced position in the market. Owing to this concern, insurance 
companies could be reluctant to take any action that might put their business 
relationship with their investee companies at risk. 
Competition between insurance companies would also give rise to conflicts of interest 
in cases where one institution investor’s engagement will benefit its competitors. For 
example, A insurance company and B insurance company, both invested in X Plc, 
with 2% and 1% of the X’s shares, respectively. B might think that improving 
performance of X will benefit its competitor A twice as much as itself, which will 
then lead itself to lose competitive advantage in the insurance market.  
Also, as said in Chapter 3, many insurance companies are closely linked to pension 
funds, as they often hold significant stock for them as external fund managers.83 The 
conflicts would be the same for insurance companies as the pension funds managers 
when they hold significant amounts of stock for pension funds.   
In addition to insurance policies and pension fund management, some large insurance 
companies run other areas of business, such as investment banking and property. For 
example, Prudential, as a large international financial services company, provides a 
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134 
 
wide range of services including personal banking, insurance, pensions and retail 
investments, institutional fund management and property investments. 84  Hence, 
before embarking on shareholder activism, they have to examine various related 
interests from their business network.  
4.2.2.2.1.3 Mutual Funds 
Mutual funds invest for numerous individuals, and thus face less conflict than pension 
funds and insurance companies that rely on corporate business. However, they are not 
entirely free of conflicts of interests.  
Mutual funds are either active, which compete on investment skill, or indexed which 
compete on cost.85  Active funds are motivated to make sure that their manual 
selection of investment will outperform the index. They do this by relying partly on 
the access to soft information provided by corporate managers. Conflicts of interest 
will therefore arise when shareholder activism would result in their future access to 
such soft information in investee companies being denied by incumbent management.  
Index funds seek to replicate the behaviour of market indexes. They do not care about 
access to soft information and thus they are less voluntary to conflicts of interest than 
active mutual funds. To be sure, they may still face some conflicts of interests when 
they hold institutional clients’ accounts and invest for them. The conflicts will be the 
same as those of other external funds managers.  
4.2.2.2.1.4 Hedge Funds 
Hedge funds are said to be more independent from conflicts of interests than the 
above traditional institutional investors.86 First, Kahan and Rock found that most 
                                                 
84 More information can be found on Prudential website <http://www.pru.co.uk> accessed 10 May 
2008.  
85 See discussion in Chapter 3 in terms of the way mutual funds manager their business. 
86 M Kahan and E Rock, 'Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control' (2007) 155 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1021, 1066-8. 
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hedge funds are organized as limited partnerships. They are usually independent 
investment vehicles and not affiliated with other institutions.87 Second, activist hedge 
funds rely on engagement to generate investment return. They will therefore not 
regard conflicts of interest as impediment to intervention if their return would be 
maximised through active engagement. 
Nevertheless, hedge funds still face some conflicts of interest to the extent that they 
want to attract institutional clients. As I have mentioned in Chapter 3.2.4, investors in 
hedge funds are high net-worth institutions or individuals, including traditional 
institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies. In this sense, 
conflicts of interest that hedge funds confront are much the same as other institutional 
shareholders as I discussed above.    
Taken together, conflicts are manifold. Without exception, when institutional 
shareholders make decisions whether to take action on governance issues, they will 
take their own landscapes into consideration. However, as situations vary, so, too, do 
the strength of these factors. 
4.2.2.2.2 Insider Dealing and Market Abuse 
The potential legal risk arising out of private meetings between the board and 
institutional shareholders is an important source of indirect costs for many institutions. 
Regarding any possible action to be taken, an activist institution must consider 
whether his action could breach insider dealing and market abuse regulation. As 
insider dealing is more likely to occur during the process of private meetings, it will 
be discussed later in Chapter 5. For now, I merely set out relevant legal norms. 
Currently, insider dealing is subject to: (1) Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA 1993), 
Part V ‘Insider dealing’; (2) FSMA 2000, Part VIII ‘Penalties for market abuse’; (3) 
FSA, Handbook, the Code of Market Conduct. 
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Part V of the CJA contains the main criminal provisions on insider dealing. It defines 
two insider dealing offences. The first offence, the dealing offence, is committed if an 
individual has information as an insider and ‘deals, in specific circumstances, in 
securities which are price-affected in relation to that information.88 The second 
offence, the ‘tipping’ offence is committed either by disclosing inside information to 
another otherwise than in the proper performance of the functions of his employment, 
office or profession, or by encouraging another person to deal in price-affected 
securities related to such information.89  
A crucial element in constituting offence of insider dealing, from the above definition, 
is the inside information. The CJA 1993 defines inside information in section 56(1) as 
follows: 
‘inside information” means information which—  
(a) relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer of securities or to particular 
issuers of securities and not to securities generally or to issuers of securities generally;  
(b) is specific or precise;  
(c) has not been made public; and  
(d) if it were made public would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of any 
securities.’90  
Hence, inside information must be undisclosed and price-sensitive. Once undisclosed 
and price-sensitive information is not properly handled, companies face a risk of 
insider dealing upon disclosure of inside information to institutional shareholders 
during their private meetings with institutional shareholders. Institutional shareholders 
also face a risk of being insiders from their engagement and therefore unable to trade 
in the securities concerned.  
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To complement the criminal offence of insider dealing and market manipulation, the 
government introduced a civil offence of insider dealing in s 118 of FSMA 2000 
under the regime of ‘Market Abuse’. Meanwhile, apart from imposing rules on insider 
dealing, the concept of market abuse also introduced statutory prohibition on several 
other forms of abusive conduct which represented a considerable expansion in the 
scope of the law.91 Behaviours, such as improper disclosure of inside information, 
disseminating false or misleading information, also constitute breach of market abuse 
provisions. As a result, institutional shareholder shall be more carefully in the process 
of shareholder activism to avoid breaching of market abuse rules. This will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.2.1.3.2.1.1.  
The FSA also maintains a Code of Market Conduct which provides guidance to 
elaborate the statutory provisions on market abuse. For example, it describes what 
factors should be considered when determining whether information is inside and 
behaviours that do or do not amount to market abuse. Furthermore, in a 2007 FSA’ 
guidance, it provides that in some circumstances, when the strategy being adopted by 
shareholder involves building upon or acquiring a stake in a target company, the 
strategy itself will be considered as inside information, thus requiring disclosure to the 
market as a whole.92 The guidance also stated that in general, simply taking advantage 
of their own expert analysis of otherwise publicly available information to carry out 
acquisitions of the target’s securities will not be regarded as market abusive.93 
However, where a shareholder comes to trade on the basis of another participant’s 
strategy or deal on the basis of their knowledge of another participant’s intentions and 
strategy, his behaviour might be considered as market abuse. The FSA has warned 
shareholder that deliberately generating a false rumour or deceptive signals about 
their future strategy intentions could also constitute market abuse. Failure to comply 
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with related regulations on market abuse subjects companies and shareholders to a 
wide range of possible sanctions, including suspension of trading or financial 
penalties. Chapter 5 will return to discuss the influence of insider dealing and market 
abuse rules on shareholder activism, in particular, private meetings. 
4.2.2.2.3 Inability to Trade 
The traditional Wall Street Rule – sell your shares if you do not like what the 
management is doing – is becoming costly for some institutions. Institutional 
investors have to continue hold firms in their portfolio because they are part of a 
market index or because their size of ownership would make exit costly.  
First, passive indexing results in funds’ inability to exit as they are ‘lock-in’ in 
portfolio companies by the market index.94 Index funds must hold every company in 
the index, irrespective of how poor the governance of the company. This, in turn, 
creates a great need for them to be activists to boost the performance of the stock 
market overall.95 It might be argued that monitoring is pointless for fund managers 
because intervention in a portfolio company will improve the index to the same 
extent.96 Against this, however, Riley suggested that, the overall improvement of the 
index is best achieved ‘not by focusing ex post upon the individual company, but by 
improving the structure under which all companies operate and are managed.’97 
Secondly, the larger and the longer-term the shareholding, the more difficult it is for 
the owner to trade their shares on the market without depressing the price.98 Many 
analysts and small retail investors tend to purchase the stock and monitor the 
                                                 
94 G Clark and T Hebb, 'Pension Fund Corporate Engagement: The Fifth Stage of Capitalism' (2004) 
59 Industrial Relations 142, 144. 
95 D D Guercio and J Hawkins, 'The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism' (1999) 52 
Journal of Financial Economics 293, 294. 
96 C A Riley, 'Controlling Corporate Management: UK and US Initiatives' (1994) 14 Legal Studies 244, 
261, See his discussion in footnote 89. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Coffee (n 9) 1329. 
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operations of firms that attract large institutional investors. It is unlikely, therefore, for 
large institutions to dispose their shares in an unnoticed way.99 When the alternative 
course of action-exit-become more costly, monitoring becomes more rational.100 The 
cost for activism as said by these fund managers under research can be well 
compensated for by the return of their efforts, given their large investment scale.101 
Del Guercio & Hawkins found the annual activism program budget for the top five 
public pension funds in the US ranges from $50 thousand to $1 million, which 
constitute less than 0.005 percent of fund assets. Larger institutional shareholders 
have more research budget, staffs and resources for activism than smaller institutional 
shareholders. 
In short, for those indexed or large institutional investors, it is sometimes not an 
option, and activism is described as the only way in which they could create value for 
their clients. As said by a fund manager, ‘It is a means to an end rather than an end in 
itself’.102  
4.3 Conclusion 
This Chapter has developed the model of institutional activism set out in Chapter 1 
both by explaining in detail how these factors driving activism play out in the case of 
different types of institutional investor, and by expanding on the discussion of some 
of the relevant regulatory norms. 
In developing the two-step analysis, we found that those larger institutional 
shareholders with long-term investment horizon are more likely to engage in activism 
because (1) it is easier for them to overcome free-riding as the factors of decisions of 
                                                 
99 P O'Brien and R Bhushan, 'Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership' (1990) 28 Journal of 
Acccounting Research 57. 
100 E Rock, 'The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism' (1991) 79 
Georgetown Law Journal 445, 462. 
101 D Del Guercio and J Hawkins, 'The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism' (1999) 52 
Journal of Financial Economics 293. 
102 Hendry and others, (n 52).  
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shareholding and collective action work strong for them; and (2) They will receive 
more benefits from engaging, while suffer from costs resulted from inability to trade. 
We also found that some institutional shareholders – as exemplified by Hermes, have 
additional incentives for activism as they will receive some ‘in process’ benefits 
through engagement.  
Moreover, Chapter 4 found that there are some factors are ‘in play’ on all types of 
institution. In determining whether to overcome free-riding, institutional ownership 
restriction limits institutions’ ability to become more decisive and the risk of being 
identified as ‘acting in concert’ to some extent deters institutions from forming 
coalitions. The normative obligation to participate has become increasingly strong in 
recent years as there have been growing regulatory demands on institutional 
shareholders to be more active. In analysing the costs of activism, we have found that 
the CA 2006 brings some reforms to enable institutional shareholders – especially 
‘indirect shareholder’ – more easily to take action. The indirect losses as result of 
potential liability for insider dealing are one of the factors that shareholder must 
consider when deciding whether to take action. 
Chapter 5 will complete our analysis of UK institutional shareholder activism by 
applying the model described in Chapter 1, and developed in Chapter 4, to the 
different forms that activism can take. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Applying the Model to a Typology of Activism 
The aim of this chapter is to apply the model of shareholder activism to the different 
forms that activism can take. It begins by setting out a typology of activism, 
differentiating four forms that activism can take: private meetings, proxy voting, 
submitting proposals, and derivative actions. It then works through these four forms in 
turn. For each one, it starts with an exploration of the current degree to which that 
type of which institutional shareholder activism takes place. Based on those empirical 
findings, it then applies the model, to explain how the various factors the model 
captures shaping institutional shareholders’ propensity for these different types of 
activism.  
5.1Typology of Institutional Shareholder Activism 
Shareholder activism is not in itself a new phenomenon. There is a long history, 
especially in the US, where shareholder activism can trace back to the beginning of 
the 20th century.1 It encompasses a broad range of formal or informal activity when 
institutional shareholders become dissatisfied with the board’s performance (and 
presumably that of the company). Writing in 1970, Hirschman offered a now-famous 
discussion of responses to unsatisfactory organizational behaviors in terms of ‘exit’, 
‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’.2  
First, shareholders can simply ‘vote with their feet,’– a practice also known as ‘the 
wall street walk’ – exit the company by selling their shares. By virtue of their initial 
purchase and subsequent exit, they convey the message to the market that they are not 
satisfied with the company’s performance. Second, institutional shareholders could 
continue to hold their shares and do nothing, and thereby show their ‘loyalty’. 
                                                 
1 S Gillan and L Starks, 'The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States ' (2007) 19 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 55. For example, early action had been taken by financial 
institutions such as Morgan Stanley to propose changes in the board of corporations. 
2 A Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1970). 
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Perhaps people are more familiar with the third approach of ‘voice’. Institutional 
shareholders continue to hold their shares but express their dissatisfaction through a 
broad spectrum of activities. The activism with which we are concerned all falls 
within Hirschman’s category of ‘voice’. And within that, we can distinguish four 
different forms, namely: initiating frequent meetings with corporate management, 
filing shareholder proposals, voting against managers’ proposals in meetings and 
bringing legal procedures against directors.  
Cutting across this four-fold typology set out above, one can also further note a 
further division, identified by Armour and Cheffins, between ‘offensive’ and 
‘defensive’ activism. 3  Offensive activism is designed to improve corporate 
governance and performance so as to raise the value of the company above what it 
was when the shareholder purchased her investment. This corresponds typically to the 
behavior of hedge funds which identify an underperforming company, then purchase 
undervalued stocks and engage with the company to raise its value. Defensive 
activism, on the other hand, is action designed to ensure the company’s value does not 
fall below that paid by the investors. This is typically the motive behind action by 
traditional institutional shareholders, such as pension funds and insurance companies.  
Kahan and Rock has put it thus:  
‘Mutual fund and public pension fund activism, if it occurs, tends to be incidental 
and ex post: when fund management notes that portfolio companies are 
underperforming, or that their governance regime is deficient, they will sometimes 
be active (footnote omitted). In contrast, hedge fund activism is strategic and ex ante: 
hedge fund managers first determine whether a company would benefit from 
activism, then take a position and become active.’4 
                                                 
3 Armour and B Cheffins 'The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds' (2009) 
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 136/2009 
 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1489336> accessed 10 August 2010, 2. 
4 M Kahan and E Rock, 'Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control' (2007) 155 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1021, 1069. 
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In spite of these differences of motive, engagement approaches employed in offensive 
activism, as we have seen in Hermes’ case, are precisely the same as that of adopted 
in defensive activism.5 Hedge funds will exercise their shareholders’ rights, including 
meeting with corporate managers, proxy voting, submitting proposals and legal 
actions, to push corporate changes and ultimately, increase corporate value.  
5.1.1 Private Meetings 
Meeting privately with company management is often the first approach that many 
institutional investors could adopt when they have concerns over corporate 
management, as it avoids public confrontation between the company and institutions.  
A typical private meeting is conducted through the following three steps. First, when 
institutions realize that the company’s governance might be problematic, they will 
evaluate the target company by applying internal criteria to decide matters such as 
whether the private meeting could be successful.6 Second, once institutions decide to 
adopt the private meeting as an engagement means, they will make informal contact 
with the target company to raise their concerns. This step will start with a letter or a 
phone call with the managers or related officers of the target company. Third, when 
both parties have initially understood each other’s concerns, the target company will 
arrange a meeting with the institutions and have a dialogue on specific governance 
topics. 
Apart from shareholder-initiated meetings, the board can generate a dialogue with its 
investors to help both parties to obtain an understanding on a variety of issues, such as 
recent financial performance, corporate change or investment strategies. As one will 
see later, private meetings have traditionally been preferred by both company 
                                                 
5  For a detailed discussion and cases of hedge funds activism, see J Macey, Corporate 
Governance:Promises Kept, Promises Broken (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 2008) 
244-264. 
6 J Yockey, 'On the Role and Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance' Illinois Public Law 
and Legal Theory Research Paper No.09-01 <http://ssrn.com/paper=1438793>3 September 2009.. 
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managers and institutions and it is still now one of the most commonly used activism 
approaches. 
5.1.2 Proxy Voting 
At the heart of any discussion about shareholder activism is the role of voting and, 
especially, of proxy voting.7 In its simplest interpretation, it is arguably the principal 
method by which a company’s shareholder can affect its governance and signal their 
views to management. Through the media of the ballot, shareholders can elect or 
remove directors, approve or disapprove directors’ proposals and (increasingly) 
authorize executive pay packages. Given its importance, it is the primary focus of the 
thesis in the context of considering shareholder activism. 
Briefly, the voting process starts when shareholders receive a Notice of Meeting by 
mail, or other electronic forms, from their investee companies.8 The Notice of a 
general meeting must state the time, date and place of the meeting. It must also 
contain information regarding the general nature of the business to be dealt with at the 
meeting subject to any contrary provision in the company’s articles of association.9 
Shareholders of a listed company are given 14 to 21 days to consider how to vote on 
matters proposed in the meeting.10 To cast their votes, a shareholder can attend the 
                                                 
7 B Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 17-8; E 
Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999) 118-22; For a 
comparative explanation of the importance of the proxy voting in various jurisdiction, see G Hertig, 
‘Convergence of Substantive Law and Convergence of Enforcement’ in J Gordon and M Roe (eds) 
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 
328, 336-8. 
8 CA 2006 s 308. 
9 CA 2006 s 311(2).  
10 CA 2006 s 307A. After implementation of the Shareholders Right Directive, listed companies are 
required to call all general meetings on at least 21 days’ notice, unless three conditions are satisfied, in 
which cases it can be held at 14 days. The first condition is that the general meeting is not an annual 
meeting. The second condition is that the company offers the electronic means for all members and the 
third condition is that a special resolution has been passed reducing the period of notice to 14 days at 
previous AGM.  
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meeting in person, or appoint one or more proxies to vote shares on their behalf. The 
voting process ends when a shareholder’s vote is recorded.  
The issues regarding voting procedures are only touched upon here. The technical 
rules are dealt with more fully in section 5.3. This thesis focuses on activism in the 
form of voting. However, it is worth nothing that there are some related 
issue/shareholder rights, but too few data to discuss separately. These things include: 
(1) Requiring the directors to call a general meeting of the company;11 
(2) Requiring a company to circulate a statement in advance of shareholders’ meeting 
and circulate a resolution in advance of AGM;12 
(3) Requiring an independent assessor’s report on a poll at a general meeting of the 
company, the independent report to be disclosed on the company’s website,13 and  
(4) Requiring the company to publish audit concerns on its website.14 
5.1.3 Submitting Proposals 
The third approach that an institution can adopt is submitting a proposed resolution 
for a shareholders’ meeting. In the UK, CA 2006 section 338 allows shareholders 
representing at least 5% of the total voting rights, or shareholders who are at least 100 
in number and whose shares are paid up by an amount averaging at least £100 per 
member, to require a resolution to be proposed at the AGM. Any request for a 
resolution to be proposed must identify the resolution and be received by the company 
at least 6 weeks before the relevant AGM (or, if later, when notice is given of the 
meeting). 
                                                 
11 CA2006 s 303. 
12 CA 2006 s 314. 
13 CA 2006 s 342. 
14 CA 2006 s 527. 
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5.1.4 Derivative Action 
Finally, shareholders have the ability to bring legal actions against a director on behalf 
of the company in the form of a derivative suit. The CA 2006 allows a derivative 
action brought by shareholders for any breach of duty, including the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skill and diligence or the duty to promote the success of the 
company. 
Before substantial action begins, shareholders should first make a prima facie case 
(based on written pleadings alone) that the company is entitled to the relief claimed, 
and must then apply for permission to continue the action as a derivative action.15 In 
respect of the application for permission to continue, the court is bound to consider a 
number of factors when deciding whether to give permission. There are certain 
‘mandatory factors’ which, if present, mean the court must refuse permission.16 These 
include the ratification of the breach of duty, its approval in advance by the 
shareholders, and the fact that a director fulfilling the directors' statutory duty to 
promote the success of the company would not proceed with the action.17  
If none of these mandatory factors apply, then the court has a discretion to grant 
permission, and there is then another list of discretionary factors that the court shall 
take into account, such as the importance a hypothetical director would attach to 
continuing the action, whether the case could be brought by the member personally 
(in which case the shareholder would usually be expected to bring his own action 
rather than bring a derivative action) and the views of independent members of the 
company, i.e. members with no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter.18 
                                                 
15 CA 2006 s 261. 
16 For a detail discussion, see A Dignam and J Lowry, Company Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2010) 191-6. 
17 CA 2006 s 263. 
18 Ibid. 
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This type of action is usually considered as an action of last resort and is very rare in 
practice. Until now, there is one case where an institutional investor did try to bring a 
derivate action: Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No.2).19  
5.2 Private Meetings 
Private meetings are one of the most commonly used shareholder engagement 
approaches. The following section, based on empirical evidence provided by other 
scholars or institutions, gives a detailed illustration on how institutional shareholders 
engaged in private meetings with investee company management. It then applies the 
activism model as described in Chapter 1, and developed in Chapter 4, to private 
meetings. It is organized as follows. Section 5.2.1 is concerned with empirical 
evidence in respect of private meetings between UK institutional investors and 
company management. The available evidence on private meetings covers such 
matters as: frequency of meetings, collective action, meeting model, meeting 
participants, topics and meeting effect. Following is a specific analysis on ‘say on pay’ 
practice in the UK. Section 5.2.2 applies the model to analyse institutional 
shareholders’ propensity for the activism of private meetings.    
5.2.1 Empirical Evidence 
One inherent challenge of examining empirically the details of negotiations between 
shareholders and executives/the board is that these meetings are usually undertaken 
behind-the-scenes and are not shared with outsiders. Despite this difficulty, such 
evidence as does exist comes from a variety of sources (1) trade association reports on 
institutional shareholder engagement;20 (2) previous academic research;21 and (3) 
newspaper reports. 
                                                 
19 [1981] Ch 257 (Vinelott J); [1982] 1 Ch 204 (CA). 
20 For example, Investment Management Association has issued five surveys since the year of 2003. 
The latest covers the situation for the two year from mid-2006 to mid-2008 and published in 2009. Its 
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5.2.1.1 Frequency of Meetings 
According to a survey by the Investment Management Association (IMA) from 2006, 
an overwhelming majority of 33 fund management companies routinely met with 
executive management at least once a year, with one doing so as many as five to six 
times.22 Some institutions have annually or regularly met with non-executives, but the 
majority of institutions contacted non-executives when there were issues, or at the 
company’s request. On average, each institution conducted 33 meetings with investee 
companies by the middle of 2006.23  
There is a wide disparity between the institutions regarding the frequency of meetings. 
IMA’s survey observed that among 23 institutions that reported in detail, one had 290 
meetings, ten institutions had ten or less and the remaining 11 had between 11 and 88 
meetings during the year of 2006.24 
However, due to the behind-the-scene character of private meetings, the number of 
meetings only indicates the frequency of contacts where there is a record. The IMA 
suggested that in many cases, meetings conducted between the executive/ the board 
and shareholder were not captured on records.25  
                                                                                                                                            
survey covers over30 managers which are responsible for about 68% of equities managed in the UK 
and represented around 32% of UK market capitalization as measured by the UK All share index. 
21 For example, G.P Stapleton’ study on UK institutions, G.P Stapleton conducted interviews with the 
chief executive or a senior fund manager of 17 investment management companies in 1993. These 17 
totally companies represented over 25% of the value of the UK equity at the end of 1991. The research 
also covers interviews involving the ISC, ABI, NAPF, AITC (now IMF) and PIRC. 
22 Investment Management Association, Survey of Fund Managers’ Engagement with the Companies 
for the Year Ended 30 June 2006 (It will be referred to as ‘IMA 2006 Survey’ in subsequent footnotes) 
< http://www.investmentfunds.org.uk/news/press_centre/default.asp> accessed 23 August 2008,14.  
23 Ibid, 1. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Investment Management Association, Survey of Fund Managers’ Engagement with the Companies 
for the Two Years Ended 30 June 2008  (It will be referred to as ‘2008 Survey’ in subsequent 
footnotes) 
 < http://www.investmentfunds.org.uk/news/press_centre/default.asp> accessed 14 October 2010, 3. 
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There are several factors that are likely to influence the frequency of meetings. First, 
companies that deliberately invested in under-performing companies, such as Hermes, 
held more frequent meetings with management than other institutions under the 
assumption that more intervention will have a positive impact on the value of 
companies. Second, as Martin and Nisar note, some large companies have established 
their own corporate governance engagement principles which require meetings with 
investee companies on a regular basis but less frequently than the first case.26 Third, 
when there are contentious issues, the meetings held and contact between company 
and institutions become more frequent.  
To make their intervention more effective, as recommended by the ISC’s 
Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents – Statement of Principles 
(Statement of Principles), in addition to the routine meetings described above, 
institutions can escalate their action by meeting with independent directors or senior 
independent directors.27 On average, each firm had 46 meetings with independent 
directors in the year ended June 2005 although the number decreased to 34 in 2006.28   
5.2.1.2 Jointly Working with other Institutional Shareholders 
When an institution seeks for more influential power over the board, it can conduct 
private meetings collectively with other institutional shareholders. Stapledon found 
that in most cases, such coalition occurred after the failure of discussion by an 
individual institution with company management.29 The number of institutions in a 
coalition varied between two and six.30 Most coalitions comprised of two to four 
                                                 
26 R Martin and T M Nisar, 'Activist Investment: Institutional Investor Monitoring of Portfolio 
Companies' (2007) 45 Management Decision, 832. 
27  Institutional Shareholders Committee, ‘The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and 
Agents – Statement of Principle’, I have introduced this guidance in Chapter 4, see Chapter 4.1.4. 
28 IMA 2006 Survey (n 22) 15. 
29 G Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance (Clarendon, Oxford 1996), 122. 
30 Ibid, 126. 
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members, and represented between roughly 20% and 40% of the equity of the 
companies concerned.31  
Black and Coffee’s research regarding British institutional shareholder activism in the 
early 1990s also confirmed that successful institutional coalitions did form with the 
characteristic of few participants but with substantial collective shareholdings.32  
5.2.1.3 Forms of Meeting 
Contacts between institutional shareholders and corporate management may take 
place by simple phone call or letters. If they decide to meet in person, institutional 
shareholders would come to see management individually or collectively in certain 
locations, such as a company’s office. Sometimes company management can visit 
their institutions for meetings. 
Riskmetric Group’s US study found a wide diversity in the ways in which boards met 
with shareholders.33 Some companies were mainly positioned as a listening post to 
hear shareholders’ concern, while others, such as Pfizer, met with institutional 
shareholders in a two-way discussion. Companies, like UnitedHealth carried out 
meetings in two ways: on an ad hoc basis, and in a separate, formal shareholder 
advisory committee on board nomination. Occidental Petroleum used ‘road shows’. 
Generally, there is no consistent model for board-shareholder meeting and companies 
often adopt a combination of models depending on the aims of the meeting.  
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 B Black and J Coffee, 'Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior under Limited Regulation' 
(1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 1997, 2054. 
33 S Dean, 'Board-Shareholder Dialogue: Why They're Talking' Riskmetric Group 
 <http://www.riskmetrics.com/system/files/private/Board_Shareholder_Dialogue_0.pdf> 3 September 
2009. 
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5.2.1.4 Participants 
Most institutional shareholders’ contacts are with the Chairman, financial directors, 
non-executives and senior independent directors.34 For example, in the Marks and 
Spencer case, as discussed in section 5.2.1.6, nine institutional investors held 
meetings with the chairman and seven had meetings with the senior independent 
directors/non-executive directors. 35  Also, five institutional investors interacted 
collectively through trade associations to bring pressure on the management of Marks 
and Spencer Plc. Moreover, Stapledon found that some large companies have set up 
specialist investor-relations executives who also attended meetings with institutions.36   
From institutions’ perspective, there are several types of people who represent the 
institutions in their meetings to have dialogue with company management. First, in a 
minority of institutions (two in 33 under IMA survey), portfolio managers were 
responsible for all engagement and were present at all board-institution meetings.37 
Second, the majority of institutions have specialist teams on corporate governance 
separate from their fund managers. The specialists were delegated by institutions to 
attend most of the meetings with company management, and in some cases, both the 
specialists and portfolio manager were present in meetings but with different aims.38 
Specialists were more concerned with corporate governance issues, while fund 
managers focused on company’s financial performance.  
5.2.1.5 Topics 
The topics covered at the meetings vary according to the different aims of meetings. 
Stapledon found that meetings were often conducted to discuss the issues of ‘the latest 
financial results; current trading operations; trends in pricing; capital expenditure; 
                                                 
34 IMA 2008 Survey (n 25) 16-8.  
35 IMA 2008 Survey (n 25) 17. 
36 Stapledon (n 29) 103. 
37 IMA 2006 Survey (n 22) 14. 
38 Ibid. 
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cash flow; gearing; etc.’39 Institutions were more inclined to discuss general issues 
such as company’s long-term strategy rather than short-term topics such as current 
trading.40 
According to Holland’s research, topics arisen in the meetings often fall into three 
main areas.41 The first major area for institutions to talk in meetings is the company’s 
‘prior strategic promises, recent strategic change, benchmark comparison with 
competitors and business management practices.’42 Secondly, institutions are often 
concerned with management quality and personality. Information on these matters is 
seen as essential to understand financial performance and to value companies. 
Whether companies have complied with relevant corporate governance guidance is the 
third area of interest of institutions. Institutions focused on matters such as the 
separation of chief executive and chairman roles, board structure, remuneration and 
other good practices.  
5.2.1.6 Effects of Meetings 
Do these meetings make a difference to board decisions? The first evidence comes 
from one of the early US studies conducted by Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach which 
focused on the activities of Teachers Insurance Annuity Association-College 
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF).43 They found that the fund had successfully 
brought changes to board practice through private meetings. TIAA-CREF is one of 
the largest pension funds in the US. The study was carried out on the period from 
1990-1992 during which TIAA-CREF had targeted 45 companies for the purposes of 
                                                 
39 Stapledon (n 29) 104. 
40 Ibid. 
41 J Holland, 'Financial Reports, Private Disclosure and the Corporate Governance Role of Financial 
Institutions' (1999) 3 Journal of Management and Governance 161, 168-170. 
42 Ibid. 
43 W T Carleton, J M Nelson and M S Weisbach, 'The Influence of Institutions on Corporate 
Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF' (1998) 53 Journal of Finance 
1335. 
153 
 
seeking board changes on corporate governance. TIAA-CREF adopted a negotiation 
approach with investee companies in the hope of achieving a mutually acceptable 
settlement prior to a proxy vote. The research found that TIAA-CREF had generally 
obtained its desired changes. It had reached agreements with 42 of the 45 targeted 
companies. Most of these settlements were made without the issue ever coming to a 
shareholder vote and to public knowledge. Moreover, investee companies generally 
implemented agreements reached in negotiations.  
The second source of evidence comes from Stapledon’s study, where he found that in 
a majority of cases where institutions had conducted private meetings with company 
management, targeted companies had made changes under institutions’ requirement 
without the need to requisition a general meeting. However, in four cases, meetings 
between institutions and company failed to reach agreements. In each of those four 
cases, however, when it became clear that institutions could win a vote on the issue, 
some or all of the impugned directors resigned prior to the actual EGM.44 
Thirdly, researchers in London Business School focused on the way in which Hermes 
engaged in private meetings on governance changes with targeted underperforming 
companies.45 During the period from 1998 to 2004, Hermes had targeted 30 of the 41 
companies it invested in, primarily through private meetings, telephone calls, letters 
between fund representatives and executive directors, investment relation officers and 
other board members. The result suggested that Hermes had been successful in using 
private negotiation to bring governance change. Over half of its targeted companies, 
in some cases as many as 75%, had adopted Hermes’s proposed changes.46 Moreover, 
once the companies have followed up on Hermes’ suggestions to make changes, the 
                                                 
44 Stapledon (n 29) 126. 
45 M Becht and others, 'Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the 
Hermes UK Focus Fund' (2009) 22 Review of Financial Studies 3093. 
46 Ibid, 3111. 
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study found that their share price increased substantially, by as much as 6% 
immediately after the changes were disclosed to the public.47  
Despite the above positive evidence on the effect of private meetings, there is 
evidence indicating that private meetings failed to achieve changes that institutional 
investors expected. The IMA survey shows that although institutions have engaged in 
meetings, their concerns have sometimes been ignored by the company 
management.48 The case of Marks and Spencer illustrates how a board might turn a 
deaf ear to shareholders’ requests.49 In 2008, Marks and Spencer announced that its 
chief executive, Sir Stuart Rose, was promoted to the post of executive chairman. In 
doing so, Marks and Spencer failed to comply with the principle of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code.50 The Code objects that the roles of chainman executive and 
chairman are exercised by a single person. Since the announcement, Marks and 
Spencer faced an investor backlash and was criticized for putting the long-term health 
and stability of the company at risk. 
Institutions made efforts to negotiate with Marks and Spencer management to address 
their concerns. According to the IMA report, among 26 companies surveyed that had 
Marks and Spencer shareholdings, 23 had in aggregate 28 meetings with the company, 
nine companies had 15 meetings with the chairman and seven had seven meetings 
with the senior independent director/non executive.51 
In spite of shareholders’ effort, both in public and private, the board of Marks and 
Spencer did not change its decision, suggesting that shareholders’ behind-the-scene 
negotiations with management failed to move changes for the company.  
                                                 
47 Ibid, 3097. 
48 IMA 2008 Survey (n 25) 3. 
49 K Burgess, ‘Questions Raised over Combined Role Move’, Financial Times (London 10 March 
2008) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9175be7c-eef0-11dc-97ec-0000779fd2ac.html> accessed 10 
September 2009 
50 A.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code provides that ‘the roles of chairman and chief executive 
should not be exercised by the same individual.’ 
51 IMA 2008 Survey (n 25) 17. 
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5.2.2 Applying the Activism Model to Private Meetings 
5.2.2.1 Step 1: Overcoming Free-riding for Private Meetings 
5.2.2.1.1 The Decisiveness of Individual Shareholding 
Private meetings offer a good opportunity for any particular institutional shareholder 
to be ‘decisive’. It involves a small number of shareholders and lets each of them have 
a chance to express their concerns directly in front of corporate managers. Directors 
are more likely to listen to institutions privately to understand whether they are 
confident on management. While a 1 or 2% of shares of the company cannot be sure 
that its own holding will be sufficient to determine the outcome of a resolution, such 
amount of holdings might nevertheless prove persuasive for executives/the board.  
Moreover, the increased decisiveness of individual shareholdings in private meetings 
stems from the threatening effect of public opposition. The board is much more 
willing to resolve shareholders’ concern on meetings before the issue is placed in 
public confrontation. It is aware if it does not appear to take seriously the concerns 
raised by shareholders, the next step could be a public opposition. This threatening 
effect is well illustrated in the case of ‘Say on Pay’ in 5.2.2.2.3. 
5.2.2.1.2 The Possibility of Concerted Action 
It seems plausible to argue that concerted action is also more likely to be achieved 
through private meetings because of their behind-the-scene nature. As the risks from 
public confrontation are avoided, institutional shareholders are more willing to 
support others’ initiatives to form an alliance and bring combined pressure to the 
board privately.   
5.2.2.1.3 ‘In process’ Benefits 
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Private meetings are also likely a good source of ‘in process’ benefits to institutional 
investors. First, private meetings provide an opportunity for institutional shareholders 
to establish a good relationship with portfolio companies. Furthermore, private 
negotiation directly with management enables institutional investors to understand 
better the company’ long-term objectives, and thus to make better judgment when 
deciding how to vote at shareholders’ meetings.52 Moreover, subject to insider dealing 
rules, private meetings do give useful information to institutional shareholders 
whether to increase or decrease their future holdings in the company – so there is a 
private ‘trading’ benefit. 
5.2.2.1.4 Normative Obligations 
5.2.2.1.4.1 Regulatory Demands 
In light of the importance of board-shareholder communication, regulators, 
policymakers, and trade organizations have all made many calls in favour of more 
frequent board-shareholder meetings, from both board and shareholder perspectives. 
For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code (UK Code) recommends that the 
board as a whole has a responsibility to conduct satisfactory dialogue with 
institutional shareholders to understand their issues and concerns. 53  It places 
particular responsibility on the chairman and to a lesser extent the non-executive 
directors and senior independent director to maintain sufficient contact with major 
shareholders.54  
In the Stewardship Code, discussion with the company on a confidential basis is 
regarded as the first stage of intervention that institutions can undertake when they 
have concerns over their investee companies.55 If institutional shareholders fail to get 
constructive response from the board, they can escalate their action, such as to meet 
                                                 
52 Ibid.  
53 UK Corporate Governance Code, E.1. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Stewardship Code, Principle 4. 
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with senior independent directors, or intervene jointly with other institutional 
shareholders.  
Guidance from trade associations all suggests institutional shareholders to seek 
regular dialogue with the investee company’s board and senior management.56 In 
addition, the International Corporate Governance Network also recommends that 
successful engagement should include maintaining dialogue with the board on 
governance issues before a crisis breaks out. Institutional shareholders should 
communicate with the board as part of their corporate governance policy.57 
Indeed, I would draw here an analogy with Ayres and Braithwaite’s famous book, in 
which they argued that most regulatory intervention should be modest, with more 
draconian or painful forms of regulatory intervention being reserved for cases where 
the first level of modest intervention does not achieve the desired result.58 By analogy, 
private meetings represent that modest form of intervention. Open challenge through 
voting can then be reserved for those companies which fail to respond to the 
institutional shareholders’ private arguments presented in private meetings. 
5.2.2.1.4.2 Cultural Factor 
Private meetings between the board and shareholders have traditionally been a part of 
UK corporate governance activism.59 Whenever possible, UK institutions have a 
strong preference for quiet, behind-the-scene negotiations to bring changes to the 
board. They believe ‘secrecy and trust are essential’ and thus, are highly reluctant to 
put concerns for public battle unless negotiations failed to achieve their aims.  
                                                 
56   For example, see ISC, ‘A Statement of Principle on the Responsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders and Agents’ (2007) 4. 
57 International Corporate Governance Network, ‘Statement of Principle on Institutional Shareholders 
Responsibility’ (2007) 4.4 ii. 
58 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford 
University Press, NewYork: Oxford 1992). 
59 Black and Coffee (n 32) 2085. 
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Prior to the early 1960s, there were irregular meetings between fund managers and 
companies when specific issues arose.60 Since the early 1970s, fund managers from 
the largest insurance companies, such as the Prudential, met with the management of 
their portfolio companies annually.61 Meetings became regularly activities in the late 
1970s. Of 994 listed UK companies, 76% of the largest 50 companies, and 43% of the 
largest 600 companies, held meetings periodically with some of their large 
institutional shareholders.62 Obviously, a culture of exerting shareholders’ control 
through private meetings has developed in the UK. And this cultural preference 
results in a relatively high level of shareholder participation in the form of private 
meetings.  
5.2.2.2 Step 2: A Cost-benefit Analysis for Private Meetings 
5.2.2.2.1 Benefits 
Benefits of engaging in private meetings will be reflected on the share of total gains to 
the company and the personal in process benefits as mentioned above in section 
5.2.2.1.3.  
5.2.2.2.2 Costs 
5.2.2.2.2.1 Direct Costs 
Seeking changes through negotiation is suggested as cost-effective.63 As shown in 
empirical evidence, specific negotiation methods, ranging from phone calls and letters 
to face-to-face meeting, all are relatively low-cost.  
Moreover, private meetings initiated by the board incur few costs to institutional 
shareholders. Part of the burden of costs is likely shifted to the board as it will arrange 
                                                 
60 See data cited in Stapledon (n 29) 102. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Yockey (n 6) 33. 
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everything for dialogue with institutions. As we have seen above, regulatory pressure 
seems to drive the board to seek a regular dialogue with its large institutional 
shareholders. A good example is the ‘Say on Pay’ rule, discussed in section 5.2.2.2.3. 
5.2.1.3.2.1 Indirect Costs 
5.2.1.3.2.1.1 Insider Dealing and Market Abuse 
Private meetings could impose indirect costs on institutional investors as a result of 
potential liability for insider dealing and market abuse. Exchange of information – 
which may be ‘price sensitive’ – is necessary for private meetings.64 However, the 
degree to which managers would disclose in the dialogue is restricted by related 
regulation.  
In Chapter 4, I discussed what constitutes inside information. If insider information is 
involved in private meetings, the general requirement for disclosure by the FSA is that 
listed companies should report insider information to the Regulatory Information 
Service as soon as possible.65 It leaves the company to make decisions on whether to 
publish an announcement or not, what information should be included and when it 
should be disclosed. It is the company’s responsibility to determine what information 
is sufficiently price-sensitive and then establish effective arrangements, such as 
Chinese walls, to restrict individuals involved from dealing, and to keep information 
confidential until it is announced. 66  In assisting company to assess accurately 
                                                 
64 J Roberts et al., ‘The Corporate-fund Manager Interface: Objectives, Information and Valuation’ 
(2004) University of Cambridge Economic and Social Research Council Centre for Business Research 
Working Paper 293 (finding that private meetings are most important source of information for fund 
managers). 
65  FSA, Disclosure rules and Transparency Rule (DTR) R 2.2.1 R. Companies subject to the 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules and/or the Listing Rules are required, in a range of circumstances, 
to make announcements to investors. There are currently eight providers approved by the FSA that act 
as Regulated Information Service providers that companies making regulatory announcement can 
choose from. See <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/doing/ukla/ris/contact/index.shtml> accessed 23 April 
2010.  
66 FSA, Market Conduct (MR) 1.3.5.E. 
160 
 
information, the DTR in the FSA handbook lay down a reasonable investor test to 
determine whether information is ‘price significant’. Under this regime, the company 
should 
‘assess whether the information in question would be likely to be used by a 
reasonable investor as part of the basis of his investment decisions and would 
therefore be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the issuer's financial 
instruments’67 
Under the reasonable investor test regime, significant information which is likely 
relevant to investor’s decision includes information which affects: 
‘(1) The assets and liabilities of the issuer; (2) The performance, or the expectation 
of the performance, of the issuer's business; (3) The financial condition of the issuer; 
(4) The course of the issuer's business; (5) Major new developments in the business 
of the issuer; or (6) Information previously disclosed to the market.’68 
In the course of dialogue between the company and institutional shareholders, the 
managers should be well-prepared to make an initial assessment of whether particular 
information in the meeting amounts to inside information. The meeting participants, if 
dealing or encourage others to deal in price-affected securities based on insider 
information, as defined in CJA1993, will be guilty of insider dealing. Another risk 
that might be easily ignored, is that even if the meeting participants do not make use 
of insider information from dialogue to deal in securities, the company manager 
disclosing inside information to an institutional shareholder in private may commit an 
offence if he cannot justify himself as acting in the proper course of his employment, 
profession or duties. The FSA elaborates on this rule and sets out factors to be taken 
into account to decide whether managers are so acting: 
                                                 
67 FSA, DTR, 2.2.4 G (1).  
68 FSA, DTR, 2.2.6 G. 
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 ‘whether the disclosure is accompanied by the imposition of confidentiality 
requirements upon the person to whom the disclosure is made and is:  
(a) reasonable and is to enable a person to perform the proper functions of his 
employment, profession or duties; or (b) reasonable and is (for example, to a 
professional adviser) for the purposes of facilitating or seeking or giving advice 
about a transaction or takeover bid; or (c) reasonable and is for the purpose of 
facilitating any commercial, financial or investment transaction (including 
prospective underwriters or places of securities); or (d) reasonable and is for the 
purpose of obtaining a commitment or expression of support in relation to an offer 
which is subject to the Takeover Code; or (e) in fulfilment of a legal obligation, 
including to employee representatives or trade unions acting on their behalf.’69 
However, most institutional shareholders are unwilling to be made insiders because it 
will affect their ability to deal in the shares of the company concerned. In order to 
minimize the risk of inside information being released in meetings, most private 
meetings were conducted soon after an announcement of results.70  Institutional 
shareholders expect investee companies to ensure that price-sensitive information is 
not disclosed to them without their agreement or without warning. Where institutions 
act jointly, they would establish an informal agreement not to deal in the company’s 
shares during the time of the intervention.71    
Some institutions, such as Fidelity, are able to accept price sensitive information 
through their corporate finance groups. The risk of dealing inside information is 
avoided as these corporate finance groups operate separately from dealing and fund 
management activities.72   
                                                 
69 FSA, MR 1.4.5 E. 
70 Stapledon (n 29 ) 105.  
71 Stapledon (n 29 ) 244. 
72 Fidelity, ‘Fidelity and the UK Stewardship Code’  
<http://fidelity-international.com/about/fil_uk_stewardship_code.html> accessed 13 August 2010. 
162 
 
However, most institutions come to meetings to resolve their concerns rather than to 
receive inside information. To avoid the danger of insider dealing or improper 
disclosures, companies must be cautious to keep inside information confidential until 
it is published and must not allow this information to leak during private meetings. 
However, despite the fact that companies are not obliged to offer any information 
other than what is in the annual report and public disclosure, they could choose to 
present information to institutional shareholders to maintain a good relationship. To 
avoid any offense resulted from inside information, companies may selectively 
disclose non-public non-price-affected information to certain major institutional 
shareholders before making public announcement of the same information. It is 
clearly stated by the FSA that in the communication with third party, unpublished 
information will not necessarily be inside information.73 In fact, what company can 
present and what institutional shareholders want to obtain is the selective briefing or 
so-called soft information. Subject to the willingness of company and legal restrains 
on inside information, such soft information can be disclosed to major shareholders 
through dialogue. 
Such soft information, which is non-price sensitive in nature, gives institutional 
shareholders advantages over individual shareholders. Public information, mainly 
including company announcements and financial reports, are argued to be inadequate 
and constrain institutions’ ability to engage in corporate governance.74 By obtaining 
soft information through dialogue, institutional shareholders equipped with 
sophisticated and internal analysts, are likely able to conflate public information and 
unpublished soft information to make more accurate assessment of the company 
performance, management quality and the effectiveness of the board. Critics of this 
practice claimed that this favoritism of institutional shareholders is unfair to small 
investors and consequently damages the market’s transparency, integrity and 
                                                 
73 FSA, DTR 2.2.10G 
74 Holland (n 41) 162. 
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reputation.75 However, given the importance of the role of institutional shareholders 
in corporate governance and the government’s policy of increasing emphasis on this 
role, it seems that such practices will continue.  
However, companies and institutional shareholders should also be aware that, if 
companies disclose unpublished information that is not inside information in nature, 
but which could enable shareholders to deal or arrange deals under a regular user’s 
test, that will amount to market abuse for misuse of information.76 This rule requires 
that information disclosed to institutions in the meeting cannot be easily used by a 
regular user to deal.  
Hence, based on the above analysis, the risks of breaching insider dealing and market 
abuse regulations have the potential to hinder institutional shareholders from meeting 
with investee companies’ board and senior management. Research concerned with US 
cases showed that similar regulation of insider dealing and disclosure in the US has a 
chilling effect in practice. Some companies refused to offer any material and 
non-public information to shareholders during the course of meetings, while some of 
them will conduct a listening model for meetings:77 ‘executives…have to make sure 
they don’t say anything that could move the stock…’78 As research has shown, 
companies have sought legal counsel to advise appropriate controls to the scope of 
their communications in accordance with regulations. One company under that 
research said it typically has counsel present during the discussions. Consequently, 
costs for private meetings increase, potentially reducing both the board and 
shareholders’ incentives for dialogue.   
                                                 
75 A Al-Hawamdeh and I Snaith, ‘Is 'Private Briefing' Illegal in the United Kingdom?’(2005) 13 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 489, 493. 
76 FSA, MR 1.5.1.  
77 S Davis and S Alogna, ‘Talking Governance: Board-Shareowner Communications on Executive 
Compensation’ (2008) Millstein Centre for Corporate Governance, Yale School of Management 10 
<http://millstein.som.yale.edu/documents/Communications-Summary_Findings.pdf> accessed 16th 
September 2009. 
78 Ibid. 
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5.2.1.3.2.1.2 Conflicts of Interest 
The form of private meetings or dialogues is less ‘conflict-prone’ for institutional 
shareholders.79 Without public confrontation, the reputational injuries to corporate 
managers from institutional shareholders’ opposition can be significantly mitigated. 
Hence, institutional shareholders have fewer worries that private meetings could 
damage their business relationship with corporate managers. Meanwhile, the potential 
fall in the share price, which could be triggered by open conflicts between corporate 
managers and shareholders, is less likely to occur if their concerns are solved through 
private meetings. Thus, private negotiations are also helpful to avoid damage to the 
company’s reputation. 
Moreover, for executives and the board, dialogue helps them to build good 
relationships with institutional shareholders that would later support company in 
certain circumstances, such as crisis, or hostile takeover bid. As Holland discovered, 
the primary goal of some companies to have a dialogue with shareholders is to 
improve corporate financing capacity and defences against takeover threats.80 For the 
above reasons, indirect loss resulted from conflicts of interest is relatively low when it 
comes to the form of private meetings. 
5.2.2.2.3 Case Study: Say on Pay 
The legal framework, on the one hand, as we have seen in section 5.2.1.3.2.1.1, can 
hinder private meetings. On the other hand, it can also facilitate them. And in 
particular, and perhaps paradoxically, legal requirements for mandatory votes can 
encourage prior private meetings, as will be illustrated by the ‘Say on Pay’. 
                                                 
79 B Black, 'Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice' (1992) 39 UCLA 
Law Review 811, 879. 
80 J Holland, Corporate Communications with Institutional Shareholders (The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland, Edinburgh 1997) in Executive Summary.   
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In 2002, Britain’s Labour Government had introduced an annual advisory vote on the 
directors’ remuneration report, which came into effect in 2003.81 This requirement, 
now found in section 439 of CA 2006, provides that:  
‘A quoted company must, prior to the accounts meeting, give to the members of the 
company entitled to be sent notice of the meeting notice of the intention to move at 
the meeting, as an ordinary resolution, a resolution approving the directors’ 
remuneration report for the financial year.’82 
This rule opened up a new opportunity for institutional shareholder engagement. The 
way directors are paid represents how a board attends to share value. Dialogue 
provides shareholders with an opportunity to offer input on remuneration-decision 
process and thus enhance the transparency and accountability of the board each year. 
The first company in the UK to have its remuneration proposal rejected by 
shareholders in accordance with the Say on Pay regulation was the GlaxoSmithKline 
PLC (GSK), the Pharmaceutical giant.83 In 2003, the year of introduction of the ‘Say 
on Pay’ regulation, GSK’s board put its proposed remuneration report for a 
shareholders’ advisory vote. Its resolution was defeated, with 50.72% of shareholders 
voting against it. 84  The widely-reported vote, although non-binding, triggered 
negative publicity against the company, deeply injurious to the board’s reputation. 
Since then, the company has been actively seeking dialogue with shareholders to 
reconstruct a good relationship with investors. It now arranges two annual roundtables 
with about a dozen investor representatives on remuneration and governance.85 
                                                 
81 The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations of 2002 (SI 2002/1986). 
82 CA2006 s 439. 
83 BBC, ‘Glaxo Defeated by Shareholders’ (19 May 2003)  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3038381.stm> accessed 16 September 2008. 
84 Ibid. 
85 S Davis, 'Does 'Say on Pay' Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation Accountable' Millstein 
Center for Corporate Governance, Yale School of Managment 
<http://millstein.som.yale.edu/Davis_Say_on_Pay_Policy_Briefing.pdf>16 September 2009.  
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This case had led other UK companies to realize the importance of board-shareholders 
communications and has produced an increase in the quantity and quality of dialogue 
between companies and institutional shareholders. 86  
‘boards are aware that if they do not appear to be taking note of the signals that are 
being sent by shareholders, the next step could be to vote against members of the 
remuneration committee – which of course is a binding vote.’87  
The ABI estimated the frequency of private meetings between companies and 
shareholders tripled after the introduction of ‘Say on Pay’.88 A number of companies 
further established a formal process for communication with their major institutional 
shareholders on ‘Say on Pay’.89  In most cases, the dialogue led companies to 
strengthen their remuneration plans in ways that closely tie pay directly to 
performance.90  
To sum up, ‘Say on Pay’ serves as a good example showing the role of legal 
facilitation in increasing the level of institutional shareholder activism. It provides 
institutional investors with a new chance to get involved in corporate remuneration 
policies. Moreover, it brings regulatory pressure to the board, encouraging them to 
seek dialogue with its major shareholders prior to votes.  
                                                 
86 Ibid, 10; Also see Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), ‘What International Markets Say on PAY: 
An Investor Perspective’ April 2007 <http://www.riskmetrics.com/node/135617> accessed 12 May 
2009. 
87 Davis (n 85) 22. 
88 Ibid, 10. 
89 F Ferri and D Maber, ‘Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK’, Working 
Paper, 2 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1420394> accessed 20 May 2010; S 
Thompson, ‘The Impact of Corporate Governance Reforms on the Remuneration of Executive in the 
UK’ (2005) 13 Corporate Governance: An International Review 19. 
90 Ferri and Maber (n 89) 4. 
167 
 
5.3 Proxy Voting 
The residual control of shareholders over companies rests in large part on their ability 
to vote in companies’ meeting. Shareholders rely on the vote to affect the governance 
of a company and to signal confidence or lack of confidence in its management. It is 
perhaps the most basic and most important tool attached to the shares. This section is 
structured in two major parts. Section 5.3.1 is devoted to examining empirical 
evidence of how institutional shareholders have engaged in proxy voting activism. 
Based on that evidence, section 5.3.2 applies the activism model to explain 
shareholder voting practice.  
5.3.1 Empirical Evidence 
5.3.1.1 Proxy Voting Process 
The voting procedure for institutional shareholders is much more complicated than 
voting by individual investors, for it involves a large number of participants as the 
following diagram, by the International Investor Relations Federation (IIRF), 
illustrates.91 
                                                 
91 International Investor Relations Federation,'Survey of Global Voting Trends Summary Report ' 
(2005). 
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 In order to present a clear discussion regarding voting process, voting participants will 
be divided into three groups, namely, registered shareholders, voting decision-makers 
and issuers. 
The voting process starts with the voting materials transfer from the issuers to the 
registered owner of the shares. Normally, the name of custodians’ nominee company 
is registered on behalf of beneficial owners. In the UK, where a custodian is appointed 
to safeguard their assets, in accordance with related regulation,92 he shall hold clients’ 
assets, at least collectively, separate from his own assets. So, it is the nominee’s name 
on the register of shares. However, it owns shares as a bare trustee and must exercise 
voting rights as instructed by the person specified in the fund-manager agreement. 
In the second step, custodians will forward voting materials to persons who decide the 
way in which votes are cast. Those decision-makers could be investment managers, 
proxy agencies or other third parties. Fund-management agreements often provide 
                                                 
92 The FSA’s Client Assets Sourcebook.   
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that fund managers are the persons to make vote-decisions. Some investors would 
appoint proxy voting agencies or other third parties to vote on their behalf. Some 
might retain voting shares and vote shares themselves. Those decision-makers decide 
how to cast votes and then forward instructions to registered owners. 
Third, the registered owners complete the proxy cards in accordance with instructions 
and then send them to the registrar.93 The voting process will not end until the vote is 
recorded. For votes to be recorded, the actually number of shares voted and the 
number of voting entitlements should match in the register system. Otherwise, voting 
instructions will be rejected and votes are invalid. However, as will be discussed later, 
some votes could not be correctly registered due to some procedural difficulties, 
which result in the problem of ‘lost votes’.  
5.3.1.2 Voting Levels 
Voting levels are an important indicator of shareholder activism. There is a growing 
body of evidence on the exercise of voting rights by shareholders, to which I now turn. 
One of the early studies dealt with shareholders’ voting which was conducted by 
Mallin for the period November 1993 to September 1994.94 This study covered 101 of 
the largest 250 listed companies in the UK and found that an average of only 35% of 
the issued ordinary shares of the sample companies was voted at AGMs. 
After ten years, there was a remarkable increase in the voting level at company 
meetings. An analysis by Manifest95 of the AGMs of 401 companies (accounting for 
about 80% of FTSE All shares) in 2005 suggested voting levels of around 
                                                 
93 In 1996 a national central securities depository system, called CREST, was introduced by LSE. This 
system was based on computer  records to register title to shares and enable shares to be transferred , 
see D French, S W Mayson and C Ryan, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law (25th edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2008) 213. 
94 The result of Mallin’s study was cited in Stapledon (n 29) 90. 
95 Manifest’ research result was cited in P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares 
((2005), London: Shareholder Voting Working Group, 1. 
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61.06%.(Myners 2005)96 Similar levels were found in 2006, with 61% of FTSE 350 
Index companies and 63% of FTSE 100.97  
Additional evidence is provided by surveys conducted by institutional shareholder 
representative bodies. The earliest is probably the one conducted by NAPF for the 
period of 1990 to 1994. It found that 60% of fund managers expected to vote on 
contentious issues, and around 20% of institutions never voted.98 The voting levels at 
that time were therefore relatively low. 
That level has dramatically increased over the past few years. In a more recent NAPF 
survey, all respondents had voted their own shares or liaised with managers about 
voting at UK company meetings.99 The report conducted by IMA in 2008 shows that 
32 firms under the study appears to be voting around 95% resolutions.100  
A point needs to be borne in mind when looking at evidence on voting levels in the 
UK. There is a discrepancy between the number of votes cast by institutional 
shareholders and the number of votes registered in companies. This discrepancy arises 
when institutional shareholders cast their votes but these votes cannot be recorded due 
to procedural problems. Some votes may be in effect lost. The IIRF’s survey found 
that 76% of institutions believed votes failed to be registered as actual votes, either 
occasionally, or often.101  
                                                 
96 Ibid. 
97 It was cited in P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares ((2007), London: 
Shareholder Voting Working Group, 1. 
98 NAPF, Annual Survey of Occupational Pension Schemes (NAPF, London 1994).  
99 NAPF, Pension Funds’ Engagement with Companies Survey 2007 (Hereinafter NAPF 2007 Survey 
in subsequent footnote) <http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary.aspx> accessed 
23 December 2008, 26. 
100 IMA 2008 Survey (n 25) 3.  
101 International Investors Relationship Federal (n 91). 
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5.3.1.3 Voting Policies of Institutional Shareholders 
A considerable number of institutional shareholders, especially large institutions, have 
now set out explicit statements about their voting policies. Actually, setting up voting 
policies is not a new practice. Early studies conducted by Mallin in 1996 found that a 
majority of institutional shareholders established policies to vote on all issues 
following the Government’s recommendation and institutions representative bodies’ 
guidelines, while some institutional shareholders had a policy to vote only non-routine 
issues. Very few of them tended not to vote at all.102   
Based on different policy-makers, institutional shareholders’ voting policies can 
mainly be categorized into three groups: representative bodies’ voting guidelines, 
voting agencies’ recommendations and their own engagement polices. It is worth 
noting here, however, these three categorizes may overlap. For example, some voting 
agencies will adopt industry organizations’ guidelines as their voting policies. Or both 
of them will be implemented by institutions in different situations.  
ISC Statement of Principle 
Following Myner’s recommendation, 103  many large institutional investors have 
incorporated the ISC’s Statement of Principle into contracts with investment 
managers or into the funds’ investment statements as their voting guidance. IMA 
found that 24 out of 33 major fund managers under its survey incorporated their 
voting policies in all new and existing contracts by 2006.104 More recently, the 2010 
                                                 
102 C Mallin, 'The Voting Framework: A Comparative Study of Voting Behavior of Institutional 
Investors in the U.S. and the U.K.' (1996) 4 Corporate Governance 107, 118. 
103 P Myners, Myners Principles for Institutional Investment Decision-making: Review of Progress 
(2005) London: HM Treasury.    
104 IMA (n 22) 7.   
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NAPF survey suggests that two thirds of 38 respondents have adopted the ISC’ 
Statement of Principle as their voting policies.105   
The ISC’ Statement of Principle suggests institutional investors:106  
1. vote all shares wherever practicable to do so. They are also suggested to ‘not 
automatically support the board, if they have been unable to reach a 
satisfactory outcome through active dialogue then they will register an 
abstention or vote against the resolution’.  
2. maintain a clear vote record, including the reason for voting against a 
resolution, for abstaining and for supporting with management. 
3. establish a policy on public disclosure of voting and such policy should be 
published and regularly reviewed.  
Voting proxy agencies’ recommendation 
Some institutional shareholders’ voting policies come from voting agencies or other 
specialists outside their own funds. These voting agencies, employed by institutions to 
help with the engagement process, act alone or co-operate with institutions’ own 
internal specialists to decide on voting policies. Some institutions review agencies’ 
recommendations they receive and reject them on their behalf after taking account of 
the specific circumstances at the company concerned. Commonly, such decisions 
have been taken on the basis of in-house analysis or meeting the investee company 
directly to discuss the contentious issue.107   
Institutions’ own voting policies 
                                                 
105 NAPF, ‘Pension Funds’ Engagement with Companies Survey 2010’ (Hereinafter NAPF 2010 
Survey in subsequent footnote) <http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary.aspx> 
accessed 20 August 2010, 11.  
106 ISC (n 56) 4. 
107 NAPF, ‘Pension Funds’ Engagement with Companies Survey 2007’ (Hereinafter NAPF 2007 
Survey in subsequent footnote) <http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary.aspx> 
accessed 20 August 2010, 11. 
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In addition to above two types of voting policies, some institutional shareholders also 
have set their own voting policies. The following are some typical examples of voting 
policies: 
Institutions Voting Policies 
Standard Life ‘We vote all shares under our control at all shareholder meetings in the UK 
and Ireland, and we always vote our shares in a manner consistent with the 
best interests of our customers’108 
Friends Provident ‘Voting on all holdings worldwide and engaging in dialogue with companies 
to promote the adoption of best practice where this can protect or enhance 
shareholder value.’109 
Fidelity ‘We have a set of proxy voting guidelines which generally direct our voting 
behaviour although we do also take account of the particular circumstances at 
the company concerned…’110 
5.3.1.4 Voting-decision Makers  
In practice, very few fund beneficiaries would retain voting rights themselves. 
According to the IMA survey, only an average of 5% or fewer of beneficial owners 
had retained their voting rights.111  These beneficial owners could make voting 
decisions themselves, or outsource to a third party, or direct the funds to follow the 
instruction of a particular agency.112 In the remaining cases, clients give the funds 
discretion to vote on their behalf.  
                                                 
108 Available at  
<http://www.standardlifeinvestments.com/corporate_governance_and_socially_responsible_investing> 
accessed 10 August 2008. 
109 Available at <http://www.friendsprovident.co.uk/doclib/fcresponsibility.pdf> accessed 10 August 
2008. 
110  Available at <http://www.fidelity-international.com/about/voting_policy.html> aaccessed 10 
August 2008. 
111 IMA 2006 Survey (n 22) 21. 
112 Ibid. 
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In cases where voting-decisions rights are delegated to funds, the IIRF survey found 
that 29% of voting decisions are made by relevant portfolio managers, 22% of those 
are decided by corporate governance executives, and 14% of those are made by proxy 
voting executives.113 In most cases, a combination of corporate governance officers 
and proxy voting executives make voting decisions rather than portfolio managers.114 
Around 8% of voting decisions are made by outside proxy advisors.  
The NAPF 2007 survey provides a closer look at the use of proxy advisors. 14 out of 
33 funds surveyed subscribed to one or more voting agencies. Some funds do not 
directly delegate to voting agencies, but still use fund managers’ or specialists’ 
recommendations, which in turn can be influenced by agencies’ guidelines.115 The 
most often subscribed agencies were RREV and PIRC. Others were Manifest and 
Glass Lewis.116  
5.3.1.5 Voting Agenda 
Meeting agendas are often dominated by certain types of issue. According to a survey 
jointly conducted by Manifest and Georgeson, directors’ (re) election, and resolutions 
dealing with share capital or transactions in own shares, are the two most common 
meeting issues in UK listed companies, followed by auditors’ (re) appointment and 
remuneration.117 Board composition and directors’ remuneration are the third most 
common issues presented in the meeting.  
In term of issues over which institutional shareholders are most likely to vote against 
management, directors’ remuneration tops the list of meeting issues.118 Of the 21 
                                                 
113 International Investors Relations Federation (n 91 ) 9. 
114 Ibid.  
115 NAPF 2007 (n 107).  
116 Ibid.  
117 Both Manifest and Gergeson are proxy voting providers. See, Manifest and Gergeson, ‘Proxy 
Voting 2007 – A Pan-European Perspective’, 63, on file with Gergeson.  
118 TUC, ‘TUC Fund Manger Voting Survey 2009’ < www.tuc.org.uk/extras/fundmanager2009.pdf> 
accessed 13 February 2010, Section two, 1.5; M Conyon, ‘Shareholder Voting and Directors’ 
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respondents, all but one mentioned remuneration as the most likely issue for 
opposition. Institutions have taken up most time engaging with the company on 
remuneration issue. The second most mentioned issue is board balance/director 
independence, followed by pre-emption rights.  
5.3.1.6 Electronic Voting 
Since Myners’ call for electronic voting in 2004,119 there has been a substantial 
increase in the number of companies that facilitate electronic voting and in the 
number of electronic votes. All FTSE 100 companies and 74% of FTSE 250 
companies had introduced electronic voting by the year of 2006, while only 47% and 
10% had adopted such system, respectively, by 2003.120 The actual utilisation of 
electronic voting in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies has risen from 22% and 14% 
in 2003, to 45% and 41% in 2006, respectively.121 This growing trend is predicted to 
continue. Major proxy voting agencies, including Manifest and RREV are all offering 
electronic voting services to their clients. There is also evidence to show that 
electronic voting is positively and significantly related to the overall engagement level 
of fund managers.122  
                                                                                                                                            
Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK ’ 18 Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 296, 296. 
119 Myners, Myners Principles for Institutional Investment Decision-making: Review of Progress 
(2005) (n 103). 
120 P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2007) London: Shareholder Voting 
Working Group, 4. 
121 Ibid.  
122  R Martin and T Nisar, 'Activist Investment: Institutional Investor Monitoring of Portfolio 
Companies' (2007) 45 Management Decision 827, 836.  
176 
 
5.3.1.7 Voting: Substance 
Most UK listed companies (92% of company meetings of the FTSE 100 in 2005 as 
reported by Myners)123, provide three voting options on all issues: ‘for’ ‘against’ or 
‘abstain’. When the company disclose its poll results on its website, it must publish 
the number of votes for, against and abstentions (if counted).124  
The TUC survey looked at institutions’ voting on remuneration reports, incentive 
schemes and director election. It presents results in terms of the split in actual 
numbers of votes, for against and abstains, and their proportion.125 It finds a clear 
divergence in investor approach to utilise their voting rights. There are a number of 
respondents who were largely or always supportive of management in all issues and 
similarly, there are some groups of respondents who are most likely to oppose 
management. Unfortunately, the survey does not provide an explanation for the 
different voting propensity among institutions. 
The voting levels against corporate management’s proposals were found to be rather 
low. IMA’s study found the institutions surveyed voted against 3.3% of resolutions in 
2008 and 2.3% in 2007 and consciously abstained on 1.7% of resolutions in 2008 and 
2.3% in 2007.126 The higher level of voting to oppose management or abstain often 
indicates there were more contentious issues than previous years.  
5.3.1.8 An Analysis of Empirical Evidence 
5.3.1.8.1 Voting Level 
                                                 
123 P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2005). London: Shareholder Voting 
Working Group. 
124 The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/1632) 19 (3). 
125 TUC (n 118). 
126 IMA 2008 Survey (n 25) 23.  
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When the average voting turnout at UK general meetings was around 50% in 2003, 
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry stated that it was not a desirable result 
and it should increase in the next couple of years.127 In the wake of this sort of 
regulatory demands, the UK market has seen a 10% rise in the voting participation by 
shareholders. However, there are still 40% of shares that not voted in meetings. This 
gives rise to the question that whether institutional investors should be responsible for 
these non- voting levels. 
As we have seen above, industry associations reported that most of their institutional 
members have voted their shares. Their surveys cover large institutions that 
collectively control a significant amount of all UK equity market capitalisations. For 
example, survey undertaken by IMA covered 33 funds managers responsible for 68% 
of the equities managed in the UK.128 Therefore, it is fair to conclude that most large 
institutional investors have made a contribution to the current increased voting level. 
As to the remaining non-voting shares, Myners suggested that foreign and individual 
investors seeming to be under-represented in the voting process.129 However, those 
non-voting shares may still include a small amount of institutional shares. Some 
institutions do not vote, while some institutions’ votes are lost. Both issues are 
examined later in section 5.3.2.2.2.4.  
5.3.1.8.2 The Substances of Voting 
As noted, the exercise of voting rights has substantially grown from a fairly low base 
a decade ago to the current relatively high level. The growing interests in shareholder 
engagement amongst regulators and the public is likely to drive a further increase in 
the future. However, it should be borne in mind that we are not merely pursuing a 
high voting level in the UK, what we really expect is that institutional shareholders 
vote in a considered way. However, unlike the voting level, which can be observed 
                                                 
127 Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2007) (n 120) 1.  
128 IMA 2008 Survey (n 25). 
129 Myners Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2005) (n 123). 
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easily, whether institutional shareholders make considered votes is a more subjective 
issue.  
This part examines institutional shareholders’ voting policy, coupled with their voting 
behaviour, to explore the actual substance of votes cast. As already shown, the 
majority of institutional shareholders have established their voting policies and follow 
those policies when they cast votes. We have seen that institutions tend to adopt proxy 
voting policies which allow them to vote with management in most cases. This might 
be defended on the ground that company managers are trying to act in the best 
interests of shareholders to promote the success of the company. And meanwhile, 
voting in favour and voting against management are both forms of activism. Of course, 
institutions’ voting policies also state that they will take into account under some 
particular circumstances and vote against management when it is necessary.  
The question remaining is whether those voting policies truly help institutions to align 
their interests with the long term value of investee companies. There are cases where 
institutional shareholders should oppose management for the benefit of shareholder 
value but simply adopted their ‘vote-for’ policy. The most high-profile case is perhaps 
the acquisition of ABN Amro by RBS. This acquisition is considered as one of the 
worst deals in UK corporate history. As the chair Philip Hampton stated in the RBS 
AGM this year, ‘it can be seen as the worst price, the wrong way to pay, at the wrong 
time and the wrong deal’.130 However, when this proposal was put to a vote at the 
AGM in August 2007, an overwhelming majority of shareholders voted in favour of 
it.131 
Moreover, in reviewing the financial crisis, people question whether institutional 
shareholders had performed as responsible owners to brake management’s risk-taking 
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approach. If it is correct that remuneration contracts at the banks to some extent 
encourage managers’ excessive risk-taking, then shareholders might not pay enough 
attention to directors’ remuneration, as the TUC survey suggests remuneration was 
not a controversial issue at shareholders’ general meeting in 2008.132 
5.3.1.8.3 The Role of Voting Agencies 
As the above evidence shows, many institutions frequently appoint proxy voting 
agencies to facilitate voting decisions. These third-party advisors therefore become an 
important link in the voting process by institutions and could potentially wield 
considerable influence in the outcome of proposals at shareholders’ meetings. This 
perceived importance of proxy advice is illustrated by an estimation that if 
recommendations issued by RREV and PIRC were followed by their large number of 
clients, they could in total influence up to 35% of the votes at the annual meeting as 
reported in 2005.133 They can sometimes determine whether or not a chairman will 
‘have an easy ride from shareholders’ at the meeting’.134 As a result, it is vital to shed 
light on what role voting agencies have played in institutional shareholder activism 
and point out issues that need further consideration. 
There is little doubt that proxy voting advisors can bring multiple benefits to the 
current voting process. First, their services help institutional investors to overcome 
resource constraints on considered use of votes. As one has seen, some institutional 
investors do not have the resources to make considered voting decisions on every 
resolution at every company they invest in, nor have enough specialised knowledge to 
judge different types of corporate governance issues. Lack of resources can hinder 
their voting capability and limit their role in corporate governance. Under these 
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circumstances, to employ others to supply analysis, or make voting recommendations, 
can overcome shortage of resources. Moreover, as proxy advisors have developed 
their specialised team, it is likely they can make more accurate voting suggestions or 
engagement strategies for institutions. As mentioned, despite some institutions having 
set up their own internal engagement team, these staff may sometimes seek help from 
advisors to get professional analysis if the issues are complicated. 
Second, the economic restraint of conflicts of interest can be mitigated through the 
use of third-party advisors. Since those advisors and their services are less likely to be 
directly connected with and affected by institutions’ investee companies, they are 
arguably more independent from conflicts of interest. Delegation to the third proxy 
voting service thus helps fund beneficiaries to ensure the voting decisions are in line 
with their interests and the value of the investee companies. 
Taken together, proxy voting advisors’ professional reputations, coupled with their 
relatively independent role in engaging in corporate governance, lead to great 
potential that agencies can serve as watchdog over management.135 
However, the usefulness of the proxy voting advisor is not undisputed.136 Conflicts of 
interest are an issue frequently mentioned in the context of proxy voting services, 
particularly when some advisors provides services, such as corporate governance 
ratings, corporate governance advice and other research services to issuing companies, 
as well as to the companies’ shareowners. The independence of advisors’ 
recommendations is doubtful, for the company in question might also be a client of 
the advisor.  
There are few studies to probe how this problem affects UK advisors, such as IVIS 
and PIRC, however, evidence on the US advisors suggest that they the interests of 
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corporate clients and that of investor clients are sometimes conflicted. For example, 
RiskMetrics, the largest of the proxy voting advisory services in the world, ranks over 
8,000 companies through its Corporate Governance Quotient Service, which evaluates 
a company’s governance systems and the quality of board of directors.137 Although 
these companies do not pay to be ranked, some of them may subscribe to RiskMetrics 
services to help them improve their corporate governance standards. In the meantime, 
RiskMetrics provides investors with voting recommendations on these same 
companies. By observation of these potential conflicts, some large institutional 
investors in the US, such as the state of Colorado, chose to move from RiskMetrics to 
other less conflicted providers.138 
In the UK context, despite the lack of reliable evidence, the thesis suggests that while 
conflicts of interest might occur, they are likely less severe than in US because 
advisors such as PIRC and IVIS only provide services to institutional investors.139 In 
spite of that fact, in order to ensure voting recommendations made by advisors are 
consistent with the interests of institutional investors and their beneficiaries, on the 
one hand, voting proxy advisors should take measures to reduce the possibility of 
conflicts, such as setting up separate teams to deal with clients if interests conflict, or 
to enhance its disclosure system. On the other hand, institutional investors should 
carefully review advisors’ analysis and report if it is not consistent with their interests. 
An additional concern with the current proxy voting advisory services is that they 
might use ‘one-size-fits-all’ governance standards for different clients. Given the vast 
number of meetings each year and large number of clients that have to be analyzed in 
a short period of time, the accuracy of the recommendation is doubtful. According to 
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138 M Thompson-Mann, 'Voting Integrity: Practices for Investors and the Proxy Industry' (2009) Policy 
Briefing No. 3 The Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance  
< http://mba.yale.edu/news_events/CMS/Articles/6516.shtml > accessed 23 March 2010. 
139 More information can be found at< www.pirc.co.uk> and <www.ivis.co.uk/> accessed 10 August 
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a UK investment manager, proxy advisors have not covered some companies in the 
depth they should and the quality suffers and thus, ‘there have been numerous times 
that I have disagreed with their opinion as they have not researched this meeting in 
sufficient depth.’140 The NAPF’ survey also shows that of the 14 funds subscribed to 
voting agencies, 8 had at some circumstances chosen not to follow the agencies’ 
recommendation.141  
In this regard, the crucial way to improve the quality of recommendations is that 
advisors should devote enough resources to apply their corporate governance to each 
company and company meeting in an individual context. Moreover, the 
communication between institution clients and proxy advisors is also helpful, as it 
facilitates advisors to work out whether the recommendation is fit for clients’ specific 
circumstances.  
In sum, evidence in regard to institutional shareholders’ voting activities suggests an 
increasing important role played by proxy voting advisors in corporate governance. 
The above analysis, however, warns that their services are potentially subject to 
conflicts of interest as well as a lack of ‘in-depth’ quality. To ensure the independence 
and effectiveness of proxy voting services, in addition to enhancing monitoring from 
the government, related institutions and investors, rules about duties of analysts and 
disclosure of potential conflicts of interest should be considered if necessary.  
Postscript: The Stewardship Code encourages proxy service providers to ‘disclose 
how they carry out the wishes of their clients by applying the principles of the Code 
that are relevant to their activities.’142 However, it is too soon to assess the empirical 
evidence of the effect of this part of the Stewardship Code. 
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5.3.2 Applying the Model to Proxy Voting 
5.3.2.1 Step 1: Overcoming Free-riding  
5.3.2.1.1 The Decisiveness of Individual Shareholding 
Whether an individual shareholder is decisive in voting depends clearly on the portion 
of shares he has. So, the larger the shareholder’s holding, the greater the chance that 
his votes may be decisive. However, it is also worth noting that ‘decisiveness’ is 
inversely related to voting levels. With low anticipated levels of voting, the relative 
strength of any exercised votes is much greater. As voting levels rise, any one 
shareholder’s votes become even more diluted. In this sense, levels of voting might be 
somewhat ‘self-regulatory’. And achieving ever higher levels of voting becomes 
increasingly difficult.   
5.3.2.1.2 The Possibility of Concerted Action 
Since voting results are binding on corporations, institutional shareholders opposed to 
management have strong incentives to form a coalition to vote down management’s 
proposal. Moreover, the way in which shareholders cast votes reveals to others what 
institutions think about the performance of incumbent management. Under these cases, 
other small, retail investors, even where they do not join a formal coalition, are likely 
to vote in the same way as those large institutional investors owing to their 
professional reputation.  
5.3.2.1.3 ‘In-process’ Benefits 
As said earlier, along with the growing awareness of corporate governance among the 
public, the willingness to participate in corporate governance has become a 
reputational issue which helps institutional shareholders to maintain their competitive 
position in the market. Voting offers a good opportunity for institutions to receive this 
kind of ‘in process’ benefit. Once they disclose their voting policies or records, 
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institutional shareholders are able to show the public that they do their bits to 
contribute to better governance in investee companies.  
5.3.2.1.4 Normative/moral Obligation 
The factor of normative obligation has become particularly strong in overcoming 
free-riding when it comes to voting. First, as will be discussed later, all corporate 
governance guidelines and governmental-reports have continually pushed institutional 
shareholders to exercise their voting rights on a regular basis in a considered way. 
Second, as voting is conducted in a visible way, the public is enabled to scrutinise 
whether institutional shareholders have exercised their voting rights as advocated by 
guidelines. Thirdly, voting resonates with democracy as it grants all members of the 
company a chance to make decision on corporate affairs. Hence, some institutional 
shareholders might view it as an important and valuable right. For all these reasons, 
voting appears to generate easily this sort of moral or normative demand that 
institutional shareholders must vote. 
The subsection lists a selection of corporate governance statements in which voting 
has been emphasized. Firstly, all key self-regulation codes of good practices require 
institutional shareholders to cast their votes as active and responsible owners. For 
example: 
Cadbury Report: ‘Given the weight of their votes, the way in which institutional 
shareholder use their power…, is of fundamental importance’, and encouraged 
institutional shareholder to ‘make positive use of their voting rights and disclose their 
policies on voting’.143 
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Hampel Report: ‘institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make considered 
use of their votes’.144  
Stewardship Code: ‘Institutional investors should seek to vote all shares held. They 
should not automatically support the board. If they have been unable to reach a 
satisfactory outcome through active dialogue then they should register an abstention 
or vote against the resolution.’  
NAPF: as early as 1995, it described the institutional shareholder’s voting activism as 
the ‘the powerful measure’ and ‘encourage-as a matter of best practice- the regular 
exercise of proxy votes by pension funds’.145 In 1999, the NAPF and ABI jointly 
issued a guidance on voting in which it emphasises the importance of voting and 
recommends voting should be exercised in a reasonable manner.146 Similar guidance 
to promote considered voting can also be found in ISC’s Statement of Principe.147 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): in its Principle 
of Corporate Governance, it refers to the voting as a basic shareholder right and 
encourages the exercise of voting rights by stating that ‘shareholders should have the 
opportunity to participate effectively and vote in general shareholders meetings and 
should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures that govern general 
shareholder meeting’.148   
Regulatory demands appear to make institutional shareholders feel much less able to 
free-ride, as evidenced by the increase of voting level in recent years. For example, 
while by the late 1970s, institutional shareholders had conducted periodic dialogues 
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with company management in most large UK listed companies, 149  ‘[on] most 
occasions where the financial institution could vote, the ability to use the voting 
proxies [was] not exercised’.150 The trend of low voting levels continued until the 
1990s where only a average of 20% of shares were cast at AGMs of about 50 of FTSE 
100 companies.151 
However, impelled by regulatory demands, empirical evidence presented in Chapter 
5.3.1 shows the general voting levels have been steadily increasing in recent years to 
the current 60%. Moreover, it is now extremely rare for institutional shareholders to 
have a policy of not voting. Most of them, even if not having a policy of voting on all 
occasions, will exercise voting on contentious issues. 
A warning should be sounded. While normative obligations to vote have become 
common, they involve a risk of ‘tick-box’ approach, which the Government is 
unwilling to allow to happen. It is always easier to list things someone must do if 
those things can be easily ‘ticked off’ like a shopping list.  
5.3.2.2 Step 2: A Cost-benefit Analysis 
5.3.2.2.1 Benefits 
The votes are binding and corporate management has to follow the decisions passed at 
shareholders’ meeting. Institutional shareholders will receive benefits which are 
reflected (1) on the share of total gains and (2) the personal in process benefits as 
mentioned above.  
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5.3.2.2.2 Costs 
5.3.2.2.2.1 Direct Costs 
Direct costs of voting could be (1) costs of acquiring information; (2) costs of 
processing that information (deciding how to vote); (3) costs of casting the vote. 
As to the costs (1) of obtaining information, I have discussed in Chapter 4.2.2.1.1 that 
CA 2006 brought new rules to empower indirect investors by enhancing their 
information rights. Institutional investors are able to receive information regarding the 
matters to be addressed in shareholders’ meetings directly from the company. The 
costs (2) of processing information are determined by individual shareholders as the 
ability to evaluate information varies between institutions. However, such costs will 
gradually reduce when an institution is familiar with the way of dealing with 
corporate governance issues. Where institutional investors have established 
specialized teams in corporate governance or appoint proxy voting services, they will 
evaluate the merits of proposed resolutions more quickly and efficiently. 
Recent introduction of electronic voting has significantly reduced the direct costs (3) 
of casting shareholders’ votes. The CA 2006 allows companies to use electronic 
means to communicate with shareholders as the default position, for example, 
companies can publish information on website and shareholders are allowed to vote 
their shares electronically.152   
In addition, the CA 2006 widens the rights of proxies so that institutional shareholders 
acting as proxies to the registered owners can exercise all the shareholders rights 
which would otherwise rest in the registered owners alone.153 It expands the rights 
conferred on proxies by CA 1985 by removing the rule that proxies are not allowed to 
vote on a show of hands. It further enhances proxy’ rights by allowing a proxy of a 
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shareholder to speak at the meetings.154  Moreover, shareholders are allowed to 
appoint more than one proxy if each proxy exercises rights over different shares.155  
5.3.2.2.2 Indirect Costs 
5.3.2.2.2.1 Conflicts of Interest 
Indirect costs incurred as a result of conflicts of interest could be considerable higher 
when institutional investors vote against corporate management, for this behaviour is 
publicly visible. John Bogle, the founder and former head of Vanguard in the US, 
suggested that merely voting against management could ‘jeopardize the retention of 
clients of 401(k) and pension account.’156 Fund managers who vote against managers 
are likely to be vulnerable to retaliation which results in lost corporate business, or a 
failure to attract new business. Considering these losses, unsurprisingly, some 
institutional investors, such as HSBC, consider public confrontation between 
shareholders and management as a sign of failure in the governance process.157 They 
prefer other less conflict-prone approaches, such as private meetings, as engagement 
strategies to solve their concerns over corporate management.  
It is worth noting here that conflicts of interest can be mitigated to some extent if 
institutional shareholders delegate proxy voting agencies to make decision for them 
and this issue has already been discussed.  
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5.3.2.2.2.2 Securities Lending  
The second source of indirect costs stems from the practice of securities lending.158 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, when shares are lent the right to vote those shares passes 
from the lender to the borrower.159 This fact, in two different ways, leads to a 
disjunction between the economic ownership of, and the exercise of voting rights 
within, a corporation. First, economic owners of the securities on loan are unable to 
exercise the votes attached to the shares, resulting in the problem of ‘lost votes’, and 
secondly, shares may be borrowed for the purpose of voting and be cast in a way that 
would not be in the economic interests of the company’s true owners. 
5.3.2.2.2.2.1 Loss of Votes 
First, the effect of share lending is, prima facie at least, to deprive some owners of the 
company of their votes.160 This might occur for two reasons. The first is less obvious. 
Where the borrower transfers to the lender shares the borrower already owns, as 
security for the shares it is borrowing, the borrower loses the voting rights attached to 
those shares. The second reason is more straightforward, and has been emphasised in 
the work of Myners.161 The lender will lose the right to exercise the votes on shares so 
long as they are subject to a loan to the borrower.   
This seems obvious, but it is worth pausing to note that if the shares are sold on by the 
borrower, the new owner may choose to exercise those votes, resulting in no overall 
loss of governance rights within the company. And whilst it may be undesirable for 
share borrowers to exercise voting rights attaching to the shares they have borrowed, 
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the same point does not of course apply to those to whom they sell those shares, who 
become ‘true’ economic owners.162   
Lenders and borrowers can recall these securities by the pre-determined time if they 
wish to exercise their rights. However, recalling all shares for voting is a rare practice, 
likely only made when owners have strong incentives for shareholder engagement, or 
resolutions are continuous, such as a takeover bid. If all shares are recalled for voting 
it would affect market liquidity in a share.163 Meanwhile, both borrowers and lenders 
have additional considerations for not recalling shares, even part of them, for voting. 
Lenders may choose not to recall securities for voting in that frequent recall might 
make them become less desirable lenders. In the event of recall, borrowers are forced 
to find alternative lenders and may be less likely to choose the lender to borrower 
securities in the future as a result of the inconveniences caused by the recall of 
securities. Besides, borrowers also have incentives to avoid recalls wherever possible 
in that frequent recalls may discourage borrowers from accessing portfolios.164 Since 
recalling securities for voting might impose costs for little profit, some lenders and 
borrowers may give up their governance rights within the company resulting in ‘lost 
votes’.  
Moreover, exercising of voting rights in a considered way is not an obligation under 
the commonly used Global Master Securities Lending Agreement (GMSLA). It states 
that ‘neither borrower nor lenders have any obligation to exercise voting rights in line 
with instructions of the other party, unless agreed between parties.’165 Thus, even if 
there are instructions concerning the way of casting votes, the lenders, for example, 
will not always insist on borrowers following their voting guidelines. The GMSLA 
also does not provide sufficient incentives for borrowers to vote.  
                                                 
162 A similar point would apply where shares are being borrowed by market makers in order to fulfil 
buy orders.   
163 P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2004) (n 161). 
164 Spitalfields Advisors (n159) 6. 
165 International Stock Lending Association, Global Master Securities Lending Agreement, Point 4.2, 
<http://www.isla.co.uk/uploadedFiles/Gmsla%202000%20version.pdf> accessed 23 August 2009.  
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Myners concluded that securities lending is one of the factors influencing voting level 
in the UK.166 In a survey conducted by Institutional Shareholder Services concerning 
securities lending and corporate governance in 2007, among 355 respondents 
surveyed, the majority were US fund management companies, whilst 9.65% were 
from the UK. 65% lent securities, but nearly half of respondents (49.3%) indicated 
that their formal policy on securities lending was not part of their proxy voting 
policy.167 Most institutions (58.9%) did not have standing instructions in place with 
their custodians to recall shares for proxy voting purposes.  
Another survey conducted by the NAPF in 2007 found that 75% of funds surveyed 
lend stock. Only 45% of them said they recall stocks for contentious voting 
resolutions and 5% for all resolutions.168 Half of them did not vote stocks on loan.  
A higher recall rate was observed in the IMA’s survey. However, there are still firms 
that did not recall stock to exercise voting rights.169  
To ensure active shareholder monitoring, codes of good practice issued by various 
bodies have promoted institutional shareholders to consider their corporate 
governance responsibilities in investee companies. For example, in July 2005, the 
International Securities Lending Association (ISLA) 170  issued a publication, 
Securities Lending and Corporate Governance, exploring how securities lending and 
good corporate governance can be aligned so as to minimise conflict. It suggests that 
all stakeholders should be informed of all necessary information about securities 
lending. Meanwhile, given the large increase of lending activity around the dividend 
                                                 
166 P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2005) (n 123) 4. 
167 Institutional shareholder Services, ‘ISS Share Lending Flash Survey 
Result’ http://www.riskmetrics.com/system/files/private/Share_Lending_Flash_Survey_Results031207
.pdf accessed 4 May 2008. 
168 NAPF 2007 Survey (n 99) 21.  
169 IMA, Asset Management in the UK, (IMA London 2007), 26. 
170 An independent trade association established in 1989 to represent the common interests of 
participants in the securities lending industry. It works closely with European regulators and in the 
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record date, it recommends that record date should be separated from the shareholder 
meeting.171 Moreover, the Stock Borrowing and Lending Code of Guidance which 
issued by the Stock Lending and Repo and Committee172 also suggests parties should 
be aware of each others’ attitude towards voting from the outset of securities 
lending.173 
5.3.2.2.2.2.1 Borrowing Shares for the Voting Purpose 
On the other hand, as observed by Hu and Black, the growth in the securities lending 
practice has led to the so-called ‘empty voting’ problem, where a shareholder’s voting 
strength is greater than his economic ownership.174 By means of securities lending, 
borrowers can get securities shortly before the record date (for a shareholders’ 
meeting) and then return them afterward. If the borrower exercises the votes attached 
to the shares, then this can give rise to significant potential conflicts of interest. A 
borrower of shares might exercise their votes in a way that would be in their own 
interests, but harmful to the economic interests of the company’s true owners. To take 
one example, a speculator who has shorted a share has an interest in driving down its 
value. If that speculator were to borrow other shares, it would then have an interest in 
using the votes on those shares to take decisions harmful to the company, with a view 
to depressing the share price.   
So how much securities lending has occurred for voting purposes? Given much 
information is undisclosed, the extent is unclear. But according to Spitalfields, the 
                                                 
171 Spitalfields (n 159) 10. 
172 A UK-based committee consisting of market practioners, members of bodies such as CREST, the 
United Kingdom Debt Management Office, the Inland Revenue, the London Clearing House, the 
London Stock Exchange and the FSA. 
173 Stock Borrowing and Lending Code of Guidance, para 7.3. 
174 H T C Hu and B Black, 'Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and 
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normal levels of borrowing would seem to be in the 2% or 3% range, with 
extraordinary peaks to 5% or 6% coinciding with dividend dates.175 The dividend date 
often corresponds with the record date of general meeting, and thus, the increasing of 
securities lending transactions in the period near dividend dates would at least indicate 
securities lending might be used for the purpose of voting. However, it is worth noting 
here that shares might also be borrowed for tax advantages.176 
There are two examples of this practice within the UK. At British Land’s 2002 AGM, 
Laxey Partners tabled a motion to unseat the board, and voted their 9% shares. It 
failed to vote down the resolution but, more importantly, it transpired that Laxey had 
raised its holding from 2.9% to 9% by borrowing securities over three days before the 
record date.177 In the same year, some shareholders of P&O Princess favoured the bid 
of Carnival, borrowed securities and voted at an extraordinary meeting to approve the 
merge with Carnival.178  
Borrowing shares for the purpose of voting to influence the outcome of shareholder 
meetings is not illegal. However, such practice is not recommended by industry good 
practice guidance. For example, Myners suggested that ‘borrowing shares for the 
purpose of acquiring the vote is inappropriate, as it gives a proportion of the vote to 
the borrower which has no relation to their economic stake in the company.’179 The 
Stock Borrowing and Lending Code of Guidance states that ‘securities should not be 
borrowed solely for the purpose of exercising the voting rights’.180  
                                                 
175 Spitalfields (n 159) 44. 
176 A fuller discussion was provided in Chapter 3.6 
177 S Marks, ‘British Land Slams Shareholder Laxey’ (16 July 2002) Evening Standard. 
178 It was cited in H T C Hu and B S Black, 'The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership ' (2006) 79 Southern California Law Review 811, 849.  
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Moreover, in its Securities Lending Code of Best Practice, the International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN) has urged regulators to consider requiring disclosure of 
positions for blocks of shares even if the position comprised largely or entirely of 
borrowed securities.181 
We now turn to consider a number of procedural constraints that make voting a more 
costly activity. These are: short notice, share register and record date. 
5.3.2.2.2.3 The Problem of Short Notice 
Before the convening of a shareholders meeting, companies are required to send 
notice of the meeting to shareholders in advance of certain time, so as to give 
shareholders time to consider how to exercise their votes.182 Most investors under the 
IIRF survey rate the adequacy of notice as the most important issue in the decision on 
whether to vote.183  
However, in practice, institutional shareholders are often left very little time to make 
voting decisions, as information passed through multiple participants is 
time-consuming. In some cases, delay in process may lead to fund managers being 
unaware of a proposed resolution. The IIRF survey confirmed this problem. Nearly all 
respondents claimed insufficient time to register their votes before the deadline and 
lost their changes to participate in corporate decisions.184  
Past years have seen a rapid increase in utilization of electronic voting. It speeds up 
the information transformation among multiple participants and saves much time 
                                                 
181 ICGN, Securities Lending Code of Best Practice, (ICGN London 2007) Appendix I. 
182 CA s 307 provides that trade companies are required to call all general meetings on at least 21 days’ 
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which would be consumed in manual way. To some extent, it mitigates substantially 
much of this concern on insufficient notice time. However, since there is large 
number of participants in the voting process, the process would still be slow if 
electronic voting means is not available in one of the links. Any delay of two or three 
days may in some cases be crucial. Moreover, there is a lack of evidence about the 
exact speed of the electronic system. In other words, there is no evidence indicating 
electronic system can entirely solve the problem of insufficient notice time. It is 
necessary, therefore, for regulators to find out the time taken for the voting process, 
and if the current notice time is insufficient, they should consider extending it.  
5.3.2.2.2.4 Share Register 
The problem of ‘lost votes’, which was noted above, is largely the product of 
procedural difficulties.185 The UK voting process for institutional shareholders is 
characterised by complexity and multiplicity of participants. Any weakness in the 
voting process may in some cases be crucial. The subsections are concerned with two 
practical issues involved in the exercise of voting rights by institutional shareholders: 
register account system and record date. 
As mentioned, shares are often registered under the name of a custodian’s nominee 
company.186 In practice, the way in which shares are registered varies. Majority of 
holdings of shares are registered in the name of one Nominee Company, without 
indicating the client’s own name, for example, ABC Nominee Ltd. This is known as 
‘omnibus account system’.187 The fact that shares are often registered in an omnibus 
account creates a potential for votes to be lost, because the issuers are unable to 
identify whose votes have been cast when the number of shares actually voted is not 
the same as the number of voting entitlements. A simple example helps to illustrate 
                                                 
185 See chapter 5.3.1.8. 
186 See chapter 5.3.1.1. Also see P Davies and J Rickford, 'An Introduction to the New UK Companies 
Act: Part 1' (2008) 1 European Company and Financial Law Review 48, 243. 
187 P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2004) (n 161) 14. 
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this point. If the shares of 500 different clients are registered under ‘ABC Nominees 
Limited’, the issuer may not be aware of the identity of those 500 underlying 
beneficial owners. When the issuer finds it has received more voting instructions than 
the number of entitlements, it cannot determine who has voted and who has not since 
it can only identify the name of ABC Nominee Limited from the registry system.  
Myners addressed the potential difficulty in voting posed by omnibus account 
system. 188  He proposed that institutional shareholders should consider using a 
designation account system instead of omnibus account system. Under this system, 
fund managers register the equity investment in a designated name relating to a 
specific investor, for example, ABC Nominees Limited-X pension fund, rather than in 
the name of one Nominee Company. In terms of voting, the benefit of this system is 
evident. It provides a clear identification of share owners which facilitates issuers to 
determine whose votes have been lost or not voted. However, Myners recognized that 
a move from an omnibus to a designation system is not straightforward.189 The 
omnibus account system has been widely used because it delivers multiples benefits 
to market participants. It helps reduce costs and administration. Moreover, the number 
of shares owned by clients may be considered confidential and the use of the omnibus 
account system can respect this concern. Thus, while the change of omnibus account 
system to a designation system would promote good governance practice, it might 
conflict with market practices. A designation system is costly and provides no client 
confidentiality. Accordingly, Myners did not recommend a whole move from 
omnibus account to designation system. He suggested, I would argue correctly, that 
fund managers should give consideration to registering shares under a designation 
system when appropriate.190  
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Finally, it is worth noting that in his later report, Myners found that main custodian 
now appear to use designation accounts in registering clients’ shares.191 
5.3.2.2.2.5 Record Date 
The record date is defined as the date on which a member must be registered as a 
member in order to be entitled to vote. In the UK, in accordance with the 
Uncertificated Securities Regulations, the record date cannot be fixed for a date more 
than 2 days before the date of the meeting.192 It is argued that the current record date 
is insufficient.193 
Due to the time taken to pass information, voting decisions have to be submitted 
earlier than voting entitlement is set. In other words, the votes have to be cast before 
determining which persons are entitled to vote. At that time, those submitting voting 
instructions might be unclear as to the number of shares that are entitled to vote when 
they hand in their voting decisions. This can lead to discrepancies arising between the 
number of voting instructions and the number of voting entitlements. As a result, 
votes are lost.  
The proposal for an extended record date were rejected by Myners, who only 
supported that weekends and bank holidays should be excluded in 48 hours length.194 
Despite the evident advantage in terms of clear identification of voting entitlements 
before votes being cast, Myners was concerned with the potential risks involved in a 
longer time framework. If given a longer period, there is a greater risk that a 
shareholder can vote his shares under the entitlement at the record date, but then 
transfers his shares and has no economic interest in the company.  
                                                 
191 P Myners, Review of the Impediments to Voting UK Shares (2007) London: Shareholder Voting 
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However, it is interesting that international practice on record date tends to have a 
longer time frame than the UK counterpart. Some countries, such as Australia, France, 
Germany, do not set a record date for voting. Some countries, such as Japan and US, 
have a considerably longer date than the UK - around 90 days in Japan and 35 days in 
the US.195 These regulations are, presumably carefully arrived at, and it should be 
asked in the UK why a longer record date works in these other countries.  
It is worth noting that CA 2006 excludes weekends or bank holidays when calculating 
the 48 hours time limit for the receipt of voting instruction.196 However, no similar 
amendment has been made to the Uncertificated Securities Regulations for setting 
voting entitlements. To ensure the certainty and consistency of regulations, those 
Regulations should be amended in accordance with relevant requirements as the CA 
2006.  
In conclusion, there are a number of legal barriers that discourage shareholders from 
voting or make voting a difficult process. It is necessary for regulators to remove 
those regulatory obstacles so as to assist monitoring by those institutions that do have 
incentive to take action and encourage those who have not engaged to vote.  
5.3.2.2.2.6 Further Reform: Mandatory Voting or Mandatory Voting Disclosure? 
The issue of whether legislation shall impose a requirement to vote, or at least to 
disclose voting behaviours, in exercise of the Government’s power under CA 2006, 
has been hotly debated in the UK.197 The following part will examine these proposals 
carefully and explore whether they will bring desirable changes.    
5.3.2.2.2.6.1 Is Mandatory Voting a Worthwhile Reform in the UK? 
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In the UK, while it is the duty of a trustee ‘to conduct the business of the trust in the 
same manner as an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct his own’,198 
voting is not mandatory for fund managers. The advocates of mandatory voting take 
the view that voting is an asset which should be exercised on all issues on behalf of 
beneficiaries and thus voting should be made compulsory.199  
I would argue, however, that the benefits from such proposal are unwarranted. To 
begin, while a mandatory voting obligation seems easy to satisfy, it is practically 
difficult to require institutional shareholders to vote in an informed manner.200 We 
have seen that in the UK, due to the fund arrangement structure, the voting rights are 
more likely to be exercised by an agent rather than by funds themselves.201 These 
agents or external fund managers vote on company resolutions based on voting 
policies provided by institutions. Given the diversity of company resolutions, voting 
policies issued by institutions are generally broadly stated, instead of detail 
instructions on every company or specific resolution. If voting were made compulsory, 
institutions have to issue very detailed voting policy statements taking into account 
every issue under different circumstances in their numerous investee companies. Or if 
voting policies were not made in detail, to justify their voting, external fund managers 
have to frequently consult funds on voting issues.  
However, voting is a time-consuming process for institutions especially on company 
issues that are contentious or of major significance. Instead of fulfilling the obligation 
of mandatory voting through the above two approaches, it is likely that some 
institutions might simply ‘box-tick’ voting options without careful consideration. In 
such cases, a high voting level would not bring the expected benefit for improving the 
overall standard of corporate governance. Myners argued against mandatory voting 
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grounded on a similar reason, pointing out that such a rule might dilute the influence 
of voting decisions taken after careful consideration.202  
One counter-argument to my analysis is that, if voting costs were to rise, then fund 
managers would likely reduce the number of companies in their portfolio and be more 
concentrated on long-term investment in the remaining portfolio companies. 203  
However, such a benefit will only follow if pension funds are managed by external 
fund managers. Under such circumstances, external fund managers will consult 
trustees on voting issues and thereby, voting costs will indeed increase and this might 
then force fund managers to reduce the number of investee companies. Such positive 
effect, however, will not take place for all types of institutional shareholders. For 
wholly insured and internally managed funds, the increased costs from mandatory 
voting requirements will not be significant because they have a closer relationship 
between fund trustees and beneficiaries than externally managed funds.204 Thus, the 
mandatory voting rule is less likely to produce the desired change in portfolio design. 
Meanwhile, institutional shareholders adopt different investment strategies to manage 
assets and some of them need flexibility in their portfolios, such as indexed funds. If 
they are forced to decrease the number of companies in their portfolio and change 
their investment strategies, while their long-holding positions could improve 
corporate governance in their investee companies, it is difficult to evaluate whether 
negative influence could occur on their management return.   
Furthermore, as argued previously, in the UK, the institutional voting level is less of a 
problem since evidence suggests there is already much institutional voting 
involvement in UK companies. The average voting level in UK companies’ meeting, 
although it appears not perfect, is not the fault of institutional shareholders. Any 
proposals for more institutional voting level might not make much sense. Once again, 
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the thesis emphasises, the purpose to promote institutional voting, is having more 
informed votes rather than merely achieving a high voting level.  
Helpfully, there is an analogue for the likely outcome of mandatory rule in the UK. In 
the US, private pension funds are mandated to vote their shareholdings by the 
Department of Labor under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA). It takes the view that ‘the fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty to 
plan participants and beneficiaries require the responsible fiduciary to vote proxies on 
issues that may affect the value of the plan’s investment’ and ‘fiduciary act of 
managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of proxies 
appurtenant to those shares of stock.’205 It treats voting as an asset and makes clear 
that the fund managers owe the duty of care to their clients and thus they must 
consider the possibility of intervening in management when the value of clients may 
be enhanced by their intervention.  
ERISA did indeed seem to significantly increase US voting levels. However, the US 
experience does not provide UK a terribly positive example. The first difficulty that 
the US Department of Labour confronts is monitoring. As discussed earlier, a fuller 
voting process hardly to guarantee that voted are cast in an informed and considered 
way. In the US, evidence suggests that some fund managers have produced 
formalized procedures, and window-dressing practices among some investment 
management are common.206 Enforcement presents the second difficulty. Beneficial 
owners have little incentive to bring litigation against their fund managers for not 
voting. Even if they intended to take action for funds’ failing to vote, it would be 
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‘extremely difficult’ for them to establish causative link between the failure to vote 
and the losses suffered in fund management.207   
Lastly, voting is a shareholder’s fundamental right to claim their residual control, 
however, it is only one possible form of institutional shareholder activism to ensure 
management accountability. Normally, institutional shareholders are likely to address 
their concerns privately with management without it being publicized in order to 
reduce any possible negative impact. If institutional shareholders are forced by 
legislation to vote, their behaviour in participation in corporate governance is likely to 
be changed.208  
For these reasons, it can be concluded that the benefits of mandatory voting would 
very likely be outweighed by the negative impact and it would not be a worthwhile 
reform.  
5.2.2.2.2.6.2 Mandatory Voting Disclosure  
As with the issue of mandatory voting, advocates of mandatory disclosure of voting 
behaviour are also inspired by the US experience. In the US, private pension funds 
governed by ERISA are also, by Interpretative Bulletin 94-2, since 1994 obliged to 
disclose information regarding voting activities. Registered management investment 
companies are also required to disclose their proxy voting policies and procedures, 
and their actual voting records since 2003 under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)’s rules.209 
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It has been argued that the UK, which has a similar share ownership structure, should 
have a similar requirement. As early as 1998, when the DTI210 started the UK Modern 
Company Law Review211, the DTI Minister, Margaret Beckett, announced before a 
conference sponsored by PIRC that institutional shareholders should vote all their 
shares and disclose annually their voting policies and records so that they may be held 
accountable. If they do not, Beckett warned that she would put such a requirement in 
the Companies Bill.212 Three years later, a similar opinion was expressed in the 
Government’s White Paper, issued in response to the recommendations of the 
Company Law Review (2001), at paragraph 2.47, where it states ‘the government… 
believes that, in principle, it would be in the public interest for institutional 
shareholders to be required to disclose publicly how they have voted in respect of 
their shareholdings in British quoted companies.’213  
This proposal was then adopted in the 2005 Company Law Reform Bill. Under the 
heading of ‘information as to exercise of voting rights by institutional investors’, 
clauses 1241 to 1244 refer to institutional investors’ voting regulations requiring 
institutions ‘to…provide specified information about the exercise of voting rights 
attached to shares…’ 
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The UK was not alone in considering mandatory voting disclosure. The EU also 
discussed whether institutional shareholders should be subject to such obligation. The 
European Commission put forward a proposal as a medium-term objective 
(2006-2008) in its Action Plan ‘Modernisation of Company Law and Enhancing 
Corporate Governance in the European Union – A plan to Move Forward’ in May 
2003. It proposed that ‘institutional shareholders should be obliged (1) to 
disclose…their policy with respect to the exercise of voting rights...and (2) to disclose 
to their beneficial holders at their request how these rights have been used in a 
particular case.214 However, this proposal was strongly resisted and has not yet been 
adopted.215  
Nor were the UK’s proposals eventually adopted by the CA 2006. The Company Law 
Review stated that ‘this is a complex area and there may be practical difficulties in 
implementing the Review’s proposal through company’s legislation.’216 Instead of 
imposing mandatory rules, the CA 2006 merely grants reserve power to the Secretary 
of State to decide whether to require public disclosure of institutional shareholders’ 
voting. This reserved power can be called upon if institutional shareholders’ voluntary 
disclosure has not significantly increased. Until now, the Government has not used 
that reserve power.  
The newly-issued Stewardship Code, which is operated on a comply-or-explain 
approach, requires institutional investors to disclose voting policies and voting 
records. 217  If institutional investors implement the Code effectively, the thesis 
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believes that this approach will bring most benefits, at least costs. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary for the thesis to have an analysis on the potential benefits and costs of 
adopting a mandatory voting disclosure rules. In examination of these issues, a look at 
US’ experience on adoption of mandatory voting disclosure rules in 2003 will be 
helpful. The US offers a good comparison: as in the UK, share ownership is relatively 
dispersed with a high percentage of shares held by institutional investors. Hence, it is 
not surprising that the concerns raised in respect of the UK mandatory disclosure 
proposal are similar to those raised with regard to the SEC’s disclosure rules. 
Proponents of mandatory voting disclosure, such as the TUC,218 believe that several 
benefits might flow from mandatory voting disclosure proposal. The first and primary 
benefit is the greater transparency concerning how institutional investors exercise 
their voting rights. Compulsory voting disclosure provides a chance for beneficiaries 
to monitor whether managers are acting in their best interests.  
It would also increase the accountability of institutional shareholders by reducing the 
risk of conflicts of interest which fund managers may face when they have a financial 
interest in portfolio companies.219 Under such cases, the disclosure requirement may 
be an appropriate option to enable beneficiaries to ensure fund managers’ voting 
decisions are exercised on the consideration of the interests of beneficiary rather than 
the interests of fund managers. 
Meanwhile, voting disclosure would allow investors to monitor fund managers’ 
performance, based not only on investment returns, but also the managers’ voting 
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10 March 2009. 
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records.220 Thus, clients are provided with additional valuable information to evaluate 
a fund’s overall performance. 
Secondly, a mandatory voting disclosure rule will be potentially value-enhancing for 
institutional investors’ portfolio companies. Fund managers under a strong external 
monitoring are likely to make better voting decisions to enhance the interests of 
portfolio companies. In this regard, mandatory disclosure of institutional shareholders’ 
voting behaviour will strengthen the accountability of corporate management, and this 
in turn, will have a positive impact on the overall shareholder value.  
The third potential benefit is the greater level of institutional shareholder engagement 
However, such a proposal is not uncontested. The major argument put against voting 
                                                
in their portfolio companies. Relevant issues have been discussed in Chapter 4 when 
the thesis considered the benefits arising from the Stewardship Code.221 A few words 
are still necessary here. Once voting policies are disclosed, not only funds’ own 
investors, but also other institutional shareholders will be concerned with the voting 
activism of the funds. Criticisms of free-riding by some passive institutional investors 
would pose reputational damages to their business. In this sense, the threat of shame 
would increase the cost of non-voting and make voting a more desirable activity. 
disclosure is the potential high costs incurred by this requirement. The Association of 
Investment Trust Companies, for example, argued that disclosure requirement will 
burden institutions with high financial expenses.222 Moreover, disclosure for voting 
activities is a time-consuming process and if fund managers spent time on disclosing 
information, they will be distracted from issues that could add clients’ real value. 
Such costs from voting disclosure will be initially born by institutions but will finally 
 
220 A Palmiter, 'Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?' (2002) 23 Cardozo Law 
Review 1423, 1477. 
221 See Chapter 4. 
222 Association of Investment Trust Companies, ‘AITC against Voting Disclosure’ (08 February 2006) 
<http://www.theaic.co.uk/en/Press-centre/AITC-ASKS-PRIME-MINISTER-TO-INTERVENE-OVER-
DISCLOSURE-OF-VOTING-IN-COMPANY-LAW-REFORM-BILL/> accessed 19 March 2008. 
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pass on to individual investors. To impose additional disclosure costs, without certain 
value-enhancement on funds performance, will be contrary to the interests of ultimate 
beneficiary owners.  
However, PIRC, a proxy service provider in the UK, argued that the high costs 
Second, opponents also question whether retail investors are really interested in how 
                                                
incurred by mandatory disclosure requirement were exaggerated. 223  Under its 
estimation, voting disclosure would be approximately between £1,000 and £ 1,500 per 
institutional investor per year. The process only involves data transferring from one 
system to another.224 Alan Macdougall, the managing director of PIRC, therefore 
commented that the cost argument is just a ‘red herring’ and not sufficient to waive 
the duty to provide competent information for clients.225 The Government, although it 
admitted it is difficult to quantify the benefits brought by mandatory disclosure rule, it 
provided an example that, ‘if better governance led to just 2% of companies increased 
their rate of return to shareholders by 0.1% per annum, the annual benefit would be 
roughly £ 30 million p.a’. The costs, on the other hand, are expected to be in the order 
of £6 to £9 million p.a.’226 Meanwhile, although the start-up costs for disclosure may 
be considered large, this cost, as pointed out by the SEC, would reduce over time.227 
Therefore, the argument that mandatory disclosure rule would cause high economic 
burden to institutions seems unconvincing.  
votes are exercised because more concerns as to the disclosed voting will be raised by 
media and other social groups for politicization. In response to the SEC’ rule, one 
fund’s counsel, argued that over the last three years, his firm had only received one 
 
223 PIRC, ‘Proxy Voting Reviews October to December 2006’ < http://www.pirc.co.uk/publications> 
accessed 12 March 2009. 
224 Ibid, 5.  
225 Ibid. 
226 DTI (as renamed as BERR), Transparency of Voting By Institutional Investors, Explanatory 
Material on Draft Clauses on the Exercise of Voting Rights by Institutional Investors, 4. 
227 SEC (n 209). 
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voting-related query from a investor and this request was related to the investor’s 
employer.228  
This consequence is likely to occur because retail investors tend to behave passively 
in monitoring fund managers’ voting activities for two reasons. First, most individual 
investors, whose focus on funds is to gain low-cost diversity and high investment 
returns, are rationally less interested in funds’ governance activism. Second, as we 
noted above, there are possibly numerous retail investors in fund arrangement and 
they are also facing a free-rider problem. Most of them hold a small stake in the fund 
and each investor hopes other investors act on behalf of every investor. Even if some 
retail investors have intentions to raise concerns on fund managers’ disclosed voting 
information, they would not take further actions because their private benefits from 
monitoring might be lower than their costs while other retail investors would obtain 
the same benefits by the free-riding.  
In respect of this concern, the SEC contended, I would argue rightly, that regardless 
of whether a large number of investors are interested in voting disclosure, it is 
investors’ ‘fundamental' right to know how fund managers exercise their voting rights 
under their fiduciary duty.229  
There are, however, three issues that cannot be overcome easily in respect of the 
impact of mandatory voting disclosure. First, it is suggested that such rule will distort 
institutional shareholders’ confidentiality of business strategy and place them in a risk 
of retaliatory actions by company managers – such as by means of denying access to 
corporate information. It is not an easy issue that can be overcome. Although SEC 
suggested that most voting policies disclosed by institutional shareholders are not 
confidential,230 it could still happen that in some cases, disclosure of voting activity 
                                                 
228 R Teilelbaum, ‘Mutual Funds Report for Funds, Disclosure is Hardly in Fashion’ (5 January 2003) 
New York Times. 
229 SEC (n 209).  
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will undermine institutional investors’ confidential investment strategy. Therefore, the 
thesis considers the ‘comply-or explain’ approach adopted by the Stewardship Code 
as an appropriate way since it ensures a certain level of flexibility.  
The second relevant concern is that once voting records are disclosed, some 
non-shareholder interest groups, will ‘politicize’ the voting behaviours of fund 
managers based on considerations such as social and culture factors, rather than 
maximization of shareholder value. They would engage in publicity campaigns 
against institutional shareholders’ voting records, which will divert a fund from 
management of its portfolio. A member from a UK insurance society admitted that 
after its proxy voting records had been disclosed, most queries came from media 
groups rather than the general public. 231  In the adoption of mandatory voting 
disclosure rules, the SEC has not given a clear evaluation on this issue in adopting the 
mandatory rule but left it to ongoing monitoring. Therefore, in this regard, the US 
experience cannot provide much valuable information about how UK can overcome 
this problem.  
Thirdly, the empirical study examining the impact of US mandatory voting disclosure 
would not instil confidence into proponents of such rule in the UK. There is some 
empirical evidence suggest that the voting disclosure regulation makes no significant 
difference on funds’ behaviours to corporate governance before and after the rule 
change. For example, mutual funds’ support for management proposal did not decline 
after the imposition of mandatory voting disclosure rule.232 Such a requirement 
therfore seems hard to achieve substantial change that governments expected.  
Taking the above arguments together, imposing a mandatory voting disclosure will 
potentially achieve greater transparency than will voluntary disclosure and market 
                                                 
231 PIRC (n 223) 5. 
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<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982493>12 March 2008. 
 
210 
 
forces, while it will result in unavoidable drawbacks. It is therefore perhaps not a most 
desirable method to promote responsible shareholder voting practice. On the one hand, 
the Government should ensure a certain level of flexibility, allowing institutional 
investors not to disclose when it is not in their interests. On the other hand, given the 
massive benefits of voting disclosure, the Government should encourage institutions 
to make every effort to inform the public about the exercise of their voting rights.  
Since voting disclosure has been regarded as a good practice in the Stewardship Code, 
the key to fulfil the above aims is the effective implementation of the Stewardship 
Code. The effect remains to be seen in the future. 
5.4 Submitting Proposals  
Submitting shareholders' resolutions (or shareholders' proposals) is the third type of 
activism which provides institutional shareholders with an opportunity to 
communicate with both corporate management and other shareholders.  
The most distinct advantage of submitting proposals, compared with other types of 
shareholder activism, is that it allows shareholders to ‘set the agenda’ – to raise their 
own points of concern at shareholders’ meetings. It gives shareholders the ability to 
vote for the issues they want and not merely negatively against the executive agenda.  
However, in the UK, it is not a popular type of shareholder activism in practice. Due 
to information limit, the discussion below will be short, compared with that of private 
meetings and proxy voting.  
5.4.1 Empirical Evidence 
There seems to have been four major studies of shareholder proposals in UK listed 
companies. The earliest study is that of Stapledon. He found out that almost all 
resolutions proposed at AGMs and EGMs were board-or management-initiated, rather 
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than shareholder-initiated.233 Shareholder proposals only occur very rarely in listed 
companies.234  
The second study involved a survey by PIRC of shareholder proposals at FTSE 350 
companies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It found that there were only three filed 
at FTSE 350 companies in 1998, and just 13 companies have been the recipient of 
such resolutions since 1995.235 Further research on shareholder resolutions conducted 
by PIRC in 2002 showed that the situation had not improved very much. By 
observation of 523 general meetings from January to September 2002, PIRC found 
that there were only a handful of shareholder resolutions out of over 6000 resolutions 
discussed.236 
The third study, which was conducted by Manifest, covered the shareholders’ 
meetings at FTSE 250 and FTSE 100 companies in 2007.237  They found that 
shareholder proposals represent only a small percentage of the total number of 
proposals dealt with by shareholder meetings in the UK and Europe. A total number 
of 5 shareholder resolutions were proposed in FTSE 250 in 2007, accounting for only 
0.2% of all resolutions in the meetings. There were also only 5 shareholders proposals 
submitted in FTSE 100, representing 0.4% of all resolution in the meeting.  
The fourth study was conducted by the TUC in its Fund Manager Voting Survey 2009. 
It reported that only 5 out of 59 proposals were filed by shareholders in 33 listed 
companies in which institutions surveyed invested.238 The first four were filed by two 
institutional investors at Northern Rock, which sought to restrict management’s 
freedom to undertake certain actions. The funds won the popular vote, however, as 
three proposals required 75% approval, only the move to prevent the board issuing 
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new shares without shareholder approval was passed.239 The final one was filed by 
TV chef Huge Fearnely-Whittingstall at Tesco, and sought to encourage Tesco to sign 
up to the RSPCA’s ‘Five Freedoms’ in respect of the welfare of chickens sold in 
Tesco. This resolution gained just under 10% of votes at the Tesco’s AGM in 2008. 
5.4.2 Applying the Model to Submitting Proposals 
Although these studies conclude that filing resolutions is rare in the UK, unfortunately, 
none has probed the reasons for this fact. One possible explanation is that the current 
threshold for submitting proposals imposed by UK law, requiring at least 5% or 100 
shareholders as co-filers, is high for many institutional shareholders.240 To satisfy 
these requirements, institutions have to incur much cost and devote time such as to get 
co-operation from other shareholders. As a result of these statutory hurdles, if 
institutional shareholders are dissatisfied with corporate management, they may seek 
other forms of activities, such as private meetings, or voting, which are much less 
restricted, instead of filing proposals. Therefore, submitting proposal is a less 
economic approach.  
In addition, the uncertainty whether shareholders’ proposals can be adopted increases 
the risk of this type of activism for any potential activist. As the above TUC’s survey 
suggested, all five shareholder resolutions were defeated, with one achieving a vote in 
favour of just under 10% at the company’s AGM.241  
5.5 Derivative Action  
Derivative actions are usually considered an action of last resort. Staplendon found 
that the vast majority of 17 UK institution he interviewed had never taken, or 
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‘seriously considered taking’, derivative action against corporate managers for breach 
of duties.242 
5.5.1 Empirical Data  
Currently, derivative actions are rarely pursued by institutional shareholders. Until 
now, there would appear to be only one case in which an institutional investor sought 
to bring a derivative suit against directors: Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries 
(No.2) [1982]243. 
There are eight cases where minority shareholders brought derivative claims based on 
the provisions in CA 2006.244 However, none of the claimants were institutional 
investors. 
5.5.2 Applying the Model to Derivative Action 
5.5.2.1 Step 1: Overcoming Free-riding 
Since there is no requirement for any particular percentage of shareholding or any 
particular number of shares that the claimant has to hold to bring a derivative action, 
the factors to overcome free-riding – the decisiveness of individual and the possible of 
concerted action – do not apply here. ‘In-process’ benefits will be discussed later. 
And there is generally no regulatory encouragement for more derivative actions and 
thus the factor of normative obligation does not work here.   
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5.5.2.2 Step 2: A Cost-benefit Analysis 
5.5.2.2.1 Benefits 
5.5.2.2.1.1 Direct Benefits 
We should bear in mind that a derivative action is taken to enforce the directors’ 
duties on behalf of the company. Accordingly, if successful, it is the company that 
benefits from any compensation, including both recovery in the sense of financial 
compensation and the return of the company’s property, not the derivative claimant. 
Any benefit for the derivative action is based on the portion of shares he owns in the 
company: if the derivative claimant owns 3% of the company then the benefit of his 
shares increases by an amount of 3% of the award of compensation.245  
5.5.2.2.1.2 Indirect Benefits 
Derivative action can generate some unique benefit from the process itself. Cox, 
Coffee and other scholars suggest liability rules, such as the threats of financial 
penalties, loss of reputational capital and ‘social stigma’ enforced by a successful 
derivative action can provide some level of deterrence against potential abuses by 
management, not only officers of the subject company but also other companies.246 
Even if the recovery benefits to the company in whose name the claim is brought do 
not outweigh the company’s litigation costs, its shareholders still may benefit. It is 
because, firstly, such action deters other officers of the company from abusing their 
authority, and secondly, institutional shareholders are likely to have diversified 
holdings in other companies and they will benefit if a derivative action deters 
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potential defendants who are situated similarity at other companies.247 Therefore, 
shareholders as a class in general will benefit in the form of increased deterrence of 
managerial misconduct.248 It is worth emphasizing here such deterrence will affect 
both ex ante expectations of wrongdoers as well as ex post liability for the total 
damages they incurred.249  
However, it can be argued that this knock-on effect on other companies seems hard to 
be achieved in the UK. One factor (probably the most important factor), when the 
courts consider whether to grant permission to continue that action, is to ask whether 
a hypothetical director acting in the best interests of the company, would pursue this 
action. When the courts apply that test, however, the court will not take into account 
the fact that even though it wouldn’t benefit this company much, it would send a clear 
signal to other companies in which this shareholder owns shares. The permission is 
unlikely to be given based on its wider educating effect.250 And it is another reason 
why DAs are unlikely to go ahead in the UK. 
5.5.2.2.2 Costs 
5.5.2.2.2.1 Direct Costs  
A practical hurdle that an institutional shareholder confronts, and one which acts as an 
overwhelming financial disincentive to taking any legal action against company 
director for breach of their duties, is the cost of bring derivative suit.251  
Derivative claimants will be saddled with significant legal costs if they lose the case. 
Unlike the US where a contingency fees arrangement is applied, typically in the UK, 
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the losing litigant may have to pay not only his own legal costs, but the defendant’s as 
well.252 If the ‘loser pay’ principle applied to a derivative claimant, it will become an 
enormous deterrent to litigation.253 However, the court may order the company to 
indemnify the claimant for his costs provided he acted reasonably in bringing the 
action. This is established in Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) (1975) and is often known 
as a Wallersteiner order. The rule was codified in Civil Procedure Rule 19.9 E.254 
The question of relevance is when the court will grant the derivative claimant a costs 
indemnification. Buckley LJ in Wallersteiner v Moir255 made the point that the 
indemnification order is available only where an independent board-acting with the 
care that would be taken by an ordinary man in the exercise of his own affairs-would 
have brought the litigation.256 Under the new derivative claim mechanism, Kershaw 
observes that the Buckley LJ’s test is similar to the ‘a person acting to promote the 
success of the company’ criterion for granting permission to continue the action 
itself.257 In most cases, then, an indemnification order will follow automatically if 
permission to continue the litigation is granted.258 
Even the action is successful, it is a lengthy process. The potential time involved in a 
derivative action increases the riskiness of this type of litigation for any potential 
plaintiff. It is likely to take many months to reach a conclusion even if permission to 
proceed is granted by the court.  
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Taken together, institutional shareholders clearly do not have incentives to incur the 
costs and inconvenience of derivative action which would tie up there fund managers 
time and result in costs that cannot be passed on to beneficiaries. 
5.5.2.2.2.2 Indirect Costs 
5.5.2.2.2.2.1 Conflicts of Interest 
An institutional shareholder who brings a derivative suit has to suffer losses resulted 
from starkly institutional conflicts of interests. While other types of activism, such as 
voting against managers’ resolutions, target the performance of the management team 
as a whole, derivative action involves a very personal attack on specific directors. It is 
therefore strongly detrimental to the business relationship between those directors and 
the institutional investor and its affiliated institutions. Meanwhile, a derivative suit 
could put the subject company’s reputation at risk as it sends a signal to the public 
that the company was badly run by those directors. For those reasons, institutional 
shareholders are reluctant to rely on derivative actions as an activism strategy.  
Taken the above factors into consideration, even if free-riding can be overcome, 
derivative litigation is not a worthwhile action for activism since the potential costs 
incurred will be higher than the received benefits. Various empirical studies have 
concluded that while the total amount of recovery may be significant, it is generally 
de minimis on a per share basis and likely to be smaller than the costs the claimant 
shareholder incurs.259 As a result, institutional shareholders will continue to channel 
their energies into other activism approaches as this thesis has considered. 
5.6 A Recap of Proposals for Reform 
The part has sought to apply the model of institutional shareholder activism to the 
different forms that activism may take. In doing so, it has presented empirical 
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evidence of the extent and nature of institutional shareholder activism in the UK, 
analyzed the factors that affect current activism levels and explored the possibilities 
for more institutional shareholder activism in the UK. My task was primarily 
descriptive and explanatory – to describe levels of shareholder activism and to explain 
these in terms of the model of factors set out in Chapter 1. However, in the course of 
my discussion, we also encountered a number of regulatory impediments to 
shareholder activism, and from these we considered possible improvements to reduce 
these barriers. It will be useful to recap the reforms that I have suggested, 
1. Securities Lending 
To ensure votes are cast in a responsible way when shares are on loan:  
a. Institutions conducting securities lending should disclose all necessary 
information about their positions and policies for securities lending;  
b. Lenders should recall shares on loan to vote when a resolution is contentious; 
c. When lenders have good reasons not to recall the shares, they should set up a 
clear voting policy or instruction in regard to how shares should be voted 
consistently with their economic interests, and should ensure it is implemented 
by the borrowers.  
2. Procedural barriers to voting 
To build a more efficient voting process and prevent votes from being ‘lost’: 
a. Participants in the voting process, such as institutions, issuers and voting 
agencies, should further introduce electronic voting capacity to enhance the 
efficiency of voting 
b. The issuers should publish the total number of votes or proxies received, to 
help to identify any ‘lost’ votes in the process 
c. Regulators should consider extending current notice time and record date if 
found they still give insufficient time for institutions to cast their votes 
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3. Acting in concert 
In order to facilitate collective shareholder action, regulators should further clarify 
provisions in respect to ‘acting in concert’. In particularly, they should give 
further explanation on what constitute ‘a long-lasting policy’ and ‘board 
control-seeking proposals’. 
4. Voting disclosure 
To achieve greater transparency in respect of institutional shareholder voting: 
a. Institutional investors should disclose both their voting policies and voting 
records when appropriate. This will enhance the transparency and 
accountability of institutional shareholders and help to promote greater 
institutional shareholder engagement. 
5. Voting agencies 
In exercising their voting rights, many shareholders have to rely on third party agents 
for information, and in this area, recent experience from the US points out to a 
concern that those agents may be subject to conflicts of interest with a resulting bias 
to produce a voting recommendation. There has not been much reported case or 
research on this area. In spite of this, it is necessary for Government to consider 
whether it is time to lay down rules about professional duties of analysts and how to 
handle conflicts of interest, such as full disclosure of this conflict may be necessary.  
With the implementation of the Stewardship Code, proxy service agencies and 
consultants should be encouraged to comply with the Code and report if against it. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has completed the analysis of the UK by applying the model established 
in Chapter 1 to four different types of activism. It was first concerned with the 
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empirical evidence on the level of each type of activity and found out that institutional 
shareholders preferred private meetings and proxy voting over submitting proposals 
and bringing derivative actions. Through applying the model, we found that such 
differences are determined by the different strengths of the factors contained in the 
model. 
In analyzing the first step of overcoming free-riding, we have noted that it is easier for 
institutional shareholders to overcome free-riding when they choose private meetings 
or voting. Private meetings provide a good opportunity for institutional shareholders 
to be decisive and to act together. Moreover, such meetings also secure significant ‘in 
process’ benefits and are culturally preferred. The normative obligation has become 
particularly strong when it comes to voting. Institutional shareholders are compelled 
by a mass of growing regulatory demands to cast their votes and thus, are less able to 
free-ride. To submit proposals, institutional shareholders have to satisfy certain 
shareholding requirements which make it an undesirable action. These factors do not 
work much in respect of derivative actions.  
While the benefits secured from different types of action are often broadly similar, the 
costs vary greatly. The primary cost incurred by private meeting is the potential 
liability for insider dealing and market abuse. Voting imposes both direct costs, 
resulting from procedural difficulties, and indirect costs-produced by conflicts of 
interest and impact on securities lending by shareholders. Costs incurred by 
submitting proposals are hardly explored due to lack of evidence. Bringing a 
derivative action involves expensive litigation and losses resulting from stark conflicts 
of interest which make it very a costly form of activism. 
Finally, in applying the model, we have noticed that there are measures that regulators 
should consider to promote a more active and effective shareholder engagement. 
These include: improvement to securities lending, removal of procedural barriers to 
voting, clarify regulations on insider dealing and acting in concert, to require 
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disclosure of voting policies and records and monitor the voting activities of proxy 
agencies.   
We are now in a position to leave the UK behind, and move our research on to China. 
 
 
Part III Institutional Shareholder Activism in China 
Chapter 6 Corporate Governance in China 
This chapter looks at the corporate governance framework in China. It begins with an 
overview of some relevant aspects of Chinese listed companies in section 6.1, 
including the typology of companies, the historic development of listed companies, 
the classes of shares and the agency problem in listed companies. Section 6.2 turns to 
describe the multi-layered regulatory framework for the corporate governance system, 
followed by a discussion of the internal governance structure of Chinese listed 
companies in section 6.3. In particular, section 6.3 provides an analysis of the 
monitoring role played by institutional shareholders to discipline upon the majority 
shareholders. Chapter 6 concludes with a brief summary in section 6.4. 
6.1 Data on Chinese Listed Companies 
6.1.1 Typology of Companies  
Chinese company law makes a distinction between two forms of company: Joint 
Stock Companies (JSC) and Limited Liability Companies (LLC), which roughly 
corresponded to the UK’s distinction between public and private companies.1 The 
form of JSC is usually adopted by large companies which intend to offer shares to the 
public, while LLC is incorporated by small businesses. Therefore, for a company to 
get listed, it must be incorporated as a JSC either through promotion or public 
subscription, with a required registration capital of at least RMB 5,000,000 (roughly 
￡500000).2  
For a JSC to be listed on a stock exchange, it must satisfy a number of key 
requirements laid down by securities law and listing rules relating to their statues, 
                                                              
1 See Chapter 2.1.1. 
2 Company Law 2005 (hereinafter CL 2005) s 81.  
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shares, business record and management. For example, the total share capital should 
be no less than RMB 30 million.3 The public shareholding shall account for more than 
25 per cent of its total stock.4 For an issuer whose total share capital exceeds RMB 
400 million, such percentage is 10 percent.5 As in the UK, companies must meet other 
requirements such as information disclosure, and audit conditions. 
Chinese listing requirements, however, lay down one requirement that is clearly 
different from the UK. Any public offer by a JSC satisfying the listing criteria must 
gain approval from the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) – the 
major regulator in Chinese securities market.6 This requirement indicates that the 
listing process of companies is ultimately controlled by the state in China. The 
position is different from the UK, where the Financial Services Authority (FSA) does 
not have discretion over which companies can issue or list shares: the listing 
requirements are set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 
2000), FSA Listing Rules and London Stock Exchange (LSE)’ relevant rules and 
companies satisfying those criteria are entitled to get listed.  
Comparing the UK and Chinese stock market, as Table 6.1 shows, the listed 
companies sector is a significant part of the economy in China as it is in the UK, but 
the number of listed companies and total value of shares traded in China are much 
less than the UK. Meanwhile, the turnover ratio for stocks traded in Chinese securities 
market is only half of that of UK market, which suggests China has a less liquid 
market.  
Table 6.1 A Comparison between the UK and Chinese Stock Market (2008) 
 Listed Market Stocks traded7, Stocks traded, turnover 
                                                              
3 Securities Law 2005 (hereinafter SL 2005) s 50 (2).  
4 SL 2005 s 50 (3). 
5 Ibid. For discussion of the CSRC, see section 6.2.2. 
6 Securities Law 2005, s 23. 
7 Stocks traded refers to the total value of shares traded during the period. 
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domestic 
companies, 
total 
capitalization of 
listed companies 
(% of GDP) 
total value (% of 
GDP) 
ratio8 (%) 
 UK     2,405    69.3    242.5      226.9 
China    1,604    64.6    126.4      126.3 
Source: The World Bank, available at < http://data.worldbank.org/> accessed 25 June 2010. 
As of April 2010, data from the World Federal Exchange show that there have been 
1837 Chinese listed companies on mainland stock exchanges. Although the number of 
listed companies is less than in the UK, the total domestic market capitalization of the 
Chinese sector is larger. The capitalization amounted to RMB 23 trillion (roughly 
￡2.3 trillion), ranking third in the world.9  
6.1.2 Historic Development of Chinese Listed Companies  
Unlike the UK, where most public companies are converted from private companies, 
most Chinese listed companies were transformed from former State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) which were incorporated in a totally different organizational form. 
This unique feature affects nearly all aspects of today’s corporate governance system 
and it is therefore necessary for this thesis to explain some background about former 
SOEs, why and how they transformed into today’s listed companies. 
Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese Government adopted the central 
planned economy, under which enterprises were owned and controlled by the State as 
                                                              
8 Turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded in a year divided by the average market 
capitalization for the period. 
9 World Federal Exchange, Statistics: Number of Listed Companies& Domestic Market Capitalization, 
available at <http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/ytd-monthly> accessed at 5 June 2010. All 
listed companies are domestic Chinese companies. 
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a basic unit to implement production plans and provide social welfare.10 On behalf of 
the State, different level of state agencies, which might be a ministry, provincial 
government or local government, exercised rigid supervision and control over SOEs 
under centralized planning.11 Managers were directly appointed by these government 
agencies and had almost no independence of management, since the Government 
determined prices, production outputs, input and retained any profits that might 
accrue from the SOEs.12 Within this system, managers’ performances were not linked 
to economic benefits of enterprises, as the aim of running enterprises was to fulfilling 
the assigned production plan rather than maximizing profits. These enterprises were 
not formed and organized as modern corporations that we are familiar with today. The 
basis on which to build a (market-based) corporate governance system was therefore 
non-existent. 
This centralized planning system had led SOEs to suffer from inevitable and 
insurmountable problems such as inefficiency and low productivity for more than 30 
years, which forced Chinese policymakers to explore reforms to improve SOEs’ 
performance in the late 1970s.13 In attempts to align the interests of managers with the 
SOEs, the Government adopted a series of measures to increase company and 
managerial autonomy, including reducing centralized control and intervention in 
enterprises’ operations, allowing managers to retain some after-tax profits, and 
introducing a contracting system in which managers could rent the SOEs from 
government in return for an agreed-upon amount of profits and taxes.14 These earlier 
                                                              
10 C Xi, Corporate Governance and Legal Reform in China (Wildy, Simmonds and Hill Publishing 
London 2009) 6. 
11 Ibid. 
12 G Yu, Comparative Corporate Governance in China: Political Economy and Legal Infrastructure 
(Routledge, London 2007) 24. 
13 For a more detailed discussion of these early reforms, see C Shi, ‘Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises in Post-WTO China’ in R Tomasic and others (eds), Corporate Governance:Challenges for 
China (Law Press, Beijing 2005) 398-412. 
14 Z J Lin, L M Liu and X Zhang, 'The Development of Corporate Governance in China' (2007) 28 
Company Lawyer 195; J Chen, Corporate Governance in China (RoutledgeCurzon, New York 2005) 
39. For example, under the contracting system, the manager of enterprise and the government made 
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experiments since 1980s led to some degree of success in increasing productivity and 
efficiency of SOEs, however, they all failed to bring fundamental changes to the 
central planned system. The performance of SOEs remained poor in the early 1990s.15 
In 1990 losses incurred by SOEs amounted to 34.8 billion RMB.16 Thus, further 
reforms were crucial.  
Ultimately, the ground-breaking SOE reform in China was initiated with the leader 
Deng XiaoPing’s triumphant visit to south China in 1992, when he called for opening 
up the Chinese economy. Later, in November 1993, the Third Plenary Session of the 
14th Party Congress issued the ‘Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a 
Socialist Market Economic Structure’ (‘Decision’) and officially adopted the policy of 
establishing a socialist market economy.17 Among other things, the priority in creating 
this system was given to enterprise reform. Under the Decision, the orientation of 
enterprise reform is to create a ‘modern enterprise system’ which has ‘clarified 
property rights, designated authorities and responsibilities, separated government and 
enterprise functions, and established scientific management’.18 After many years’ 
trials, the Decision signaled that the Government officially endorsed the modern 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
contract that specified the enterprise’s performance target and production quota, and financial 
obligation to the state. Apart from these conditions, the manager was free to run their business, such as, 
producing over-quota goods, setting salaries. However, this system soon led to substantial widespread 
corruption. Many managers expropriated state’s assets by pursing short-term profits under their 
contract term.  
15 These early initiatives also produced new, unexpected problems, such as speculative investments, 
asset stripping, diversion of enterprise funds to the managers for discussion of the problems which had 
in the past SOEs , see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Reforming 
China’s Enterprises (OECD, Paris 2000) 64. Also, see Y Mai and F Perkins, 'China's State Owned 
Enterprises - Nine Case Studies' (1997) Briefing Paper Series, No. 7, East Asia Analytical Unit, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade . 
16 Project Group of the China Academic of Social Sciences, ‘Several Problems related to the 
Establishment of a Modern Enterprise System’ (1996) 17 Social Science in China, 20.  
17 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jianshe Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji Tizhi Ruogan Wenti de 
Jueding [Decisions of the CPC Central Committee on Some Issues Concerning the Establishment of a 
Socialist Market Economy System], adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the CPC Fourteeth 
National Congress on 14 November 1993.  
18 Ibid, section 2.  
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corporation system as an important measure to reform SOEs. 
The reform was pursued mainly in three steps.19 First, the introduction of business 
organizations: in 1992, the nation’s first Company Law, was promulgated as a legal 
foundation for the establishment and operation of modern companies. It recognized 
and created mandatory standard form of two types of company: JSC and LLC. For the 
first time, Chinese Company Law legally lay down that the objective of a corporation, 
whether state-owned or not, is to increase productivity and economic benefits, in other 
words, to maximize the wealth of that corporation.20 Secondly, the Government 
launched restructuring movement by incorporating former SOEs into the forms of 
company governed by the Company Law, as introduced above, namely, JSC and LLC 
– a process generally referred to ‘corporatization’. The corporatization separates the 
State from SOEs, at least theoretically, as the State became the shareholder of a 
corporation rather than the direct owner and controller. Thirdly, having corporatized 
themselves into share-capital companies, in order to generate funding from the public, 
to diversify SOE risks and (to some degree) to separate government administration 
from SOEs management, most large SOEs gained listing on domestic and 
international stock exchanges. Therefore, given the large number of SOEs 
transformed from traditional enterprises, ‘listed companies’ in China could actually 
mean listed SOEs.21   
The process of reform, as put by Deng XiaoPing, is ‘crossing the river by feeling each 
                                                              
19 For a full discussion of Chinese enterprise reform, see, OECD, Reforming China's Enterprises (n 
15); and World Bank, China's Management of Enterprise Assets: The State as Shareholder (World 
Bank Country Report, Washington DC 1997); And, I Macneil, 'Adaptation and Convergence in 
Corporate Governance: the Case of Chinese Listed Companies' (2002) 2 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 289, 297-30; Also, see W P Mako and C Zhang, 'State Equity Ownership and Management in 
China:Issues and Lessons from International Experience' OECD Paper 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/23/31226002.pdf>12 October 2008., 2-5. 
20 Section 5(2) of 1993 Company Law. 
21 Lay-hong Tan and J Wang, ‘Modelling an Effective Corporate Governance System for China’s 
Listed State-owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in A Transitional Economy’ 7 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies (2007) 143, 147. 
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stone’ which indicates the reform has to undergo a unique Chinese approach. Indeed, 
the reform is clearly one with ‘Chinese characteristics’. In contrast with the corporate 
and market reforms in Russia and some East European countries, the approach being 
taken by China is to reconstruct SOEs into private commercial firms, but still under 
tight state control.22 During the listing process, only higher quality assets of former 
SOEs were allowed to be listed on stock exchanges under the Government’s listing 
quotas, with the remaining SOEs turned into holding companies. The holding 
company, which might be organized as the LLC or JSC, became the parent company 
and the major shareholder of the listed companies. The non-state investors, although 
allowed to share control over the company, have to be minority shareholders.23  
6.1.3. Classes of Shares  
Under the Company Law, a Chinese listed company may have only one class of share: 
ordinary share with each share carrying one vote. There are, nevertheless, several 
types of share in Chinese listed companies, in terms of different shareowners and 
trading rules.  
One primary distinction is that between tradable and non-tradable shares. Tradable 
shares are shares that can be freely sold to the general public on various stock 
exchanges. Tradable shares can be sub-divided into several distinct types. ‘A’ shares, 
analogous to ordinary shares in the UK, are the most common kind of share. Similarly, 
they entitle holders to receive dividend and to vote in the shareholders’ meeting. 
However, originally, A shares differed from the UK ordinary share in that they were 
exclusively available to Chinese national investors. As one shall see later, since the 
launch of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) program in 2002, qualified 
foreign institutions can buy ‘A’ shares within the quotas allocated by the 
                                                              
22 OECD (s 15) 64, major approach being taken by other transitional countries is massive privatisation.  
23 See discussion in sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.4. 
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Government.24 The A share market is China’s biggest stock market.  
The rights attached to ‘B’ shares are similar to the UK ordinary shares but only 
available to foreign individuals and institutions.25 They are subscribed and traded in 
foreign currency instead of RMB. In addition buying B shares, foreigners can invest 
in Chinese listed companies by buying shares listed on foreign share exchanges. The 
most common example is ‘H’ shares (being shares listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange).  
A, B and H shares are the main types of tradable shares in Chinese listed companies. 
In a 2000 survey of 257 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 252 
companies issued A shares, 21 companies issued A and B shares, 5 companies issued 
only B shares.26 These data suggest that, as in the UK, although listed companies 
could issue several classes of share, A share or ordinary share is the dominant 
category. It is worth noting that a small part of China’s stocks can also come in the 
forms of so-called ‘red chips’, ‘L’ shares, ‘N’ shares and ‘American Depository 
Receipts’ (ADRs).27 Red chips are stocks issued by Hong Kong registered companies 
that have a mainland Chinese shareholder holding at least 35% of the shares. It is 
traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and is available to international investors. 
L shares are Chinese shares issued by a small number of Chinese companies listed on 
the LSE. N shares and ADRs are issued by Chinese listed companies traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange. These overseas listings require the approval of Chinese 
Government.  
The remaining group of non-tradable shares – although carrying same rights as 
tradable shares – are subject to strict restrictions on tradability. This unique class of 
                                                              
24 See Chapter 7.2.4.  
25 Since 2001, a small number of eligible domestic investors are allowed to trade B shares, however, 
they are not the concerns of the thesis. 
26 S Tenev, C Zhang and L Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building 
the Institutions of Modern Markets (World Bank Publications Washington 2002) 76. 
27 Chen (n 14). 
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share is a by-product of China’s gradualist approach to its economic reform and it was 
used as a tool to retain Government control over listed companies. During the process 
of SOEs reform, the Government intended to resolve SOEs’ inefficiency and to raise 
capital from the public through listing. However, it was afraid to lose its central 
control if all shares could be freely sold.28 The State finally adopted a split share 
structure ownership in listed companies: it holds a large portion of SOEs shares as 
non-circulating shares, with the remaining portion going to the public. In other words, 
only part of SOEs’ shares in an IPO can be freely sold to the public.  
The remaining shares that were prohibited from being sold, were generally designated 
‘state share’, if retained by the state, ‘legal person share’ if owned by 
government-related organizations with legal personalities, or ‘employee share’ if 
owned by the collectively body of company employees.29 
The transfer of state and legal person shares can only be conducted through private 
negotiation following approval by the securities regulatory authorities. Employee 
shares have to be held for 6 to 12 months after an IPO, and can then be traded on 
stock exchanges with Government’s approval.30 
Non-tradable shares represent a significant portion of the total equity of listed 
companies. By the end of 2004, nearly 64% of listed companies’ shares were not in 
circulation. 74% of them are state-owned shares. Despite a lack good data, at present, 
the percentage of non-tradable shares in listed companies has decreased as a result of 
split structure reform – to which I now turn. 
6.1.3.1 The Split Share Ownership Structure Reform 
The split share ownership structure in Chinese listed companies is widely seen as an 
                                                              
28 Macneil (n 19) 300.  
29 The number of employee shares is gradually falling since 1998 when the government issued a 
circular in relation to discontinuing the issuance of employee shares, see Tenev, Zhang and Brefort 78. 
30 Tenev, Zhang and Brefort (n 26). 
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impediment to further development of the stock market. As admitted by the 
Government, the split-share ownership hindered the development of the market in 
terms of  
‘distorted pricing mechanism, resource allocation inefficiency, invalidation of the 
market share price as an innate factor that promotes efficiency and limits the power 
of the substantial shareholders and management of listed companies, lack of 
common interest as the basis for corporate governance, the price discrepancy 
between negotiated non-tradable share transfer and competitive quotation of tradable 
shares, deficient market condition for exercise of capital operations’.31  
To bring non-tradable shares on to the market, the Government made three early 
attempts in – 1996, 1999 and 2001 – to invite companies to convert their non-tradable 
shares to tradable shares. However, the lack of a well-designed mechanism to 
compensate tradable shareholders who bought their shares at a higher price, triggered 
significant declines in the stock market.32 For example, in 2001, the announcement of 
the reform trigged a collapse of Chinese stock markets, wiping 43% and 53% off the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen composite index respectively.33 These consequences forced 
the Government to withdraw those reform plans.34 
A further reform was initiated in May 2005.35 Two official documents: Guidance 
                                                              
31 Guidance Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies, Clause 2, issued on 
August 23, 2005, jointly by the CSRC, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), the Ministr of Finance, the People’s Bank of China and the Ministry of 
Commerce  
 <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n4001948/n4002120/4069773.html> accessed 12 March 2009. 
32 S L J Lee, 'From Non-tradable to Tradable Shares: Split Share Structure Reform of China's Listed 
Companies' (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 57, 65. 
33 Ibid, 64. 
34 Ibid. 
35 For detailed discussion of the reform, see Lee (n 32) and X Jia and R Tomasic, Corporate 
Governance and Resource Security in China : the Transformation of China's Global Resources 
Companies (Routledge, London 2010) 6-10. 
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Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies (Guidance)36 and 
Measures on the Administration of Split-share structure Reform of Listed Companies 
(Measures) were issued by the Government to guide split share structure reforms. The 
Guidance specially emphasized that the aim of the reform was not to sell-off 
state-owned shares, but rather to give the shares owned by the Government the same 
rights and responsibilities as the tradable shares held by the general public.37  
The Measures laid down rules to govern operational issues in the split share structure 
reform. Listed companies are required to proposal a reform scheme to transfer 
non-tradable shares to tradable shares and to provide a compensation package for 
existing tradable shareholders in return for the right to sell their shares on stock 
exchange.38 According to the Measures, only tradable-shareholders are allowed to 
exercise their votes on the reform proposal at the shareholders’ meeting and the 
reform will be adopted with two-thirds of tradable shareholders approval.39 
By the end of 2008, the vast majority of listed companies had completed the process 
of converting non-tradable shares to tradable shares.40 However, a large quantity of 
shares after converting was still subject to lock-ups and not yet available in the market. 
According to the Measures, for 12 months from the date of implementing the reform 
scheme, these shares cannot be traded.41 Thereafter, the shareholders of these shares 
holding 5% or more of the total amount of shares of any listed company, can sell no 
more than 5% of the total amount of shares of the company within 12 months and no 
                                                              
36 See (n 31) 
37 Guidance Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies, 2. 
38 Measures on the Administration of Split-share structure Reform of Listed Companies, issued by the 
CSRC in September 2005 <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n4001948/n4002120/4069846.html> 
accessed 12 March 2009. 
39 For a more detailed discussion of share compensation see, Y-H Yeh and others, 'Non-Tradable 
Share Reform and Corporate Governance in the Chinese Stock Market' (2009) 17 Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 457. 
40 W H Yeung, 'Non-tradable Share Reform in China: A Review of Progress' (2009) 30 Company 
Lawyer 340, 345. 
41 Measures on the Administration of Split-share structure Reform of Listed Companies, s 27. 
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more than 10% within 24 months.42 
The reform represents one of most significant steps that China has taken to develop its 
stock market and particularly has important bearings on the development of Chinese 
institutional investors. The release of non-tradable shares requires sufficient demand 
from the market. Amongst the public, institutional investors, including pension funds, 
insurance companies and QFIIs are key to generating a stable market environment for 
state shares. Along with their growing power, institutional shareholders could set up 
and increase the level of engagement with their portfolio companies.  
6.1.4 Agency/governance Issues in Chinese Companies 
Institutional shareholders of Chinese listed companies are confronted with two types 
of agency problems: majority shareholder-minority shareholder agency problem and 
manager-shareholder agency problem. First and most important, investors have to 
deal with the problem resulting from the current concentrated shareholding structure – 
the exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders.43  
Kim and Qiu found that for the period 1996-2003, share ownership in most listed 
companies is highly concentrated with a single, large owner associated with the 
Government or Government-run and related enterprises.44 Moreover, in these samples, 
43% of all shares outstanding are held by a single shareholder and about 66% of these 
largest shareholders in their samples are associated to the Government.45 More recent 
research from the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 2009 shows that 77 
                                                              
42 Ibid. 
43 There is massive literature concerning minority-majority conflicts problem, for example, see S 
Claessens and J P Fan, ‘Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey’(2002) 3 International Review of 
Finance 71; R Tomasic and N Andrews, ‘Minority Shareholder Protection in China’s Top 100 Listed 
Companies’ (2007) 9 Australia Journal of Asian Law 88. 
44 F A Gul, J-B Kim and A Qiu, 'Ownership Concentration, Foreign Shareholding, Audit Quality and 
Firm-Specific Return Variation: Evidence from China ' 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984142>17 October 2009.. 
45 Ibid. 
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companies of top 100 Chinese listed companies have their 5 largest shareholding 
constituting more than 50% of total shares.46 The largest shareholder in 86% of the 
top 100 listed companies is the state or state-related institutions. In the non-state share 
group, as we will see in Chapter 7, institutional shareholdings amount to half of the 
total equity, with the rest held by individual investors. 
The owner of the state or state-related share, of course, is the state. However, it has 
only a conceptual existence. Prior to 2002, the agencies representing the state owning 
the equities are the central government, local governments and the parent SOEs of 
listed companies. However, the multiplicity of agencies has generated many 
high-profile problems, 47  which led to the establishment of State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) as one 
single authority to represent the Government as the owner in listed companies.  
To sum up, most Chinese listed companies have ‘insider/control-oriented’ structures, 
where the State acting as ‘block-holder’ owns a sufficiently sizeable fraction of the 
voting shares to exercise considerable control over the managers, by contrast with the 
‘outsider/arms-length’ corporate structure in the UK.48  
The second type of agency conflict encountered in Chinese listed companies is the 
manager-shareholder agency problem. It has been mentioned earlier that the 
separation of owner and manager in modern corporations results in there being an 
agency problem between the shareholders as the principal and the managers they 
                                                              
46 Institute of world economic and political in Chinese Academy of social science, 2009 nian 
Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi 100 qiang gongsi zhili pInjia [Corporate Governance Assessment Report 
on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies For 2009] <http://www.iwep.org.cn/> accessed 14 
September 2009. 
47 For example, the multi-tiered network of institution caused many insider problems, such as false 
reporting of profits or soft loans to augment poor cash-flow. The interference by numerous, 
uncoordinated government agencies also hinder the efficient decision-making of companies. See, 
OECD (n 15) 65. 
48 Discussions regarding the share ownership in UK listed companies can be found in Chapter 1 and 3. 
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employed as agent.49 Since Chinese listed companies also adopt a share-capital 
corporate structure similar to the UK, they seem to be no exception to the puzzle of 
how to hold self-serving directors accountable to shareholders as a whole. 
6.2 The Chinese Corporate Governance Regulatory 
Framework 
As discussed previously, the regulatory framework of a country significantly affects 
the level of shareholder activism. An effective one will enfranchise institutional 
shareholders by enabling them to engage in corporate governance. By contrast, legal 
barriers will increase the costs of activism and thus reduce shareholders’ incentives 
for engagement.  
Before turning to introduce Chinese corporate law and its corporate governance 
framework, it is necessary to provide a brief description of Chinese legislation 
hierarchy, since it sharply differs from the UK legal system.  
In contrast to the UK, China adopts a continental legal system, which suggests only 
statutes are in effect.50 Generally, the legal system can be divided into three layers, 
depending on various legislative bodies and legislative effect. Different organs hold 
different legislative powers and as such, the enactments they make have different 
binding authority. The top layer is the state law which can only be enacted by the 
central authorities. Under the Chinese Constitution, the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) with its standing committee is authorized as the highest legislative power of 
the State.51 Only legislations enacted by the NPC and its standing committee can be 
defined as basic law. Major laws in this level dealing with Chinese corporate 
governance are the Company Law and Securities Law. 
                                                              
49 See Chapter 1.1. 
50 For a more detailed account on Chinese legal regime and its historic development, see Jianfu Chen, 
Chinese Law: Context and Transformation (Brill, Leiden 2008). 
51 Legislation Laws of the People's Republic of China (Hereinafter Legislation Law) s 7. 
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The second layer is administrative regulations and rules made by the State Council – 
the central government – or the Ministries under the State Council.52 The various 
Ministries and Commissions of the State Council are permitted to formulate rules 
within the respective limits of their power.53 Of the State Council’s 28 ministries and 
commissions, the one that is most relevant to corporate governance is the CSRC, 
which is responsible for enacting rules governing companies such as corporate 
structure, information disclosure, listing of companies, shareholder protection and 
directors system. In terms of designation, the regulations can take the forms of 
‘provisions’, ‘guidelines’, ‘measures’, and ‘opinions’.  
The third level is the local regulations and rules by local government.54 The local 
legislation will be concerned with matters not yet governed by national laws or 
regulations or matters to implement national laws and regulations. In the area of 
company law, local enactments played an important role in Chinese legislation history. 
Before the promulgation of national company law in 1993, Shenzhen, one of the 
special economic zones established in 1980 in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s 
developing socialist market economy policy, enacted regulations for corporate 
experiments in 1986 as the first local authority.55 In these days, national regulations 
and rules were rapidly developing to cover almost every aspect of corporate matters, 
resulting in fewer demands for local rules. However, it is still suggested that they are 
necessary to fill gaps left by national rules and to accommodate local circumstances.56  
                                                              
52 It is authorized to formulated legislation to govern the following matters: (a) when matters requiring 
the formulation of administration regulation to implement the provisions of law (b) when regulations 
are needed to govern matters are within the administrative functions and powers of the state council as 
stipulated by the Constitution (c) when NPC and its standing committee authorized the state council to 
formulate administrative regulations for matters originally under the responsibilities of NPC and its 
standing committee. Legislation Law, Section56 
53 Legislation Law s 71. 
54 Legislation law, ss 63, 71. 
50 J Wang ‘An Overview of Chinese Corporate Law Regime’(2008)  
<http://preprodpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1222061&rec=1&srcabs=893962> 
accessed 23 May 2009.  
56 Ibid. 
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Besides the above three levels, the rules made by Chinese stock exchanges in relation 
to listing requirements as well as trading rules are binding on the companies listed. 
They play an important role in the legislation governing securities market and some of 
them are directly relevant to institutional shareholder activism. As stock exchanges’ 
rule making authorities are empowered by the Securities Law, I will term rules at this 
level as ‘delegated rules-making’.  
6.2.1 Updates of Company Law and Securities Law 
Law is at the core of the Chinese corporate governance framework. The most 
significant legislation in the regime comprises of the Company Law 200557 (CL 2005) 
and the Securities Law 2005 (SL 2005)58. Both are applicable to Chinese listed 
companies’ corporate governance systems, but with different emphasis. The CL 2005 
contains rules governing the creation of corporations, internal governance 
mechanisms, shareholders’ rights, directors’ duties and other matters concerning the 
operation of companies, while the SL 2005 stipulates rules to regulate securities 
market, such as listing requirements, share offering and information disclosure.  
As this thesis does not intend to give a detailed introduction on all aspects of Chinese 
corporate legislation, the following part will only be concerned with recent updates to 
explore whether institutional shareholders are empowered to participate in corporate 
governance in a more facilitative legal regime. Some rules will be discussed in greater 
detail later.  
Changes made by the CL 2005 relevant to corporate governance include:  
                                                              
57 Enacted by the Standing committee of the NPC on 29 December 1993, first revised on 25 December 
of 1999, Second revised on August 2004, the third and most recent revision on 27 the October 2005, 
effective on 1 January 2006, compulsory for LLCs and JSCs registered in China.  
58 Enacted by the standing committee of the NPC on 29 December 1998, first revised on 28 August 
2004, second and most recent revised on 27 October 2005, effective on 1 January 2006. Applied to the 
issuance and transaction of stocks, corporate bonds as well as any other securities as lawfully 
recognized by the State Council within the territory of the People's Republic of China. 
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1. Minority shareholder protection: Enhances the protection of minority shareholders, 
such as by permitting shareholders to use cumulative voting system when electing 
directors and supervisors,59 entitling shareholders to view financial statements and 
allowing shareholders to bring derivative suits. 60  Moreover, it requires that 
shareholders should not abuse their voting powers to the detriment of the company 
or other shareholders.61 
2. Information rights: Introduces new rules to entitle shareholders to consult and 
copy the articles of association, minutes of the shareholders’ meeting, resolutions 
of the board of directors, resolution of the board of supervisors, and financial 
reports.62 Furthermore, it allows shareholders to bring forward suggestions or 
inquiries regarding the operation of the company. Section 151 empowers 
shareholders to elicit accurate information from directors, senior officials and 
supervisors. It demands that directors, senior managers and supervisors answer 
shareholders’ enquiries. 
3. Supervisory board: Increases the power of the board of supervisors, such as 
granting powers to make proposals to the general shareholders’ meeting and 
bringing lawsuits against directors and senior managers.63 
4. Directors’ duty: Lays down diligence and loyalty duties on directors, including an 
obligation to comply with laws and a prohibition on bribery and embezzlement.64 
5. Independent director: Introduces a statutory basis for independent directors.65 
Independent directors owe ‘duties of good faith and due diligence towards the 
listed company and all the shareholders’.66 In particular, independent directors 
                                                              
59 CL 2005 s 106. 
60 CL 2005 s 34,152. 
61 CL 2005 s 20. 
62 CL 2005 s 98. 
63 CL 2005 s 54,119.  
64 CL 2005 s 148. 
65 On 16th August 2001, the CSRC issued the ‘Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the 
Board of Directors of Listed Companies, requiring that at least one third of board should to be 
independent directors by June 2003. CL 2005 formally endorses this position in section 123. 
66 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies s 50. 
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shall be concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders from 
being infringed.67 
Compared with its predecessor, the 1998 Securities Law, the SL 2005 made some 
progresses to clamp down on securities irregularities and improve investors’ 
protection. It requires listed companies to establish a protection fund for stock 
investors.68 The fund would offer some compensation to individual investors if they 
suffer losses due to a financial crisis or bankruptcy of a broker. It specifies that funds 
derived from the settlement of transactions of investors be deposited in commercial 
banks, prohibiting investment banks from manipulating these investor funds or 
securities as part of their own funds.  
On the front of information disclosure, section 68 draws on US experience (in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act) by providing that the directors and senior managers of listed 
companies must provide their opinions in the periodic reports of their companies and 
guarantee the authenticity, accuracy and integrity of the information as disclosed in 
these reports. The SL 2005 expands the notion of material information for the purpose 
of continuous information disclosure,69 and the scope of the category of insiders for 
the prohibition of insider trading. 
All in all, these reforms bring Chinese corporate governance close to those in 
developed countries and are critical to future corporate governance practice in China. 
Some reforms, such as cumulative voting and derivative suits, have far-reaching 
implications for shareholder activism. Despite these achievements, there are concerns 
about the lack of detailed and functional measures to supplement the application of 
CL 2005 and SL 2005.70 For example, while the CL 2005 empowers shareholders’ 
                                                              
67 Ibid. 
68 SL 2005 s 134. 
69 SL 2005, ss 67,74, For further discussion, see B Wang and H Huang, 'China's New Company Law 
and Securities Law: An Overview and Assessment ' (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
229. 
70 Ibid, 242. 
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rights to participate in governance, the real effect is compromised by the failure to set 
out adequate sanctions and remedies. Moreover, inefficient legal enforcement has 
long been a problem for Chinese lawmakers and as a result, the law reform may be of 
more symbolic than practical value.71 Take the example of the system of independent 
directors, introduced in 2001, where empirical evidence suggested that the practical 
success is limited.72  
6.2.2 Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
The central regulatory institution for corporate governance of Chinese listed 
companies is the CSRC. It was established by the State Council in October 1992 to 
serve as the country’s main regulator of the newly created securities markets.73  
Unlike the UK’s FSA, which is organized as an independent non-governmental 
company, the CSRC is a ministry-level unit that answers only to the State Council. 
The main duties of the CSRC include supervising the issue and the transaction of 
securities, regulating market intermediaries, such as institutional investors, issuing 
licenses to professional institutions such as auditors and stock brokers, and promoting 
and monitoring corporate governance in the market. 
The CSRC sees good corporate governance as linked to the confidence of investors to 
                                                              
71 B Wang, ‘Competition and Development: The Theme of Corporate Law Reform’ in B Wang et al 
(Eds), Quanqiu Jingzheng Tizhi xia de Gongsifa Gaige [Corporate Law Reform for a Global 
Competitive Economy] (Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, Beijing, 2003) 170. 
72 For example, JinXin Securities Research Institute, 'Xianzhuang Diaocha: Duli Dongshi Zenmeyang 
Le? [A Survey of the Current Independent Director System]' Zhengquan Shibao [Securities Times] 
(August 2003); and D Clarke, 'The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance' (2006) 31 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 125. These studies found that due to practical limitations, the 
effectiveness of independent directors system is doubtful.  
73 It is worth note here that it was not until 1998 that the CSRC became the central regulator of the 
Chinese securities market. Its regulator was formally established in the 1998 Securities Law. See R 
Tomas and J Fu, ‘The Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China: An Overview’ DATE?10 
Australia Journal of Asian Law 268. 
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invest in Chinese listed companies. 74  It has been seeking to improve Chinese 
corporate governance standards mainly through issuing various regulations, circulars, 
standards, and guidelines that have been important to the establishment of a detailed 
corporate governance framework for China. These include： 
(1) August 2001 Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Directors 
System in Listed Companies;  
(2) January 2002 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (discussed in 
detail later);  
(3) December 2004 The Provisions on Strengthening the Rights and Interests of 
Public Shareholders;  
(4) March 2006 Guidelines on Articles of Association for Listed Companies; 
(5) March 2006 Rules on the General shareholders’ meeting of Listed Companies. 
To ensure compliance with the regulations, the CSRC has a range of different 
sanctions, depending on its assessment of the level and the scope of the infraction. It 
may give internal warning, public criticism, public condemnation, official warning, 
monetary fines, or ban a company from the market. Punishment such as warning, 
penalties, and disqualification can also be issued to corporate officer, including 
directors, supervisors and secretaries of the board of directors. In 2002, the CSRC 
announced the establishment of the ‘good faith file’ system for securities market 
participants.75 According to then-vice president of CSRC, if directors, supervisors, 
and senior officers who violate ‘good faith’ will, according to the Listing Rules, their 
qualifications for their position will be restricted.76 Moreover, listed companies and 
financial intermediaries who breach good faith will find that when the CSRC accepts 
                                                              
74 L M Cha, ‘The Future of China's Capital Markets and the Role of Corporate Governance’ Luncheon 
Speech at China Business Summit, 18 April 2001, available at 
< http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n4001948/n4002030/4064448.html> accessed 5 March 2008. 
75 Zhongguo Zhengjian Hui Jiang Jian Chengxin Dangan [CSRC Establishes Good Faith File System], 
Renmin Wang [People Net] (27 April 2002) 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper39/6077/605476.html> accessed 19th January 2009.  
76 Ibid. 
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reports on various matters, it would ‘consider’ their good faith records to increase the 
cost for violations.77 
To date, many actions taken against Chinese companies are related to financial 
reporting. From 1999-2003, Chen shows that 64% of them involved a failure to 
disclose information, delay in disclosure or false statements.78 Among the infraction 
from 2002 to 2007, the CSRC issued a total of 211 punishment decisions. Of those, 99 
were for disclosure violations involving listed companies and senior managers.79  
6.2.2.1 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 
China  
In January 2002, the CSRC issued a Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in China (Chinese Code). It was based to some extent on the OECD’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance, as modified to reflect China’s own special 
situation.80 In contrast to the UK Corporate Governance Code, which adopts a 
‘comply or explain’ approach, the Chinese Code is mandatory for companies listed on 
China’s stock exchanges. Whilst it is not possible to undertake a comprehensive 
analysis of the Chinese Code here, a discussion of the way shareholders are treated 
will suffice for the purpose. Section 2 of the Chinese Code states: 
‘The corporate governance structure of a company shall ensure fair treatment toward 
all shareholders, especially minority shareholders. All shareholders are to enjoy 
                                                              
77 Ibid. 
78 G Chen and others, ‘Is China’s Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence from 
Enforcement Actions’ (2005) 24 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 451. 
79 D Clarke, 'The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China' (2008) The George Washington 
University Law School Public Law and Legal Working Paper No.433 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1245803> accessed 20 November 2009, 42. 
80 For a detailed comparison between the OECD code and Chinese code, see R Tomasic, ‘Comparing 
Corporate Governance Principles: China, Australia and the OECD’ in Tomasic and others (eds) (n 13) 
1-31. 
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equal rights and to bear the corresponding duties based on the shares they hold.’81 
Section 3 further points out that a listed company shall set up effective channels of 
communication with its shareholders. In particular, whilst it may be seen as more 
theoretical than real, section 19 of the Chinese Code establishes a fiduciary duty owed 
by controlling shareholders to minority shareholders. It states that ‘the controlling 
shareholders shall be prevented from damaging the company or other shareholders’ 
legal rights and interests.’82 However, in practice, it is hard to enforce this fiduciary 
duty partly because there lack rules regarding procedures to enforce it and the 
remedies for violations. 83  Moreover, the Chinese Code calls for institutional 
shareholders to play a role  ‘in the appointment of company directors, the 
compensation and supervision of management and major decision-making 
processes’.84 
6.2.3 Stock Exchanges 
China has two stock exchanges: Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE). They were established in 1990 and 1991, with eight and six listed 
companies, respectively. Since then, as we have seen, the Chinese capital markets 
have grown rapidly over the past decade generated by the steady opening up of the 
Chinese economy. SSE and SZSE ranked respectively the first and fourth 
fastest-growing exchanges in terms of market capitalization in 2006.85 
Similar to many other stock exchanges, the roles that SSE and SZSE play are to 
provide a market for sellers to raise new capital and trade company securities, and for 
investors to buy shares. There are, however, some differences between the listing 
                                                              
81 Chinese Code s 2. 
82 Chinese Code s 19.  
83 J-Q Qiu, 'Corporate Governance in China:From the Protection of Minority Shareholders Perspective' 
(2006) 2 Corporate Governance Law Review 311, 331. Also see Jia and Tomasic (n 35) 21-28. 
84 Chinese Code s 11. 
85 World Federation of Exchanges, ‘Annual Report of Statistics of 2006’,  
<http://www.world-exchanges.org/ > accessed 12 August 2008. 
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markets provided by SSE and SZSE. In 2004, SZSE launched a Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME) which designed as an exclusive market segment to facilitate small 
and medium size companies to trade on the exchange.86 Since then, while there seems 
no fixed thresholds differing the size of listing companies on the two exchanges, 
smaller companies satisfying the requirements for listing were exclusively traded on 
SME board, while companies listed on SSE tend to be larger and have more 
Government connections than those listed in Shenzhen.87  
In addition to providing listing market, the exchanges undertake a number of 
regulatory tasks. Like the LSE, they make trading rules as well as a variety of other 
rules and standards relating to listing standards, information disclosure, investor 
protection and corporate governance, and monitor listing companies’ compliance of 
these rules. These rules provide detailed obligations and rights for participants in 
securities market and play a significant role in the legislation on listed companies and 
securities trading. Relevant instruments here include: 
1. Trading Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange88 and Trading Rules of Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange;89  
2 Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange90 and Rules 
Governing Listing of Stocks on Shenzhen Stock Exchange; 91  
                                                              
86 ‘Briefing of Small and Medium Enterprises Board’, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2004, available 
at http://www.szse.cn/main/en/smeboard/aboutsmeboard/200408316286.shtml, accessed 4 April 2008. 
87 B Liebman and C Milhaupt, 'Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market ' (2007) Columbia 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 318 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999698> accessed 27 December 2009. 
88 Available at  
<http://static.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/c01/c09/c01/p1075/c15010901_p1075.shtml >accessed 20 March 
2009. 
89 Available at http://www.szse.cn/main/en/rulseandregulations/sserules/ accessed 20 March 2009.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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3. Guidelines on Protection of Investor Rights and Interests for SME Board92 
For violation of trading rules, exchanges have available five sanctioning methods, 
which are, in ascending order of seriousness, (1) circulating a notice of criticism 
among members; (2) publishing a public censure in CSRC-designated media; (3) 
suspending or restricting trading; and (4) revoking trading qualification or canceling 
membership.93  
It seems that Chinese stock exchanges play similar roles in securities markets as the 
LSE. In fact, however, Chinese exchanges are significantly different from the LSE in 
that they are not independent of the state despite their self-regulatory nature as 
defined by the SL 2005. The UK model of an exchange established as an independent 
business organization with limited government interference does not apply to China. 
The stock exchanges are under the direct supervision of the CSRC, with the senior 
personnel, such as chairman and vice chairman, appointed by it. It is often said that 
these stock exchanges are more like ‘two subsidiaries of the CSRC’.94 Unsurprisingly, 
there are concerns that they lack sufficient autonomous regulatory authority to enforce 
their roles in securities markets. In the context of corporate governance, again, the 
exchanges lack real power and sufficient resources to monitor compliance effectively 
and punish non-compliance.95 For example, given that corporate governance is only a 
recent object of attention in China, the exchanges provide educational courses for 
listed companies to raise the awareness of corporate governance. Interestingly, due to 
absence of authority, the educating role provided by the exchanges was even ranked 
higher than the role of monitoring corporate governance practice among the 
                                                              
92 Ibid. 
93 Trading rules of Shanghai Exchange, Chapter X, 10.1.  
94 C Hua, 'Bonding, Law Enforcement and Corporate Governance in China ' (2007) 13 Stanford 
Journal of Law, Business, and Finance 82, 114. 
95 For a full account, see generally R Tomasic and J Fu, ‘Legal Regulation and Corporate Governance 
in China’s Top 100 Listed Companies’ (2006) 27 The Company Lawyer 278. 
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exchanges’ list of priority, according to the study conducted by Tomasic and Fu.96 
6.3 The Internal Governance Structure of Chinese Listed 
Companies 
In regard to the internal governance structure of listed companies, Chinese corporate 
legislation relies heavily on a mandatory approach to prescribe a clear allocation of 
decision-making power among shareholders’ meeting and the board of directors, 
instead of the ‘permissive regime’ adopted by the UK.97 
Three governance organs are required to be established under the CL 2005: 
shareholders’ meeting, board of directors and board of supervisors. This section 
introduces each of them and compares their authorities with their UK counterparts. 
6.3.1 Shareholders’ General Meeting 
Chinese listed companies are required to hold shareholders’ general meetings 
annually.98 CL 2005 empowers the general meeting as an ‘organ of power’ which 
suggesting that it has the highest decision-making authority of a company.99  
Table 6.2 summarizes the power of the general meeting in listed companies under CL 
2005.  
Table 6.2 The power of the general shareholders’ meeting 
                                                              
96 Ibid, 14 
97 See Chapter 2.3. 
98 CL 2005 s 40. 
99 CL 2005 s 37. 
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(1 )Deciding the operational policy and investment plan of the company;100 
(2) Electing or replacing directors and supervisors who are not representatives of 
the staff and workers, and to decide on matters concerning the remuneration of the 
directors and supervisors;101 
(3) Examining and approving reports of the board of directors;102 
(4)Examining and approving reports of the board of supervisors or the 
supervisors;103 
(5) Examining and approving the annual financial budget plan and final accounts 
plan of the company;104 
(6) Examining and approving the company’s plans for profit distribution and for 
recovering losses;105 
(7) Adopting resolutions on the increase or reduction of the registered capital;106 
(8) Adopting resolutions on the issue of corporate bonds;107 
(9)Adopting resolutions on the merger, division, dissolution, liquidation or 
transformation of the company;108 
(10) Amending the articles of association;109 
                                                              
100 CL 2005 s 38(1). 
101 CL 2005 s 38(2). 
102 CL 2005 s 38(3). 
103 CL 2005 s 38(4). 
104 CL 2005 s 38(5). 
105 CL 2005 s 38(6). 
106 CL 2005 s 38(7). 
107 CL 2005 s 38(8). 
108 CL 2005 s 38(9). 
109 CL 2005 s 38(10). 
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(11) Deciding the appointment or dismissal of an accounting firm;110 
(12) Examining and approving the matters relating to guarantees as prescribed in 
Article 41 of the Guidance for the articles of listed company;111 
(13) Examining such proceedings as the purchased and sold assets in one year by 
the company exceed 30% of the audited total assets of the company of the latest 
term;112 
(14) Examining and approving the usage of the collected fund;113  
(15) Examining and approving stock-based incentive plan;114 
(16) Examining other proceedings prescribed in laws, administrative rules, 
regulations or the company’s article of association to be decided by the 
shareholders’ meeting.115 
Note: Based on the 2005 Company Law and the Guidance for the Articles of Association of Listed 
Companies 
These rights are clearly more extensive than those enjoyed by shareholders of UK 
companies. Unlike their UK counterparts, shareholders of Chinese listed companies 
can decide the company’s management policy and investment plan. The shareholders 
also examine and approve the company’s plan for the distribution of profits and 
recovery of losses. In contrast, UK company law grants those decision-making 
powers exclusively within directors’ authority.  
The extensive power accorded to shareholders under the Company Law, is consistent 
                                                              
110 Guidance for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies (2006) s 40 (11). 
111 Ibid, s 40 (12). 
112 Ibid, s 40 (13). 
113 Ibid, s 40 (14). 
114 Ibid, s 40 (15). 
115 Ibid, s 40 (16). 
249 
 
with the Government’s desire not to relinquish ownership or lose ultimate control over 
companies. By assigning management authority to the board of directors, while 
holding majority of shares as a strong owner, the state can retain the significant level 
of control through exercising the extensive power as provided in company law.  
6.3.2 Board of Directors 
The Chinese company law follows closely the pattern of the German Model and 
adopts a two-tier board, in which a board of directors and a board of supervisors are 
mandated for listed companies. The purpose of a two-tier board is to create a clear 
distinction between the management and monitoring organs within a company. This 
section first deals with the board of directors. Directors are elected by, and responsible 
to, the shareholders’ meeting.116 The Chairman of the Board of Directors is designated 
as the legal representative of the company – a concept that does not exist in the UK 
company law, which imposes the legal liability of the company on a human agent. 
The power of the legal representative can be delegated but generally, he bears greater 
liability than other ordinary directors in a Chinese company or directors in the UK 
company. The board appoints General Managers, a role similar to an executive 
director in the UK, to decide on business matters related to the company. Their 
powers are as follows: 
Table 6.3 The powers of the board of director 
(1) Convening the meeting of the shareholders assembly, and reporting on its work 
to the board;117 
(2) Implementing resolutions adopted by the shareholders; assembly;118 
                                                              
116 CL 2005 s 47.  
117 CL 2005 s 47(1). 
118 CL 2005 s 47(2). 
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(3) Deciding on operational plans and investment plans;119 
(4) Formulating the annual financial budget plan and final accounts plan;120 
(5) Formulating plans for profit distribution and plans for making up losses;121 
(6) Formulating plans for the increase or reduction of the registered capital and the 
issue of corporate bonds of the company;122 
(7) Formulating plans for the merger, division, dissolution and transformation of 
the company;123 
(8) Deciding the establishment of the internal administrative bodies of the 
company;124 
(9) Deciding the appointment or dismissal of the manager of the company and the 
matters concerning his remuneration and, upon recommendation of the manager, 
deciding on the appointment or dismissal of the deputy manager(s) and persons in 
charge of the financial affairs of the company, and on the matters concerning their 
remuneration;125 
(10) Deciding the basic management system of the company;126 
(11) Formulating proposed amendments to the company’s article of association;127
                                                              
119 CL 2005 s 47(3). 
120 CL 2005 s 47(4). 
121 CL 2005 s 47(5). 
122 CL 2005 s 47(6). 
123 CL 2005 s 47(7). 
124 CL 2005 s 47(8). 
125 CL 2005 s 47(9). 
126 CL 2005 s 47(10). 
127 Guidance for the Articles of Listed Company s 117 (12). 
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(12) Making proposals to the general shareholders’ meeting as the hiring or 
replacement of an auditing firm;128 
(13) Other functions and powers stipulated by the company’s articles of 
association.129 
Note: Based on the 2005 Company Law and the Guidance for the Articles of Association of Listed 
Companies 
As seen above, the boards’ function and powers are largely analogous to those in UK 
companies. As China adopts a continental law regime, CL 2005 does not recognize 
the concept of ‘fiduciary duty’. In spite of this difference, the terms used to describe 
directors’ duty such as ‘fidelity and diligence’ in Chinese company law bear 
resemblances to fiduciary duties of that in the UK.130  
There are, however, some differences. A comparison between the power of the board 
of directors given by Table A in the UK and that of in the China shows that while both 
countries assign authority to the board of directors as the agent of shareholders to run 
the company, the Chinese approach is clearly more restrictive. Unsurprisingly, when 
the shareholders’ meeting in Chinese listed companies is allocated more powers, of 
which some fall into the authority of directors in the UK, the scope of power of 
directors is narrowed down. 
6.3.3 Supervisory Board 
The supervisory board comprises representatives of employees and shareholders and 
has a minimum number of three. No less than one-third of members must be elected 
by employees, with the remainder elected by shareholders.131 Managerial personnel 
                                                              
128 Ibid, s 117 (14). 
129 CL 2005 s 47(11). 
130 CL 2005 s 148. 
131 CL 2005 s 53.  
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such as directors and managers are excluded from serving as supervisors.132 The 
power of the supervisory board is as follows:  
Table 6.4 The power of the board of supervisors 
(1) Examining the financial affairs of the company; Examining and submitting the 
regular report prepared by the board of supervisors;133 
(2) Supervising the acts of directors and senior managers in respect of the 
performance of their duties, and putting forward proposals for removal of directors 
or senior managers who violate laws, administrative regulations or the company’s 
articles of association, or the resolutions adopted by the shareholders assembly;134 
(3) Demanding directors or senior managers to rectify when their acts damage the 
interests of the company;135 
(4) Proposing convening an interim meeting of shareholders and to convening and 
presiding over the meeting when the board of directors fails to perform the duty of 
convening and presiding over such meeting as provided for by this Law;136 
(5) Submitting proposals to shareholders’ meeting;137 
(6) Bringing law suit against directors or senior managers in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 152;138 
(7) Conducting investigation when irregularities in the company’s management are 
found. When necessary, employing such professional institutions such as 
                                                              
132 CL 2005 s 118. 
133 CL 2005 s 54(1). 
134 CL 2005 s 54(2). 
135 CL 2005 s 54(3). 
136 CL 2005 s 54(4). 
137 CL 2005 s 54(5). 
138 CL 2005 s 54(6). 
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accounting firms, law firms for assistance, the expense of which shall be borne by 
the company, and;139 
(7) Exercising other functions and powers stipulated by the company’s articles of 
association.140 
Note: Based on the 2005 Company Law and the Guidance for the Articles of Association of Listed 
Companies 
The role envisaged for the supervisory board is similar to that for non-executives 
suggested by the UK Corporate Governance Code.141 In comparison with the UK 
board, the Chinese supervisory board is granted larger scope of power to monitor 
executives. Some power held by the Chinese supervisory board, such as convening 
shareholders’ meeting, or submitting proposals in shareholders’ meeting, are not given 
to UK non-executives. 
However, just as the effectiveness of UK non-executives is often doubted, the Chinese 
supervisory board has been criticized as window-dressing. Although the supervisors 
seem to have extensive monitoring powers in law, there is a huge gap between the law 
and its implementation in practice in terms of the role of supervisory board. In 
practice, the effectiveness of the board is undermined by its composition.142 The 
members of the supervisory board who are nominated by the board of directors and 
elected by shareholders are typically representatives of the dominant shareholder, or 
close friends to senior managers. They are reluctant to, and rarely do, speak against 
management.143 Employee members of the supervisory board are even less effective, 
because they are dependent on management for their jobs and welfare. These 
difficulties make the actual monitoring role of the supervisory board much weaker 
                                                              
139 Guidance for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies s 144 (8). 
140 Ibid. 
141 UK Corporate Governance Code A.4. 
142 Tan and Wang (n 21) 166. 
143 Jay Dahay Yusuf Karbhari Jason Zezong Xiao and Mei Yang, ‘The Usefulness of the Supervisory 
Board Report in China’ 11 Corporate Governance 2003. 
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than it is in law. As a theme of this thesis, we should note that, for China, the lack of 
sufficient board supervision makes more effective monitoring by institutions even 
more crucial.  
6.3.4 The Extent of the Governance Problem in Chinese Listed 
Companies 
As mentioned in section 6.1.4, the basic objectives of Chinese corporate governance 
are firstly, to address the shareholder-manager agency problem, and secondly, to 
prevent expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders. We have 
now gained a general understanding of Chinese corporate governance framework. It is 
essential to ask here: does the framework achieve these aims? Unfortunately, a large 
body of evidence suggests that Chinese listed companies are far away from a 
sufficient governance standard. 
As regards manager misconduct, many managers of Chinese listed companies are 
found to pursue their private interests by using the companies’ assets. As described by 
the SSE’ report, expropriation of shareholders by managers in Chinese listed 
companies including using company’s resources for personal consumption, or 
developing personal connections by using companies’ resource, 144  and using 
management buy out to transfer listed companies’ assets to themselves.145  
Moreover, managers sometimes bribe government officers to get deals authorized. 
Recent evidence shows that 106,000 Chinese officials were found guilty of bribery in 
2006, worth more than 1 million RMB, an increase of 19% over the year.146 Among 
                                                              
144 For example, nepotism and appointing corporate staffs based on criterion of the manager’ interest 
rather than the company’s interest, see the footnote below. 
145  Shanghai Stock Exchange, Gongsi Zhili Baogao [Corporate Governance Report] (Fudan 
University Press, Shanghai 2003) (hereinafter SSE Report) 17, 18; and, Xi (n 10) 60; Also, Qiu (n 83) 
316-322.  
146 BBC News, ‘Corruption up Among China Government Officials’ 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8448059.stm> accessed 19 January 2010. 
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those officials, many are senior executive which are investigated or have been 
convicted as guilty of bribery or other crimes. The notorious one in China is the 
former head of oil giant Sinopect, Chen Tonghai. He was sentenced to death in 2009 
for taking nearly RMB 240 million in bribe.147  
The majority-minority shareholder problem is perhaps even more pressing, as the 
scale and magnitude of expropriation by controlling shareholders exceeds that of 
managers’ expropriation. 148  Meanwhile, where the State acts as the controlling 
shareholder, the way it pursues its own interests differs compared to where managers 
do so. In China, the State has multiple strategic goals, of which many are social and 
political that need not coincide with those of other investors in the company. For 
example, a major objective of the Communist Party of China (CPC) – the ruling party, 
has been to maintain ‘social stability’ or today’s ‘harmony society’ by maintaining 
social equity, ensuring full employment and refraining from taking such profit 
enhancing measures as asset divestiture and job cuts.149  
In pursuit of these interests, the State could exert political control through several 
channels. The first and perhaps most dangerous one is the method of making rules in 
favor of itself, in other words, it could potentially legitimate its expropriating 
behaviors or political interests since the State serves a dual role as major shareholder 
and regulator.150 It has been noted that during the legislative process for the Securities 
Law in the early 1990s, members of the NPC had involved in and brought in a 
number of diverse voices based on political considerations.151 As a result, the 1998 
Securities Law was very concerned about outside speculators, but rather relaxed about 
                                                              
147 Ibid. Chentonghai’s sentence has been suspended for two years, which suggests it might be 
commuted to life jail.  
148 For a good discussion of minority shareholder protection in Chinese listed companies, see R 
Tomasic and N Andrews, ‘Minority Shareholder Protection in China’s Top 100 Listed Companies’ 
(2007) 9 Australia Journal of Asian Law 88. 
149 S Yiyi, X Dean and P P H, 'Principle-principle Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public 
Companies' (2008) 4 Management and Organizaiton Review 17, 19. 
150 SSE Report (n 145) 14. 
151 B Naughton, 'The Politics of the Stock Market' (2002) 3 Chinese Leadership Monitor , 9. 
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the problems of CCP or government control of an enterprise.152  
Section 19 of CL 2005 could also serve a prime example to suggest that CPC is 
justified to play an important part in the governance of Chinese companies. 
‘An organization of the Chinese Communist Party shall, according to the Charter of 
the Chinese Communist Party, be established in the company to carry out activities 
of the Chinese Communist Party. And the company shall provide necessary 
conditions for the activities of the Chinese Communist Party’. 
Moreover, as we already seen, company law grants wide ranging decision-making 
powers to the shareholders’ meeting. By doing so, the State’s control over companies 
is guaranteed by its majority position in shareholders’ meeting. It is also found 
without a clear division of these roles, the State can make economic decisions in 
‘administrative-order nature.’153  
Hence, although China has announced its intention to march towards a ‘socialist 
rule-of-law state’ for many years, it appears that law is still sometimes seen as a 
means to serve the interests of political ends, at least in the corporate governance 
context as discussed above.154 
Second, the managerial personnel in listed companies are largely appointed by the 
controlling shareholder. A majority of board seats in most listed companies are held 
by state representatives appointed by the largest shareholders and therefore, 
unsurprisingly, financial institutions and individual investors play only a relatively 
minor role in the selection of directors.155 The senior managers on the board, such as 
the chairman or General Manager, are often also serving as he Secretary of the Party 
                                                              
152 Ibid.  
153 SSE Report (n 145) 14.  
154 R Peerenboon, China’s Long March toward Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, New York 
2002) 1. 
155 S Yiyi, X Dean and P P H (n 149) 19. 
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Committee within listed companies.156 The manager appointed by the State to exert 
its control refers to so-called ‘key person’ who is often the CEO, the chairman or a 
senior executive manager of the company.157 The key person has significant de facto 
control rights over both strategic planning and management. With strong Government 
involvement, these state-related directors are educated to interpret their fiduciary 
duties in the light of the state.158 In cases if there were a conflicts of interest between 
the pubic and the private investors, it is perhaps not surprising that he is likely to 
prefer the state’s interests.  
The criteria to select managers are often decided not by their financial performance 
but their connections with government. 159  People with good connections with 
government are more likely to gain a competitive position. This practice, commonly 
referred to as ‘guanxi’, has been deeply rooted in Chinese culture for centuries and 
plays a central role in business as well as other aspect of social life.160 As a result, it 
seems hard to align managers’ incentives with companies’ performance, which in turn, 
is the most important concern of minority shareholders. This problem only can be 
mitigated if more shareholders are allowed to have a say on appointment. (Or if 
managers were appointed by the state based on companies’ financial performance.) 
Given the above potential conflicts, there are voluminous documented cases where the 
controlling shareholders have engaged in the expropriation, or so-called 
‘tunneling’.161  An early study by the SZSE revealed that, as at 30 June 2001, 
expropriations by controlling shareholders or related enterprises has been found in 95 
                                                              
156  Tomasic and Fu, ‘Legal Regulation and Corporate Governance in China’s Top 100 Listed 
Companies’ (n 95) 6. 
157 Tan and Wang (n 21) 150. 
158 S Yiyi, X Dean and P P H (n 149) 20. 
159 SSE Report (n 145) 14. 
160 I will discuss Chinese culture and associated issue of ‘guanxi’ in Chapter 9.2.2.2.3. 
161 As summarized by Tenev, Zhang and Brefort, tunneling in China may take three forms：First, soft 
loans from listed companies on a long-term basis, secondly, the use of listed companies as guarantors 
to borrow money from banks, and thirdly, widespread of use of related-party transaction, for example, 
the large shareholders sell assets to listed companies at an unfair price. See ibid. (n 26) 101. 
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listed companies among the 516 companies listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange, with 
an average misused assets of RMB 0.16 billion.162 
6.3.5 The Role of Institutional Shareholders  
Given the weaknesses in the governance mechanisms described above, what role can 
institutional shareholders play to improve matters? 
As to the manager-shareholder agency problem, this section will not give a further 
discussion here, as Chapter 1 has described shareholder activism as a link in a web of 
constraints on managers and discussed potential benefits of such activism. The 
potential for shareholder activism to mitigate those problems applies here (although, 
of course, working out how best it can do so in China requires much further analysis, 
as later chapters develop). In the above section, we have seen that the more pressing 
hazard in Chinese listed companies is the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
majority shareholders due to the concentrated share-ownership. Hence, the unique and 
perhaps currently more urgent role of institutional shareholders in Chinese listed 
companies is to hold majority shareholders accountable to minority shareholders. 
How can institutional shareholder engagement work to alleviate the majority-minority 
agency problem in Chinese listed companies? Firstly, institutional shareholders can 
play a catalytic role in activating the use of various corporate governance mechanisms 
already established in the Chinese regulatory framework.163 In the above parts, we 
have seen that a variety of monitoring mechanisms are established in the Chinese 
framework to ensure the independence of companies from controlling shareholders. 
However, the effectiveness of those mechanisms, such as board of directors and 
disclosure, depends clearly on parties having enough incentives to use them. 
Otherwise, they are likely to remain decorations without real functions. Institutional 
                                                              
162 He Jianliang ‘Lun Shangshi gongsi de Guanlianjiao jiqi jianguan’[Related-party Transaction in 
Listed Companies], Securities Market News, 2002. 
163 Tenev, Zhang and Brefort, (n 26) 160; Also, Mako and Zhang (n 19) 13. 
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shareholders are expected to make active use of the shareholders’ legal rights to 
ensure these mechanisms work for the benefit of shareholders at a whole, and in the 
process provide some protection to other minority shareholders. For example, they 
could elect the directors who represent the minority shareholders’ interests. Their 
participation will require increased transparency and disclosure. While the regulatory 
framework encourages companies to adopt, for example, a cumulative voting system 
to empower minority shareholders, such system is merely a formality if institutional 
shareholders do not make use of it. 
Secondly, institutional shareholders will enforce good corporate governance as a way 
of replacing direct regulatory control from the State. Given the limitations imposed by 
the dual role played by the state, the Government will have to gradually decrease its 
regulatory and political control over listed companies, while in the meantime, 
strengthening market forces as a discipline over companies. 
In that process, the institutional shareholder is a key to develop a market that expects, 
demands, and rewards good corporate governance practice. Institutional investors 
have direct economic interests in the companies in which they invest, owing relatively 
large and sophisticated management teams, which all make them likely to become 
sanction power when the State’s direct intervene reduces. The State can then enhance 
its regulation over institutional investors, such as internal governance structure, 
adequate disclosure, voting policies, as an indirect method to control listed companies 
sector. This point will be discussed in greater details in Chapter 10.164 In this regard, 
institutional shareholder engagement is also a means to enhance the regulatory 
capacity of the Government.  
The above discussion on the benefits of institutional shareholders rests largely on their 
having sufficient ability and power to exercise shareholders’ rights. In Chapter 7, one 
will see that the group of institutional shareholders has become the largest group of 
equity holders in the Chinese tradable-share markets. With on-going non-tradable 
                                                              
164 See Chapter 10.2.2 
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share reform, institutional shareholders are likely to become still more powerful to 
counterbalance majority shareholders and bring benefits to the development of 
corporate governance in the future.  
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the corporate governance framework in 
China. It examined some relevant aspects of listed companies, reviewed the Chinese 
company regulatory framework, explored the extent of the governance problem and 
discussed the role of institutional shareholders in the framework.   
By way of conclusion, it is desirable to draw some points from the above discussion 
to assess the bearing of corporate governance system on institutional shareholders 
activism. First, the dominance of the State as shareholder is likely to become the main 
hurdle to institutional shareholder activism. It holds a controlling block of stakes in 
listed companies which often enable it to determine corporate affairs without the 
participation of other non-state investors. Institutional shareholders’ ability to 
discipline companies is therefore significantly weakened. Consequently, they are less 
likely to overcome the free-riding and have fewer incentives to engage in investee 
companies than the UK counterparts. This thesis will return to this point in Chapter 9 
and 10.  
Secondly, corporate governance has become a concept that has increasingly engaged 
the minds of corporate regulators and stock exchanges in China. We have seen many 
regulations and mechanisms are in place to promote managerial accountability and to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders. However, the serious extent of both 
managerial malfeasance and expropriation by majority shareholders in listed 
companies cast doubt on whether these mechanisms are more than symbolic. 
Thirdly, the thesis argued that the future development of Chinese corporate 
governance will to some extent rely on institutional shareholder engagement. It is 
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because firstly, institutional shareholders will play a catalytic role in activating the use 
of various corporate governance mechanisms that already established in regulations, 
and secondly, they are needed to enforce good governance to reduce the direct 
regulatory control of the Government.  
The role of institutional shareholders mentioned above will become yet more 
important when non-tradable share reform releases state-owned non-tradable shares to 
the market. The reduced state stakes are likely to fall into the hands of institutional 
investors and lead to an increase in the level of institutional shareholding in Chinese 
listed companies. The following Chapter 7 turns to present an overview of the 
institutional landscape in China. 
Chapter 7 The Landscape of Institutional Investment 
Before proceeding to the discussion of Chinese institutional investment, a point must 
be emphasized here. Some institutions introduced in the UK part – including industry 
trade associations, securities lending participants and proxy voting services – do not 
exist at all, or to anything like the same extent – in China. The thesis therefore focuses 
on the major types of institutional shareholders themselves. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.1 briefly describes the recent growth 
of institutional investment to demonstrate institutions’ ability and power to affect 
corporate governance. Sections 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 survey the major types of 
financial institution in China, namely, securities investment funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors. Each section 
investigates the historical development of those institutions, their structural 
organization and legal or institutional arrangement, followed by a discussion on their 
further growth potential. Section 7.6 concludes.  
7.1 The Growth of Institutional Investment 
The increase of Chinese institutional investment gathered pace from the year of 2001. 
Figure 7.1 shows a sizeable increase over 2001-2007 from approximately 5% to 
nearly 30% in 6 years. This change was mainly associated with two factors: (1) the 
Government’s facilitation of development of investment funds; and (2) non-tradable 
shares are gradually transferred to tradable shares since 2005. This trend continues 
and at the end of 2009, institutional shareholding account for more than 50% of total 
tradable shares.1 (However, as one will see in Chapter 8, institutional ownership still 
only accounts for a minority portion of the total equity in Chinese listed companies.2) 
                                                              
1 Vice-president of the CSRC, Yaogang reported at ‘The Eighth Chinese Securities Investment Funds 
International Forum ’, cited in Hong Kong Wenhui News (3 December 2009) in Chinese 
 < http://paper.wenweipo.com/2009/12/03/FI0912030025.htm> accessed 20 December 2009. 
2 See Chapter 8.1.2. 
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With the on-going non-tradable share reform, it is reasonable to predict that 
institutional investment will further grow in importance in the near future. 
Figure 7.1 The percentage of tradable shares in Chinese publicly listed companies 
owned by institutional shareholders, over 2001-2009 
 
Source: Data drawn from the CSRC <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/sjtj/ 
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The key institutional shareholders in China comprise of securities investment funds, 
Figure 7.2 Composition of institutional investors in China, by Market Capitalization 
January 2010. 
insurance companies, pension funds, qualified foreign institutional investors. The 
composition of institutional investors is shown in Figure 7.2.  
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 Source: Wind Data quoted in Y Kang, L Shi and E D Brown,'Chinese Corporate 
Comparatively, the Chinese institutional market differs sharply from the UK in the 
The composition of institutional investors has significant bearing on the level of 
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Governance-History and Institutional Framework' (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 2008) 
much greater presence of mutual funds.3 In China, mutual funds are the largest 
participants, with 85% of total institutional shares. This compares with approximately 
11% in the UK.4 Pension funds and insurance companies only account for a small 
portion (around 10%), compared to 70% in the UK. This difference mainly results 
from China’s undeveloped insurance and pension markets and the Governments’ strict 
restriction on portfolio investment.5  
institutional shareholder engagement in a country. As I have observed in Chapter 4, 
long-term institutions, such as pension funds and insurance companies have more 
incentives for engagement because it is easier for them to overcome free-riding, and 
generates greater benefits. Thus, the activism model established in Chapter 1 would 
predict that the smaller presence of long-term institutional investors should lead to a 
lower level of engagement in China. As we shall see below, empirical evidence 
 
3 See UK part, Chapter 3.1. 
4 See Chapter 3.1, Table 3.1. 
5 See discussion in section 7.3 and Chapter 9.1.1.1. 
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confirms this prediction. 
In essence, the function and structure of Chinese institutional investors are akin to 
7.2 Securities Investment Funds 
Mutual funds or so-called securities investment funds (SIF) represent the largest 
Compared with the UK’s mutual fund industry which started in the mid-19th century, 
                                                             
their UK counterparts. They are performing as financial agencies on behalf of 
individuals to diversify investment risk and increase return. However, they are shaped 
by China’s unique economic system and are in significant ways unlike UK 
counterparts. Understanding the characteristics of institutions is crucial to 
understanding the strategies they adopt in corporate governance. The following will 
survey each type of Chinese institution in detail. 
group of institutional investor in the stock market. There were in total 621 securities 
investment funds, with assets of RMB 2,676 billion (roughly￡267.6 billion ) by the 
end of 2009.6 SIFs’ holdings accounted for 14.85% of the Chinese A-share market.7 
By virtue of their large presence, SIFs are the major participants in institutional 
shareholder activism. 
China’s fund industry is quite young, with less than two decades existence. The birth 
of China’s fund industry took place soon after the establishment of stock exchanges in 
the early 1990s. Despite this late start, with the rapid expansion of the Chinese stock 
market, the industry has since grown at an impressive pace and emerged as a 
significant investment tool for investors in the stock market. Generally, the industry 
has developed in two stages divided by the promulgation of the first regulation on the 
 
6 China Galaxy Securities Research, ‘Report on China’s Securities Investment Funds in 2009’, 6 (in 
Chinese) <http://www.Chinastock.com.cn/research/ResearchHYYJ.shtml> accessed 19 January 2010. 
China Galaxy Securities Research is a lead securities research institute in China which was founded in 
2000.  
7 Ibid. 
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industry in 1997.8  
7.2.1 Historic Development of SIF 
The first two security investment funds in China, the Shenzhen Nanshan Risk 
At the first stage, these old funds prospered under the desire of capital markets and the 
The rapid growth of Chinese securities funds was at the cost of being ahead of the 
Investment Fund and the Wuhan Securities Investment Fund, were found in October 
1991, marking the beginning of the fund industry.9 Since then, investment funds 
surged. Those funds established before 1997 were operated in an absence of 
regulation and thus were referred to as ‘old funds’ as opposed to the ‘standards 
investment fund’ established after the law was promulgated.10 
facilitation of the Government. By the end of 1997, there were 75 old funds with more 
than 5.8 billion RMB in net asset value and 10 billion RMB in market value.11 Most 
of those funds were established as close-end funds and invested in real estate, 
industrial projects as well as securities. The supervisory authority at that time was the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC). 
legislative and regulatory framework. The industry lacked a standardized national 
regulation as well as a centralized supervising authority, resulting in many 
high-profile problems within these old funds which hampered its innovation and 
further development.12 For example, the structure of those old funds was far from 
                                                              
8 Provisional Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment Funds，issued by the CSRC on 
November 1997, and abolished on October 2004. 
inhangjia [The Banker] 24.  
rgeoning Securities Investment Fund Industry in China: Its Development and Regulation' 
mbia Journal of Asian Law 203, 211; Also Zhongguo Jijinye Lishi Huigu Yu Fazhan 
9 Z Yin, 'Wo Guo Zhengquan Touzi Jijin de Fazhan Lichen HuiGu [The Historic Development of 
Chinese Securities Investment Funds]' (2008) 10 Y
10 See (n 8). 
11 Yin (n 9). 
12 T Tao, 'Bu
(1999) 13 Colu
Sikao [History of China’s Fund industry and a Discussion of its Development], Zhongguo Zhengquan 
Bao [China Securities] (4 December 2004). 
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standard. Designed to reduce investment risk, a standardized investment fund should 
have a manager, who is responsible for managing fund assets, and a fund trustee who 
keep the assets safe. The manager and trustee should be mutually independent. 
However, it was not unusual for the role of fund manager and fund trustee to be 
performed by the same company or agency. In some cases, old funds even had one 
company or organization to act as fund promoter, fund manager and fund trustee.13 
Therefore, national legislation was urgently needed.  
The first national regulation was issued by the CSRC in 1997: the Provisional 
Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment Funds (Provisional 
Measures),14 signaling the beginning of the second stage of Chinese fund industry. 
Funds incorporated after the promulgation of the Provisional Measures are generally 
known as ‘new funds’. 
The following years witnessed significant steps towards the development of the fund 
industry. At the initial development stage of China’s securities market, market 
misconducts were rampant partly because of the small presence of institutional 
investors. Hence, right from the beginning, Chinese regulators had placed many 
efforts to facilitate the development of fund management industry as a tool to curb 
price manipulations. On the one hand, regulators began to restructure old funds to 
new funds. On the other hand, it adopted a series of measures to nurture new funds, 
which were still in their infant stage. For example, it allocated 20% of all new-issued 
SOEs’ shares to fund management companies.15 New, regulated funds have been 
established and old funds restructured and consolidated under the instruction of the 
Government. By April 2001, all old funds had been successfully restructured into 25 
standardized new SIFs.16 With the approval of the CSRC, Shanghai-based Hua'an 
Fund Management Company launched the country’s first open-end fund, marking the 
                                                              
u, Fund Management in China (China Knowledge Press 2005) 16. 
13 Tao, ibid. 
14 See (n 8) 
15 T T Xiaoh
16 Ibid. 
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arrival of a new era of the development of the SIFs industry.17 The creation of 
open-end funds marked a great change to the structure of investors in the securities 
market, and attracted a large number of stable, long-term investors. Since then, few 
new close-end funds have been established and existing close-end funds started to 
transform into open-end funds. By the end of 2009, only 31 SIFs were organized as 
close-end funds, accounting for 4.63% of total funds assets, with the remaining 590 
SIFs established as open-ended funds.18 Meanwhile, a greater variety of SIFs have 
emerged, for example, bond funds, index funds, guaranteed funds and balanced funds. 
Given this fast rate of growth in the SIFs market, it is imperative to put in place an 
adequate legal and regulatory framework. As a result, on October 28, 2003, the 
also fuelled by the demands of securities 
market, after nearly ten years’ huge expansion in the number and types of funds, 
market. It is also perhaps one of the fastest growing businesses in the world, which 
                                                             
Securities Investment Fund Law (Fund Law), which draft took four years and seven 
months to complete, was finally passed in the fifth session of the Standing Committee 
of the Tenth National People's Congress. Currently, the Fund Law is at the core of 
China’s legal framework for SIFs. It stipulates the provisions with regard to fund 
managers, custodians, the investment activities of funds, subscription and redemption 
of funds, information disclosure, rights and interests of fund holders, supervision and 
administration of funds, and legal liabilities. Moreover, the CSRC also issued many 
regulations and rules to supplement and clarify the Fund Law. Examples include (1) 
Circular on Issues concerning Warrant Investment by Securities Investment Funds in 
the Split Share Structure Reform, (issued in 2005); and (2) Provisional Code of 
Corporate Governance for Securities Investment Fund Management Company, (issued 
in 2006).  
With the facilitation of the Government and 
securities funds are now the largest kind of institutional investor in China’s stock 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 China Galaxy Securities Research (n 6) 5. 
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increased more than 80 times from 1997 to 2008.  
The following part turns to discuss SIFs’ structural arrangements according to the 
Fund Law. There are important to the understanding of shareholder activism, for 
conflicts of interest among different funds’ participants affect funds’ incentive for 
7.2.2.1 Fund Management Company  
Under the Fund Law, only fund management companies approved by the CSRC may 
 management industry develop safely, 
the Government is taking a cautious attitude by setting out strict thresholds for the 
is allowed. Specifically, the Establishment of Fund 
Management Companies with Foreign Equity Participation Rules (Foreign Rules)21 
                                                             
involvement. 
7.2.2 Fund Structure 
establish a SIF. In order to make the young fund
participation in this industry. For example, the company must have a registered capital 
of at least RMB 100 million.19 It must have a principal or key Chinese shareholder 
with the highest stake in the company, who must have at least RMB 300 million 
registered capital. 20  This principal shareholder may be a securities company, a 
securities investment consultant, a trust management company or other financial 
institution approved by CSRC.  
Following China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001, foreign participation in 
the fund management company 
has set out some requirements applying to foreign shareholders in joint venture fund 
management companies. First, foreign investors cannot hold more than 49% stakes in 
a fund management company, which is in line with anticipated higher limit under 
 
19 Fund Law s 13 (2).  
20 Fund Law s 13 (3).  
21 Establishment of Fund Management Companies with Foreign Equity Participation Rules, issued by 
the CSRC on June 2002 and took into effect in July 2002. 
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China’s commitment to WTO.22  
Second, the foreign shareholder must be a financial institution with experience in 
asset management. It must have a registered capital of at least RMB 300 million and 
its country must have established channels of cooperation with the CSRC.23  
them having the participation of foreign investors.  The industry is concentrated, 
Fund manager, fund custodian and fund unit holders are three most important players 
he UK 
counterpart. Their responsibilities are to raise the fund, handle the offering, 
le for safeguarding the security of fund 
assets, opening and maintaining bank accounts, and handling the clearing and 
                                                             
China’s booming fund industry is attracting foreign investors to take part in the local 
business. By the end of 2009, there were 60 fund management companies, with 34 of 
24
with 49.74% of funds assets controlled in the hands of top 10 companies.25 The assets 
managed by the largest company, Huaxia, account for 9.93% of total assets.26  
7.2.2.2 Fund Manager, Fund Custodian and Fund Unit Holders 
involved within a SIF. The role of fund manager in China is somewhat akin to t
subscription, redemption and registration of fund shares, and establish funds 
investment portfolio and strategies.27 Fund managers are required to be appointed by 
the fund management companies and must obtain qualification to engage in the fund 
industry.  
Commercial banks licensed by the CSRC may act as fund custodians. Similar to their 
UK counterparts, fund custodians are responsib
settlement of investment orders of the fund manager pursuant to the stipulations of 
 
22 Foreign Rules s 8. 
23 Ibid, s 6 (3). 
24 China Galaxy Securities Research (n 6) 5.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Fund Law s 19. 
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fund contracts.28 Fund custodians must also supervise fund manager’s investment 
behaviors and prevent the manager from infringing the fund unit holders’ interests. 
For example, fund custodians must report to the CSRC if they found fund managers’ 
behaviors violate the law or the terms of a fund contract. By the end of 2009, there are 
14 commercial banks acting as custodians for investment funds. 91.57% of funds 
assets are handled by five state-owned commercial banks – the Bank of China, 
the China Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China and Bank of Communications.29 
Fund unit holders are the ultimate owners of fund assets and therefore, the Fund Law 
gives their interests high priority. For example, unit holders who separately or in 
aggregate constitute more than 10% of the fund’s total shares may convene a general 
Insurance companies form the second largest group of institutional shareholder in the 
s size is sharply smaller than SIFs. The insurance 
market consists of the non-life, and the life, insurance sector. As of September 2009, 
                                                             
unit holders’ meeting to decide funds matters. Fund units are authorized to sue fund 
managers and/or custodians whey they are in breach of their duties. 
7.3 Insurance Companies 
Chinese securities market although it
China had 120 insurance companies.30 The industry is concentrated in the hands of 
relatively few big insurance companies. For example, the largest life insurance 
company in China – China Life Insurance – has about a 35% share of the life 
insurance market. The insurance assets company it owns is also one of the largest 
institutional investors in China.  
 
28 Fund Law s 26. 
29 China Galaxy Securities Research (n 6) 6 
30 W Dingfu, 'Xin Zhongguo Baoxianye Fazhan bolanzhuangkuo 60 Nian [The developement of 
insurance industry in the past 60 years]' (2009) China Insurance News 
<http://business.sohu.com/20090923/n266934430.shtml> accessed December 23 2009. 
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7.3.1 The Development of Insurance Market 
China’s insurance industry started in the late 1970s when economic system reform 
insurance company assets 
may be invested only in safe investment instruments, such as bank deposits, 
nies were allowed to invest directly in the securities market 
and manage their own investment portfolio since 2004, subject to a maximum 10% of 
                                                             
began. The Insurance Law of 1995 (Section 104) states that 
government and financial bonds, and other assets approved by the State Council. At 
the end of 1999, insurance companies were permitted to indirectly invest in equities 
up to 15% of their total asset through SIFs. 31 Thus, every expansion of permissible 
investments required a new authorization from the Government. Since returns from 
equity investment were more often profitable than that from conservative investment 
channels, many insurance companies soon became large holders of SIFs. As of 2002, 
the investment amount of insurance companies in securities market through SIFs 
reached RMB 31.2 billion, accounting for 21.98% of total value of the publicly 
offered SIFs.32 Nearly 25% of the tradable shares market in China at that time were 
(indirectly, through SIFs) in the hands of insurance companies. The investment in 
SIFs by insurance companies accounted for 13% of their overall investment portfolio, 
up from 2% in 1999.33  
As a result of rapid asset expansion and increasing demand for access to securities 
market, insurance compa
 
31 According to Interim Measure on Administration of Insurance Company’s Investment in Securities 
Investment Funds, the upper limit of each insurance company have to approved by the China Insurance 
Regulatory Committee. Generally, the investment subject to 5% to 15% of the total assets of the 
insurance company. See D Zhimin, Zhengquan Shichang Jigou Touzizhe Guifanhua Fazhan Yanjiu 
[On the normal development of institutional investors in China' securities market] (Zhejiang Daxue 
(Zhejiang University), Hangzhou 2008), 20.  
32 E Sekine, 'China's Insurance Companies Step Up Outbound Portfolio Investment' (2007) 10 Nomura 
Capital Market Review 41, 46. 
33 Ibid. 
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total assets investment limit.34 More recently, the newly issued Provisional Measures 
on Administration of Operation of Insurance Capital by the China Insurance 
Regulatory Committee (CIRC)35 on August 5, 2010, which came into effect on 
August 31, 2010, raised the cap to 20%.36 Meanwhile, the practice of indirectly 
investing in stock through SIFs remains and thus, the amount of shares held by 
insurance companies in the total institutional investment shall be much larger than 
suggested (6%) in Table 7.2.  
Over the past decade, the Chinese insurance industry has experienced rapid expansion. 
Despite that trend, in comparison with UK insurance companies where a large portion 
 
                                                             
As of end 2009, the total assets of insurance companies have reached RMB 4000 
billion, up nearly 25% over 2008.37 The profits generated in the past year reached 
RMB 53.06 billion.38 Investments have become more diversified, in step with gradual 
lifting of restrictions on investments in securities market and real estate. Bank 
deposits and government bonds have accounted for a declining share of these 
investments, while asset allocations on securities have been increasing.  
of assets are allocated to stocks, Chinese insurance companies invest the majority of 
their assets in safe vehicles such as government bonds. At end-November 2006, 33.2%
of assets were held in bank deposits, while cumulative amount of stock acquired 
account for only 4.59%.39 As of September 2009, bonds investment alone accounted 
 
34  Provisional Measures for the Administration of Stock Investment by Insurance Institutional 
Investors, jointly issued by the CSRC and China Insurance Regulatory Commission on October 24, 
2004. 
35 The CIRC will be introduced in section 7.2.2 below. 
36 Provisional Measures on Administration of Operation of Insurance Capital s 16 (4). 
37 Xinhua, '2009 Nian Baoxian Gongsi Lirun Zonge dadao 530.6Yi Yuan [The Total Profits has 
reached RMB 53.06 billion]' Xinhua News (21January 2010) 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-01/21/content_12848126.htm> accessed 24January 2010. 
38 Ibid. 
39 E Sekine, see (n 32). 
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for 50.6%.40  Moreover, in developed countries like the UK and US, insurance 
companies are one of the most important long-term investors in capital markets. In the 
UK, as pointed out earlier, insurance assets represented nearly 17% of total assets of 
securities market.  
In spite of the huge differences above, the potential growth for insurance companies is 
enormous. Further relaxing on investment, together with increasing demands from the 
market, will promote insurance companies to become an important equity holder as 
well a major participant in corporate governance. 
7.3.2 Regulatory Framework for Insurance Companies 
Chinese insurance companies are governed by Insurance Law, which was 
promulgated in 1995 and recently revised in 2009. The law lays down the regulatory 
principles and operation framework for the insurance industry. It covers insurance 
contracts, incorporation, investment and supervision of insurance companies. The 
registered capital requirement for establishing insurance companies is double that of 
fund management company, where it must have a registered capital of RMB 200 
million.41 The law stipulates that the investment scope of insurance companies’ assets 
includes listed stocks, real estate, government bonds, bank deposits and other 
channels laid down by the insurance regulator, and that the assets allocation of 
insurance companies portfolios should follow the relevant requirements of the 
regulator.42  
Under the Chinese policy of ‘separate business, separate regulation’, insurance 
companies are regulated by different organ from SIFs. Currently, CIRC is the 
                                                              
40 Xinhua, 'Chinese insurance regulator stresses supervision on insurance investment ' Xinhua News 
(16 November 2009) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/16/content_12463912.htm> 
accessed 24 January 2010.  
41 Insurance Law s 68. 
42 Insurance Law s 106. 
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regulatory and supervisory institution for the insurance industry. CIRC was 
established on November 1998 as a ministerial institution directly under the State 
Council. The Insurance Law entitles a number of regulatory authorities to the CIRC, 
for example, the right to supervise the insurance market, to make qualification 
requirements for the senior managers of insurance companies, and to grant approval 
for insurance agencies.43 As we have seen in section 7.2.1, regulations that relaxed 
insurance companies’ equity investment limits were all made by the CIRC. 
7.4 Pension Funds 
Apart from SIFs and insurance companies, the major institutional fund source comes 
from certain parts of the Chinese pension fund system. That system is relatively 
complex. It is composed of a number of separate so-called ‘Pillars’.44 To understand 
these, and their implications for institutional investment, it is necessary to provide a 
brief introduction of Chinese pension system since it differs substantially from the UK 
counterpart. 
China’s pension system was initially established in 1951 and has undergone 
significant reforms in the past several decades. China had, until the late 1980s, 
maintained an urban-and state-owned enterprise-based Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) 
pension system. At that time, the pension system was part of ‘iron rice bowl’ – 
pensions were directly provided by SOEs, supported by fiscal subsidy.45 1997 is the 
benchmark year for China’s pension system in which a new unified three-pillar 
                                                              
43 Insurance Law s 120.  
44 The Multi-Pillar pension system only provides funding for urban workers. Rural residents are 
covered by separate rural pension system, or the Minimum Life Security System. They are unfunded 
program and thus, will not be discussed in the thesis. 
45 China Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS) ‘China’s Old-age Insurance 
System and Review of its Reform’ (2009)  
<http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/Desktop.aspx?path=Desktop.aspx?PATH=/sy/ZYYLBXZT/ZYYLBXZT_
infoView&gid=d926b73d-5ab8-400d-8a51-eb72a9d68195&tid=Cms_Info> accessed 10 May 2010. 
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pension system was set up broadly in line with the recommendation of World Bank.46 
The new system aimed to establish a multiple-pillar scheme combining social pooling 
and individual accounts, where the Government, employers and employees all share 
the burden of providing an individual retirement security. The framework of this 
system was issued by the State Council in Documents 26, ‘Decision on Developing 
Unified Basic Old Age Pension System for Enterprise Employees’.47 
Basically, the pension system has three-pillars. They are (1) Pillar I, comprised of 2 
tiers, namely – tier 1: a basic pension or defined benefits PAYG pillar, financed 
entirely by enterprise contributors; and tier 2: a mandatory, defined-contribution 
individual system funded by employees contributing 8% of their monthly income; (2) 
Pillar II: a voluntary or supplementary defined contribution system set up by eligible 
employers, also known as ‘Enterprise Annuities’ (EAs) or corporate pension funds 
(CPFs); and (3) Pillar III: voluntary schemes which managed by private companies or 
insurance companies, for employers whose size cannot justify the enterprise annuity 
format.48 
Table 7.1 Summary of the Multi-Pillar System 
   Contributions   Benefits 
 Pillar I (Tier 1) Mandatory Employer 
contribution of 20% of 
employee's wages (max 
300% min 60% of provincial 
wages). 
35% of average monthly 
income (after 15 years of 
employment)  
                                                              
46 S Leckie and N Pan, 'A Review of the National Social Security Fund in China ' (2007) 12 Pensions: 
An International Journal 89, 91. 
47 The State Council’s Document No. 26: ‘Decision on Developing Unified Basic Old Age Pension 
System for Enterprise Employees , promulgated in 1997. 
48 Y Kim, I S M Ho and M S Giles, 'Developing Institutional Investors in People's Republic of China' 
(2003) World Bank Country Study Paper, 8. 
277 
 
Pillar I (Tier 2) Mandatory employee 
contribution of 8% of 
monthly income  
Target replacement rate of 
24% of average monthly 
income  
Pillar II (EA) (or Corporate 
Pension Fund) 
Voluntary contributions by 
employers and employees  
Individual account  
Pillar III Voluntary contributions by 
employees  
Individual account 
Source: F Salditt, P Whiteford and W Adema, ‘Pension Reform in China: Progress and Prospects’ 
(2007) OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers. 
Although China has set up a multi-pillar pension system, in many less-developed 
provinces, cities and counties, the social securities system is not adequate. In the 
meantime, the severe aging population has increased the burden of the pension system. 
There is an urgent need for the Government’s support and the National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) was therefore established in 2000 as a complementary vehicle 
to support the social security system in China. The NSSF does not form part of the 
above state pension pool but work as a back-up reserve fund, or ‘fund of last resort’ to 
cover unfunded liabilities in the PAYG system. It aims to install a national long-term 
reserve fund to offset the gap between the pension system’s expenses and the future 
demands of China’s rapidly aging population. The fund is not ready to make any 
major expenditure in the medium term.49  
So far, although Chinese pension system consists of three Pillars, the operation of 
Pillar I and Pillar III are limited to conservative investment tools, such as government 
bonds. Only CPFs (Pillar II) and the NSSF are permitted to invest assets in stock 
market subject to some upper limits and only these two of them will be included as 
institutional shareholders in the thesis.  
                                                              
49  NSSF reports that expenditures are not foreseen for the next 15-20 years until 2025-30. 
<http://www.ssf.gov.cn/zyjh/ldjhhbg/> accessed 12 December 2009. 
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7.4.1 Corporate pension fund (CPF) (Pillar II) 
The CPF was first introduced in the 1990s when the Government started to reform the 
old pension system towards the multi-pillar model as I described above.50 However, it 
was not until 2004 that this term was formally endorsed in regulations. In 2004, the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MLSS) released: (1) Interim Measures for 
Enterprise Annuities (IMEA); and (2) Interim Measure for the Management of 
Enterprise Annuities Fund (IMMEA),51 with the purpose of consolidating the Chinese 
CPF markets and enhancing supervision. 
Under the IMEA, the CPF has to be run under a trust model.52 The plan trustee 
(which can be company internal trustee or a third party professional trustee) appoints 
other CPF service providers – plan administrator, custodian and investment manager 
approved by the MoLSS.  
The IMMEA impose quantitative limits on the investment of CPFs, such as assets 
allocation, portfolio requirement. For example, investment in government bonds alone 
shall not drop below 20% of net assets.53 The maximum investment in stocks is 
limited to no more than 20% of net assets.54 The thesis will return to these limits in 
Chapter 9.1.1.1. However, there is lack of good data on investment activities of 
Chinese CPFs. Actual asset allocation in the CPFs systems is not disclosed by the 
Government. As the majority of fund managers appointed by CPFs’ trustees act 
through fund management companies and insurance companies, the participation of 
                                                              
50 For a discussion on the reform, see, B Zheng, ‘Reforming Complementary Enterprise Pensions: 
Overview, Assessment and Prospect’ in D Deng and C Liu (eds), China's Economic Reform in the Past 
30 Year: Overview, Assessment and Prospect (China Social Science Publishing House, Beijing 2009). 
51 Interim Measures for the Management of Enterprise Annuities Fund (Order No. 23 of the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Security) jointly by the MLSS, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) in 2004.  
52 IMEA s 15. 
53 IMMEA s 47. 
54 Ibid. 
279 
 
CPRs in the securities market is largely hidden. It is also reported that CPFs asset 
managers largely adopt conservative investment strategies, investing in financial 
instruments such as governmental bonds and banks.55 
The CPF system is embryonic but has already grown significantly. By the end of 2009, 
the total assets of CPFs are an estimated RMB 230 billion, up 30 billion in a year.56 
The potential for future growth is considerable due to the very low current coverage.57 
Until now, many corporations and employees lack awareness of the significance of 
CPFs, how they are operated and what benefits they can get.58 It is estimated that CPF 
market will grow to RMB 14.4 trillion by 2030. 59  Given their potential large 
economic scale, CPFs will become an important category of institutional investor in 
the Chinese securities market. 
7.4.2 National Social Security Fund (NSSF) 
The operation of the NSSF is overseen and managed by the NSSF Council – a 
ministerial level entity directly reporting to the State Council. The assets of the NSSF 
mainly come from four sources: (1) the funds allocated by the central government’s 
budget; (2) capital derived from reduction or transfer of state-owned shares – a 
proportion of the IPO proceeds arising from the public offering of state-owned 
enterprises; (3) sales of lottery tickets; and (4) return on investment.60 
                                                              
55 G Impavido, Y-W Hu and X Li, 'Governance and Fund Management in the Chinese Pension System' 
(2009) IMF Working Paper No. 09/246, 30. 
56 Caijin Wang [Caijin Net], '2009 Nian Zhongguo Qiye Nianji Guimo Yuji 2300 Yi yuan [The Assets 
of Chinese Enterprises Pension Funds are Estimated to Reach 230 Billion]' (2010) Caijin 
<http://www.caijing.com.cn/2010-01-21/110363001.html> accessed 27 January 2010. 
57 Impavido, Hu and Li (n 55) 29.  
58 S Dunaway and V B Arora, 'Pension Reform in China: The Need for a New Approach ' (2007) IMF 
Working Paper No. 07/109 . 
59 Y Hu, F Stewart and J Yermo, 'Pension Fund Investment and Regulation: An International 
Perspective and Implications for China's Pension System' (2007) OECD, 11. 
60 NSSF, About the National Council for Social Security Fund,  
<http://www.ssf.gov.cn/Eng_Introduction/ >Accessed 24 June 2009.  
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Fiscal subsidies from the central government used to be the largest source of NSSF. 
This proportion has been in decline from 100 per cent of the NSSF’s assets to 17% 
due to the diversified sources.61 The second largest source of NSSF is the reduction of 
state-owned shares at IPO seeking an overseas listing, accounting for about 20% of 
fund assets in 2006 and it would continue to serve as the main source for the NSSF.62 
According to a State Council Regulation issued in 2001 entitled ‘Provisional 
Measures for Raising Funds for NSSF from Divestiture of SOE Assets’, SOEs must 
contribute 10 per cent of all initial public offerings to the NSSF. This requirement was 
originally applied to both domestic and international offering, but it was suspended 
for domestic offerings in June 2002 because of adverse reaction from the domestic 
market. 63  As a result of the IPO transferring policy, the NSSF is the largest 
institutional investor on the Hongkong Stock Exchange. 
In June 2009, the transfer of shares from domestic offerings was resumed, and 
according to Measures for the Transfer of Some State-owned Shares from the 
Domestic Securities Market to the National Social Security Fund, a total of 131 SOEs 
that conducted domestic IPO since July 2005 were required to transfer the equivalent 
of 10% of their total IPO shares to the NSSF. 64 The Ministry of Finance estimated the 
total market capitalization of those companies to be RMB 63.93 billion ($9.35 
billion).65 As such, the NSSF will become the largest institutional shareholder of 
those companies.  
                                                              
61 NSSF Council, ‘Caizheng Bori Quanguo Shehui Jijin Zijing Qingguobiao’ [Assets source of the 
NSSF] <http://www.ssf.gov.cn/web/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=682> accessed 13 July2008. 
62 Ibid. 
63 J Anderlini, 'China may shift shares to fund pensions' Financial Times (London 29 February 2008) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d173cc2c-e6fc-11dc-b5c3-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1> accessed 
14 April 2008 
64 Measures for the Transfer of Some State-owned Shares from the Domestic Securities Market to the 
National Social Security Fund issued by the Ministry of Finance, State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission and National Council for Social 
Security Fund, 19 June 2009. 
65 Song Yanhua, ‘Listed Companies to Transfer State-owned Shares to Social Security Fund’, Caijing, 
26 June 2009. 
281 
 
The investment activities of the NSSF are mainly governed by Interim Measures on 
the Administration of the Investment of National Social Security Fund issued by the 
MoLSS and MOF in December 2001(NSSF Measures). The NSSF Measures provide 
quantitative investment limits for strategic asset allocation. In-house asset 
management is limited to bank deposits and government bonds. Any other forms of 
investment, such as tradable securities investment funds and stocks, need outsourcing 
to external fund managers.66  
As safety has been the priority of fund investment, the NSSF has adopted a 
conservative investment strategy. Prior to 2002, most of the fund assets were managed 
internally and in low-yielding instruments such as cash and government bonds. 
Nominal gross returns for this cautious management way were particularly low given 
China’s low interest environment.67 With the rapidly ageing trend, the NSSF has 
gradually broadened its investment channels and developed new investment 
instruments with higher return and low risk. Since 2003, the NSSF appointed six 
domestic fund managers, considered among the best in the Chinese fund industry, to 
invest fund assets in the securities market.68 As at the end of 2003, the amount of 
assets managed by the appointed domestic fund managers was RMB 31.8 billion, or 
approximately 24% of the total assets.69 
The NSSF has increasingly allocated assets to external fund managers and broadened 
investment channels from the domestic market to overseas markets.70 The portion of 
                                                              
66 Interim Provisions on Administration of NSSF Investment, issued by the MLSS in 2003, s 25.  
67 Impavido, Hu and Li (n 55) 24. 
68 The six fund management companies are Boseri, Changsheng, Huaxia, Harvest, Penghua and 
Southern. 
69 The NSSF Annual Report 2003, available at http://www.ssf.gov.cn/tzsj/ accessed 12 June 2008. 
70  In 2006, The National Council of the NSSF issued Interim Provisions Concerning the 
Administration of Overseas Investment, allowing fund managers to investing in foreign financial tools 
subject to limits. 
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assets outsourced increased from 24.07% to 46.65% during the period 2003-2009.71 
From 2003 to 2007, the annual investment return of the fund hit 10.7%. By the end of 
2009, assets under management of NSSF reached RMB 776.5 billion, up 38% from 
the previous year.72  
Nevertheless, social security funds only account for a small portion of the securities 
market in China. This is a sharp contrast to developed countries. For example, as early 
as 1997, pension fund investment in the US had already accounted for 55.7% of the 
stock markets.73 However, the Chinese pension market has developed rapidly and has 
high potential to become a major institutional shareholder in the securities markets 
because (1) since the 1970s, the Government adopted the one-child policy to conduct 
birth-control. One of the most severe consequences is that China faces an increasingly 
ageing population. By November 2008, China had about 150 million people aged 60 
or above, 11.6% of the population.74 By 2050, it is estimated that one in four people 
will be 60 or above.75 Thus, building up a sustainable pension system to benefit this 
population tops the agenda of the Chinese Government. According to the World Bank, 
China will be the world's third-largest pension fund market by 2030, worth $1.8 
trillion.76  
The expected large overseas IPOs of a number of SOEs in the coming years will make 
a substantial contribution to the NSSF. The NSSF will become a long-term investor in 
                                                              
71 Data collected from NSSF annual reports, available at http://www.ssf.gov.cn/tzsj/ accessed 20 June 
2010. 
72 Xinhua, 'China's Social Security Fund Managed Assets Reach 776.5 bln Yuan People's Daily Online 
(15 January 2010) <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6869751.html> accessed 25 
January 2010 
73  Y Kang, L Shi and E D Brown,'Chinese Corporate Governance-History and Institutional 
Framework' (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 2008). 
74 Xinhua, 'China Vice Premier Urges Investment to Improve ' People Daily Online (08 November 
2008) <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6529733.html> accessed 25 January 2010. 
75 Ibid. 
76 X Qian and C Zhu, 'Risk Control of Pension Fund Management in China ' (2007) 15 China & World 
Economy 37, 40. 
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these enterprises after getting these shares. Therefore, while it is relatively small, 
compared with the assets of SIFs, the NSSF has the potential to become one of the 
largest investors worldwide. Moreover, the chairman of NCSSF, Dai xianglong has 
said that the pension fund industry is expected to become an active participant in its 
invested companies to promote the standards of corporate governance, fulfilling the 
role active pension funds like Calpers do in other markets.77 It is therefore one of the 
research objectives of this thesis. 
7.5 QFIIs 
QFIIs are foreign institutions which meet certain conditions, and therefore may invest 
directly in the Chinese A-share market under the quota granted by the Government. 
This type of institution has existed in China only since December 2002, when the 
Government launched QFIIs program to open up its domestic market to large overseas 
investors. Before turning to examine the identity of QFIIs, it is helpful to gain a basic 
understanding of the QFIIs program. 
Prior to the QFIIs program, foreign investors were not allowed to invest directly in the 
Chinese A-share market. As we have seen in Chapter 6, international investors 
interested in acquiring positions in the Chinese market were only permitted to buy B 
shares, or to buy stocks through H shares, red chips and N shares.78 However, the 
non-A share market only accounted for a small amount of the Chinese securities 
market. Opening up the A-share market will bring many opportunities to foreign 
investors, and meanwhile, boost Chinese securities economy.  
As Chinese securities market has only had a relatively short history, the Government 
did not intend to lose its control after opening-up the securities market. QFII program 
is a good choice. QFII system or similar programs have been widely carried out in 
                                                              
77 J Anderlini ( n 63).  
78 See Chapter 6.1.3. 
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many countries, especially in the newly developing market economy countries, where 
the currency has not been freely converted, capital investment has not completely 
opened up and is still in a transitional system. For example, Taiwan, South Korea, 
India and Brazil have all successfully introduced programs similar to the QFIIs 
system. 79  Yeo notes that of those other systems, the experiences have been 
overwhelmingly positive in terms of the development of domestic securities markets, 
the improvement of risk management and ‘encouragement of foreign investment’.80 
The positive results from these countries further encouraged China to conduct its own 
QFII program to liberalize its capital market.  
Under China’s system, before QFIIs start their investment activities in China, they 
have to meet certain conditions and get approval from the Government. The purpose 
of this program is to open the domestic market to foreign investors but to keep it 
under tight control prior to adopting a fully freely convertible currency. It gives 
authorities large powers to control the magnitude of capital flows and to relax or 
restrict them when necessary.  
Following a two-year period of cautious research and consultation, on November 5, 
2002, China launched the QFII system with some $ 10 billion being made available. 
There is no definite timetable for China to fully open its stock market and this is 
probably some time away, depending on the opening up of China’s foreign exchange. 
For the moment, those international investors expecting to operate their business in 
one of the world’s most rapidly developing countries will need to apply to participate 
in QFII program.   
At present, a basic legal framework for QFIIs has already been established to govern 
their investment activities in China. In this structure, first, the primary legal regulation 
for QFIIs is the ‘Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities 
                                                              
79 S YEO, 'The PRC Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors Market' (2003) 14 China Economic 
Review 443, 448.  
80 Ibid.  
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Investments of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors’ (Provisional Measures) 
which was jointly issued by the CSRC, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) on 24 August 2006. A series of 
supplementing rules have been made to clarify the general principles set out by 
Provisional Measures and to provide guidance in detailed issues related to the QFIIs 
scheme. There are: 
1. Notice on the Implementing of Provisional Measures on Administration of 
Domestic Securities Investments of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(‘Implementing Notice’) , issued by the CSRC In September 2006.   
2. A set of Question & Answers (‘Q&A’), issued by CSRC in September 2006 
and which highlighted the objects of the Provisional Measures.  
 
The main regulators of the QFII program are the CSRC, responsible for supervising 
QFIIs’ trading activities, and SAFE, in charge of foreign exchange operations. The 
following section describes the most important rules in respect of the operation of 
QFII program and its implication for Chinese corporate governance.  
7.5.1 QFIIs Qualifying Criteria  
The Chinese Government aims to attract top, sound and global international investors 
by setting up strict barriers. Foreign institutional investors who wish to access the 
China domestic securities market, according to the Provisional Measures, must meet 
strict financial conditions.81 For example, they should have solid financial status, 
good credit standing record and certain assets size.82 A summary of legal thresholds 
                                                              
81 Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities Investments of Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (hereinafter referred to as the Provisional Measures), Article 2. QFIIs includes 
oversees fund management institutions, insurance companies, securities companies, commercial banks, 
trust companies and government investment entities. 
82 Provisional Measures s 6 (1). 
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for each type of foreign institution is presented in the Table 7.2.83  
Table 7.2 Legal threshold for each type of foreign institution 
Applicant  Operating 
experience 
Revenue Assets under 
management 
(Preceding 
Accounting Year)
 Others 
Fund 
Management 
>= 5 years  N/A >=$ 5 billion   N/A 
Insurance 
Companies 
>= 5 years  N/A >=$ 5 billion   N/A 
Securities 
Companies  
>= 30 years  >= $ 1 billion  >=$10 billion    N/A 
Commercial 
Bank  
  N/A  N/A  >=$ 10 
billion 
  Among the 
world’s to 100 
banks by total 
assets in the 
preceding 
accounting 
year  
Other 
institutional 
investors 
(pension 
funds, trust 
funds, charity 
funds, etc) 
 >= 5 years  N/A  >=$ 5 billion   N/A 
                                                              
83 Implementing Notes s 1.  
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In addition to the foregoing, the QFII applicant shall have a well-established 
governance structure and internal control system, conduct the standardized business 
and receive no major penalties by the regulatory institutions in its home country or 
region during the last three years.84  
However, in order to encourage medium and long-term investment into China, the 
QFIIs Provisional Measures expressly state that the priority will be given to QFIIs 
applicants who manage closed-end China-focused funds, pension funds, insurance 
funds and mutual funds with good investment records in other markets.85 QFIIs with 
long-term and stable investment strategies will yield multiple benefits to the Chinese 
security market. It is envisaged that their participation in the Chinese securities 
market will not only reduce the volatility of the stock market, but also accelerate the 
improvement of corporate governance standard in Chinese domestic companies. This 
point will be covered in detail in section 7.5.5.  
The CSRC will issue each QFII with a Securities Investment License and each QFII 
should submit an application to SAFE through its custodian to request an investment 
quota in a year after it gets the license.86 Upon approval, each QFII is allowed to trade 
A-shares in China’s domestic securities market but only within their investment 
quotas. The QFII’s investment in the securities market is subject to strict limitations, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
7.5.2 Opening of Multiple Securities Account 
To control foreign investors using other QFII’s quota in order to access the Chinese 
market without meeting the strict qualification,87 the Provisional Measures permit 
                                                              
84 Provisional Measures s 6 (3). 
85 Ibid, s 10.  
86 Provisional Measures s 9. 
87 S Leung and Y Zhang, ‘Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors in China’, An O’ Melveny & 
Myers LLP research report. There have been media reports that a recent Citigroup investment into 
China domestic securities market was on behalf of other non QFII fund management entity. 
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each QFII to open multiple segregated security accounts that correspond to respective 
multiple cash accounts. Each QFII may open multiple security accounts as ‘director 
accounts’ or ‘nominee accounts’.88 The Implementing Notice further provides that 
when QFII provides asset management services to customers, a nominee account 
should be opened for customers.89 Where a QFII opens a security account for public 
funds, insurance funds, charitable funds, donation funds, governments funds or other 
long-term investment fund under its management, the account can be in the joint 
name of “QFII+fund”, independent from the assets of the QFII and belonging to the 
relevant funds.90 
Permitting the opening of multiple accounts is a significant amendment by the 
Provisional Measures, done in response to representations made by interested parties 
who were concerned that the single account policy under the Interim Measures would 
lead to unclear assets structure. Under the Interim Measures, a QFII could only have 
one RMB special account and only appoint one custodian. Investment of a QFII 
through its QFII quota had to be put together in the same account with the assets of 
QFII’s clients and other underlying investors investing through the QFII. The single 
account approach raised the risk that the underlying investors are beyond the 
supervision of Chinese government. In addition, under the Interim Measures, the QFII 
was recorded as the owner of assets, which result in some QFIIs being in breach of 
their home jurisdiction’s laws. 
The Provisional Measures made a great improvement to deal with these problems by 
adopting a multiple accounts policy. First, the ability to open sub-accounts will 
facilitate the fund manger of QFII to clearly identify the structure of assets in the 
accounts as belonging to their customers instead of to themselves and therefore, the 
investors’ protection will be enhanced. It will also increase the ability of underlying 
                                                              
88 Provisional Measures s 16.  
89 Implementing Notice s 7. 
90 Implementing Notice s 8. 
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investors to use its vote meaningfully which may help in improving the corporate 
governance standard of Chinese listed companies. 
Second, the QFIIs are required to report the name of actual holders and allocation to 
each actual investor to the CSRC and stock exchanges.91 The investment activities of 
shadow investors will be under the supervision of the Chinese authority. Moreover, 
the changes in relation to the opening of securities accounts will satisfy both domestic 
and overseas regulations as stated in the CSRC’s Q&A.  
QFIIs are required to carry out the duty of information disclosure, and should comply 
with laws, regulations and other relevant rules.92 To correspond with the shift from 
single account policy to multiple account policy, underlying investors are also obliged 
to disclose information. They are required to add up the foreign listed stocks and 
domestic listed stocks in the same listed company and report this aggregate holding to 
the stock exchanges through the QFIIs. QFIIs are under a duty to ensure that 
underlying investors for which the QFII opens nominee accounts comply with the 
relevant regulations.  
7.5.3 Lock-in Period 
Prior to the promulgation of Provisional Measures, the investments of QFIIs in China 
were subject to a lock-in period with a view to encourage long-term holdings and 
prevent short-term volatility. They had to keep their capital within the PRC for at least 
one year. For close-end funds, the minimum period was three years. During the 
lock-in period, the funds remitted into China by the QFIIs must be held by custodian 
in a special purpose RMB account. Concerning that these stringent lock-in 
requirements may deter fund managers from operating the investment funds 
efficiently, the revised Provisional Measures do not lay down specific lock-in period 
                                                              
91 Provisional Measures s 16. 
92 Ibid. 
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but instead provide that any lock-in period shall be as adjusted by the SAFE based on 
China’s economic and financial situation, foreign exchange balance and according to 
arrangements set by the PBOC.93 Until now, SAFE has not set out any supplemental 
rules with respect to the lock-in period.  
Currently, requirements regarding lock-in period are provided in the CSRC’s Q&A. 
The CSRC Q&A stipulates that the principle lock-in period for pension funds, 
insurance funds, mutual funds and other long-term foreign investors would be reduced 
to 3 months, and for other types of investor, the lock-in period would remain 1 year. 
Owing to lack of formal legal rules, the period regulation in the CSRC’s Q&A has 
legal binding effect. Besides considering the safety of the Chinese financial market, 
such restrictions are made on the expectation that the long-term interests of QFIIs in 
the lock-in period would motivate them to participate in companies’ affairs and 
contribute to better corporate governance standards.  
7.5.4 Custodian Banks  
According to the Provisional Measures, each QFII is required to entrust a domestic 
commercial bank as custodians for its QFII assets and a domestic securities company 
as brokers for its domestic investment activities. There is a separate set of strict 
qualifying criteria to become a QFII custodian, which is laid down in the 
administrative regulation – ‘Review and Approval for the Qualification for Custodian 
banks of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors’. There are currently 13 banks 
approved by the CSRC and PBOC as QFII custodians.94  
A custodian bank provides QFIIs with significant financial services for their 
                                                              
93 Provisional Measures s 28. 
94 They including 8 Domestic Qualified Custodians: Bank of China, China Construction Bank, 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of Communications, 
China Merchants Bank, China Everbright Bank, China citic Bank and 5 Foreign Qualified Custodians: 
Standard Chartered Bank Shanghai Branch, Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation Shanghai 
Branch, Citibank Shanghai Branch, Deutsche Bank, DBS bank.   
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investment in the Chinese securities market. Where a QFII intends to gain a license 
and investment quota, it should submit the application documents through its 
custodian to the CSRC and SAFE. Under the approval of SAFE, the QFII shall open a 
RMB special account with its custodian. After it has qualified as foreign institutional 
investor, the QFII will be offered securities and cash clearing services from the 
custodian bank. The custodian bank is in charge of all the assets entrusted by QFII, 
and will service all QFII-related business such as the foreign exchange and other cash 
settlement needs of the QFII. The QFII is entitled to change its custodian provided it 
has adequate reasons to do so to be in line with its interests or if the custodian is 
deemed incompetent by the CSRC and SAFE.95  
A custodian also acts as the primary communication channel between the QFII and 
the CSRC and SAFE. It is responsible for supervising the investment activities of 
QFII and reporting to the CSRC and SAFE in case QFII investments are found to 
have violated laws or regulations. A custodian also must report to the CSRC and the 
SAFE about the status of QFII’s RMB special account and to compile the QFII's 
annual financial report. A custodian bank must keep records regarding its QFIIs’ fund 
activities and foreign exchange operation for at least 20 years.96   
7.5.5 Current QFIIs and their Role in Corporate Governance 
The first QFIIs were UBS and Normura Securities, approved by May and June 2003, 
soon followed by other global foreign institutions. Previously, the Government was 
reluctant to raise the QFII quota, both for fear of sparking currency appreciation and 
bubble risk in the domestic stock market. However, official figures show that QFIIs 
have turned out to be less speculative than other institutional investors in China 
because their investment types are stable and tend to keep their investment, for 
                                                              
95 Implementing Note s 5.  
96 Provisional Measures s 13 (7). 
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example, blue chip stocks for a long time.97 Reviewing the performance of QFIIs, 
SAFE considered that this system had facilitated a transformation in Chinese 
investors' sophistication, improved risk management, strengthened the global clout of 
Chinese capital markets and helped optimize corporate governance.98  Thus, the 
Government has gradually eased the criteria and restriction on QFIIs. As of 2009, 
there were 91 institutions qualified as QFIIs with a foreign exchange quota of USD 30 
billion.99 75.6% of granted quotas have been invested in stocks.  
One of the most significant roles that the Government expects QFIIs to play is to 
improve corporate governance standards in Chinese listed companies. This is 
reflected in the select criteria for QFIIs, where priority is given to long-term and 
stable institutions having a well-established corporate governance structure. The 
positive impact of QFIIs on corporate governance can be achieved in two ways. 
Firstly, the intention to attract QFIIs’ investment will drive Chinese companies to raise 
their corporate governance standards. Xia and Tomasic found that QFIIs would have 
more interest in a company’s corporate governance than small investors who at most 
time were only concerned with the company’ share performance. 100  Therefore, 
companies will stand a better chance of attracting QFIIs’ investment if they exhibit 
the corporate governance characteristics that foreign investors recognize and prefer.  
The second way to achieve better corporate governance is QFIIs’ active engagement 
with the companies in which they invest. However, by investigating some QFIIs’ 
activities in one Chinese listed company, Xia and Tomasic found that the present role 
                                                              
97 Xinhua News, ‘China Triples QFII Quota Ahead of Key Meetings with U.S. Officials’ (10 
December 2007) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/10/content_7226220.htm> Accessed 3 
February 2008; China Securities Journal, ‘China to relax regulation on foreign investment in Chinese 
securities market’ (April 9, 2008) 
98 Ibid. 
99 Data from CSRC, available at < http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/sjtj/ > accessed 19 March 
2010. 
100 X Jia and R Tomasic, Corporate Governance and Resource Security in China : the Transformation 
of China's Global Resources Companies (Routledge, London 2010) 67. 
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of QFIIs in improving corporate governance is rather limited.101 As one will see in 
Chapter 9, QFIIs’ activism is not observed in the sample companies. This largely 
results from the fact that their shareholdings are generally small, compared with the 
dominant controlling shareholders. Chapter 9 will discuss this issue in detail. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the extent and nature of the institutional shareholder 
ownership in China. We have seen the rise of that ownership, as well as the different 
types of institutional shareholder, and the structure they employed to run their 
investments.  
From a comparative perspective, some significant points can be recapitulated. First, 
some main participants in the UK market which can facilitate institutional shareholder 
engagement, including institutional shareholder representative organizations, proxy 
voting agencies, do not exist in Chinese market. Second, whereas UK’s institutional 
ownership is mainly dominated by long-term investors, such as pension funds and 
insurance companies; relatively short-term mutual funds prevail in the Chinese 
institutional market. Despite considerable growth potential, pension funds, insurance 
companies and QFIIs are still in embryonic stage, subject to strict quantitative 
investment limits. These features predict that the level of institutional shareholder 
engagement will be lower than the UK part.  
The following Chapter 8 takes a more empirical turn, to investigate the level of 
shareholder engagement in Chinese listed companies. 
 
 
 
101 Ibid, 125. 
 Chapter 8 Chinese Shareholder Activism: Empirical 
Evidence 
Given their large investment scale and huge potential for growth, there is no doubt 
that institutional investors have become increasingly important equity holders in the 
Chinese stock market. Do, however, Chinese institutional shareholders actually 
engage in the governance of portfolio companies? How do they interact with 
corporate management? What differences exist amongst different institutional 
shareholders in terms of their level or type of activism? And, crucially, how far do the 
answers to these questions confirm the validity of the model of activism developed in 
Chapter 1? These are questions this chapter answers. 
In the UK, as one has seen, there is much evidence produced by a number of 
institutional representative organizations and academic scholars to understand how 
institutional shareholders shape the corporate governance of their portfolio companies. 
However, in the Chinese context, despite institutional investment in China having 
gained increased popularity over the last few years, empirical evidence investigating 
the role of institutional investors on corporate governance is rare.  
So far, there are four studies concerning the exercise of shareholder rights in Chinese 
listed companies. There are: 
 
(1) Yang’s research on shareholders’ meetings during 2002-2003;1 
(2) Peng’s study (2005) on the voting activities of shareholders at AGMs;2 
(3) Institutional Shareholder Service’s survey (2006) on ten Chinese institutional 
investors, investigating their views on Chinese corporate governance;3 and 
                                                                
1 J Z Yang, 'Shareholder Meetings and Voting Rights in China: Some Empirical Evidence' (2007) 18 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 4.  
2 Wan Peng, ‘Fenlei biaojue tedian xianzhu, zhuanjiahuyu touzizhe xinshi toupiaoquan’[Call for More 
Exercising of Voting Rights by Investors], Zhengquanshibao [Zhengquan Times],3 March 2005. 
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 (4) Yuan et al’s study (2007) on the role of financial institutions in the corporate 
governance of Chinese listed companies;4 
(5) Clarke and Howson’ study on the use of derivative actions in Chinese companies.5 
These studies make great contribution to investigating the role of shareholders in 
corporate governance. However, solely relying on this evidence cannot provide an 
adequate overview of institutional shareholders’ participation in China. Therefore, it 
has been necessary for me to find empirical evidence to make the study feasible.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.1 sets forth the research method, followed 
by a discussion of the basic characteristics of the sample. Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 
survey and discuss the results obtained from the sample by type of activism – private 
meetings, submitting proposals, proxy voting and derivative actions. Each section 
starts with an overview of findings of the sample as a whole and then investigates the 
evidence in more depth by focusing on the comparison of results among groups. 
Because of data availability, the analysis focuses on activism in the form of 
submitting proposals and voting. Less attention is paid to private meetings and 
derivative actions. Section 8.5 draws conclusion. 
8.1 Research Design 
8.1.1 Research Method 
All the companies in the study were selected from the top 100 Chinese listed 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
3 Institutional Shareholder Service, ‘2006 Global Institutional Investor Study – Corporate Governance: 
From Compliance Obligation to Business Imperative’, ISS. 
4 R Yuan, N Milonas and J Z Xiao, 'The Role of Financial Institutions in the Corporate 
Governance of Listed Chinese Companies' (2006) Cardiff Accounting and Finance Working Papers 
<http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/research/workingpapers/accounting_finance/A2006_3.pdf > accessed 
3 June 2009. 
5 D Clarke and N Howson, ‘Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China’ in The Prospect of 
Structural Reform of Corporate Legal System (The 21st Century Commercial Law Forum-Tenth 
International Symposium 2010) 190. 
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 companies ranked by market value as of 2008. After evaluating the main sources of 
data and the institutional, technical and economic resources available, the focus was 
narrowed down to 30 companies on the basis of two selection criteria – institutional 
shareholding and corporate governance standard. The study selects the top 10 Chinese 
listed companies with largest investment funds’ shareholding and categorize them into 
group A6 (see Table 8.1), the top 10 companies which scored with highest corporate 
governance performance and categorizes them into group B7 (see Table 8.2). Another 
10 companies categorized into Group C were randomly selected from the top 100 
listed companies which were excluded by Group A and Group B (see Table 8.3).  
It is worth noting here that in the initial data, three companies fell into both Group A 
and Group B. For the purpose of comparison, these three companies were categorized 
into Group A and three other companies ranked top 11-13 were added into Group B as 
a matching sample. In order to present an accurate result, these three companies are 
discussed separately if data indicate their performances are distinctive from other 
companies in Group A.  
The purpose of the study is two-fold. First, it intends to provide some empirical 
evidence on shareholder activism of Chinese listed companies. Since the Chinese 
shareholders activism is by far less well understood and studied compared with the 
UK part, the study offers an analysis of evidence obtained from the sample to present 
an overall picture of institutional shareholder activism in Chinese listed companies. 
                                                                
6 The largest institutional holding in Chinese listed companies by the end of 2009 is summarized by 
Hexun.com, a large financial securities website in China. The data only covers the proportion of 
investment funds’ holdings and the actual holding of total institutions is estimated higher than this data. 
However, since SIF’ investment accounts for about 80% of all institutional assets, this ranking could 
still roughly reflect the shareholding of institutions in Chinese listed companies.  
7 The assessment of corporate governance is conducted by Institute of world economic and political in 
Chinese Academy of social science in its 2009 nia Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi 100 Qiang Gongsi Zhili 
Pinjia [Corporate Governance Assessment Report on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies For 
2009],available at http://www.iwep.org.cn/, accessed 14 September 2009. Its evaluation criteria are 
based on six criteria: rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, 
disclosure and transparency, board responsibility, and supervisory board responsibility.  
297 
 
 Second, the study compares data in each group, with an interest in how and to what 
extent shareholder activism differs in each of these three groups of companies. We 
suggested in Chapter 1 that the greater the percentage of shares held by large 
institutions, the greater likelihood of shareholder activism. Also, the better the 
governance arrangement (meaning the lower the costs of activism), then again, the 
greater the level of shareholder activism we would expect. 
To test the first assumption, the study chose the top 10 listed companies with largest 
institutional shareholdings, collectively. Meanwhile, as we will see in Tables 8.1, 8.2, 
8.3, individual shareholding by the largest institution is higher than the rest of two 
groups. To test the second assumption, the study selected the top 10 listed companies 
identified as leaders in corporate governance. For comparison purpose, the study 
picked up third set of companies in the sample which are excluded from the previous 
two groups. In line with above assumptions, the analysis undertaken here finds that 
companies in the first two groups demonstrate more active shareholder participation 
than their peers. 
Moreover, it is interesting to conduct a comparison between companies having larger 
institutional shareholding and companies having good corporate governance standards. 
Certainly, institutional shareholders are most likely to engage in their portfolio 
companies if their shareholdings are large and meanwhile, a facilitating corporate 
governance regime is provided. The idea here is to look at which factor is more 
decisive for institutional shareholder engagement: facilitating corporate governance 
arrangements as represented by the Group B or a large institutional shareholding, as 
represented in Group A. Could larger institutional shareholding lead to more activism 
in Chinese listed companies? Would better corporate governance systems attract more 
institutional investment and more shareholders’ involvement? These are questions the 
study set out to answer.  
All in all, the research design, as discussed above, could provide valuable evidence on 
the extent to which institutional shareholders monitor portfolio companies. However, 
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it is necessary to point out that this research is subject to a limit. The sample is 
relatively small and thus, hard to represent the overall institutional shareholders 
activism in China. However, it is not small relative to the total size of institutional 
holdings and the number of institutions in those listed companies. Nevertheless, when 
analyzing the results from these sample companies, the thesis also looks at other 
studies which covered larger sample companies randomly selected in the Chinese 
securities market. Thus, the evidence presented in the thesis can still give an objective 
assessment on institutional shareholder activism in China.
 Table 8.1 Group A: Top 10 Chinese listed companies with largest investment funds’ shareholding (At December 2009) 
Ranking    Name  Listing 
Code 
      Shareholding  Distribution      Shareholding of the 
largest owner (% of 
total shares) 
 
Shareholding of the 
largest fund (% of total 
shares) 
Restricted 
Shareholdin
g (%) 
Institutional 
shareholding(% 
of tradable 
shares) 
Institutional 
shareholding (% of 
total shares) 
1 Luzhou Laojiao 000568 48.69 41.50 21.29 53.52 1.56 
2 Suning Appliance  002024 32.62 35.12 24 28.61 2.48 
3 Shuanghui 
Fazhan 
 000895 
51.48 34.58 17 30.27 2.2 
4 Industrial Bank  601166 0 27.80 27.8 20.40 1.4 
5 Xishan Meidian  000983 53.28 24.17 11.29 53.28 1.64 
6 Shen Fazhan A  000001 5.84 23.58 22.2 16.76 4.54 
7 Qinghai Salt Lake 
Potash 
 000792 
49.40 21.48 15.48 30.60 3.41 
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 8 Gree Electric 
Applicances  
000651 
1.46 20.83 20.53 21.30 2.67 
9 Ping An 
Insurance 
 601318 
0 20.41 20.41 8.43 1.51 
10 Bank of Beijing   601169 36.48 19.82 12.79 16.06 0.74 
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 Table 8.2 Group B Top 10 Chinese listed companies with highest scores on good corporate governance performance (At December 2009) 
Ranking Name 
Listing 
Code 
Shareholding Distribution 
Shareholding of the 
largest shareholder(% 
of total shares) 
Shareholding of the 
largest fund (% of total 
shares) 
Restricted 
Shareholding 
(%) 
Institutional 
shareholding(%
of tradable 
shares) 
Institutional 
shareholding (% of 
total shares) 
1 
China 
Merchants 
Bank 
600036 
0 18.37 18.37 17.63 0.64 
2 Bank of China 601988 0 0.19 0.19 67.49 0.04 
3 
China Shenhua 
Energy 
601088 
73.86 19.72 5.15 73.86 0.22 
4 
Jiangsu 
Expressway 
600377 
67.2 0.72 0.23 54.44 0.29 
5 ZTE 000063 3.77 17.58 16.91 36.21 1.80 
6 Baoshan 600019 0 5.33 5.33 73.97 0.78 
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 Iron&Steel 
7 
China Citic 
Bank 
601998 
71.42 3.28 0.94 62.33 0.08 
8 
 
Bank of 
Communicatio
ns 
601328 
20.36 11.36 9.05 26.48 0.45 
9 
Shanghai 
Pudong 
Development 
Bank 
600000 
10.24 14.37 13 21.16 3.39 
10 
China Life 
Insurance 
601628 
0 
NA(less than 
1%) 
NA 68.31 0.11 
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 Table 8.3 Group C (At December 2009) 
 Name 
Listing 
Companies
Shareholding Distribution 
Shareholding of largest 
shareholder(% of total 
shares) 
 
Shareholding of the 
largest fund (% of total 
shares) 
Restricted 
Shareholding(
%) 
Institutional 
Shareholding 
(%of tradable 
shares) 
Institutional 
shareholding (% of 
total shares) 
1 
Shanghai 
International 
Airport 
600009 43.25 3.23 2.16 53.25 2.24 
2 Liaonin Chenda 600739 0 13.41 13.41 19.08 4.50 
3 Shenergy 600642 0 1.55 1.55 50.56 0.32 
4 
China United 
Network 
Communications 
600050 0 9.56 9.56 60.74 0.56 
5 
Sany Heavy 
Industry 
600031 7.41 7.42 6.91 60.73 1.45 
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6 Yunnan Yuntianhua 600096 50.72 12.36 6.09 55.83 1.4 
7 CITIC Securities 600030 0.90 10.69 10.59 23.69 3.22 
8 
Inner Mongolian 
Baotou Steel Union 
600010 57.65 2.92 1.23 61.20 0.26 
9 
Shanxi Guoyang 
New Energy 
600348 0 7.78 7.78 58.34 1.23 
10 Youngor Group 600177 35.75 0.26 0.0016 44.70 0.93 
 8.1.2 Sources of Data 
The data required for the present study were hand-collected from listed companies’ 
websites, their annual reports and quarterly announcements from CSRC and stock 
exchanges.   
One of the most important sources the study used is listed companies’ self-assessment 
reports. In 2007, Chinese listed companies were required to conduct self-examinations 
on their corporate governance system by answering a list of questions provided by the 
CSRC. Three points in the reports are of critical importance to the study: influence of 
institutional shareholders, companies’ relationship with investors and shareholder 
resolutions.  
Another significant source of the data comes from the sample’s shareholders’ 
meetings announcement in the year 2007 and 2008. The announcements disclose 
information regarding the shareholders’ attendance, resolutions, voting level and 
voting outcomes. 
Subject to source limit, the sample periods for the below three types of activism are 
different. In the discussion of private meetings, the study relies on the information 
provided by self-examinations which covers the period over each company’s IPO and 
2007. In the section of submitting proposal, the study finds that the sample would be 
too small if it is only concerned with 2007 and 2008 and thus, it also collects relevant 
evidence from self-examinations. The sample period for submitting proposals, 
therefore, is each company’s IPO to 2008. In terms of shareholder voting, the data 
consist of voting evidence at shareholders’ meetings over the 2007-2008 sample 
period.  
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 8.1.3 Basic Characteristics of the Sample Companies 
The sample companies represent 10 industries, based on the industry classification 
proposed by CSRC. In relation to geographical distribution, listed companies located 
in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Shandong account for 62 percent of the total. In 
terms of listing locations, 22 companies are listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and the remaining are listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
In terms of share holding structure of the sample, two fundamental characteristics are 
apparent. The first is that shares in majority of companies are subject to tradability. In 
75% of the companies, shares are not fully circulated in the stock market. Among 
those share-restricted companies, non-tradable shareholding in nearly 35% of them 
account for more than 50% of the total.  
The second notable characteristic of the sample is that ownership in majority of them 
is relatively highly concentrated. In almost 63% of sample companies, the largest 
shareholders hold over 30% shares of the total, which is the threshold for being 
controlling shareholder. Although a majority of companies in the sample have a 
dominant share owner, disparity emerges when one analyzes the shareholding by 
group. Table 8.4 reports the average shareholding of the largest owner and 
distribution by group. Table 8.5 sets out the number of companies in each group 
according to the shareholding of the largest owner.   
Table 8.4 Largest shareholding by Group 
 
Group 
               Large shareholding 
Mean% Median% Min% Max% 
A 27.92 24.96 8.43 53.52 
B 50.19 58.34 21.16 73.97 
C 48.81 54.54 19.08 60.74 
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 Table 8.5 Number of companies in each group by the largest shareholders’ holdings 
Group  No of Company 1-30% 30-50% 50%-Above 
A 10 6 2 2 
B 10 3 1 6 
C 10 2 1 7 
As the above Tables shown, in Group A, the average shareholding by the largest 
shareholder is around 27.92% and the majority of companies in this group do not have 
a controlling shareholder. By contrast, in Groups B and C, as indicated by the average 
level of the largest shareholding and the number of companies having controlling 
shareholders, ownership is relatively high concentrated. This difference suggests that 
large institutional shareholding result in a relatively dispersed share structure. 
As one will see later, these features of share ownership structure in the sample have 
significant bearings on the extent to and the way in which shareholders engage in 
corporate governance. Having obtained an overall image of the sample, the below 
sections set out evidence to analyze each type of shareholder activity in detail. 
8.2 Private Meetings 
The first form of shareholder activism that the study explores is private 
communication between the board/executives of portfolio companies and investors. 
When an institution has an issue it is concerned with, a typical engagement process is 
often that, first, to contact a portfolio company privately about the issue. Then, if the 
company management respond negatively, the institution will determine whether to 
file proposal or vote against management’ proposals at the shareholders’ meetings. 
Private meetings, therefore, are often used as the first mechanism for shareholder 
activism. As discussed earlier, this strategy has been widely adopted by UK 
institutional investors. In the Chinese context, research from Yuan, Milonas and Xiao 
also found that Chinese institutional shareholders demonstrate a preference for private 
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 negotiation over other forms of activism as the first action.8 
By interviewing 20 financial institutions and 10 directors from listed companies, they 
observed that institutions would go to talk to the management to explain why they 
might be dissatisfied and what action they desired from the portfolio companies. In 
the event of voting against a board proposal, they always informed the company in 
advance and explained the reasons for doing so. 
Another significant purpose for institutional shareholders to conduct private 
communications is to collect information from corporate management. Institutions 
under ISS’ global study describe private meetings as an investment necessity which 
enables them to gain information that is not disclosed in public statements.9 A 
majority (12) of institutions under Yuan, et al’s study also rely on private meeting to 
obtain information about the company and the quality of the management team.10  
The concerns of their meetings vary according to the different aims of meetings. 
Generally, the topics often focused in the area of corporate financial performance, 
corporate strategy, and corporate growth opportunities. The persons they get in touch 
with are often the secretary of the board, company chairman, general managers or 
managers from functional departments. 
In short, there is no doubt, as the above evidence confirmed, that private meetings 
have been widely adopted by institutions in China as an important means to improve 
the shareholders-board communication as well as an important type of shareholder 
activism. However, despite the importance of private meetings, more detailed relevant 
information is not provided in Yuan et al’s research. Thus, my study extends their 
work to provide more evidence on the interaction between shareholders and corporate 
                                                                
8 R Yuan, N Milonas and J Z Xiao, 'The Role of Financial Institutions in the Corporate 
Governance of Listed Chinese Companies' (2006) Cardiff Accounting and Finance Working Papers . 
9 Institutional Shareholder Service, ‘2006 Global Institutional Investor survey’, ISS, 61.  
10 Yuan, Milonas and Xiao (n 8).  
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 management. 
An inherent challenge in analyzing what happens once boards and shareholders do 
engage in private meetings, however, is that they are just that private. Therefore, the 
details of the negotiations are not shared with outsiders.  
Despite these difficulties in measurement, some general aspects of such contact 
between the company and shareholders, such as the forms of meetings, the frequency 
of meetings, can still be captured. The source mainly comes from the self-assessment 
reports of sample companies, in which listed companies are required to disclose how 
they have communicated with investors.11 Since companies are free to choose the 
information they intend to report, the contents and the extent of this disclosure vary 
among companies. Some companies had missing data. 
Having analyzed information available in these reports, this section presents findings 
by three aspects of private meetings: meeting model, meeting participants and the 
frequency of meetings.  
8.2.1 Form of Meetings  
Companies in the sample report that their contacts with investors take the following 
forms: (1) phone call, emails; (2) investors’ visiting; (3) corporate annual results 
investors’ and analysts’ briefing, press conference, and institutional investor meetings 
organized by companies; (4) conference or forum organized by institutional investors; 
and (5) road shows. Among those contact methods, investors’ visiting in person, or 
phone call, emails are often the most commonly used methods for investors to get in 
touch with companies. 
                                                                
11 In 2007, Chinese listed companies are required to issue reports on their corporate governance 
systems. 
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 8.2.2 Meeting Participants 
The majority of companies in the sample have established investor relations 
departments to deal with contacts with investors and thus, the persons with whom 
most investors talk to are staff or managers in these departments. In two companies, 
secretaries of board of directors and the CEO are in charge of these investor relations 
departments. In investors’ conference or forum, persons from companies having 
dialogue with institutional shareholders were often directors and company senior 
managers.  
8.2.3 Frequency of Meeting 
Most companies in the sample reported that they met with fund managers and 
financial analysts each year. Some companies also provided detailed information 
regarding the frequency of meetings with investors. Table 8.6 summarizes the 
available data by Group.  
Table 8.6 The frequency of board-shareholders contact during 2006 
Group Company No of investors No of Conference 
B 
601328 350 87 
601088 1000 NA 
600019 584 23 
600000 Around 100 NA 
600377 300 9 
C 
600642 39 6 
 600030 150 4 
Unfortunately, none of the companies in Group A has provided information with 
regard to the frequency of their contact with investors. However, it cannot simply 
draw the conclusion that there is more board-shareholder communication in Group B 
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 companies since this difference might be produced by insufficient data. Nevertheless, 
available data that listed in the Table 8.6 suggest that both the number of shareholders 
that companies contacted and the number of meetings that companies attended in 
group B are higher than in Group C. It therefore can be said that at least for the 
companies listed in the Table 8.6, Group B has achieved more frequent 
board-shareholder contacts.  
8.2.4 Conclusion 
To recapitulate, the above analysis finds that there may be frequent investor-board 
contacts in the sample and the way in which they get in touch with each other. 
However, subject to limited data, the study is unable to explore more relevant 
information in detail. 
8.3 Submitting Proposals 
8.3.1 Legal Rules on Submitting Proposals 
Submitting resolutions is another control mechanism for shareholders to make 
demands on management for changes in corporate practice. In China, under Company 
Law 2005 (CL 2005), shareholders who singly or collectively hold 3% or more of the 
voting rights of a company may propose a resolution for a shareholders’ meeting by 
written submission to the board 10 days before a meeting.12 The board must give the 
other shareholders notice of such a resolution within two days after receiving it and 
must present it for consideration at the meeting.   
The study on the sample sought to determine the frequency of shareholders’ 
resolutions submitted, types of shareholder proposals filed, the types of companies at 
which proposals were filed, the type of filer and the level of support for proposals. 
                                                                
12 CL 2005 s 103. 
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8.3.2 Frequency of Shareholders Proposals Filed 
In the sample studied, there were 2 out of 30 selected companies in which 
shareholders submitted a total 6 resolutions at the shareholders’ meetings during the 
2007 to 2008 period. Table 8.7 shows the frequency of companies receiving these 
proposals across the sample period.  
Table 8.7 Frequency Distribution of shareholder resolution proposed at the 
shareholders meetings  
Shareholders resolution proposed at 
the shareholders’ meeting 
(2007-2008) 
Frequency Percentage 
No 28 93.33 
Yes 2 6.67 
Total 30 100.0 
 
A study on these two resolutions is hardly to reveal the basic characteristics of 
shareholder resolutions in Chinese listed companies. In order to present a more 
complete picture of shareholder resolutions, the study also collected relevant 
information from self-assessment reports of the sample companies. Prior to 2007, data 
recorded in their self-assessment reports show 9 companies in the sample have been 
the recipients of shareholders’ resolutions. To make it clear, it is necessary to note that 
this number does not include the two companies in which shareholders resolutions 
were proposed over the period 2007-2008. 
In total, the data consist of 25 shareholder proposals submitted at shareholders’ 
meetings in 11 companies over the period of 2002-2009. Table 8.8 reports summary 
statistics on the shareholders resolutions proposed.  
  
 Table 8.8 Shareholder resolution at the shareholders’ meeting in China 
Group Companies Number of 
items 
proposed 
Issues Proposing shareholders Proposing shareholder 
holdings (%) 
Identities of the filer 
 
 
 
 
 A 
002024 1item C4 The largest shareholder 34.01 Individual 
000001 4 items C1 The largest shareholder 16.68 NSOE 
601318 2 items C1 
C3 
The 3rd largest shareholder 7.4% NSOE 
601169 3 items C2(2) 
C4 
Shareholders collectively holding 
over 3% of voting rights 
3.20 NSOE 
 
 
B 
600063 3 items 
C1 
C2(2) 
2 items by the largest shareholder 
and 1 by the shareholders 
collectively holding over 3% of 
voting rights 
12.10 
 
5.05 
SOE 
601988 3 items C2(2) 
C5 
The largest shareholder 67.49 SOE 
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 000063 3 items C3 The largest shareholder 36.21 NSOE 
600019 3items C2(2) 
C4(1) 
The largest shareholder 78 SOE 
 C 
   
600030 1 item C5 The largest shareholder 31.75 SOE 
600739 2 item C4 C5 The largest shareholder 12.76 SOE 
Note: (C1-Financial reporting/auditing/dividend; C2-Nominating/Electing, directors and supervisors;C3-Remuneration policies;C4-Amendment 
of articles of association; C5-Cash/bond offer issues, SOE-State-Owned Enterprises, NSOE-Non State-Owned Enterprises) 
 8.3.3 Who Were the Filers? 
8.3.3.1 Aggregate Analysis 
Filers of proposals were presented in Table 8.8. Of all 25 resolutions, 19 (76%) were 
proposed by the largest shareholders. The remaining 6 were dispersed among 
non-largest shareholders or individual shareholders collectively holding 3% or more 
shares.  
Another notable fact revealed in Table 8.8, is that the shareholdings controlled by the 
largest shareholders are all significantly higher than the 3% legal threshold. This 
could explain the difference that shareholder resolutions are more frequently seen in 
Chinese listed companies than their UK counterparts. 3% might be a high threshold in 
companies with diversified ownership structure, while in China, in light of the 
concentrated ownership of Chinese listed companies, it is much easier for large 
shareholders to meet this requirement to exert their control over management.  
Looking more carefully at the identities of those proposing shareholders summarized 
in Table 8.9, we can find that the most common group of shareholders that filed 
resolutions is NSOE, such as property investment enterprises (in 601169) and foreign 
investment institution (in 000001)13. None of the NSOE is institutional investor. 44% 
of resolutions were filed by SOEs, making it the second most common type of 
shareholder. The remainder was submitted by an individual investor who holds a 
controlling stake in the company (in 002024).  
Table 8.9 The identities of proposing shareholders and the number of resolutions they 
proposed 
Identities of proposing No of resolution Percentage 
                                                                
13 I should note here that, it is likely that some of the NSOE are state-related. Unfortunately, data 
provided the Companies’ reports do not give necessary and sufficient information about this issue. 
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 shareholder 
SOE 11 44% 
NSOE 13 52% 
 Individual 1 4% 
8.3.3.2 Analysis by Group 
Table 8.10 provides a breakdown of the number of proposals submitted by the identity 
of filers in each group. The result suggests a number of differences among groups.  
Table 8.10 The identities of proposing shareholders and the number of resolutions 
they proposed by Group 
Group 
No of 
resolutions 
Proposing shareholders Identities of shareholders 
Largest 
shareholders 
Non-largest 
shareholders 
SOE NSOE Individual 
A 10 5 5 0 9 1 
B 12 11 1 9 4 0 
C 3 3 0 3 0 0 
First, Group B received the largest number of resolutions over the entire sample 
period, closely followed by Group A. Group C received the fewest. It appears that, 
shareholders in companies that having good corporate governance systems (Group B), 
tend to be more active in submitting proposals. This point is further supported by the 
fact that half (5) of the resolutions proposed in the Group A were actually presented in 
the two companies which overlapped both Group A and Group B. 
Second, a majority of shareholder resolutions in Group B, and all in group C, were 
proposed by the largest shareholders, while in Group A, only half of the total 
resolutions were filed by the largest shareholders. In terms of the identities of 
proposing shareholders, again, Group B and Group C share some parallels while 
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 Group A is distinct. The predominant proposing shareholders in Group B and C were 
SOEs, while they were NSOEs in Group A, with none of the resolutions proposed by 
the SOE.  
8.3.4 Topics of Proposals 
8.3.4.1 Aggregate Analysis 
Changes desired by proposing shareholders vary widely. The study collapses these 
topics into five broad categories: C1-Financial reporting/auditing/dividend; 
C2-Nominating/Electing directors and supervisors; C3-Remuneration policies; 
C4-Amendment of article of association; C5-Cash/bond offer issues. 
Of the 25 proposal filed over the period of 2002 to 2008, as Table 8.11 indicates, by 
far the most popular category is the directors and supervisors election, followed by the 
category of corporate financial performance and planning. These two categories 
accounted for over half of proposals filed.  
The third most popular targets of shareholder resolutions are issues of executive 
remuneration and amendment of article of association, followed closely by concerns 
about cash and bond offers.  
Table 8.11 Frequency of each type of issues proposed by shareholders  
 No of resolutions Percentage 
Nominating/Electing 
directors C2 
8 32 
Financial 
reporting/auditing/dividend 
C1 
6 24 
Remuneration policies C3 4 16 
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 Amendment of article of 
associationC4 
4 
16 
 
Cash/bond offer issuesC5 3 12 
     Total 25 100 
8.3.4.2 Analysis by Group 
To highlight the distinction among Group A, B and C companies, Table 8.12 reports a 
breakdown of the number of proposal submissions in each Group by the various 
categories of issues that resolutions were concerned with. 
Table 8.12 Frequency of each type of issue proposed by Group 
Group 
No of 
resolutions 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
A 10 5 2 1 2 0 
B 12 1 6 3 1 1 
C 3 0 0 0 1 2 
As the above Table shows, topics addressed by shareholder resolutions vary greatly 
between Groups. Companies in Group A filed a total 10 proposals, with the majority 
of them focused on issues of financial reporting and strategic planning. The issue 
dealt with most frequently in Group B is election of directors and supervisors. Of 
three resolution filed in Group C, two dealt with cash and bond offer issues and the 
remaining one was concerned with amendment of article of association. 
The discrepancy between Groups in regard to the concerns in resolutions may be 
explained by previous findings that the identities of filers in each Group vary and the 
issues that filers concerned with were therefore different. For the largest SOE 
shareholders, the direct way for them to exert their control over company is to appoint 
board personnel and thus, as seen in Group B, the resolutions proposed by them 
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 would be more closely associated with director election or relevant issues.  
8.3.5 Voting Outcomes 
8.3.5.1 Aggregate Analysis 
Another important measure of shareholder resolutions is the voting outcomes. By 
observation of voting data provided by the sample companies, a notable fact is that all 
resolutions proposed by shareholders were passed with significant majority votes. In 
majority cases, the voting levels in favor of shareholder resolutions were between 
94%-99%. 8 resolutions even won 100% supports. One resolution was passed with the 
support of 83.45% of votes, representing the lowest supporting level among all 
resolutions.  
In order to provide a more accurate result, the study also examines whether the voting 
outcomes are related to the identity of the proposing shareholders and the particular 
issue being proposed. 
Table 8.13 shows the voting results by issue type. The issue that received the most 
support was the one related to amendment of articles of association, followed by those 
financial reporting and strategic issues (C1 and C5). The election of directors, 
supervisors-related and remuneration-related issues in terms of vote against are most 
controversial issues that received least support.  
Table 8.13 Voting outcomes by issues 
Issues No of resolutions Min% Max% Mean% 
C1 6 97.27 100 99.47 
C2 8 83.45 100 97.75 
C3 4 95.44 98.91 97.71 
C4 4 99.99 100 99.99 
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 C5 3 98.59 100 99.43 
8.3.5.2 Analysis by Group 
Table 8.14 separates the voting data according to group. 
Table 8.14 Voting outcome by Group 
Group No Min% Max% Mean% 
A 10 83.45 100 97.57 
B 12 97.60 100 99.45 
C 3 98.84 100 99.61 
Proposals submitted in Group A received a remarkable lower level of support than 
proposals in the other Groups. However, as pointed out above, the majority of 
resolutions in Group A are concerned with C1, which is not the most controversial 
issue as shown in Table 8.13. This result is likely to suggest that shareholders 
involvement in Group A was more active in comparison with the rest two Groups. 
The section below will return to this point. 
8.3.6 Conclusion from Data Analysis 
Overall, the analysis above can lead to some tentative conclusions. Firstly, it appears 
that the mechanism of submitting resolutions in the sample companies is largely 
controlled by the large shareholders to demand changes from corporate management. 
By virtue of their dominant share holdings, resolutions sponsored by those large 
shareholders were passed with high levels of supports.  
Second, in cases in which resolutions were filed by the non-largest shareholder, or 
coordinated shareholders, it is interesting to find that they also received widespread 
supports at shareholders’ meetings. This fact provides an indication that there might 
be a great chance for institutional shareholders to win if they attempted to exercise 
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 their rights to submit proposals. However, it could also be the case, where resolutions 
were only being proposed, even by non-SOEs, when the filers already know that the 
controlling shareholders would support, or at least not oppose, the resolution. 
The third finding is that shareholders distinguish, on the basis of the subject of the 
proposals, how they vote. Those proposals relating to election of directors, 
supervisors and their remuneration receive relatively lower voting support than others. 
These issues were more controversial since appointment of managerial personnel has 
been widely seen as a method by the largest shareholder to control the company.   
The examination of the data by Group also observed some differences among each 
group in regard to number of resolutions submitted, issue addressed, sponsor identity 
and voting outcome.  
Group B received the largest number of resolutions in the sample, indicating that 
shareholders in this group have most actively engaged in the companies in which they 
invested. However, a more carefully evaluation of the data reveal that most of those 
resolutions in Group B were proposed by SOEs as the largest shareholders. Although 
Group A ranked the second, it topped in terms of number of resolutions submitted by 
non-largest and NSOE shareholders. It is an important finding, for it suggests that in 
fact, institutional shareholders or minority shareholders are provided with more 
opportunities to exercise their shareholder rights in the companies with high 
institutional shareholdings (Group A).  
Of all groups, Group A is also distinct in terms of the voting outcomes. Even though 
the issues proposed in this Group were not most controversial, it received the 
remarkable lowest level of support per proposal. It might supports the assumption that 
shareholders are more actively engaged in voting activity in companies in which 
institutional shareholdings are higher.   
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Taken the above findings together, the study suggests that the type of company is an 
important determinant in the activism of submitting proposals. Shareholder 
 resolutions are more common in companies having better corporate governance 
standards. However, for institutional shareholders or other minority shareholders, the 
chances to have shareholder proposals are greater in companies with higher 
institutional shareholdings. It is least likely for this activism to occur in Group C.   
Another important result from the study is that shareholder resolutions have not been 
initiated by institutional investors. Yang’s research on 267 companies also does not 
report any case of institutional shareholders’ resolution.14 Chapter 9 will apply the 
activism model to explain institutional shareholder passivity in this regard,   
Nevertheless, there has been one reported case in which institutional shareholders 
submitted a proposal to address the corporate governance issue of their concern. This 
case happened in Vanke (listing code: 000002) at the 2004 AGM.15 The following part 
provides a snapshot of this company and explores how institutional shareholders 
exercised their rights to engage in the companies’ affairs.  
8.3.7 Vanke Case 
Vanke is the largest listed real estate developer in the Chinese securities market. It 
also has high reputation for good corporate governance. Although under research 
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, Vanke is not ranked in the top 
ten Chinese listed companies with good corporate governance, it was awarded ‘The 
best corporate governance’ in China by Investors Relations Magazine, Aisamoney 
Magazine and The Asset Magazine.16 It has attracted a large amount of institutional 
investment. According to the data provided in its self-assessment report, institutional 
holdings often accounted for more than 50% of its total tradable assets.17 Another 
                                                                
14 Yang (n 1) 5. 
15 M Jin, ‘Jijin Gaodiao Banyan ‘Jiji Touzizhe’ [Funds acted as ‘Active investors] (9 May 2005) 
Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao [China Securities News]. 
16 Information comes from Self-assessment report of Vanke on corporate governance. 
17 Ibid. 
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 notable feature of this company is that in comparison with many other listed 
companies in China, the share ownership is much less concentrated. The largest 
shareholder-Huarun company – only controlled about 13% of total shares of Vanke 
company.  
In this case, the issue in question was the provision of a guarantee by Vanke to a 
related-party. Guarantees for related-parties often dominate shareholders’ concern on 
investee companies since as mentioned earlier, corporate guarantee is frequently used 
by the majority shareholder to exploit minority shareholders. At the shareholders’ 
meeting, the board of China Vanke proposed to alter a provision of Vanke’s articles of 
company’s association as regards the proportion limits on guarantees for risk 
investment and asset mortgages. If the proposed amendment was passed, the 
thresholds for the amount of corporate guarantee would be calculated on the basis of 
the company’s total assets. After the board’s proposal was announced, 23 funds, 
managed by three fund management companies, Huaxia, Boshi and Nanfang, 
representing 12.83% of Vanke’s tradable shares, voiced their dissatisfaction with the 
board’s recommendation. They presented a proposal at the meeting that the thresholds 
should be calculated on the basis of company’s net assets instead of total assets, which 
suggested a tighter threshold over the provision of guarantee. The funds’ proposal was 
passed with the approval of majority shareholders. 
8.4 Proxy Voting  
8.4.1 Proxy Voting Rules 
Prior to the shareholders’ meeting, a notice of meeting shall be given to every 
shareholder 20 days in advance of an AGM, and 15 days in advance of an EGM. A 
shareholder can be physically present in the meeting or appoint a proxy voting on his 
324 
 
 behalf.18 
The default voting system is one-share, one-vote. A resolution can be passed with the 
approval of more than half of voting rights.19 A two-thirds majority of the voting 
rights in the company is required to approve fundamental changes, such as the 
modification of the article of association, mergers and dissolution.20 
In particular, a cumulative voting mechanism is allowed in Chinese listed companies 
for shareholders to elect directors or supervisors.21 In cases where cumulative voting 
is applied, shareholders can multiply their votes by the number of directors and 
supervisors to be elected and can cast all their votes for a single nominee for the board 
of directors when the company has multiple candidates on its board.22 For example, if 
an election is for five directors and a shareholder holds 100 votes, under a straight 
voting system, he has a maximum of 100 shares for any one nominee (500 vote total, 
100 votes for each of the five nominees). With cumulative voting, he could cast all 
500 for one candidate, 250 each to two candidates, or otherwise divided whichever 
way they choose. Cumulative voting has significant implications for institutional 
shareholder activism and Chapter 9 will return to this point. 
In respect of the use of electronic voting, while not explicitly mentioned in the CL 
2005, it was encouraged in the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
(Chinese Code). The Chinese Code encourages listed companies to ‘make every effort, 
including fully utilizing modern information technology means, to increase the 
number of shareholders attending the shareholders’ meeting.’23 
                                                                
18 CL 2005 s 103. 
19 CL 2005 s 104. 
20 Ibid. 
21 CL 2005 s 106. 
22 CL 2005 s 106. 
23 Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies s 1 (2). 
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 8.4.2 Voting Level 
The study of shareholder voting covers 120 shareholders’ meetings conducted at 30 
companies over the 2007-2008 sample period.  
8.4.2.1 Aggregate Analysis 
On average, the study finds that the voting level at the shareholders’ meetings in the 
sample was around 60.49%. This result is higher than that of prior work conducted by 
Yang, in which he observed the average voting level in the 2002-2003 financial year 
was around 56.79% in 267 Chinese listed companies.24 
Table 8.15 Voting level and shareholder attendance in the sample 
 No of 
meetings 
Mean Median Min Max 
Voting 
Level 
117 60.49% 60.55% 19.08% 86.49%
Number of 
shareholders 
attended 
117 273 24 2 9,731 
There are a number of likely contributory reasons for this difference. First, the 
increased level of voting is perhaps fueled by the use of electronic voting in some 
shareholders’ meeting.25 At the time when Yang conducted his study, electronic 
voting system was not introduced into Chinese shareholders’ meetings. In my sample, 
some companies had adopted electronic means, providing shareholders with a cheap 
and convenient way to cast their shares, and thus promoted a higher level of 
                                                                
18 J Z Yang, 'Shareholder meetings and voting rights in China: some empirical evidence' (2007) 18 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 4, 10.  
25 Electronic voting will be introduced in the section below 8.4.3. 
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 shareholder participation in voting. For example, in one company, the average voting 
level hit 73.88% when internet voting was provided, around 21% higher than meeting 
when shareholders or proxies had to be present in person. Second, the companies 
selected in the sample are companies evaluated as having good corporate governance 
practice or large institutional holdings, suggesting that they may have greater chance 
to encourage more shareholders’ participation. The last possible reason is that the 
Government’s increased efforts as mentioned above at improving corporate 
governance practice have raised the level of shareholders’ engagement. 
Generally, the voting levels in the sample appear to be quite close to that of UK listed 
companies. However, voting levels are positively connected to the share concentration 
level of a company. A high concentration ownership structure would result in high 
voting levels but represent few shareholders in number. For example, suppose in a 
company, 60% of the total shares are controlled in the hand of the largest shareholder, 
a single presence of this largest shareholder could hit the voting level of shareholders’ 
meeting to 60%.  
Indeed, looking more carefully at the data provided, the median attendance of the 
AGM is about 24 people, which means nearly half of the meetings conducted in the 
sample having less than 24 people voting in the meeting. This result reflects the fact 
that voting levels in the sample might be much lower if the votes from the controlling 
shareholders are excluded. Therefore, the institutional shareholder participation in the 
sample is typically far less than its counterpart in the UK, where voting levels largely 
depend on institutional shareholders’ involvement.  
The study could present a more desirable result if the votes cast by the largest 
shareholders can be separated from institutional investors and individual investors. 
However, subject to insufficient data, it is only possible to investigate the level of 
minority shareholders’ participation in companies where the share concentration 
levels exceed 50%. In this type of company, any voting level above 50% is impossible 
to be achieved in the absence of the largest shareholder’ participation. Therefore, if 
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 the overall voting level deducts the largest shareholder’s shares, the result is the 
minority shareholders’ voting level. However, this method can not be applied in 
companies where the largest shareholder’ holding is less than 50%. This is because 
one cannot exclude the chance that he might not have attended the meeting even if the 
voting level larger than 50%. In the absence of the largest shareholder’s votes, even 
though the possibility is tiny, the voting level might be produced by the remaining 
minority investors. 
Of all 30 companies, 14 companies have dominant ownership structures with the 
largest shareholders owning 50% or above of total equities. After excluding the 
largest shareholders’ votes, the study finds that over the sample period, the average 
voting levels in those companies were around 7.02%, suggesting that 17% of the 
remaining shareholders cast their votes. The voting levels in those companies turn out 
to be dramatically lower than previous data when large shareholders’ votes were 
counted in.  
The section below divides data obtained by Group, so as to explore whether 
institutional investors’ passivity or retail investors’ passivity attributed to low voting 
levels in companies.   
8.4.2.2 Analysis by Group 
As Table 8.16 shows, the voting level in Group B (70.96%) is nearly 15% higher than 
that of both Group A (55.96%) and Group C (54.55%). Group A also presents a 
higher voting level than the Group C, however, the different is not as significant as 
between Group B and the other two groups. 
Table 8.16 Voting level by Group 
Group Mean% Median% Min% Max% 
A 55.96 55.42 33.53 70.45 
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 B 70.96 74.79 44.46 86.49 
C 54.55 54.97 19.08 67.28 
Table 8.17 Attendance of shareholders by Group 
Group 
No of 
meetings 
Mean Median Min Max 
A 43 509 25 5 9,731 
B 31 215 33 5 1,845 
C 43 77 13 2 961 
However, as discussed earlier, since the voting level could be significantly associated 
with a company’s concentration level, it is necessary to conduct a more in-depth 
analysis to distinguish shareholder attendances between companies with different 
share concentration level.  
The study divides companies into three categories according to the size of the largest 
shareholder. There are (1) companies with the largest shareholding between 1-30%; (2) 
companies with the largest shareholding between 31-50%; and (3) companies with the 
largest shareholding above 50%. The number of each category in three groups and 
their average voting levels are presented in Table 8.18. 
Table 8.18 Voting level by the concentration level 
Group 
1-30% 30-50% 50%-Above 
No of 
companies 
Voting 
level 
No of 
companies 
Voting 
Level 
No of 
companies 
Voting 
Level 
A 6 55.44% 2 59.55% 2 55.42% 
B 3 57.68% 1 56.17% 6 80.06% 
C 2 35.74% 2 51.35% 6 62.01% 
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 Two points are noteworthy. Firstly, the voting levels in each group increase as the 
concentration levels increase, although this trend is not followed in all cases. This 
trend is particularly obvious in Group B, in which the level in the third category is 
nearly 24% higher than the first and second categories. A similar sharp difference in 
voting levels have also been seen in the Group C: the voting level has risen by 27% to 
62.01% when the concentration level in those companies exceeds 50%.  
In contrast, the voting level in Group A remains steady when the holdings of the 
largest shareholder rise. We can even observe a slight drop in respect of voting levels 
when share concentration in Group A is over 50%. 
Second, notably, the voting levels in both Group A and Group B are much higher than 
of Group C. This disparity is sharp in the first categories when companies have less 
dominant share owner structure. 
Table 8.19 presents the average concentration level and voting levels after excluding 
the largest shareholders’ votes in the sample companies in which the largest 
shareholdings exceed 50%. 
Table 8.19 Voting by minority shareholders in companies with over 50% of largest 
shareholding 
Group Average largest shareholding Voting level by minority shareholders
A 53.40% 4.02% 
B 66.73% 13.39% 
C 58.35% 3.66% 
Another apparent point is that despite shareholdings in companies in Group B are 
much more concentrated, its voting level is still notably higher.  
In addition to the above findings, a point worth noting here is the discrepancy with 
regard to voting levels between the three companies with high corporate governance 
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 rankings and the rest companies in Group A. An average of 64.57% of the total votes 
in those three companies was cast, while a lower level – 52.25% – was found in the 
other companies.  
8.4.3 Electronic Voting 
8.4.3.1 Aggregate Analysis 
As discussed earlier, electronic voting is key to a more efficient voting system. It 
provides shareholders with a cheap and convenient channel to cast their votes at the 
shareholders’ meetings. The benefit of electronic voting has been well recognized by 
Chinese authorities, as reflected in the Chinese Code and the Provisions on 
Strengthening the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders, where electronic voting 
are advocated for listed companies.26  
Is this mechanism widely adopted in Chinese listed companies? The study analyzes 
relevant data and finds that the actual utilization of electronic voting system in the 
sample studies is quite low.  
Only 14 out of 117 meetings in 9 companies were provided with internet voting to 
shareholders over the 2007 and 2008 sample period. There is an absence of data in the 
sample companies regarding which types of shareholder have voted their shares 
electronically. However, it has been reported in Securities News that since the 
introduction of electronic voting, in majority electronic voting events, institutional 
shareholders were found to be the main participants.27  
Although electronic voting has only been adopted in a few cases, its positive influence 
on increasing shareholders’ participation is obvious. Table 8.20 reports the voting 
level of meetings that applied electronic voting.  
                                                                
26 Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies s 8, The Provisions on Strengthening the Rights 
and Interests of Public Shareholders, issued by the CSRC in December 2004, s 5 (2). 
27 P Wan (n 2).  
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 Table 8.20 Voting level at the meetings when electronic voting was provided 
 Mean Median Min Max 
Voting Level 65.69% 69.11% 35.68% 84.70% 
Attendance of 
shareholders 
2036 746 196 9,737 
Compared with Table 8.15, it is obvious that both the voting level and number of 
shareholders are higher when electronic voting system was adopted. Notably, the 
mean number of shareholders attending the meetings was nearly 10 times higher.  
8.4.2.2 Analysis by Group 
Table 8.20 separates the above aggregate result by Group. It shows that Group C 
appears to achieve the highest voting level of all Groups. However, interestingly, in 
terms of attendance of meetings, the number in Group C is about 5 times lower than 
that of Group A. The results therefore, seem inconsistent. The most likely contributory 
reason is the discrepant concentration level of share ownership between Group C and 
Group A.  
Of the three companies in Group C, two of them have largest shareholders controlling 
around 60% of total equity, while in both Groups A and B, even the highest 
concentration level of share ownership is less than 40%. It is not surprising, therefore, 
in spite of less shareholders’ participation, the voting level in companies with larger 
concentration ownership level is higher than that of others.  
Table 8.21 Voting level at the meetings when electronic voting was provided by 
Group 
Group 
 
No of 
companies 
Voting Level % Attendance of shareholders 
Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max
A 4 66.32 69.57 35.68 84.70 3427 743 196 9,737
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 B 2 61.47 59.48 51.05 73.88 643 740 277 911 
C 3 68.65 70.95 61.73 73.28 648 751 231 961 
8.4.4 Voting Substance 
Among the three voting choices provided by Chinese listed companies: for, against or 
abstain, voting in favor of resolutions prevailed in most shareholders meetings. Of all 
117 meetings, resolutions in 110 meetings received more than 90% support. As Table 
8.22 suggests, on average, voting level against the resolutions at the AGM is around 
1.5%. In Tang’ research, in a sample of 267 companies, there were only eight cases in 
five companies , where the resolutions were rejected at the shareholders’ meetings.28 
Table 8.22 Voting level opposing resolution at the meetings 
 
No of 
companies 
Mean (%) Median (%) Min (%) Max (%) 
Voting 
level 
against 
resolution 
at the 
meetings 
 
30 
 
 
2.31 
 
 
1.5 
 
 
0 
 
 
68 
Only in 3 cases in one company (Listing Code: 000792) were the board of directors’ 
proposals defeated at the shareholders’ meeting. These three resolutions, concerning 
related-party transactions, failed to pass at the 2008 EGM by 68.50% opposing votes. 
At that time when this meeting was held, relevant data suggested the amount of 
shareholding owned by investment funds accounted for nearly 67% of all tradable 
                                                                
28 Yang (n 1) 11. 
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 shares. 29  Among top ten tradable shareholders, which were all found to be 
institutional investors, 9 institutions voted against these three proposals. Despite the 
difficulty to trace how other institutions cast their votes, the high opposing level is 
unlikely to be achieved without institutional investors’ effort given the large 
institutional shareholdings.  
With regard to issues that are most likely to trigger opposition from shareholders in 
the meetings, related-party transactions top the list of meeting issues in the sample 
companies. Proposals concerning changing companies’ audit firms, dividend policies 
and new share schemes also attracted opposing votes. In Tang’s study, directors’ 
remuneration and election of directors are also issues that are more likely to be 
disagreed by shareholders.30   
8.4.5 Conclusion from Data Analysis 
The analysis undertaken in this section finds that the average voting level in the 
sample is similar to the UK counterpart. However, the attendance and voting level are 
largely decided by the large shareholders, rather than institutional shareholders, as 
observed in the UK.  
The study also finds that electronic voting system played a significant role in helping 
increase shareholders’ engagement. Companies that adopted electronic voting have 
seen much higher voting levels and attendance at shareholders’ meetings, particularly 
in Group A. This result implies that institutional shareholders were more willing to 
cast their votes if a convenient voting method was provided.  
The comparative evidence shows that the Group of companies identified as leaders in 
                                                                
29 By the date meeting held, shareholdings by investment funds were 26227 and the total value of 
tradable shares are 39075.  Data available at http://q.stock.sohu.com/cn/000792/jjcc.shtml, accessed 
15 February 16, 2010. 
30 Yang (n 1) 11. 
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 corporate governance have shown higher voting levels at the shareholder meetings 
than the other two Groups. However, interestingly, the average attendance of 
shareholders at the meetings in Group A is higher than the other two Groups. 
Different shareholding structures can partly explain the discrepancy. It is likely that 
more dispersed share structure in Group A results in higher attendance, while in 
Group B, relatively concentrated ownership structure is positively associated with the 
voting levels.  
Compared with Group C, both Groups A and B demonstrate higher voting levels and 
shareholder attendance. This result is consistent with hypothesizes proposed in the 
beginning that large institutional shareholding and good corporate governance 
environment promote shareholder activism.  
8.5 Derivative Action  
8.5.1 Legal Rules 
The shareholder derivative suit was introduced in China for the first time in 2005, in 
Chapter Six of the 2005 CL. It has significant implication for minority shareholder 
protection, for it provides small shareholders with a weapon against insider and 
controlling shareholders abuse in listed companies. According to Section 152, 
shareholders holding 1% singly or collectively may, depending on the circumstances, 
make a demand on the board of directors or the board of supervisors to sue under 
Section 150 of the Company Law, which imposes liability for compensation on any  
    ‘director, supervisor, or senior manager who causes losses to the company by 
violating laws, administrative regulations, or the articles of association during the 
course of performing his duties’.31  
                                                                
31 CL 2005 s 150,152. 
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 If shareholders request the board of directors to bring suit to remedy the alleged harm 
and the company does not bring suit within thirty days, they may bring suit in their 
own name.32 
8.5.2 Empirical Evidence 
Unfortunately, in the sample, there has no reported case of derivative action.  The 
survey conducted by Clarke and Howson also found that derivative suits involving 
listed companies are completely absent by the end of 2009, despite the robust use of it 
in limited liability company.33 
They suggested that this absence of listed companies-related cases is largely 
associated with potential high litigation and transaction costs incurred, which this 
thesis will turn to in Chapter 9.34 Another likely reason is that courts do not accept 
derivative suits in relation to listed companies because of politically sensitivity or 
technically complexity involved. Clarke and Howson pointed out that the local Party 
and state officials have considerable influence over courts mainly through the power 
of appointment and power of budgets.35 Courts will therefore refuse to permit the 
litigation to be proceeded if they confronted interference from local governments or 
related-institutions. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The study selected a total of 30 companies as the sample to explore shareholder 
activism in China. By examining a variety of factors and some extensive statistical 
data, the findings demonstrate that institutional shareholders’ participation in listed 
                                                                
32 CL 2005 s 152. 
33 D Clarke and N Howson, ‘Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China’ in The Prospect of 
Structural Reform of Corporate Legal System (The 21st Century Commercial Law Forum-Tenth 
International Symposium 2010) 190. See discussion in Chapter 9.2.2.1.2. 
34 Ibid, 205. 
35 Ibid, 195. 
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 companies has not, in general, being active. Despite frequent shareholder resolutions 
and relatively high voting levels being seen in the sample, evidence suggests these 
activities were largely attributable to the large shareholders’ involvement, rather than 
that of institutional shareholders. As a result, the shareholders’ meeting, although 
legally it is the ‘organ of the company’, is often simply used by the large shareholders 
to advance their interests. 
In regard to Group comparisons, the analysis undertaken here finds a sharp difference 
between companies having large institutional shareholdings, companies having good 
corporate governance standards and those peers having neither in terms of shareholder 
involvement. In line with the two assumptions put forward in the beginning of this 
chapter, the former two Groups demonstrate more active shareholders’ involvement 
with reference to shareholder resolutions and voting levels in comparison to the last 
group. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect more active institutional shareholder 
engagement in the future in China when institutional shareholding increases and 
corporate governance practices improve in listed companies. Although some 
shareholders activism failed to make changes on corporate behaviors, it is likely that 
company boards will now at least think twice before determining on a course of action 
that may damage the interests of minority shareholders.  
Moreover, the comparative evidence shows that the degree of involvement by 
institutional shareholders in the governance of their portfolio companies has 
sometimes been active and thus, distinguishes their investee companies from those 
with less institutional shareholdings. This finding is significant as it suggests that 
institutional shareholders have the potential to become the major player of corporate 
governance when institutional shareholding gained further popularity. 
In some circumstances, more active shareholders engagement was also seen in 
companies having larger institutional shareholding than those having good corporate 
governance standards. It is important to note here that, large institutional shareholding 
and good corporate governance are not isolated. As indicated by the sample, majority 
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of companies identified as leaders of corporate governance also have attracted much 
institutional investment.  
Overall, the theme that emerges from this analysis is that shareholders’ participation 
in China relies heavily on the controlling shareholders and relatively little on 
institutional shareholders. The following Chapter 9 applies the model set out earlier to 
examine the factors influencing institutional shareholders’ engagement in the 
governance of portfolio companies. 
Chapter 9 Application of the Model in China 
The core method of the thesis adopted to explain shareholder activism is the model of 
activism established in Chapter 1. The model provides a framework showing the 
factors that explain when individual institutional shareholders are likely to engage in 
activism. Recall, it suggests a two-step analysis. The first is to determine whether 
institutional shareholders can overcome the free-riding problem that faces any 
collective action. This thesis proposed four factors that will undermine the likelihood 
of free-riding: the decisiveness of large individual institutional holdings, the 
possibility of concerted action, ‘in process’ benefits and a normative obligation to act. 
Once free-riding can be controlled, the second step proceeds to ask whether that 
shareholder’s gains are greater than its costs. I suggested that the ‘gains’ include the 
shareholder’s share of the total gains to the corporation from the activism, plus any 
individual benefits it secures through its activism. The costs are split up into direct 
costs and indirect costs.  
In applying the model, given limited evidence, it is difficult to work out completely 
how these factors play out in the case of all types of activism. This chapter is 
structured so as to be divided up expressly around different types of activism, as 
Chapter 5 was. Most data available in this chapter relate to shareholder voting and I 
will therefore focus on that form of activism. However, as I proceed, where possible, I 
shall note differences in the way the model might apply to other types of activism.  
9.1 Overcoming Free-riding 
In determining whether free-riding can be overcome, the first two factors – the 
decisiveness of large individual institutional holdings and the possibility of concerted 
action – will apply differently depending on the voting systems adopted at 
shareholders’ meeting. As discussed earlier, Chinese listed companies can adopt a 
usual one-share, one-vote system, or class voting system, or cumulative voting system, 
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determined by certain circumstances stipulated by legislation. The sections below will 
explain how these factors play out in different voting systems. 
9.1.1 Usual Voting: The Decisiveness of Large Individual 
Institutional Holding  
One of the factors which might overcome the free-riding problem is where a 
shareholder’s stake in the company is sufficiently large that the shareholder calculates 
that stake will be decisive in changing corporate behaviors. Is the individual size of an 
institutional investor likely to be big enough to tip the balance? While there is not 
comprehensive data on all Chinese listed companies, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 summarize 
data from the sample. The answer is clear: most individual institutional shareholders 
are unlikely to have a decisive shareholding in their portfolio companies due to the 
presence of large state shareholdings. 
In UK listed companies, with shares widely dispersed, there is some chance of a vote 
being fairly evenly ‘split’ and shareholders with 2 or 3% might sometimes be able to 
tip the balance. However, that is unlikely in Chinese listed companies, when 50% or 
above of the shares are controlled by the largest shareholder, as shown in Table 9.2, in 
half of the sample.  
In the remaining 15 listed companies where the largest shareholding is less than 50%, 
an individual institutional shareholder might have tiny chance to be decisive. 
However, it is highly unlikely, given that the portion of shares held by the largest 
shareholders are still bigger than his.  
Table 9.1 Number of company by the largest individual institutional investor 
The largest individual institutional 
shareholding 
Number of Company 
3% - above 5 
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1-3% 12 
0-1% 13 
Table 9.2 Number of company by the largest shareholder 
The largest shareholding Number of Company 
50% - above 15 
30-50% 4 
1-30% 11 
The low level of individual institutional concentration in a single company is partly 
the product of strict investment restrictions. Institutional investors are often limited in 
how much stock they can own and the percentage of stake they can have in a single 
company. The part below gives a summary of equity portfolio regulations on each 
type of institution in China and then discusses the impact of these rules on 
shareholders activism. 
9.1.1.1 Investment Restriction 
Back in 2000, Caijing, a leading financial magazine in China, published an article 
entitled ‘Inside story of Fund Management Industry’, in which it revealed that many 
fund managers had manipulated the price of their holdings in order to gain unlawful 
short-term profits.1 This report immediately drew public and regulatory attention on 
the booming funds industry. Regulators quickly stepped in to curb the malpractice. 
Since then, the Chinese Government has tightened the control of the securities 
investment funds (SIFs)’ investment in the securities market by laying down strict 
investment limits. 
Under Fund Law, a SIF is not allowed to hold more than 10% of its net assets in the 
                                                              
1 B Naughton, 'The Politics of the Stock Market' (2002) 3 Chinese Leadership Monitor ,4. 
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shares of a single issuer.2 Neither is it permitted to hold more than a total of 10% of 
one company’s share in the fund managed by the same fund manager.3  
For insurance companies, it was not until 2004 that they were allowed to invest in 
equities, and they remain subject to strict regulations. The upper limit for directly 
investing in stock is 20% of total investment value.4 In addition, insurance companies 
are permitted to access to securities market through investing in SIFs. Again, this 
investment channel is restricted. The aggregate investment in SIFs should not exceed 
15%.5  
The pension fund industry in China is still young, and perhaps not surprisingly, it 
faces tight restrictions on stock ownership. For corporate pension funds (CPF), when 
managed by an investment management company, investments in equities, 
investment-type insurance products, and equity funds shall be no more than 30% of 
the fund's net assets, while investments in equities alone shall be no more than 20% of 
net assets.6 When a CPF managed by a single investment manager invests in a stock 
issued by a single company or in a mutual fund, the amount of that investment shall 
not exceed a total share of 5% of said stock or said mutual fund, nor shall exceed 10% 
of total pension fund assets managed by the investment manager.7 
For the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), at least 50% of the NSSF assets must 
be invested in bank deposits and government bonds and among this, no less than 10 
per cent should be invested in the bank deposits. For the remaining assets, no more 
                                                              
2 Fund Law, s 31(1); The same restriction applies in the UK mutual funds, see Chapter 4.1.1.1. 
3 Fund Law, s 31(2). 
4 Provisional Measures on Administration of Operation of Insurance Capital s 16(4). For detailed 
discussion, see Chapter 7.2.2.2.  
5 CIRC, Second Quarterly Press Conference in 2009, ChinaNews, 
 <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/cj-gncj/news/2009/07-31/1798879.shtml> accessed 20 December 
2009.  
6 Interim Measures for the Management of Enterprise Annuities Fund s 47. 
7 Ibid, s 49.  
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than 40 per cent are allowed to be invested in equities. 8  Therefore, securities 
investment must be a minority portion of total assets. 
A Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) is subject to both the investment 
scope and ownership shareholdings. First, the investment scope of QFIIs is limited. A 
QFII can invest in shares(excluding B shares), treasuries, convertible bonds and 
enterprise bonds listed on China's stock exchanges.9 Non-tradable shares and legal 
person shares of listed companies and derivative securities products are off-limits to 
QFIIs. Second, the total percentage of shares held by all QFIIs in a single listed 
company must not exceed 20% of the total shares of that listed company.10 Moreover, 
investment by a single foreign investor through the QFII scheme in a single listed 
company must not exceed 10% of the total shares of that listed company.11 
All in all, these strict investment restrictions mean that an institutional investor could 
only have a small portion of its assets in a single stock. As in the UK, the main 
purpose of these portfolio regulations is to help institutions maintain a diversified 
portfolio to limit the exposure of risks resulted from a large block in a single stock.12 
Another specific concern of Chinese policymakers is to prevent fund manager holding 
a large stake in a company from manipulating its share price. Prior to the split share 
structure reform, given that tradable shares only account for one-third of all 
outstanding shares, market abuse was threatening since a holding of 10% of a 
company’s shares by a fund manager may actually hold one-third of tradable share, 
enabling the fund manager to engage in speculative trading to manipulate the stock 
market. 
As we have already seen, portfolio regulation can also be found in the UK. What 
differentiates China’s situation is that institutional shareholders are permitted to invest 
                                                              
8 Interim Provisions on Administration of NSSF Investment s 28. 
9 Notice on the Implementing of Provisional measures on Administration of QFIIs s 9. 
10 Ibid, s 10. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See Chapter 4.1.1.1. 
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only a certain percentage of their total assets in the securities market. Under such 
restrictions, an institutional shareholder is not only limited in how much stock he can 
own in a single company as in the UK counterpart, but also the collective 
shareholdings of institutional shareholders are limited.  
Admittedly, such regulations enabled the Government to curb market abuse and thus 
played an effective role in the nascent development of Chinese securities market. With 
the ongoing non-tradable reform, coupled with the robust development of institutional 
investment, the extent of the regulatory control is an issue of concern for future 
development. The hope for institutional shareholders to play a role in corporate 
governance relies heavily on their increasingly large shareholdings, and if their 
growth is limited, it is less likely for them to overcome the problems associated with 
concentrated state ownership as discussed in section 9.1.1.  
9.1.2 Usual Voting: The Possibility of Concerted Action 
Is, then, concerted action among institutional investors sufficient to ‘tip the balance’? 
As said, in the Chinese context, this not only depends on the size of collective 
institutional share ownership, but also the size of the largest shareholder given the 
concentrated-share ownership.13 The larger the institutional share ownership and the 
smaller the largest shareholding, the greater the chance they can collectively 
counterbalance the incumbent management.  
The discussion of the likelihood of concerted action in the sample companies will be 
divided into two parts, depending on the size of the largest shareholders. First, for the 
15 companies where 50% or above of shares are concentrated in the hand of the 
largest shareholder (see Table 9.2), even if it were feasible to form an alliance 
comprising all institutional shareholders in the company, still the concerted action 
would not make a difference to the voting outcomes. The cases of ZTE, and of China 
                                                              
13 The shareholding disclosure rule, which will be discussed in section 9.2.2.2.2 as a source of indirect 
costs of activism, is also relevant to discussing the concerted action.  
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Merchants Bank, in the following section will illustrate well this point. 
Second, we will turn to discuss the possibility of concerted action in the remaining 15 
companies. Table 9.3 shows that in the majority of 15 companies, the institutional 
share ownership accounts for more than 10% of the total shareholding, with 5 
companies having a collective institutional shareholding of more than 20%. However, 
none of these companies has an institutional ownership holding more than 30% of the 
total equity. These data indicate that, even if all institutional shareholders can 
explicitly agree with others that each will join in an action, together they do not have 
enough votes to tip the balance unless they can persuade a sufficient number of retail 
investors to do likewise. 
 
Table 9.3 Number of Companies by the per cent of institutional shareholding  
 
Institutional shareholding (% of total shares) Number of Companies 
20-30% 5 
10-20% 8 
0-10% 2 
Comparatively, the possibility of concerted action is much higher in the UK than in 
China. Owing to the higher level of concentrated institutional ownership, fewer 
shareholders need to agree to act together in order to constitute a decisive block of 
shares in the UK.  
9.1.2.1 Cases: ZTE and China Merchants Bank 
The ZTE case has been widely seen as the example to demonstrate the weakness of 
institutional shareholders under a concentrated state ownership system. In July 2002, 
the board of ZTE Co., one of the largest listed telecoms manufacturers, announced a 
proposal to offer shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). It was believed 
that the H-shares’ low price-earnings would drag down the price of the companies’ 
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A-shares.14 The potential negative impact on the A-share holders incurred widespread 
anger among institutional investors.  
Private meetings and public rows between ZTE and funds failed to force the company 
to withdraw the plan. At the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting, 113 shareholders 
were present, aggregately representing 66% of the total stakes. Eleven fund 
companies, holding 12.77% of the company’s shares, voted against the proposal at the 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting, arguing that A-share holders’ interests will be 
diluted by the dual listing on the HKSE. However, the proposal was easily passed 
with the support of the largest shareholder, Zhongxingxin Company, a state-controlled 
enterprise, holding 52.85% of the shares of ZTE. This case demonstrates clearly the 
powerless of institutional shareholder coalitions in Chinese listed companies with 
concentrated share ownership. 
The plan was eventually aborted under market pressure despite having gained success 
in the meeting. Frustrated institutional investors dumped their shares after the failed 
battle and consequently prompted a sharp drop in the company’s share price. 
A second eye-catching case is that of China Merchants Bank and its issue of RMB 10 
billion worth of convertible bonds.15 China Merchant Bank is one of the biggest listed 
banks in China with a large institutional shareholding – more than 25% of the existing 
tradable shares were held by 53 funds. After the plan was released at the bank’s 2003 
interim performance report meeting, fund managers furiously opposed it arguing that 
it would dilute their interests. Some decided to exit, selling shares, prompting a sharp 
drop in the company’s share price. Many publicly criticized the company’ plan as a 
method to expropriate the interests of tradable shareholders, and some proposed 
alternative fund-raising schemes. However, the bank refused to compromise and 
                                                              
14 J Zhao et al., ‘Zhong JIjin Nanban Zhongxing Tongxun’[Funds Unable to Win in ZTE?] (16 August 
2003) Guoji Jinrong Bao [International Finance News].  
15  P Wang, ‘Jijin Fandui Zhaohang Faxing Baiyi Kezhuanzai Rongzi’[Funds Disagreed China 
Merchant Bank’s Bond Offer Plan]Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao [Chinese Securities Journal], September 
29, 2003. 
346 
 
placed the plan before the votes. Eight funds, representing more than 20% of the 
tradable shareholder (or 5% of total shares) voted against the board.16 However, it 
was virtually impossible for them to win despite forming an alliance due to 75% of 
the bank’s shares being non-tradable shares and not surprisingly, the proposal 
survived with a majority supporting vote. 
To sum up, although fund managers dissatisfied with corporate behaviour chose 
‘voice’, rather than ‘exit’, they lost their cases and this is likely to continue to happen 
so long as large blocks of shares remain non-tradable or highly concentrated.  
9.1.3 Unusual Voting System 
The two factors – the decisiveness of individual votes and the possibility of concerted 
action – will become much more significant when the power of the large shareholder 
is restricted under a class voting system or cumulative voting system. 
9.1.3.1 Class Voting System 
One of the effective ways to mitigate the influence of the dominant non-tradable 
shareholders is to adopt a class voting system. It allows tradable shareholders to 
decide matters on shareholders’ meetings by disenfranchising the non-tradable 
shareholders’ votes.  
9.1.3.1.1 Regulation of Class Voting System 
The class voting rule has first been seen in a regulation concerning cash offers in 
Chinese listed companies. Cash offer is a method adopted by listed companies when 
they wish to raise further capital from the public after an IPO. It is, however, widely 
considered as a means of expropriation of minority shareholders by overreaching 
majorities since the new cash offer would restructure the interests of current tradable 
                                                              
16 J Wang, ‘Zhaohang yu Jijin: Gudong Dahui Shang Doufa’[Merchant Bank & Funds: Contest at the 
Shareholders’ Meetings] (16 October 2003) Zhengquan Shibao [Securities Times].  
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shareholders. Consequently, announcements of a cash offer by a company could often 
shake the confidence of investors in the company and cause a sharp drop in share 
price. To stabalise the financial market, the CSRC issued Relevant Requirements for 
Listed Companies’ Cash Offer of New Shares (2002 Cash Offer Regulation) to 
regulate cash offer.17 One of the key rules under the 2002 Cash Offer Regulation is 
that if the new shares issued exceed 20% of the company’s existing total shares, the 
offering proposal must obtain approval from tradable shareholders at the shareholders’ 
meetings.  
Clearly, tradable shareholders' role in significant corporate decision-making will be 
enhanced under this separate voting system. However, it falls short of practical 
applicability. Again, here considers the ZTE and China Merchants Bank cases. The 
controversial issue in both cases was cash offers, however, neither applied the split 
voting system, although they both happened after the promulgation of 2002 Cash 
Offer Regulation. The CSRC denied the request from funds for the application of the 
regulation to the proposals, ruling on the grounds that (1) in ZTE case, the Regulation 
only applies to the cash offers in the domestic market, moreover, the amount of new 
shares (18% of the understanding shares) issued in the proposal has not reached the 
trigger point of 20%; (2) in China Merchant Bank case, the Regulation does not apply 
to convertible issue.  
These two cases reflect two important problems with the 2002 Cash Offer Regulation. 
First, the application of the class voting system is limited to cash offer and therefore, 
denies its access to other significant corporate issues which are all critically important 
to the interests of tradable shareholders. Secondly, the board of listed companies could 
take advantage of the 20% minimum rule to deliberately set the amount of cash offer 
along the bottom line, where the rejection of the rule would be almost a certainty. In 
consequence, the 2002 Cash Offer Regulation did not work as expected to restrain the 
                                                              
17 Relevant Requirements for Listed Companies’ Cash Offer of New Shares] issued by the CSRD on 
July 24, 2002. 
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power of controlling shareholders in shareholders’ meeting. 
In recognition of these shortcomings, new rules regarding the application of class 
voting system eventually came in 2004 Minority Shareholder Protection Provision 
(MSP Provision) which was issued by the CSRC.18 The MSP Provision has expanded 
the applicable scope of the class voting system, providing that major corporate 
matters such as cash offers, convertible bonds, significant assets restructuring, and 
overseas listing of subsidiaries should all win majority votes from holders of 
tradable-shares present in the general shareholders meeting.19 
However, it does not come without problems. These problems may, if left 
unaddressed, have a significant impact on the efficacy of the separate voting system.  
First, the workability of these rules is in serious doubt due to the lack of detailed and 
functional provisions. For example, the MSP Provision provides no useful guidance as 
to what issues would fall into the category of ‘major corporate matters’ and how the 
conditions operate. The second problem lies in the unclear legal remedy. If tradable 
shareholders disagree with decisions made by the board, as to what remedy they 
would seek to protect their legitimate rights, the MSP Provision set no guidance. Thus, 
although the separate voting system will help institutional shareholders exert a greater 
say in governance, the applicability of this is in need of further explanations from 
regulators. 
9.1.3.1.2 Applying the Decisiveness of Individual Shareholdings and the 
Possibility of Concerted Action under the Class Voting 
A class voting system offers institutional shareholders a good opportunity to be 
decisive in companies where non-tradable shares are high. In the sample, as shown in 
Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3, shares in 20 companies are not fully circulated in securities 
                                                              
18 Provisions on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the General Public 
Shareholders, issued on December 7, 2004 by the CSRC. 
19 Ibid, s 1.  
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market.20 Among them, 10 companies have a restricted shareholding accounting for 
nearly 50% or above of total equity, held by the state as the largest shareholder. When 
non-tradable votes are excluded in these companies, the ability of individual 
institutional shareholder is significantly enhanced. For example, if an institutional 
investor holds 3% of total equity in a company where 50% of equity is restricted to 
the public, a class voting system will enable him to control 6% of total shares at 
shareholders’ meeting. Hence, the decisiveness of the individual shareholding is 
obviously stronger with a class voting system than a normal voting system. 
Using a class voting system will also increase the possibility of concerted action. That 
is because, first, a coalition will make a difference on the outcome when the largest 
shareholder’s votes are abstained at meetings, and secondly, the fewer institutional 
shareholders need to agree to act together in order to constitute a decisive block of 
shares. Take the Luzhou Laojiao (Listing Code: 000568) as an example. Under usual 
voting system, even if it is practical for all institutional shareholders to form a 
coalition, it is meaningless since the coalition cannot determine the voting outcome 
due to presence of large non-tradable shareholding. However, when non-tradable 
votes are excluded at AGMs under a class voting system, votes collectively controlled 
by institutions will increase from 21.29% to 41.50%, which makes the coalition 
decisive. 
An important point to make here is that the facilitating role of the class voting system 
will be restrained when concentrated shares are not non-tradable (as the class voting 
only exclude non-tradable shareholders’ votes not the largest shareholders’ votes). 
This issue has to be addressed by gradually reducing state-owned shares and it will be 
discussed in Chapter 10. 
9.1.3.2 Cumulative Voting 
9.1.3.2.1 Introduction 
                                                              
20 See Chapter 4.1.1.1. 
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Enabling listed companies to adopt cumulative voting is another method to increase 
the power of institutional shareholders in concentrated share ownership companies.21 
A cumulative voting system, as described by section 106 of Company Law (CL 2005), 
allows a shareholder to multiply his votes by the number of directors and supervisors 
to be elected and to cast all his votes in favor of one candidate for director or 
supervisor or distribute his votes among all candidates.22 Before turning to discuss the 
implications of the cumulative voting system for institutional shareholder activism, it 
is illustrative to give a brief account of its development. 
The cumulative voting system originated from Britain but in practice it was more 
widely adopted and attracted more attention in America. It has experienced a rise and 
fall history.23 This system first spread rapidly in the late 19th century in many 
American States. At that time, the majority of these states adopted mandatory 
cumulative voting, only a small group of states added cumulative voting in a 
permissive form.24 The benefits of such system, as suggested by Bhagat and Brickley 
is that it gives minority shareholders a chance to select their representation on the 
company board, to affect board and management and may reduce agency costs.25 
Gordon further argued that cumulative voting would probably increase the 
shareholders’ welfare in large companies in cases when corporate control is active.26 
However, a range of criticisms have been leveled against it. One is that a board 
elected under cumulative voting may be less effective than a board elected on ‘a 
                                                              
21 For a good discussion of how cumulative voting can be beneficial in corporations, see generally, B 
Black and R Kraakman, 'A Self-enforcing Model of Corporate Law' (1994) 109 Harvard Law Review 
1911. 
22 CL 2005 s 106. And also see the discussion in Chapter 8.4.1. 
23 D Sun, ‘Cumulative Voting’ (2008) 8 Knowledge Economy 32 (In Chinese), 35.  
24 J Gordon, 'Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting' (1994) 94 
Columbia Law Review 124, 142-46. 
25 S Bhagat and J Brickley, 'Cumulative Voting: the Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights ' 
(1984) 27 Journal of Law and Economics 339. 
26 Gordon (n 24) 129. 
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winner-take-all basis’. 27  In addition, cumulative voting may reduce the large 
shareholders’ willingness to participate in corporate governance.28  
Due to these considerations, since the early 1970s, many US States began moving 
away from a mandatory to a permissive regime.29  No important corporate law 
jurisdiction now continued to adopt mandatory cumulative voting. The legal practice 
of other countries, for example, Japan and South Korea also adopted a permissive 
cumulative voting system.30 
The rise and fall of cumulative voting in the US cast doubt whether its benefits would 
outweigh the costs. The thesis argues that the impact of cumulative voting is 
dependent on, and varies with, the shareholding structure of a corporation. As 
discussed later, under some circumstances, the cumulative voting can be an effective 
instrument for institutional investors to enhance their ability to elect representatives 
on the board.  
9.1.3.2.2 Legal Framework for Cumulative Voting  
Provisions for cumulative voting existed prior to the revised company law. The Code 
of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (Chinese Code) had first stipulated 
rule on the cumulative voting system as a means of fully reflecting the views of 
minority shareholders. Listed companies that have a controlling shareholder holding 
over 30% of the shares were required to adopt a cumulative voting system in 
shareholders’ meeting for election of director, and companies that did not adopt the 
cumulative system should stipulate the implementing rules of this system in the 
articles of association.31 The 2004 Minority Shareholder Protection Provision further 
encouraged companies to adopt cumulative voting for the selection of directors and 
                                                              
27 See views summarised in Black and Kraakman Black and Kraakman, (n 21) 1949. 
28 Gordon (n 24) 126. 
29 But Professor Gordon attributes the decline of this system primarily to the political power 
of incumbent managers who wanted to make proxy contests more difficult, see Gordon (n 24) 153. 
30 Sun (n 23). 
31 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies s 31. 
352 
 
supervisors.32  
Cumulative voting has now been codified in the revised CL 2005, giving it a more 
formal legal background for better enforcement. Section 106 adopts a permissive 
regime to enable public companies to choose whether to adopt a cumulative voting 
method in the election of directors and supervisors. However, whereas the CL 2005 
applies a permissive regime, the requirement laid down by the Chinese Code that 
listed company with controlling shareholders holding more than 30% of the shares 
should adopt cumulative voting systems is also mandatory in nature. In theory, as 
explained in Chapter 6 concerning legislation hierarchy, company law formulated by 
the State Council has higher authority than the Chinese Code issued by the CSRC. In 
practice, however, there are no public disputes raised in respect of the application of 
the cumulative voting system. In the sample, 17 of 30 listed companies have adopted 
in their articles of association or have used cumulative voting to elect directors at the 
shareholders’ meeting, which roughly corresponds to the number of companies where 
the largest shareholding accounts for more than 30% of the total equity shares.   
9.1.3.2.3 Applying the Decisiveness of Individual Shareholding and the 
Possibility of Concerted Action under the Cumulative Voting 
The likelihood of overcoming free-riding via the decisiveness of individual 
shareholdings and through concerted action would be increased in cases where 
cumulative voting is adopted, in particular the latter factor. However, as one will see 
later, the impact of cumulative voting is dependent on, and varies with, the size of 
institutional shareholding and the number of directors to be elected.  
Suppose a company which comprises of 10 shareholders is to elect 5 directors. The 
largest shareholder A owns 510 shares, which account for 51% of the total shares and 
the other 9 shareholders own 490 shares, which account for 49% of the total shares. If 
                                                              
32 Provisions on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the General Public 
Shareholders s 1 (4).  
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it is estimated that the entire 1,000 shares will be voted, under the straight voting each 
shareholder is entitled to cast votes equal to the number of shares held. A controls 510 
shares and can decide the composition of the board and the other 9 shareholders have 
no say. However, with cumulative voting, the number of votes given a shareholder 
equals the number of shares times the number of candidate directors. Thus, the total 
vote number becomes 5,000,33 and among these shares, A owns 2,250 votes, the other 
9 shareholders own 2,450 shares. The cumulative voting enables a shareholder to cast 
all his votes to one single candidate or votes for more than one candidate. If all the 9 
minority shareholders could cumulate their shares together to vote for certain 
candidates, they can at least elect two directors even if A vote against them. Under 
this situation, A can only elect up to 3 directors.  
The above example reveals that cumulative voting could strengthen the ability of 
minority shareholders to negotiate over the board composition by cumulating their 
shares together for one or more candidates. However, it will not benefit all 
shareholders to win a board seat for them, but only those that own a certain 
percentage of shares alone or together with others. Therefore, as suggested by Vittas 
and Gordon, it becomes the most powerful tool for allowing institutional shareholders 
to elect directors that are truly independent and to play an active role in protecting the 
interests of minority investors.34  
Moreover, whether institutional shareholders’ block of shares is decisive depends on 
the number of directors to be elected. The larger number of directors proposed in the 
shareholders’ meeting, the larger chance for minority shareholders to win a board seat.  
By law, the Chinese board of directors can consist of 5 to 19 directors elected by the 
                                                              
33 1000 shares multiple the number of directors to be elected, in this case, is five.  
34  D Vittas, 'Institutional Investors and Securities Markets: Which Comes First?' (1998) Paper 
presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics Latin American and Caribbean 
Conference, June 28–30, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 15; Gordon, Institutions as Relational 
Investors (n 24), 170-74 (describing the value of cumulative voting in overcoming the rational apathy 
of institutional investors). 
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shareholders’ meeting.35 Previous studies suggested that the average size of the board 
in top 100 Chinese listed companies is 11, which indicates that only shareholders 
individually or collectively hold 9.09% or more of shares have the possibility to win a 
seat in the board.36  
In the sample, as we have seen, none of the largest institutional shareholder can 
individually reach that threshold. The success to elect a director through cumulative 
voting therefore relies on whether a coalition could constitute 9.09% or above of the 
total shares. It is worth nothing here that the size of the individual shareholding is still 
clearly relevant to the practicality of such coalitions because it could determine the 
number of shareholders that have to get involved. In the sample, Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 
8.3 show that there is a total of 14 companies where institutional shareholder 
ownership accounts for more than 11.44% of the total equity. As previously analyzed, 
only in these 14 companies can cumulative voting work as an effective tool to allow 
institutional shareholders to determine the position of a director.  
Presumably, it will be more difficult for minority shareholders to elect supervisors of 
board by using cumulative voting, mainly because the size of supervisor’s board is 
much smaller than board of directors – only 4.95 in top 100 Chinese listed 
companies.37 Another reason is that nearly one-third of supervisor board must be 
elected by employees, and the rest are open for shareholders.38 In 2007, about 36.97% 
of members of supervisor board are represented by employees in the top 100 Chinese 
listed companies. 39  Unfortunately, we lack good data on how institutional 
shareholders make use of the cumulative voting.  
Two additional important points in regard to the cumulative voting system should be 
                                                              
35 CL 2005 s 107. 
36 Institute of world economic and political in Chinese Academy of social science, 2009 nia Zhongguo 
Shangshi Gongsi 100 qiang gongsi zhili pInjia [Corporate Governance Assessment Report on the Top 
100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2008] < http://www.iwep.org.cn/> accessed 14 September 2009. 
37 Ibid. 
38 CL 2005 s 117. 
39 Ibid. 
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sounded here. First, one way for companies to reduce the likelihood that minority 
shareholders will elect a director is to decrease the size of the board.40 By regulations, 
the number of board of directors in listed companies should be clearly stipulated in 
the articles of association, suggesting that the number of directors can be changed by 
the amending of articles.41 In the companies where majority shareholders are able to 
control two thirds or more of shares, the number of directors can be determined by the 
controlling shareholders and through adjusting the articles of association, the election 
of directors will probably continue to be controlled by the large shareholders.  
Second, the cumulative voting only ensures a minority of directors be elected by 
minority shareholders. This minority number certainly cannot guarantee any 
advantages for public investors in the board-decision process. However, at least, 
minority shareholders’ voice gets the chance to be raised and it seems impossible or 
unreasonable in any country’s listed companies that minority shareholders’ 
representatives shall dominate the board.  
9.1.4 ‘In-process’ Benefits 
To date, there is no institutional investor in China akin to Hermes that adopts 
engagement as its investment strategy. Moreover, as there is a lack of awareness 
among the public for the importance of shareholder engagement, the reputational 
benefit is minimal. 
9.1.5 Normative Obligation 
9.1.5.1 Regulatory demands 
The role of institutional shareholder engagement in corporate governance appears to 
attract growing interests from Chinese regulators. In a public forum, for example, the 
                                                              
40 Bhagat and Brickley (n 25) 342.  
41 CL 2005 s 44.  
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president of the CSRC, Shang Hulin stated that institutional shareholders shall 
continue to play a positive role in facilitating non-tradable share reforms, promoting 
corporate governance system of Chinese listed companies and enhancing capital 
market.42  
The role of institutional shareholder in corporate governance has been specially 
emphasized in the Chinese Code by stating:  
‘Institutional shareholders shall play a role in the appointment of company directors, 
the compensation and supervision of management and major decision-making 
processes.’43  
The normative obligation from regulatory demands worked stronger in non-tradable 
share reform, as one will see in section 9.2.2. However, a comparison analysis 
between the UK and China in terms of normative obligation on shareholder 
participation suggests that Chinese regulatory framework clearly falls short and thus, 
unlikely to provide institutional shareholders with strong incentives to take part in 
corporate governance.44 
9.1.5.2 Culture 
Chinese cultural beliefs which uphold a value of collectivism appear to be critical of 
the practice of free-riding. To understand the implications of a more collectivist 
society for overcoming free-riding, it will be useful first to consider some cultural 
beliefs in a collectivist society that govern a particular kind of individual behavior. 
Collectivism and individualism are frequently used to describe how people interact 
                                                              
42 Jiandinbuyi fazhan zhuangda jigou touzizhe [To strongly promote the further development of 
institutional shareholders] CSRC cite Shanghai Securities 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n575667/n641992/n2671194/3038836.html> accessed 12 March 
2009. 
43 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, s 11. 
44 See Chapter 10.2.3. 
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with others in a society.45 Societies are described by Hofstede as individualistic when 
ties between individuals are loose, and people are expected to look out for themselves 
and tend to ignore group interests if they conflict with personal interests.46 The 
opposite cultural dimension of individualism is collectivism. This occurs when people 
are integrated into strong cohesive in-groups and the interests of the group take 
precedence over individual interests.47 Owing to traditional Confucianism values, 
Chinese society has long been regarded as collectivist where family and social ties are 
strong, which distinguish it from British culture which is more individualistic.48 
Under Hofstede’s model, the individualism index in China is scored only at 36, 
comparing to a much higher score of 89 in the UK.49  
Within a collectivist culture, people look out for the well-being of the groups to which 
they belong, even if such actions sometimes require that personal interests be 
disregarded. 50 Accordingly, if institutional shareholder activism is collectively 
beneficial, every individual shall make his contribution to achieve ‘group’ interests 
even if his personal interest cannot be secured. The practice of free-riding on other’s 
efforts is therefore culturally unacceptable and would lead to criticisms from other 
members. 
                                                              
45 There is a massive literature on this subject, for example, see C Triandis, C McCusker and H Hui, 
'Multimethod Probes of Individualism and Collectivism' (1990) 59 Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 1006. 
46 G Hofstede, Culture's Consequences, Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations 
Across Nations (Second edn Sage Publications, California 2001) 20. 
47 Ibid. 
48 S Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (de Gruyter, Berlin 1990) 62; D Williamson, ‘A 
Management Control Assurance in the Different Cultures and Institutions of China and the UK in D H 
Brown and A MacBean. (eds), Challenges for China's Development:an Enterprise Perspective 
(Routledge, New York 2005) 121. Williamson compared the individual index under Hofstede’ 
framework and showed that UK individualism scored at 89, while Chinese culture only has a 36. 
49 Hofstede (n 46) 87. Hofstede’s survey did not include the China. However,Cragin has applied 
Hofstede’s instrument to the China, see J.Cragin, ‘Management technology absorption in China’in S 
Clegg, D Dunphy and S Redding (eds), The Enterprise and Management in East Asia (University of 
Hong Kong, Hong Kong 1986).  
50 John A Wagner III, 'Studies of Individualism-Collectivism: Effects on Cooperation in Groups' (1995) 
38 The Academy of Management Journal 152, 153. 
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Chinese cultural beliefs for collectivism seem to provide a good driving force to 
overcome free-riding problem. If institutional shareholders are culturally obliged to 
take action, the level of shareholder activism in China would be much higher than the 
UK counterpart, where an individualistic culture is followed. However, as we have 
already seen, this is not the case. Section 9.2.2.2.3 will explain that some other aspects 
of Chinese traditional culture, such as the importance of relationships, and 
authoritarianism, will work more strongly to make shareholder opposition a less 
worthwhile activity. 
9.2 A cost-benefit Analysis 
Even if shareholders can be persuaded not to free-ride, recall that my model claims 
that we must still go on to ask whether the benefit of activism will outweigh the cost. 
9.2.1 Benefits 
Benefits from activism would be the share of total gains. In the UK part, the thesis 
noted that large institutional shareholders with longer-term investment horizons will 
receive more benefits from activism than smaller ones and this will also apply in the 
Chinese context.51 However, this difference between institutions is less significant in 
China since the majority of institutional investors participating in activism are mutual 
funds. The potential long-term institutions, such as pension funds and insurance 
companies, are in an embryonic stage, and are subject to strict investment limits or 
have to indirectly invest through mutual funds.  
Since the concept of shareholder activism is still relatively new in China, institutional 
shareholders are likely to receive lower reputational gains than in the UK as fewer 
beneficiaries would take institutional investors’ engagement into account when they 
choose their asset managers. 
                                                              
51 Chapter 4.2.1.1. 
359 
 
9.2.2 Costs 
Costs of shareholder activism include indirect and direct costs. The part below 
provides an analysis on how regulatory or cultural elements reduce or increase the 
costs to shareholder when they engage in corporate governance.  
9.2.2.1 Direct Costs 
9.2. 2.1.1 Electronic Voting 
Electronic voting is key to a more cost-effective voting system. Unfortunately, it is not 
explicitly mentioned in the CL 2005 (unlike UK corporate legislation).52 It is a 
practice merely recommended in administrative regulations, such as the Chinese Code 
and the Provisions on Strengthening the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders. 
The Chinese Code stipulates that a listed company shall ‘make every effort, including 
fully utilizing modern information technology means, to increase the number of 
shareholders attending the shareholders’ meeting.’53  
The facilitating role played by the electronic voting is obvious, as explained by 
empirical data in Chapter 8.54 For example, when electronic voting was available, the 
mean number of shareholders attended the meetings was nearly 10 times higher than 
when not.55 This finding is clearly in line with the view proposed in Chapter 1 that 
lower costs for engagement can stimulate more institutional shareholder participation.  
However, empirical evidence also shows actual utilization of electronic voting system 
in the sample studies is quite low, which could partly explain the low level of voting 
at the AGMs. 
                                                              
52 CA 2006 s 333. 
53 China Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies s 8.  
54 See Chapter 8.4.3 . 
55 Ibid. 
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9.2.2.1.2 The Costs of Litigation 
This section is concerned with the cost incurred in bringing derivative action. The 
introduction of the shareholder derivative suit in CL 2005, as noted earlier, allows 
shareholders to pursue litigation when their interests are infringed by corporate 
managers. It certainly represents a major step towards stronger shareholder protection 
in corporate legislation, and could have significant implications for shareholder 
activism in the future. 
However, even though derivative actions are allowed by statute, economic 
disincentives remain for institutional shareholders.56  The cost of litigation, as that in 
the UK, has traditionally been a key determinant for whether to bring a derivative 
action. In China, filing a suit may bring huge financial costs, composed of at least two 
parts: the court’s fees and the attorney’s fees. The court’s fees include the filing fees 
(anjian shouli fei) paid to the court before the suit and other expenses incurred during 
the hearing of the case such as fees for investigation and for preservation of assets. In 
addition, shareholders have to pay attorney’s fees. 
According to section 19 of the Supreme People Court’s (SPC) Measures on the 
People’s Courts’ Acceptance of Litigation Fees 1989, the losing party should bear the 
filing fees and other litigation fees allocated by the court excluding attorney’s fees.57 
Therefore, if the plaintiff shareholder loses the case, he has to pay a considerable 
amount in litigation costs.  
When the derivative suit is successful, the recoveries accrue to the company as a 
whole, thereby, the plaintiff-shareholder – who will yet only a pro rata benefit – has 
little incentive to take litigation unless he can recover his costs off the top. That is, as 
                                                              
56 D Clarke and N Howson, ‘Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China’ in The Prospect of 
Structural Reform of Corporate Legal System (The 21st Century Commercial Law Forum-Tenth 
International Symposium 2010) 190, 205. 
57 Clarke and Howson reported that occasionally, the ‘loser pays all’ principle is not applied for some 
reasons undisclosed by courts. See ibid, 211. 
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discussed in Chapter 1, a classic ‘collective action problem’. This disincentive is 
exacerbated by the fact that as a general rule in China, the plaintiff will have to bear 
some legal costs even if he wins the case. While Chinese law generally awards trial 
costs to the winner, such costs are usually defined only as funds paid to the court as 
filing and other fees, and do not include attorneys’ fees.58 
Comparatively, UK investors face similar economic burdens. As discussed above, a 
plaintiff-shareholder will benefit from the recovery only in proportion to his 
shareholding and unless a ‘Wallersteiner’ order is obtained, a losing plaintiff 
shareholder will have to pay his fees and those of the defendant.59 Partly by virtue of 
this economic disincentive, the level of derivative claims in the UK has been low.  
In an attempt to prevent fees being obstacles to shareholders, some commentators 
have recommended the US approach to deal with the cost of litigation.60 In the US, 
contingency fee arrangements apply, that is, the attorney’s fees are contingent on the 
case being successfully settled. If the court grants monetary relief, the attorney will be 
paid at a fixed percentage of the recoveries, normally, in the range of 20-30%.61 In 
cases where non-monetary relief is granted, the attorney’ fee will be paid according to 
his or her work done, for example, on the basis of the hours he spent.62 As this 
contingency fee system can be operated easily by the court, it is proposed as a reform 
to current Chinese derivative action rules.  
Other commentators, as summarized in a study by Clarke, have suggested the 
                                                              
58 Yanfen Wu, Lun Woguo Minshi Susong Feiyong Zhidu de Gaige yu Wanshan [On the Reform and 
Perfection of the System of Civil Litigation Costs in China] (2004), Guangxi Xingzheng Guanli Ganbu 
Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of The Guangxi Administrative Management] 82, 84. 
59 See Chapter 5.5.2.2. 
60 H Huang, ' The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations ' 
(2007) 4 Berkeley Business Law Journal 227, 249. 
61 M Loewenstein, 'Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate Governance' (1999) 24 Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law 1,14. See, e.g., In re Oracle Secs. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1452 (N.D. Cal. 
1994); Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320, 321 (Del. Ch. 1979). 
62 See, e.g., Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); Sugarland Indus. Inc. v. Thomas, 
420 A.2d 142, 149-50 (Del. 1980). 
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establishment of a foundation that would own shares in every listed company.63 In 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, litigation has been filed through similar non-profit 
organization and said to be reasonably successful.64 It remains to be seen whether the 
model can be adopted in China.  
9.2.2.2 Indirect Costs 
9.2.2.2.1 Conflicts of Interest 
The separation of ownership and control in a fund, just like that in listed companies, 
may give rise to divergence of interests between fund managers and fund investors. 
The conflicts are greatest starkly in publicly-visible activism, such as voting, 
derivative action, and to a lessen extent in private meetings. This conflicted interest if 
exercised without restraint would lead to fund managers acting for the purpose of 
obtaining private interests at the costs of shareholders’ value. It has emerged as a 
serious governance issue, as admitted by a Chinese official.65 
Acute conflicts of interests often arise from the fact that fund managers are affiliated 
with other financial institutions, mainly securities companies, trust and investment 
companies, who act as the major shareholders of most Chinese fund management 
companies. As Table 9.4 indicates, the largest shareholder of the top 10 fund 
                                                              
63 D Clarke, 'The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China' (2008) The George Washington 
University Law School Public Law and Legal Working Paper No.433 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1245803> accessed 20 November 2009, 55. 
Clarke quoted Liang Dingbang (Anthony Neoh), Cong Zhengquan Jianguan Jiaodu Kan Gongsi Fa 
Xiugai [Viewing the Amendment of the Company Law from the Angle of Securities Supervision], in 
Feng Guo and Jian Wang, Gongsi Faxiugai Zongheng Tan [An All Around Discussion of Reform of 
the Company Law] (Falü Chubanshe 2000) 29-34; Jiang Ping, Gongsi Fa Cong 19 Shiji Dao 20 Shiji 
de Fazhan [The Development of Company Law from the 19th to the 20th Century], also in Feng Guo 
and Jian Wang 21. 
64 See generally C Milhaupt, 'Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory, and 
Evidence from East Asia ' (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law 1 
65 J Sun, ‘Xu Jinyibu Yueshu Dagudong Ganrao Jijin Gongsi de Xingwei’ [Need to Further Constrain 
the Majority Shareholder’s Intervention in the Fund Management Company] Shanghai Zhengquan Bao 
[Shanghai Securities News] (9 September 2005). 
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management companies is either a security company or a trust company.  
The conflicts stem from the affiliated financial institutions’ business relationship with 
listed companies. Apart from fund management, securities and trust companies also 
conduct other business such as asset management or consultant services which could 
contribute a large portion of profits for them. For example, the CITIC Securities Co., 
which is the largest shareholder of China Asset Fund Management company, has 
carried out undertaking service for 54 listed companies in 2009, which generated a 
total profit of RMB 0.675 billion.66 By virtue of the multiple business nets, when fund 
managers’ activism would damage their business relationship with listed companies, 
they may pressure fund managers to be passive despite it conflicting with the interest 
of investors. A simple example could be helpful to illustrate that conflict. A listed 
company X is one of the companies in fund management company Y’s portfolio. X 
also has business relationship with a securities company Z, which is a major 
shareholder of Y. If Y votes against X’s proposal, X might terminate the business 
contract with Z and change asset management service to another securities company. 
Under this circumstance, Z may require Y to place its interests at a higher priority, 
voting pro manager to save its contract with X.  
Another notable fact revealed in Table 9.4 is that the share ownership structure is 
highly concentrated in the top 10 fund management companies, with an average 47% 
of shares controlled in the hand of the largest shareholders. In Bosera Fund Company, 
the amount of stakes held by the largest shareholder reached as high as 73%. Thus, 
there is little doubt that those securities companies and trust companies have 
significant bearings on the operation and investment of the fund management 
companies if there is no mechanism to ensure the independence of funds from their 
major shareholders.  
                                                              
66 Q Wu, ‘2009 Nian Juanshang Chengxiao IPO Jinzhang 48.5yi’ [Securities Traders has Made Profits 
of 4.85 Billion by Undertaking IPO Service in 2009] Zhengquan Shibao [Securities Times] (5 January 
2010). 
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Table 9.4 Shareholding of the top 10 fund management companies (At 30 December 
2009) 
Ranking Name 
The largest 
shareholder 
Percentage 
1 China Asset Management 
CITIC securities 
Co. 
60.73% 
2 Bosera Fund 
China Merchants 
securities Co. 
73% 
3 Harvest Fund 
China Credit Trust 
Co. 
40% 
4 China Southern Fund 
Huatai securities 
Co. 
45% 
5 E fund GF securities Co. 20% 
6 GF fund GF securities Co. 48.33% 
7 Da Cheng Fund Zhongtai Trust Co. 48% 
8 Hua An Fund 
Shanghai 
International Trust 
Co. 
20% 
9 
Bank of Communications 
Schroder Fund 
Bank of 
Communications 
Co. 
65% 
10 China International Fund 
Shanghai 
International Trust 
Co. 
51% 
Source: Data drawn from the CSRC.  
Rules eventually came in 2004 to address these conflicts of interests, contained in the 
Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment Fund Management 
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Companies (2004 Measures). The 2004 Measures seek to avoid interference in the 
fund management company’s business by securities companies, trust companies and 
investment banks 
The 2004 Measures provide a set of relevant rules to require listed companies to 
establish systems for corporate governance and that (1) ensure the fund management 
business is not subject to interference by any particular shareholders. Shareholders of 
fund management company may exert their control only through shareholders’ 
meeting;67 and (2) protect against any particular shareholder seeking assistance with 
their own securities underwriting or investment in a way that damages the interests of 
fund investors.68 In addition, a mandatory independent board system is imposed in the 
fund management company which requires at least one-third of the board of a fund 
management company must be composed of independent directors.   
Moreover, in a recent provision issued by the CSRC in 2009: Guidance Opinion on 
the Administration of Managerial Personnel in Fund Management Company, it 
explicitly lays out that the fund manager should place investors’ interest in priority 
when it is conflicted with the interest of the fund management company, its 
shareholders or other affiliated institutions.69 These rules are expected to minimize the 
adverse impact of conflicts of interest on institutional shareholder activism. However, 
the effectiveness of this in resolving the problem remains to be seen.  
Another potential solution to reduce this conflict is to align the interests of major 
shareholders of fund management companies with the fund unit holders. This effort 
was seen in a 2005 regulation from the CSRC which allows the fund management 
                                                              
67 Zhengquan Touzi Jijin Guanli Gongsi Guanli Banfa (issued by the CSRC on September 16, 2004, 
and became effective on October 1, 2004) (‘‘2004 Fund Management Company Measures’’). The 
Measures repealed the 1997 Provisional Measures s 36. 
68 Ibid, s 38. 
69 Guidance opinion on the Administration of managerial personnel in fund management company, 
issued by the CSRC in 2009 s 6.  
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company to invest in its own funds products.70 Although this new investment channel 
should comply with a set of restrictions, when the affiliated institutions are also 
placed in the position of fund investors, they may be less likely to interfere with fund 
managers’ engagement with portfolio companies. 
In addition to business-relational conflict, fund managers are sometimes found to 
self-serve their private interests at the expense of that of fund unit holders. There is 
anecdotal evidence that during the share structure reform, some fund managers have 
taken advantage of their large tradable shareholding to blackmail management of 
investee companies for bribery in return for supporting votes on compensation.71 
Moreover, Zhang and Zeng found that in order to gain access to soft information in 
listed companies, some institutions acted against the interests of minority shareholders 
and voted for compensation schemes proposed by boards, making controlling 
shareholders obtain liquidity rights with rather low costs.72  
9.2.2.2.2 Shareholding Disclosure Rule73 
Given the dominance of state ownership in most listed companies, influencing a 
board’s behavior is unlikely to be achieved by even a major fund manager alone and 
thus, the success of institutional shareholder activism lies in strengthening methods of 
collaboration among shareholders. Moreover, collaboration allows cost-sharing 
among shareholders, which further helps them to reduce the passive incentives created 
                                                              
70 Notice on Fund Management Company’s Investment in Securities Investment Fund with its Own 
Assets, issued by the CSRC in 2005.  
71 ‘Wuliang Jijin Jingli Suohui Zao Tousu, Zhengjianhui Yankong Gugai Heimu’ [Villainous Fund 
Managers Seeking Bribery Subject to Complaints, CSRC Stepped up Scrutiny of Unlawful Activities 
in the Share Structure Reform], Zhengquan Shibao [Securities Times] (September 5, 2005); Also “Jijin 
Gongsi: Zapan Haishi ‘Du Qianyan’” [Fund Management Companies: Dumping Shares or Self 
Sacrificing], Shangwu Zhoukan [Business Weekly] ( July 20, 2005). 48, 50. 
72 Y Zeng and J Zhang, 'The Dark Side of Institutional Shareholders Activism in Emerging Markets: 
Evidence from China's Non-Tradable Share Reform' (2008)  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1372428> accessed 5 May 2009. 
73 It is worth noting here again that shareholding disclosure rule is also relevant to the possibility of 
collective action. 
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by the collective action problem. Therefore, it is particularly important that there is no 
legal impediment to collective shareholder engagement. However, the collaboration 
among shareholders with similar concerns to influence a board has given rise to some 
concern that it would generally fall into the concert party situation. The shareholding 
disclosure regulation defines ‘concert party’ as  
‘two or more natural persons，legal persons or other organizations that，by way of 
any lawful means such as agreement，cooperation or relationship of affiliated parties 
so as to expand their controlling ratio of the shares in a listed company or 
consolidate their controlling status in a listed company，and make the same 
declaration of intention when exercising voting rights in respect of the listed 
company’.74  
The collective action, as laid down in the regulation, could include submitting 
proposal, appointing directors or proxy voting without indication of voting purpose. 
One of the most significant consequences for institutions to form an alliance, apart 
from placing a mandatory bid as takeover is rare in China, is to comply with the 
troublesome disclosure requirement. 
As in most jurisdictions, Chinese law requires an investor meeting certain thresholds 
to make an adequate and timely disclosure of his shareholdings. Section 86 of 
Securities Law 2005 (SL 2005) stipulates, when an investor comes to hold 5% of a 
listed company’ stock, the investor must report his or her position. To do so, the 
investor must submit a report to the CSRC and the stock exchanges within three days 
from the date when such shareholding occurs, and must notify the company and the 
public.75 During this period, the investor is prohibited from changing his position 
                                                              
74 Shangshi Gongsi Gudong Chigu Biandong Xinxi Pilu Guanli Banfa [Administrative Measures for 
Information Disclosure of Shareholding Changes of Shareholders in Listed Companies] (issued by the 
CSRC on September 2002, and became effective on December 1, 2002), (‘‘2002 Shareholding 
Information DisclosureMeasures’’). section 9.  
75 SL 2005 s 86. 
368 
 
until the market is informed.76 Moreover, he shall report and make announcement of 
each five per cent increase or decrease in the proportion of the issued shares he holds 
of the said company through securities trading on a stock exchange. During the 
reporting period, and for two days after the report and announcement are made, the 
investor may not continue to purchase or sell shares of the listed company.77  
As regards the scope of the actual disclosure obligation, the information that the 
investor needs to disclose in the report includes facts about his identities and the 
amount of shares held.78 He is also obliged to disclose his trading activities within the 
six months prior to the disclosure, including the amount of shares he traded monthly 
and the price range of the trading.79 In addition, the investor must report his intention 
with respect to increasing or decreasing shareholding in a company and make 
announcements of his plan in the following 12 months.80  
In addition to the above disclosure requirements, investors must abide by more 
stringent rules once a ‘concert party’ is formed. First, the members of the party are 
required to apply to the securities registration and clearing institution for temporary 
custody of all the shares held or controlled by each of them in the company for at least 
6 months.81 Second, the party must disclose its purpose, the time of forming the group, 
the contents of the agreement, and its plans regarding the exercise of voting rights.82  
The above rules, while intended to safeguard the order of securities market, create 
legal impediments to shareholder collaboration action. First, given the dominant 
shareholding of the state, the threshold of 5% of a total share in a company is 
                                                              
76 SL 2005 s 86(1.) 
77 Ibid.  
78 SL 2005 s 87. 
79 Guideline on Contents and Format for Information Disclosure of Companies with Publicly Issued 
Securities No.15—Report on Shareholding Changes of Shareholders in Listed Companies, issued by 
the CSRC, s 36. 
80 Ibid, s 20. 
81 Shareholding Information Disclosure Measures, s 10. 
82 Ibid, s 19(2) 
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stringent and could be conflicted with good corporate governance practice. 
Institutions collectively holding even 5% do not have enough power to bargain with 
the largest shareholder. 
Second, a ‘concert-party’ faces a burdensome disclosure requirement, followed by 
compliance costs. If a proponent seeks supports from other shareholders before 
launching a campaign, he must be aware of the disclosure requirement. Not only his 
information, the filing documents also have to identify all other group members. 
There is an absence of reliable evidence on how burdensome the strict disclosure 
requirements are to institutional shareholders. However, a costly compliance 
aggravates the effect of the collective action problem, reducing institutional 
shareholders’ incentive for taking collective action. 
Thirdly, concert parties confront a legal risk for non-complying even if the members 
did not break the rules on purpose. Any legal sanctions, ranging from corrective to the 
CSRC investigation, would bring a negative impact, such as reputational damage, on 
the institutional shareholders. 
Lastly, a direct result from temporary custodian requirement is that the liquidity of 
stocks holding by parties is affected. As noted, members of a group have to place their 
securities in the listed company into temporary custodian for at least 6 months. Thus, 
possible restriction on liquidity would discourage institutions to engage in collective 
action.  
In sum, institutional shareholders face a dilemma: if they do not launch activism 
jointly, they are unlikely to succeed; if they form a group, they have to incur costs to 
fulfill burdensome obligations surrounding the concerted action. Therefore, a trade-off 
must be made between the facilitation of collective shareholder activism and the 
shareholding disclosure regime by choosing the appropriate threshold and disclosure 
time.  
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This balance can be determined on the basis of the local situation. Thus, there should 
be some flexibility over the threshold and disclosure time according to different cases. 
For example, if 5% of the outstanding shares do not account for a significant holding 
in a company with a concentrated ownership, in order to encourage shareholder 
activism, the regulator could consider raising the threshold. Or an alternative way 
would be for the regulator, as in the UK, to provide clarification on the distinction 
between shareholder activism and corporate controlling.  
9.2.2.2.3 Cultural Factors  
The traditional Confucian culture embedded in Chinese society, which does not 
encourage people to solve a dispute in public, impose additional indirect cost on 
institutional shareholders who wish to take action. 
As observed by Redding, Confucian values penetrate Chinese people’s belief via a 
combination of school and family teachings at their early ages.83 It governs people’ s 
expectation of how others will behave in a particular situation and guides them to 
make choices on their own behaviors based on these expectations.  
One of the central Confucian values is the high degree of collectivism, that I have 
already explained in section 9.1.4.2. In a collectivist society, the interests of groups 
take precedence over the needs of individuals. This seems to have two, but 
contradictory, implications for the likelihood of shareholder activism. On the one 
hand, as already noted above, this absorption of collectivist values may make 
free-riding less likely. The likelihood of free-riding on others’ efforts is reduced as 
individuals feel obliged to make their contribution for the interests of the group. On 
the other hand, however, when it comes to balancing the costs and benefits of 
activism, at that point activism may still be less likely since people in a collectivist 
society may perceive a higher cost in the sort of confrontation that activism involves. 
Rather, they may rely more on informal norms within the relationship rules to interact 
                                                              
83 Redding (n 48) 47.  
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with others.84 Although UK and other countries see relationships as important, the 
nature of British and Chinese relationships tend to be different. The terms of 
relationships are often viewed, as Li et al note, as ‘personal connection’, ‘networks’ 
and ‘networking’ or similar alternative in Western countries.85 In China, however, it 
has a wider meaning, including all these elements of the relationship in the UK and 
more. It is commonly referred to in Chinese word as‘Guanxi’. Yang describes guanxi 
as: 
‘dyadic relationships that are based implicitly (rather than explicitly) on mutual 
interests and benefit. Once guanxi is established between two people, each can ask a 
favour of the other with the expectation that the debt incurred will be repaid 
sometime in the future.’86 
Guanxi is an important characteristic of the Chinese cultural collectivism. It forms the 
basis of personal and social networks, and the formation and maintenance of which 
are important task for Chinese people. To do so, people have to establish trust in such 
networks. The bounded trust in the network of relationships, as argued by Redding, 
works on the basis of ‘personal obligations, the maintenance of reputation and 
face…’87 
In consequence, people are very concerned with their ‘face’. Public confrontation is 
seen as improper as it would result in loss of face – a feeling of shame. Although face 
or reputation is widely considered important in most societies, the importance of it for 
the Chinese is much greater. It was seen as the primary sanction in a society under 
traditional Confucian values. 88  In such an environment, shareholders are not 
comfortable questioning directors and criticizing directors through public actions. 
                                                              
84 Redding (n 48) 62. 
85 Yunyan Li, Martin Parnell and Nick Hawkins, ‘Guanxi, Relationship, Marketing and Business 
Strategy’ in Brown and Macbean (n 48) 102, 103-4. 
86 M M-H Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China (Wilder House 
Series in Politics, History, and Culture, Cornell University Press, New York 1994)1. 
87 Redding (n 48) 67.  
88 Redding (n 48) 48.  
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Hence, at this stage, it is not surprising that many aspects of China’s business culture 
is largely relationship-driven and built on a desire to avoid conflict.  
The second characteristic of Chinese culture that appears to have an impact on 
shareholder activism is its respect for status and power. The culture can be supportive 
of paternalism and tends to uphold authoritarianism.89 These features are termed a 
‘high power distance’ culture under Hofstede’s framework, that is, the interpersonal 
power of influence between two people as perceived by the less powerful.90 Under 
Hofstede’’s framework, China was scored with 56, while UK has score of 35.91 
Compared with other countries, such as Malaysia which has a score of 104, the high 
power distance culture in China is not as strong. It could, however, be one reason for 
lower shareholder activism in China than in the UK and therefore, worth a brief 
discussion here. 
As explained by Redding, people within a high power distance culture tend to express, 
in their behavior and attitudes, a strong sense of ‘vertical order’ of their surrounding 
world.92 The orders include ‘family order, itself inside a powerfully maintained state 
order, itself seen as part of a natural cosmic order…’ and all these are ‘dedicated to 
the maintenance of the status quo.’93  
Public confrontation in shareholder activism thus does not fit with the cultural belief 
that ‘an individual must fit into and conform to the basic social order of his 
surrounding world.’94 As a result, shareholder activities opposing directors who are 
often appointed by the Government or related institutions are against the culture 
within the high power distance society. 
                                                              
89 See generally J Pan, 'The Dual Structure of Chinese Culture and its Influence on Modern Chinese 
Society' (1990) 5 International Sociology 75.  
90 See (n 49), and the accompanying text.  
91 It is cited in Williamson (n 48) 121. 
92 Redding (n 48) 61. 
93 Redding (n 48) 51-52. 
94 Redding (n 48) 58. 
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To sum up, relationship rules and high power distance embedded in society help to 
explain the low level of institutional shareholder activism in China. Even if the first 
step of overcoming collective action is met, the second step fails since the costs could 
be likely higher than the received benefits owing to these culture hurdles.  
9.2.3 Case study: Institutional Shareholder Activism in the 
Process of Non-tradable Share Reform  
Institutional shareholder activism in the non-tradable share reform offers a good 
opportunity to show how the activism model is applied. As I discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6, all mainland listed companies were required to propose a reform scheme to 
operate the transfer of non-tradable shares to tradable shares. As this may affect the 
value of existing tradable shares, the reform scheme must include a compensation 
package for those existing holders of tradable shares.95 In the reform, institutional 
shareholders show a higher level of engagement in listed companies than usual. There 
are many high-profile cases where institutional investors strongly opposed the board 
sand forced them to re-plan the proposal for the benefit of tradable shareholders. The 
part below will apply the activism model to explain why institutional investors were 
more willing to participate in non-tradable share transfers in their investee companies.  
Step 1: Overcoming Free-riding 
1. Decisiveness; and 2. The possibility of concerted action 
The reform requires a class voting system at shareholders’ meetings to let 
tradable-shareholders decide whether or not to accept reform schemes. As I have 
discussed in section 9.1.3.1, when large non-tradable shareholders’ votes are abstained, 
the likelihood of individual shareholding being decisive and the possibility of the 
concerted action would increase to an extent where institutional shareholders may, 
individually or collectively, be sufficiently large to surmount the collective action 
                                                              
95 See Chapter 6.1.  
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problem. For example in Shanghai 3F New Materials Co.(3F), the top five tradable 
shareholders, which all are institutional investors, collectively accounted for more 
than two-thirds of the total tradable shares.96 A coalition consisting of those top five 
shareholders is therefore sufficient enough to determine the voting outcome. Given 
their power, it is not surprising to see that institutional investors in 3F, as well as other 
companies which have similar shareholding structure, such as Shenzhen Yantian Port 
Co., Hailuo Cement Co, strongly opposed the board’s reform schemes.  
3. ‘In-process’ benefits 
Institutional shareholders’ participation would help them get a more favourable or 
profitable plan from non-tradable shareholders. Moreover, due to the regulatory 
demands, institutions would put their reputation at risk if they do not engage in the 
reform. In turn, those who show a certain level of involvement would potentially 
attract more clients.  
4. Normative obligation 
Due to the large institutional shareholding in the group of tradable shares, the 
regulatory demands for institutional shareholder engagements are strong in the 
non-tradable share reform. Under the Guidance Notes on the Split Share Structure 
Reform of Listed Companies, institutional shareholders are encouraged to:  
     ‘take active part in the share reform, and defend the rights of investors, especially 
public investors, as well as sustained development of the market. Disciplinary 
actions will be taken against those institutional investors for such misconducts as in 
interfering into the decision-making on the part of other investor, manipulating the 
voting results of the Share Reform meeting of interested A-shareholders, or abusing 
                                                              
96 San’aifu Gugai Liuchan, Farengu Jiezheng Renu Jijin’ [3FShare Structure Reform Miscarried, Legal 
Person Share Problem Annoyed the Funds], 21 Shiji Jingji Baodao [21st Century Economic News] (19 
December 2005). 
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the dominant shareholding position to seek interest exchange.’97 
Driven by regulatory pressure, institutional investors are more actively to devote their 
resources and time to vote their shares on reform schemes. 
Step 2: A cost-benefit Analysis 
Benefits 
Benefits come from a more profitable reform scheme. The ‘in process’ benefits are 
those discussed above. 
Costs 
In many cases, institutional shareholder involvement is conducted through private 
meetings with corporate managers and non-tradable shareholders. As analyzed in 
Chapter 5, the form of private meeting is a relatively cost-saving activism. Private 
negotiation over the reform plan is a way preferred by both the board and institutional 
investors. For the company, after it announced its plan for transferring non-tradable 
shares to the public, the non-tradable shareholders must consult with the tradable 
shareholders to form a consensus on the scheme. The failure to win two-thirds 
approval from tradable shareholders would force listed companies to go through the 
time-consuming and costly process again after initial compensation scheme was 
denied. 
For institutional investors, private meetings help them to avoid potential negative 
market impact associated with public confrontation, such as the fall of share price. 
Under this circumstance, the dissenting fund manager may have to sell down his 
shares at a lower price, indicating that ‘exit’ is also no longer a favourable option. 
Meanwhile, the indirect costs resulted from the conflicts of interest can be reduced 
through the behind-the-scene negotiation.  
                                                              
97 Guidance Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies s 14. 
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To sum up, through applying the model, we have seen now that institutional 
shareholder activism was more frequently seen in non-tradable share reform because, 
firstly, it is easier for them to overcome free-riding, and secondly, the benefits from 
activism more likely outweigh the costs. 
9.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has applied the activism model to explain how these factors contained in 
the model play out in the case of Chinese institutional shareholder engagement.  
In doing the first step of determining whether free-riding can be overcome, we found 
that the first two factors – the decisiveness of large individual institutional holding, 
the possibility of concerted action – have applied differently between usual and 
unusual voting systems. Under a usual one-vote one-share scheme, owing to small 
institutional shareholdings and the presence of a dominant state shareholder, 
institutional shareholders rarely have the ability to challenge corporate managers in 
their investee companies. We have seen that the likelihood increases in some listed 
companies when a class voting or a cumulative voting system was adopted at 
shareholders’ meeting. However, the impact of unusual voting systems still depends 
on the size of institutional share ownership. The third factor of ‘in-process’ benefit 
does not work in the Chinese context since currently no or few institutions adopt 
engagement as their investment strategy. In respect of the normative obligation, 
whereas regulatory demands for shareholder activism are relatively weak, it is 
culturally strong because Chinese traditional collectivism beliefs are critical of 
free-riding.   
In doing the second step of cost-benefit analysis, we found similar as the UK, the 
benefits mainly come from the share of the total gain. However, since the concept of 
shareholder activism is still relatively new in China, the ‘in-process’ benefits to 
institutional shareholders are likely to be lower than in the UK. Costs of shareholder 
activism include indirect and direct costs. This chapter has analyzed how regulatory 
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or cultural elements reduce or increase the costs to shareholder when they engage in 
corporate governance. We have seen that electronic voting system encourages 
shareholder participation by reducing the cost of voting and we also seen an 
overwhelming financial disincentives for shareholders to bring legal action against 
company director for breach of their duties. When moving on to consider indirect 
costs, we found some of the costs, such as conflicts of interest and shareholding 
disclosure rules, are similar to the UK. A high indirect cost which serves to distinguish 
China from the UK is the traditional Confucian value. It governs people to rely on 
relationship rules and encourages high power distance, which together make 
shareholder activism a costly activity. 
In an effort to work out more clearly how the model is applied in China, this chapter 
employed a case study to discover the contributory reasons for a higher level of 
shareholder engagement in non-tradable share reform. 
To sum up, this chapter applied the model to explain the current level of institutional 
shareholder activism found in Chapter 8. It suggests that efforts to promote 
shareholder activism are not likely to be sufficiently successful so long as listed 
companies remained under the control of majority shareholders, as almost all are 
today. It is expected that non-tradable share reform would change the balance of share 
ownership, with a decline in state ownership and a corresponding increase in the 
ownership of public investors, especially among institutional investors. When shares 
in Chinese listed companies become fully tradable, institutional shareholdings will be 
more likely to replace the state or local government to become the large shareholders 
in many enterprises. Chapter 10 will make a comparative turn to explore what China 
might learn from UK’s approaches to promote a more active institutional shareholder 
engagement. 
 
 
Part IV Comparisons and (Modest) Prescriptions for 
Reform 
Chapter 10 The Way Forward in China: Some Implications from 
UK Experience 
In Parts II and III, we have explored and compared the nature and the extent of 
institutional shareholder activism in both countries. Generally, UK institutional 
shareholders present a more active involvement in corporate governance than their 
Chinese counterparts. UK institutional shareholders are more aware of the importance 
of corporate governance and shareholder engagement, have more frequent contact 
with the board of their investee companies and have more often exercised their voting 
rights in relation to their shares to discipline management. 
Based on the above findings, this chapter will comparatively apply the activism model 
and examine factors that contributed to the different levels of activism in the UK and 
China. It will then make some valuable recommendations about how China could 
draw lessons from the UK to deal with the issue of promoting institutional 
shareholder engagement. 
Before delving deeply into these inquiries, it is necessary to deal with a preliminary 
issue that is relevant to any comparative study. This concerns whether borrowing 
experience or rules from other countries is desirable and workable. Having done so, 
the analysis will then move up to the essential questions of what China can learn from 
the UK’s approaches and how these proposals could be implemented in the Chinese 
governance system. 
10.1 The Possibility of Applying UK Approach to China  
This section deals with the issue of whether aspects of the UK approach can be 
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transferred to the Chinese system, or whether different systems are so influenced by 
so-called ‘path-dependency’ as to be unable to adapt to new rules.  
10.1.1 Is Convergence Taking Place relating to Shareholder 
Activism? 
The practice of transferring legal rules or experience from one country to another is 
commonly observed around the world, in different periods of history and in a variety 
of conditions. Watson terms such practice as ‘legal transplantation’ and considers it 
as the most fertile source of legal development since ‘most changes in most systems 
are the result of borrowing.’1 As a result of such transplantations,2 it is sometimes 
said that in many respects a convergence3 is occurring in many part of the world in 
the field of corporate governance. This convergence is often attributed to the effects of 
the globalization of financial and product markets.4 As argued by the OECD,  
 
‘as regulatory barriers between national economies fall and global competition for 
capital increases, investment capital will follow the path to those corporations that have 
adopted efficient governance standards.’5 
                                                              
1  A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press, 
Edinburgh 1974) 94. 
2 Legal borrowing may occur voluntarily by, for example, adoption or imitation, or involuntarily as 
when a country is colonized. Chinese corporate legislation is a good example of voluntary legal 
transplantation. Some countries, for example, Malaysia and Singapore, received British commercial 
legislation and common law during the period of British colonial rule as involuntarily transplants. See 
generally, P De Cruz, Comparative Law in A Changing World (Cavendish, Londoon 2006) 511. A point 
should made here is that convergence is more likely to occur voluntarily under the pressure of 
globalization. 
3 Gilson provides a helpful model and categories the convergence occurred into three types: functional, 
formality and contractual. Functional convergence occurs when existing regulatory institutions are 
sufficiently responsive to change without a change in the rules. This type of convergence is suggested 
to be the first response to competitive pressured because it is less costly method. Formal convergence 
involves changes occurred in the legislative level when the regulatory framework is adapted. 
Contractual convergence occurs when existing governance institutions have to adapt contractually as 
national institutions are not flexible enough to adapt to accommodate changes and political obstacles 
constraint formal convergence. See, R J.Gilson, 'Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of 
Form or Function' (2001) 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 329.   
4 S Nestor and k Thompson (eds), Corporate Governance in OECD Economics:Is Covergence Under 
Way? (Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, Paris 2000). 
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5 OECD，Corporate Governance: Improving Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets 
(Paris: OECD 1998) 83. 
 Owing to the convergence trend, commentators have argued that the governance 
structure and good corporate governance practice of large corporations all over the 
world will come to resemble each other.6 
Transposing this background to the context of corporate governance in Chinese listed 
companies, is there already a convergence under way relating to shareholder activism? 
If we compare institutional shareholder activism in both countries, we will find that 
there are clearly many resemblances between two countries at the legislative level.  
Under corporate legislation of both countries, shareholders are granted a variety of 
similar rights over companies to ensure managerial accountability, such as, proxy 
voting, calling for shareholders’ meetings, submitting proposals and bringing 
litigation in the form of derivative actions, as already discussed in Parts II and III. The 
technical rules for exercising these rights also exhibit a certain level of similarity.   
For example, for proxy voting, apart from class voting and cumulative voting systems 
which apply in Chinese listed companies under certain circumstances, the default 
position of voting under corporate law in both countries is one-vote, one-share.  
For submitting proposals, although the thresholds differ, (3% and 5% of the total 
votes in the UK and China, respectively,) both allow shareholders to require a 
resolution to be proposed at the AGM.7 The shareholder resolutions if passed at the 
AGMs are binding on companies under both company laws. In terms of legal 
procedures, shareholders in both the UK and China have the statutory ability to bring 
legal actions against directors in the form of a derivative suit. 
At the less formal regulatory level, we can also observe some similarities between 
                                                              
6 See e.g. H Hansmann and R Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate law' (2002) 89 Georgia 
Law Journal 439; J Coffee, 'The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and Its Implications' (1999) 93 Northwestern University Law Review 641; B Cheffins, 
'Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto ' (1999) 10 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 5; L A Cunningham, 'Commonalities and Prescriptions 
in the Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate Governance' (1999) 84 Cornell Law Review 1133.  
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7 UK CA 2006 s 338; Chinese CL 2005 s 103. 
two countries with regard to the way they consider shareholder engagement. 
Corporate governance guidelines in both countries, such as UK Stewardship Code and 
Chinese Code of Corporate Governance, have placed considerable emphasis on the 
role of institutional shareholders in promoting good practice in listed companies. They 
encourage institutional shareholders to make constructive use of their ownership 
rights and we have seen that regulatory demands have increased the level of 
institutional shareholders’ engagement in both countries. 
Overall, there is evidence of some degree of formal convergence, as Gilson terms it, 
even if actual practice is often different behind the rules.8 However, whilst the rules 
on which institutional shareholder activism is built look similar, it should not be 
concluded uncritically that the UK’s approach can necessarily be borrowed into China 
without problems.  
This is because laws must not be separated from their purpose or from the 
circumstances in which they are made. 9  Differing cultural and ideological and 
economic traditions beneath the law have sowed considerable divergence into national 
systems and they are likely to limit the ability of national systems to adapt or evolve 
elements of governance from other systems with fundamentally different cultures and 
ideology.10 Sometimes this is referred to as the phenomenon of ‘path-dependence’ 
whereby the dynamics of history and the design of politics can set national system 
down a particular path, which will create and maintain differences in corporate 
governance systems around the world.11 
                                                              
8 Gilson (n 3). 
9 O Kahn-Freund, 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 The Modern Law Review 1; 
P Legrand, ‘What ‘Legal Transplants’? ‘in D Nelson and J Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart 
Publishing Oxford 2001) 55, 57. 
10 D M Branson, 'The Very Uncertain Prospect of 'Global' Convergence in Corporate Governance ' 
(2001) 34 Cornell International Law Journal 321; Also see A N Licht, 'The Mother of All Path 
Dependencies, Towards a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems' (2001) 26 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 147; Mauro F. Guillen, ‘Corporate Governance ad Globalization: 
Is there Convergence across Countries’ in T Clarke. (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: the 
Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance (Routledge, London 2004) 225. 
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11 L Bebchuk and M Roe, 'A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance ' 
(1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 127, 137. 
Empirical analysis also reports some rather unsuccessful transplant examples from the 
past, where the borrowed rules or systems failed to fit with existing institutions or 
conditions in the receiving countries.12 An often mentioned case is the transplant of 
corporate law in Russia. While Russia has established a more refined corporate law in 
the region thanks to American advisors, it failed to induce as much corporate 
accountability and other benefits as its proponents expected.13  
Bearing these risks in mind, in doing a comparative study, we shall take a cautious 
approach towards convergence, recognizing that ownership and control mechanisms 
are part of a society’s unique characteristics. However, we shall not be 
over-threatened by these risks. The problems involved in transplantation can 
sometimes be alleviated or even avoided if one could carefully examine the conditions 
and needs of each case. For millennia, legal systems around the world have developed 
through legal borrowing. And until now, when a legal problem is confronted in 
countries, ‘the overwhelming trend’ is still ‘to turn to a more developed legal 
system.’14 
10.1.2 The Need for Sensitivity in Legal Transplantation 
So legal borrowing must always be sensitive to, firstly, whether imported rules can fit 
into the broad corporate governance system of the receiving country, and secondly, 
whether any ‘path-dependency’ might prevent the imported rules from achieving the 
same results as in the original country. Convergence will be more constrained in a 
country which has more unique institutional, political and social traditions as they are 
                                                              
12 One well-known example is Columbia, which voluntarily transplanted the Spanish Commercial 
Code of 1829 and enacted a liberal corporate law in 1853. Unfortunately, it did not work as expected 
mostly because economic systems were unprepared for the changes it brought so that the private 
corporation did not take hold in the country. Again, the Uniform Law on Negotiable Instruments, which 
was widely applied in the U.S, failed in Colombia. D Berkowitz, K Pistor and J-F Richard, 'The 
Transplant Effect' (2003) 51 The American Journal of Comparative Law 163,179; De Cruz (n 2) 511. 
Moreover, see problems occurred in legal transplantation in China, see D C Clarke, 'Lost in Translation? 
Corporate Legal Transplants in China ' (2006) GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 213 . 
13 B Black, R Kraakman and A Tarassova, 'Russian Privatisation and Corporate Governance: What 
Went Wrong?' (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1731, 1752-57. 
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more likely to defeat attempts of legal transfer. These are issues this section addresses. 
First, there needs to be sensitivity to the fact that all the rules must work as a coherent 
whole. There should not be a ‘pick and mix’ approach. It requires us to ask whether 
the adoption of new rules is able to work in conjunction with fundamental principles 
in corporate legal systems. Thus, we have to look at broad corporate governance 
systems of two countries and explore whether fundamental mechanisms that the 
potential imported rules build upon are available in the receiving country.   
If one looks at the corporate governance mechanisms in the Chinese system, a wide 
range of institutions are all instantly recognizable to anyone familiar with western 
corporate governance. That is because the development of corporate legislation and 
corporate governance system in China is itself a borrowing process. When China’s 
first Company Law was being formulated in the early 1990s, the policymakers looked 
to more developed Western models and finally adopted a system fairly closely to the 
continental model in terms of the types of company that it contemplates and in some 
of its rules regarding corporate structure. The Chinese company law is now more like 
a hybrid-model, combining features from both continental model, such as the board of 
supervisors, and civil model, such as independent directors. There are many parallels 
between the UK and China in the way that they deal with various aspects of corporate 
governance, in particular when Chinese company law introduced an independent 
director system in light of the UK experience. Whilst it is not possible to compare 
every similarity of two countries’ corporate systems, a discussion of a few key areas 
will suffice our purposes. Both the UK and China adopt similar corporate structure.15 
The core functional features of that structure are: (1) limited liability for share owners 
and managers; (2) shared ownership by many investors; and (3) management and 
organization structure of the company, such as shareholders’ meeting and board of 
directors. Meanwhile, the division of private company and public company in the UK 
bear resemblance to the division of Limited Liability Company and Joint Stock 
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15 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 6. 
Company. Hence, there seems a trend to converge corporate forms, as suggested by 
Hansmann and Kraakman.16 
There are also many identical terms or requirements designing corporate governance 
mechanisms in both countries’ framework. For example, both countries have specific 
statutory provisions aimed at ensuring accountability of the company and enhancing 
investor protection. Chinese company law imposes duties, such as the duty of 
diligence, the duty of loyalty, which have similar meanings as fiduciary duty in the 
UK, on company directors. Directors in both countries are liable for breach of duty if 
they violate law or the company’s articles of association, and consequently cause 
damage to the company.17 
While at first glance the UK adopts a different board structure without a separate 
board of supervision as in China, the role of non-executive directors, as previously 
compared, is very similar to that of supervisory directors in Chinese listed 
companies. 18  In light of UK experience, independent director system has also 
formally endorsed in Chinese company law as a way of strengthening supervision 
over corporate malfeasance.   
At the field of securities regulations, the trend towards convergence with a western 
model becomes more evident, as analyzed by Macneil.19  There is considerable 
evidence that structure and content of Chinese securities and listing regulations are 
very similar to those operating in developed markets.20 For example, as said in 
Chapter 6, the listing requirements set out in Chinese laws follow very closely the 
pattern of UK model.21 Macneil explains the reason given for those convergences, is 
the source of path-dependency – the state control – as one will see later, less likely to 
                                                              
16 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 6). 
17 See Chapter 2.3 and Chapter 6.3.2. 
18 Ibid.  
19 I Macneil, 'Adaptation and Convergence in Corporate Governance: the Case of Chinese Listed 
Companies' (2002) 2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 289, 306.  
20 For a more detailed discussion of how Chinese securities regulation differ and follow western model, 
see Macneil, Ibid.  
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21 For a full account of Chinese listing requirement, see A Lau, 'The New Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Listing Rules: An Egg Hatched or An Egg within An Egg' (1999) 20 Company Lawyer 243. 
work as a barrier because the process of raising capitals and secondatory trading of 
securities less affect the interests of the State as the dominant holder in listed 
companies.22 
Taking the above discussion together, the Chinese corporate governance framework 
has already exhibited considerable evidence of formal convergence with the UK 
model, or broadly, western pattern. Therefore, it seems that introducing rules relating 
to shareholder activism at a ‘low level’ will not produce difficulty in fitting in ‘higher 
level’ systems that the ultimate values or purposes the rules are intended to serve. 
However, we must ask whether there are any ‘higher level’ differences which restrain 
the ability to adapt. Thus, secondly, there needs to be sensitivity to hurdles that would 
prevent new rules from achieving the same purposes in receiving countries as the 
original country. The question follows what and how do those sources of 
path-dependency make Chinese institutional shareholder activism differ from UK 
counterpart? In the main, the State, playing dual role as the regulator and controlling 
shareholder, constrains China’s ability to adapt itself to resemble a UK model.   
The State can make use of its role as regulator to facilitate its control over listed 
companies as a dominant shareholder. As a regulator, the State make rules in favor of 
itself. Many aspects of Chinese corporate governance system are served for the 
purpose of preserving the State’s control. For example, to retain governmental control 
over listed companies, it applied a restrictive concessionary approach to make 
corporate legislation rely heavily on administrative control and mandatory regulations, 
compared with a ‘permissive regime’ adopted in UK company law.23 Moreover, 
Chinese company law differs sharply from the UK in its requirement for a role of 
political party in a listed company. For example, it requires an organization to be 
                                                              
22 Macneil (n 19) 306. 
386 
 
23 A Seidman and R B Seidman, 'Drafting Legislation for Development: Lessons From a Chinese 
Project' (1996) 44 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 13; K T W Ong and C R Baxter, 'A 
Comparative Study of the Fundamental Elements of Chinese and English Company Law' (1999) 48 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 88, 94. 
established in the company to carry out activities of the Chinese Communist Party.24 
In contrast, UK company law advocates freedom of contract and is hostile towards the 
government’s interference on business affairs.25  
As a dominant shareholder, the State can determine the outcome of corporate affairs 
even sometimes without the participation of the remaining non-state shareholders. 
Their control as shareholders over listed companies is further enhanced in company 
law where the shareholders’ meeting in Chinese listed companies is allocated large 
decision powers, among which some of them are placed within the scope of the 
directors’ authority under UK company law.26  
It has been noted that Chinese institutional shareholders present a much lower level of 
involvement in corporate governance than the UK counterpart and this thesis believes 
that the continuing large shareholding by the State is perhaps the biggest contributory 
reason for that gap. For example, the State can control voting outcomes under a 
one-vote, one-share system, which will certainly reduce institutional shareholders’ 
incentive for engagement when they know they cannot make any difference. It limits 
the growth of institutional investment, which makes the factors contained in the 
model, such as the decisiveness of individual shareholding, the possibility of 
concerted action, the cost-benefit analysis, considerable weaker in Chinese landscape.  
To sum up, we have seen there are similarities in the corporate legislations of both 
countries as regards institutional shareholder activism and also various aspects of 
corporate governance system, which show a tendency towards convergence. Yet we 
have also noted that these two systems are clearly differentiated and the system of 
corporate governance still operates in a manner which is fundamentally different to 
the UK as a result of the state control.  
The point, perhaps, is that, for the moment, although convergence of legal rules at 
                                                              
24 CL 2005 s 19.  
25 Ong and Baxter (n 23) 94. 
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‘low level’ in relation to shareholder activism is occurring, fundamental, deep-seated 
differences in ideology, political attitude, and economic policies would first have to be 
reconciled with each other. Chinese corporate governance remains in a considerable 
degree idiosyncratic and therefore a wholesale process of convergence towards the 
UK model is unlikely to occur. Therefore, it is not possible to adopt every aspect of 
UK rules and systems in relation to shareholder activism into China. 
After carefully evaluating the needs of the receiving country, its potential for 
exportation, and its capacity for importing foreign experiences, the recommendations 
in the sections below can be split up into three types. First, when the UK’s approach 
is valuable but not workable, I explicitly points out the impossibility of direct 
transplant and turns to other solutions, such as the UK’s prudent person model. 
Second, there are cases where the UK approach is both valuable and workable but 
China shall adopt a different means to achieving it, such as the shareholder 
engagement guidance. Third, some proposals which do not require institutional 
change are highly adaptable, such as calling for more academic support.  
10.2 What can China Learn from UK Experience? 
Yet we have seen that institutional investment has gained an impressive growth in 
both countries and accompanying these increases, calls for more active institutional 
shareholder engagement in portfolio companies are widely seen in both countries. We 
have also seen that, despite both countries clearly devoting much effort to promoting 
shareholder involvement, UK institutional shareholders have more incentives to 
engage in corporate governance and thus present a higher level of activism. The 
question is now turning to the last one remaining unaddressed in the thesis: What can 
China learn from the UK approach?  
There could be various relevant factors contributing to the greater institutional 
shareholder activism in the UK. However, as explained, not all can be applied in the 
Chinese context. Based on its needs and conditions, the thesis suggests that China 
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could still embrace certain features of corporate governance mechanisms employed in 
the UK. They include: 
1. To create a stronger institutional investor base through removing unnecessary 
investment limits, enhancing institutional internal corporate governance and 
increasing foreign participation 
2. To establish industry trade associations, representing institutional shareholders, to 
encourage the emergence of active and informed owners and support concerted 
shareholder action. 
3. To establish institutional shareholder engagement guidance, which sets out good 
practice on engagement with portfolio companies which the government believes 
institutional investors should adopt, and backed up by a rigorous and effective 
legal system. 
4. To encourage institutional shareholders to adopt clear policies regarding their 
standards for corporate governance of portfolio companies and the way in which 
they exercise their voting rights. 
5. To encourage institutional investors to establish a well-organized and efficient 
internal corporate governance. 
6. To nurture a good culture of corporate governance by means of more academic 
support and governmental advocacy. 
10.2.1 The Decisiveness of Individual Shareholding: Promoting 
(Long-term) Institutional Investment 
We have seen that institutional shareholders with large institutional shareholdings and 
long-term investment horizons, have more incentives to avoid free-riding and thus to 
take action in their portfolio companies. Institutional shareholder engagement is 
therefore more active in a country having higher level of institutional shareholding 
concentration in listed companies. 
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The comparison of the institutional landscape between the UK and China, as already 
shown in Part IIs and III, reveals two evident disparate features. First, although 
institutional investment has grown impressively in both countries, we have seen that 
the UK still differs from China in the greater presence of institutional investors. 
Ownership of UK equities by institutional shareholders soared from 18% in 1963 to 
40% in 2008.27 In China, due to the presence of large state shareholder, institutional 
ownership only accounts for a relatively small portion of the total equity of listed 
companies ( an average of 10% in the sample).28 Secondly, whereas UK’s institutional 
market is dominated by long-term investors, such as pension funds and insurance 
companies, relatively short-term mutual funds prevail in the Chinese institutional 
investment industry.    
By virtue of those differences, it is not surprising to find that UK institutions investee 
companies are more willing to take part in corporate governance than their Chinese 
counterparts. As such, in pursuit of a higher level of institutional shareholder 
participation, the Chinese government should further promote the development of its 
institutional investment industry, in particular pension funds and insurance 
companies.  
Apart from promoting good corporate governance, China has other strong reasons to 
develop an institutional investor base. Greater participation of institutional investors 
in the securities market would promote market integrity, stability and increase 
financial innovation.29 Moreover, the development of institutional share ownership 
has evident synergies with other reforms currently occurring in China, such as 
reforming SOEs, transferring non-tradable share to tradable shares and establishing a 
social security system. 
                                                              
27 See Chapter 3.1. 
28 See Chapter 8, Tables 8.1, 8.2, 8.3. 
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presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics Latin American and Caribbean 
Conference, June 28–30, World Bank, Washington, D.C. and Y Kim, I S M Ho and M S Giles, 
'Developing Institutional Investors in People's Republic of China' (2003) World Bank Country Study 
Paper , 2-4. 
Accordingly, over the near term as well as over the long term, the Chinese 
government should put effort into promoting the emergence of competent institutional 
investors. Based on the Chinese situation, the thesis considers the following reforms 
as vital to strengthen the institutional industry: 
1. Gradually reducing state-owned shares or constraining the State’s ability to 
interfere with corporate affairs;30 
2. Relaxing investment limitations mainly through reducing allocation in fixed 
income assets and increasing equity investment; Combining investment 
restrictions with a move to a prudent person rule where possible;31 
3. Relieving tax policy on pension funds;32 
4. Encouraging foreign institutional investors’ participation.33 
10.2.1.1 Reducing State Ownership in a Gradual Way 
As we have seen, the greatest obstacle to institutional shareholder activism is the 
dominance of the State as shareholder in listed companies. To reduce state ownership 
is therefore the first and foremost reform that I propose to promote institutional 
shareholder activism in the future.  
Currently, China is undergoing a non-tradable share reform which brings state-owned 
non-circulated shares on to the securities market. This reform would obviously 
present a promising opportunity for expansion of institutional industry. Institutional 
investors, including foreign institutions, can provide the liquidity and sophistication to 
absorb these transferred shares without disrupting market stability. However, such 
growth cannot be achieved if the State retains control of those shares after they float 
in the market. A fundamental change in ownership pattern demands the Chinese 
government to reduce the number of state-owned shares. 
                                                              
30 See section 10.2.1.1. 
31 See section 10.2.1.2. 
32 See section 10.2.1.3. 
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There are a number of ways to gradually dilute state ownership or constrain the 
Government’ control in listed companies. China has been considering mechanisms to 
reduce state shares through transferring state shares to pension funds. As we have seen, 
some state-owned enterprises conducting domestic IPOs were required to transfer 10%
of their shares to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF).
 
                                                             
34 In the future, based on 
market needs and conditions, the Government could continue this approach to support 
and strengthen its pension fund system.  
Transforming the state equity into non-voting shares or restrained voting shares is 
another approach that the Chinese government could employ.35 This would separate 
control rights from the Government’s income right in its investee companies, so as to 
empower public investors by enabling them to have a proportionately greater say in 
corporate affairs and therefore to allow market forces to shape corporate governance 
standards. Currently, as we have seen, China implements a class voting system to 
refrain the largest shareholder from voting when deciding on some significant 
corporate matters. Both these measures – restricting the State’s voting power while 
remaining a beneficial owner – could be useful mechanisms at a transitional stage, as 
they could signal that the Government would not interfere with corporate 
management through its political power.  
In the meantime, given the limitations imposed by dominant state ownership on the 
effectiveness of direct regulatory control, the Government shall shift its role within 
companies by relying more on indirect control including delegated monitoring or 
self-regulatory organizations. The thesis will return to this point in section 10.2.2. 
10.2.1.2 Relaxing Institutional Investment Restriction 
The second significant factor explaining the higher level of institutional concentration 
in the UK is its more liberal investment ownership limits. Institutional investors in 
 
34 See Chapter 7.4.2. 
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35 S Tenev, C Zhang and L Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building 
the Institutions of Modern Markets (World Bank Publications Washington 2002), 144. 
both countries are subject to some restrictions to ensure that they diversify their 
investment risks. However, different regulation models apply in these two countries. 
In the UK, pension fund investment portfolio management and part of insurance 
industry are operated under a ‘prudent person’ model, in which the investment of 
pension assets is undertaken with care, the skill of an expert, prudence and due 
diligence.36 Trustees and/or asset mangers invest fund assets fiduciary as someone 
would do in the conduct of his or her own affairs, i.e. there is generally no any 
specific restriction on particular assets investment.37  
In contrast, Chinese institutional investment industry is managed under a ‘quantitative 
portfolio regulation’ approach, where limit holdings of certain types of assets within 
the portfolio.38 For example, no more than 40% of the NSSF assets shall be invested 
in equities. Consequently, the concentration level institutional investment, both 
individually and collectively, is constrained.  
Although a much less restricted ownership limit is imposed on securities investment 
funds, it is suggested that the growth of investment fund will be slower if pension 
funds and investments funds are compelled to invest in non-marketable products, 
which limit their investment into SIFs.39  
These tough restrictions partly deter institutional shareholders from exerting a greater 
voice in the governance of portfolio companies. Moreover, much empirical analysis, 
for example that by Calatan, found that the development of China’s capital market is 
less likely to be achieved if institutions were restricted in their holdings of marketable 
equities.40 Therefore, although the total size of institutional investment in China can 
be considered enormous, its beneficial impact on capital market development is 
                                                              
36 See Chapter 3.2.1. 
37 P E Davis, 'Prudent Person Rules or Quantitative Restrictions? The Regulation of Long Term 
Institutional Investors' portfolios' (2002) 1 Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 157, 167. 
38 See Chapter 7 and Chapter 9.1.1.1. 
39 D Fernando and others, 'The Global Growth of Mutual Funds' (2003) World Bank Policy Research 
Paper 3055 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636417> accessed 23 March 2009, 7. 
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Which Leads?' (2000) World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper Series 
<http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2421.html> accessed 12 August 2008. 
constrained by stringent investment limits.41 
Accordingly, to promote greater shareholder activism, the Chinese government should 
adopt appropriate strategies of deregulation to relax the current strict investment 
limits for institutional investments. The UK’s experience in developing its financial 
institutions is clearly inspiring. In the UK, a ‘Prudent Person’ approach has the 
advantage of ensuring investment flexibility by avoiding constantly regulatory 
adjustment and it will yield better results in the long term.42  
However, importing a similar approach into Chinese system is not the most desirable 
solution, at least not in the near future. The precondition to apply a ‘Prudent Person’ 
approach is that conflicts of interest are clearly defined in regulations and understood 
by market participants from legal cases. Moreover, it requires highly experienced fund 
managers and strict supervisory bodies on investor malpractice as well as 
self-regulatory bodies.43  
These conditions are currently not sufficiently available in China. In comparison with 
the UK’s more developed market, the Chinese market is nascent, with shorter trading 
histories, less liquidity and a smaller institutional investor base. As suggested by 
Davis, there could be rational for a country to impose regulatory restrictions on 
institutions if they are not sufficiently experienced and the market is more volatile.44 
International experience also suggests that it is common that in an initial stage of 
institutional investment, a country may well start by adopting a strict regulatory 
regime and then proceed to relax it as the needs of institutional institutions and the 
securities market evolve. 45  Moreover, the implementation of ‘Prudent Person’ 
approach involves legal difficulties since both regulators and asset managers in China 
are unfamiliar with the concept of fiduciary responsibilities in a civil law jurisdiction.  
                                                              
41 Tenev, Zhang and Brefort, (n 35) 4.  
42 P E Davis, Private Pensions in OECD Countries (OECD, Paris 1997). 
43 Davis (n 37). 
44 Ibid. 
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45 Fernando and other (n 39) 16. For example, Chile and some countries in Eastern Europe have 
engaged in long-term upgrading of their regulatory systems since the pension reforms in 1980s.  
Thus, it is more appropriate for the Government to follow a gradualist approach to 
ease slowly institutional investment restrictions. In the long run, institutional investors 
should be encouraged to apply a ‘prudent person’ principle over investment 
management activities where possible. 
The reform to liberate investment restrictions should concentrate mainly on two areas. 
The first is the lower limits on certain assets classes, e.g. government bonds and bank 
deposits.46 At present, the investment of both corporate pension funds and NSSF must 
comply with minimum investment limits, e.g. at least 20% of net assets of corporate 
pension funds shall be invested in government bonds, and minimum 50% of NSSF 
assets must be allocated in bank deposits and government bonds.47  
This practice is not recommended in the OECD’s Guidelines on Pension Fund Asset 
Management (Guidance) issued in 2005 to address the issue of using quantitative 
limits for controlling pension fund investment risks. Although the Guidelines do allow 
for the use of investment limits to control the risk of assets investment, nevertheless, 
the Guidelines warn that quantitative limits shall be applied with care. For example, 
they do not recommend minimum investment limits because these could constrain 
fund managers’ ability to make proper decisions, reduce investment profitability and 
may ‘artificially inflate asset prices’. 48  Given that, the current minimum limits 
imposed by the Chinese regulatory framework might well be counter-productive to 
achieving a return which is capable of dealing with China’s serious ageing problem. 
In the future, institutional investments should be made less in conservative, low risk, 
low return assets classes and increasingly in more innovative securities for a higher 
return where possible.  
The second target for reform is the tough upper limits on equity investment. There is 
                                                              
46 Y-W Hu, 'China's Pension Reform: A Precondition Approach' (2006) 35 Global Economic Review 
413, 16; Also Y-W Hu, F Stewart and J Yermo, 'Pension Fund Investment and Regulation: An 
International Perspective and Implications for China's Pension System' (2007) OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/30/39604854.pdf> accessed 18 June 2009, 2. 
47 See earlier discussion in Chapter 9.1.1.1. 
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much evidence on the benefits of a less restricted approach on diversification and 
performance. Hu, for example, looked at the quantitative effects if corporate pension 
funds were operated in more or less liberalized regulatory regimes. He found that 
returns are consistently higher for more diversified portfolios. As such, he concluded 
that the existing pension investment regulation has forced assets to be invested in an 
overly conservative manner, which led to a lower return for the portfolio and thus a 
lower benefit for retirees. 49  Hence, Chinese regulators should relax existing 
restrictions and encourage institutions to invest in more sophisticated, innovative 
securities products in the search for higher risk-adjusted rewards. (In the long run, 
China should move towards a prudent person rule where possible.) And this change in 
portfolio investment might be achieved by a move towards a regulatory regime based 
not on fixed quantitative limit, but rather on a model more like the UK’s ‘Prudent 
Person’ approach. 
10.2.1.3 Tax Relief 
An important contributory factor for rapid growth of institutional investment in the 
UK is its beneficial tax treatment.50 In light of the UK experience, the Chinese 
government should grant greater tax relief to both employers and employees to 
facilitate the growth of institutional investment. Currently, under China’s tax practice, 
employer contributions of 4% (or more) of the payroll are tax deductible, while 
employees’ contributions are not tax deductible. 51  Contributions used to buy 
insurance contracts are not entitled to tax concessions: the employee should pay tax 
on the contribution the employer makes for his benefit.52 Meanwhile, tax benefits 
vary in practice from province to province. In the future, the Chinese government 
should make efforts to standardize and harmonize tax relief policy and increase tax 
                                                              
49 Hu, ‘Pension Fund Investment and Regulation: An International Perspective and Implications for 
China's Pension System’ (n 46) 15. 
50 See Chapter 3, footnote 7, 8 and the accompanying texts. 
51 BBVA, 'Pension Trends:Latest Development of China's Pension Market' (2008)  
<http://www.bbvaresearch.com/KETD/ketd/ing/nav/tematicas/pensiones/historico/afondo/index.jsp> 
accessed 12 March 2009. 
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benefits on corporate pension funds.  
 
10.2.1.4 Encouraging Foreign Institutional Investors’ Participation 
A further factor in creating a strong institutional investment is to increase foreign 
participation. China faces the opportunity to import regulatory and corporate 
governance capability by opening its market to foreign institutional investors.  
It is believed that massive international funds will flow into China in the next few 
years, according to a recent survey conducted by Fidelity International and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit.53 The survey covered 109 large global institutional 
investors. 58% of institutional investors surveyed planned to increase their investment 
allocation to China in 2010 in the hope of better returns and improved 
diversification. 54  57% of Western institutional investors and 62% of Asian 
institutional investors named China as their top choice for fund investment.55 
Despite the promising market expansion of foreign funds’ assets in China, the current 
investment legislation, as we have previously seen, might be counter-productive to 
facilitating an attractive investment regime. Under existing policies, foreign 
institutional investors are allowed to access the Chinese domestic stock market 
through the QFIIs program. However, their investment scope and amount in Chinese 
listed companies are restricted. China has been taking a cautious step in opening up its 
domestic market to QFIIs. Capital inflows and outflows are strictly controlled to 
avoid the potential financial risk that would be imposed by any dramatic changes 
from foreign capital. JINGU notes that similar stringent approach was also taken by 
Taiwan to regulate its QFIIs program and thanks to this way, Taiwan suffered 
comparatively little turmoil during the Asia financial crisis.56 Therefore, there is little 
                                                              
53 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘From West to East: Gauging Institutional Investor Attitudes to Asia’, 
February 2010 <http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/eiu_fidelity_fromwesttoeast.pdf> accessed 24 June 
2010. 
54 Ibid, 4. 
55 Ibid, 5. 
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doubt that a strict policy on foreign capital entrance can help the Governance to 
maintain the stability of the domestic securities market. However, Chinese 
qualification requirements for foreign institutional investors to access the domestic 
markets are still much higher than that of in Taiwan. For example, in Taiwan, when it 
first introduced the QFII scheme in 1991, the ranking requirement for banks was the 
top 500 in the world, and in 1993, the regulation was further relaxed to the world’s top 
1000.57 However, under the QFII regulation in China, for commercial banks wishing 
to invest in Chinese securities markets, they are required to be ranked among the 
world’ top 100. A great deal of foreign long-term assets institutions such as pension 
funds, securities companies who are interested in investing in China failed to access 
China’s A-share market, to a large extent because of these strict qualification 
requirements on assets size, operational experience and world rank. It is fair to say 
that, while these rigid requirements help to take precautions and reduce the financial 
risks, the fact that foreign investors cannot invest in the securities market has denied 
China a further source of capital and a further source of institutional investors. 
Hence, the restrictions imposed on the scope and structure of the investment regime 
need to be considered and slowly relaxed when the financial institutions and capital 
market become more mature and better regulated by effective supervisory authorities. 
Along with more foreign investors, the Chinese government should encourage them to 
increase their engagement level with companies whose shares they hold. 
It is crucial to note here, in addition to the above four ways (reducing state shares, 
relaxing investment limits, tax reliefs and liberation of foreign participation), a more 
rigorous accounting system, increased level of transparency and disclosure, a 
competent regulatory framework and improved standard of corporate governance 
systems in listed companies are all critical importance to the future develop of 
Chinese institutional industry. There are concerns from investors that current poor 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
11 August 2008, 4. 
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financial sectors deter them from increasing their investment. For example, despite 
seeing significant opportunities, international portfolio investors surveyed also 
expressed some worries about their investment in China’s A-share market. Concerns 
about transparency and the quality of the regulatory infrastructure are commonly cited 
as main barriers to investment in China among institutional investors surveyed.58 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Kim, Ho and Giles, the poor financial health and 
inadequate corporate governance mechanism in China, deter foreign investment in 
China.59 
Moreover, the growth of institutional investment will require the managers and staffs 
of institutions to own adequate profession skills to become involved in investment 
analysis and portfolio management. Therefore, action would be taken to strengthen 
the professional capability of institutional analysis and managers to manage equity 
portfolio in the clients’’ best interest. For example, relevant associations or regulators 
to financial institutions can provide institutions with training or continuing educations 
on prudent behavior and investment techniques. The Government should promote 
more cooperation and communication between foreign and domestic institutional 
investors. The advanced technology and skills transplanted from foreign institutions 
will likely rapidly and markedly upgrade the capacity of domestic institutional 
investors in China. 
10.2.2 Concerted Action: Industry Trade Association 
In order to strengthen the power of institutional shareholder in listed companies, 
China could learn from the UK to establish industry trade associations to co-ordinate 
institutional shareholder engagement. As shown in previous chapters, the facilitation 
of trade associations in the UK has undermined the free-riding problem by making it 
easier for institutions to form a coalition. In addition, these organizations give voting 
advice, develop opinion papers on governance issues, sponsor research, and raise the 
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salience of particular issues. Their efforts have ultimately contributed to the increase 
of shareholder activism in the UK.  
In the Chinese context, apart from promoting shareholder engagement, establishing 
self-regulatory organizations will yield some unique benefits. Firstly, trade 
associations can facilitate the Government to reduce its political and administrative 
control over companies – a widely-recognized barrier that deters a well-run financial 
market and restrains corporate autonomy. Strong state control hampers the ability of 
the managers to respond efficiently to market forces, aggravates the expropriation of 
minority shareholders by majority shareholders, and leads to weak governance of 
many listed companies.  
To gradually reduce its regulatory role, the Government should rely more on indirect 
regulatory methods, including ‘delegated monitoring, self-regulation of professional 
organizations, and mobilizing public in the enforcement processes’.60 Tenev, Zhang 
and Brefort further point out that, empowering the ‘right’ party to build a strong 
regulatory capacity would increase the Government’s confidence that it is able to run 
the economy effectively without direct ownership control.61 Hence, it offers some 
reasons to vest rules writing in a quasi-public or non-profit organization rather than in 
a government agency. 
Furthermore, establishing industry associations could enhance the Government’s 
regulatory efficiency by mitigating resource constraints. As the economic and 
enterprise reform continues to broaden and deepen, the complexity of the issues and 
the magnitude of the task pose significant challenges to the Government’s regulatory 
capacity. If the State decides to do its job entirely on its own resources and direct 
methods of regulation, it will have difficulty meeting these challenges. Co-operating 
with self-regulatory bodies and allowing those institutions, which own professional 
staff and capacity, to prepare for regulatory rules will release the Government’s 
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burden. The UK’s approach to develop its corporate governance framework has 
illustrated how government can rely on self-regulatory guidelines and on extending 
right parties to enforce good practice. Moreover, as already seen in the UK case, some 
provisions in Codes or guidelines may also assist to prepare the ground for changes in 
company and securities law, where such changes are deemed necessary. 
In the Chinese context, all the above benefits – promoting shareholder engagement, 
reducing government’s political control and enhancing government’s regulatory 
capacity – ultimately rest on the independence of trade associations. The Government 
should realize that preserving their independence is crucial to the effectiveness of 
trade organizations. As such, it is important to ensure that associations are formed as 
non-governmental, independent organizations acting on the behalf of institutional 
shareholders. However, at the initial stage, when trade associations are new to China, 
the Government could assist them to become established, for example, training 
professional staffs, providing opportunity to learn experience from other countries and 
granting funds where necessary. Meanwhile, various means could be adopted to 
strengthen the independence of trade associations. A minimalist approach could 
include, for example, an effective election mechanism to ensure the independence of 
associations’ staffs and internal regulations to define the responsibility and power of 
the associations. 
In the light of the UK experience as well as Chinese conditions, the thesis believes 
industry associations should achieve three basic objectives: (1) promoting good 
corporate governance practice and encouraging shareholder engagement; (2) 
Facilitating concerted action among institutions; and (3) promoting the development 
of institutional investment. 
10.2.2.1 Promoting Good Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
Engagement 
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An important role that UK trade associations have played is to promote the 
importance of good corporate governance and to encourage more active shareholder 
activism. In China, trade associations can pursue the same objective by issuing a 
series of guidance to raise the awareness of the importance of good corporate 
governance, help members to understand their responsibilities and rights, and make 
suggestions on possible shareholder actions.  
In the initial stage of development, Chinese associations can learn from international 
experience through an active exchange with organizations in other countries. A large 
body of guidelines or good practice as regards UK institutional investors’ 
responsibility is seen in the UK prepared by trade associations, such as NAPF, ABI 
and ISC. The ISC’s earlier guidelines,62 have now adopted by the FRC as the UK 
Stewardship Code. Another good example of institutional investor self-regulation is 
the ICGN’s Statement of Principles on Institutional Shareholder Responsibilities. 
These guidelines could complement China’ input to further develop and refine the 
recommendations by associations. It is crucial to note here that these would need to be 
developed in a way that sensitive to China’s situation.   
10.2.2.2 Establishing Voting Policy 
In the UK, the engagement policies set out by trade associations are often among the 
most important factors determining institutions’ approach to corporate governance. 
For example, ISC’s Statement of Principles have been widely adopted by many 
institutions as a part of their voting policies.63 This role played by trade associations is 
potentially of particular importance in the Chinese context. Currently, having policies 
to clarify how institutions would cast their votes in the governance of portfolio 
companies is rare. Institutions’ representative bodies can produce statement of, and 
guidance on best practice in respect of voting to facilitate inexperienced institutions to 
set up their voting polices. The thesis will return to this point later in section 10.2.4.  
                                                              
62 See Chapter 3.3. and Chapter 4.1.4.1.2. 
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10.2.2.3 Facilitating Concerted Action 
With a more developed and larger institutional investor industry, the power of 
institutional shareholders as a group will be strengthened in Chinese listed companies, 
providing strong possibilities for collective action. To co-ordinate corporate 
governance initiatives among institutional shareholders to form effective coalitions 
against incumbent management and powerful controlling shareholders should be 
placed as a priority on the agenda of trade associations.  
In China, collaboration among institutions is perhaps among the most significant 
factors determining the outcome of their activism, given the dominant shareholding of 
the large shareholder. Regrettably, as we have seen, communication and cooperation 
among institutional shareholders to initiate shareholder activism are currently rare in 
China. This is mainly the result of the perceived lack of awareness of corporate 
governance as well as lack of institutions to organize collective action. To establish 
professional, self-regulatory association would help to fill these gaps.  
Aggregating the power of institutions is relatively easily achieved through the 
facilitation of these associations, as already proved in the UK case. For example, the 
case committees formed by NAPF and ABI have been reported to be an effective tool 
to assist institutions to meet with boards and negotiate changes in corporate 
behaviors.64  
Moreover, as representatives of their institutional members, trade associations could 
speak out for the benefits of their members if a company’s behavior is identified as 
being in breach of good corporate governance standards. Their collective voice could 
send a powerful dissenting signal and will be more threatening than individual action. 
Meanwhile, where collective action is organized by associations, the likelihood of 
retaliatory action by management against activist shareholders, and the conflicts of 
interest for institutional shareholder that the fear of such retaliatory action can 
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produce, are both likely to be reduced.  
10.2.2.4 Promoting Institutional Investment 
Besides encouraging shareholder engagement, trade associations should achieve the 
objective of promoting the development of institutional investment. In the future, as 
we have seen in section 10.2.1.2, China has to gradually move towards a more 
liberalized investment regulatory regime for institutional investors. The continued 
liberalization, along with increasing sophistication of China’s capital markets would, 
overtime, create demand for professional expertise and high industry standards. The 
support provided by trade associations to strengthen the professional capability of 
institutional analysis and managers will be much needed and particularly beneficial. 
To meet these challenges, trade associations should set up their own code of ethics 
and conduct in areas, such as institutional investment, share schemes, and provide 
training services, such as asset management, risk control, to their members. These 
services have been widely undertaken by UK trade associations. Take the NAPF as an 
example, it offers training courses to different levels of pension fund trustees in 
varying programs. It also issues a range of publications, including an Annual survey 
of the industry, asset pooling, and Indices and Bench marketing to guide its members. 
Accordingly, Chinese industry associations can offer similar services to facilitate the 
development of institutional investment industry.  
Moreover, with their professional judgment, trade associations would facilitate the 
Government to evaluate regulatory limits on investment and determine whether and 
how further relaxation can be achieved. They can also liaise with and/or lobby the 
Government to propose reforms that are beneficial for the development of 
institutional industry. 
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10.2.3 Normative Obligation: Institutional Shareholder Engagement 
Guidance 
The third significant reason for a higher level of institutional shareholder activism in 
the UK is, I believe, its more sophisticated regulatory framework as regards the role 
of institutional shareholder in corporate governance. Institutional shareholder 
engagement has long been ascribed a vital role in the UK’ system of corporate 
governance. In contrast, China lacks a sufficient recognition of the role that 
institutional shareholder can play to promote corporate governance.  
In the UK, the CA 2006 gives the Government the power to require institutional 
investors to disclose how they have voted their shares.65 While it is stated that the 
Government will use this power only if a voluntary regime fails to improve disclosure, 
the threat forces institutional investors to consider their responsibilities to be 
responsible owners of investee companies for the interests of their beneficiaries. In 
response to the reserve power, as noted, more UK institutional investors have set up 
the level of engagement with their investee companies.66 In contrast to the UK, 
Chinese company law has not recognized the potential influence of institutional 
shareholders and their role in corporate governance. 
Moreover, in the UK, successive corporate governance guidance, from the Cadbury 
Report in 1992, through the Greenbury, Hampell, Turnbull, Higgs reviews in the mid 
1990s to early 2000s to the current UK Corporate Governance Code (UK Code), has 
placed significant emphasis on institutional shareholder monitoring as a discipline on 
corporate management. The newly-issued Stewardship Code well demonstrates the 
Government’s consistently willingness to promote shareholder engagement in the UK. 
The Stewardship Code sets out good practice on engagement with portfolio 
companies to which the government believes institutional investors should aspire.  
                                                              
65 CA 2006 s 1277-1280. 
405 
 
66 See discussion in Chapter 4.1.4. 
By contrast, the role of institutional shareholders has not attracted sufficient attention 
from regulators, which can be reflected in China’s Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies (Chinese Code). While the role of institutional shareholders is 
indeed mentioned in the Chinese Code, it is very vague. Section 11 of Chinese Code 
states that ‘institutional shareholders shall play a role in the appointment of company 
directors, the compensation and supervision of management and major 
decision-making processes.’67  
Such a broad provision can be hardly implemented in practice. It does not make the 
case for why institutional shareholders should consider active engagement to be in 
their interests and be consistent with their duty to their beneficial owners. Nor does it 
give sufficient guidance to those institutions that are seeking to play a role in 
corporate governance. These shortcomings give rise to the lack of awareness among 
institutional shareholders about why and how they can make constructive use of the 
ownership influence that they undoubtedly have. It is perhaps not surprising then, that 
although some institutional shareholders in China have made commendable efforts to 
influence companies in the right directions, cases in this area have been regrettably 
few. 
Given this, I believe that a Guidance for institutional shareholder engagement, 
incorporated into the current Chinese Code, would present a chance to build a critical 
mass of institutional shareholders to the high quality of engagement with companies 
needed to underpin good governance. Based on China’s conditions, a set of 
benchmarks and principles relating to, for example, the responsibilities of institutional 
shareholders, should be prepared by relevant institutions for the contents of  
guidance. The guidance shall be regularly reviewed, updated and changed to adapt to 
the varying market situations.  
If this approach is to work, it would bring large potential benefits to China. The 
emphasis of the role of institutional shareholders will provide them with more 
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incentives to act responsibly in relation to the companies whose share they hold. More 
active institutional shareholder voice should enhance minority shareholder protection, 
curb majority shareholders and managerial malfeasance, and assist the efficient 
operation of capital market. Greater clarity in the responsibilities of institutional 
shareholders will also enhance their accountability to clients, which will ultimately 
contribute to the increase of confident in business.  
These benefits can not be achieved if the guidance is not designed and implemented 
properly. The UK Stewardship Code provides a good example of how similar 
guidance can be addressed in the Chinese context. However, given that UK has a 
stronger shareholder engagement culture, some aspects of UK Stewardship Code can 
not be adopted in Chinese case where its shareholder activism is still in infant stage. 
Details of the Guidance shall be carefully evaluated and well-prepared by relevant 
institutions. In general, the thesis considers that three points are particular important 
and should be prepared in the Guidance. 
Firstly, the effectiveness of this approach depends on institutional shareholders being 
willing, directly or indirectly, to put resources into engaging actively with the 
companies whose shares they hold. As such, the overriding emphasis in the Guidance 
should be on recognizing the role institutional shareholders can play to promote better 
corporate governance in listed companies. The Guidance should be explicit about the 
responsibilities of institutional shareholder towards the companies they invest in, 
including the need for informed shareholder engagement. A good-awareness of the 
multiple benefits of active institutional shareholder ownership, as already repeatedly 
noted in the thesis, will provide institutions with the right incentives to act responsibly. 
However, it is best to keep in mind that merely adopting provisions declaring the 
benefits of active engagement is unlikely to achieve desirable change. Accompanying 
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the guidance should come supporting institutional arrangements, further development 
of institutional investment, more academic research and governmental advocacy.68 
Secondly, Chinese guidance should provide some instructions on the way in which 
institutional shareholders are expected to engage with their investee companies. The 
UK Stewardship Code gives some good guidance on what institutional shareholders 
can do to monitor their investee companies. When institutions have a concern over 
corporate management, the first step recommended by the Stewardship Code is to 
have an initial discussion taken place on a confidential basis. If the board does not 
respond to institutional shareholders’ concerns, institutional shareholder can consider 
escalate their action to approaches that the thesis has introduced in Chapter 2.2.3.2.69 
Moreover, the guidance shall encourage institutional shareholders to establish clear 
voting policies and disclose their voting activities when appropriate – this will be 
covered in detail in section 10.2.4. 
10.2.3.1 Implementation 
Having said that, implementing a Guidance of institutional shareholder engagement in 
China would bring multiple benefits to Chinese corporate governance framework, 
however, the success of the guidance is contingent on effective implementation and 
enforcement. As with the UK Code, the Stewardship Code is implemented on a 
‘comply or explain’ basis.70 Institutional investors are encouraged to disclose in their 
reports or websites if and how they have applied the Code. The Financial Reporting 
Council will retain a list of those investors who have published a statement on their 
compliance or otherwise with the Code.  
Whether this implementation method is effective on promoting corporate governance 
still remains to see. However, as the Stewardship Code is developed from the best 
practice guidance issued by the ISC in 2002, surveys reported by the NAPF and IMA 
                                                              
68 Academic and governmental support will be discussed in section 10.2.5. 
69 UK Stewardship Code, Principle 4. 
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showed that there is an increase in the level of institutional shareholder engagement as 
a response to the ISC guidance.71 
Will this ‘comply-or-explain’ approach work effectively to enforce shareholder 
engagement in the Chinese context? This thesis believes China should give it rather 
greater legal force than this approach.72 The ‘comply or explain’ approach functions 
on the basis that the market and shareholders are capable of enforcing good standards 
and thus requires investors to actually pay a premium on those companies and 
institutions implementing the recommendation. However, as discussed, the Chinese 
corporate governance system has long been relying heavily on tight government 
control. It is therefore natural to doubt whether the market and shareholders have 
incentives and capacities to perform their checks and balances.  
It is essential that compliance and disclosure against the Guidance is monitored 
effectively, and the thesis suggests that this role would fall most appropriately to the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) at the first stage. Compared with 
the UK approach, Chinese implementation method can be more threatening. However, 
for the future, the thesis suggests that the Chinese government could work along a 
gradualist approach, to considerably and slowly ease government’ intervention and at 
the meanwhile, increase the sanction of the market. During the process, companies 
and organizations that specialize in evaluating and informing on corporate governance 
practice such as compliance advisors, rating agencies, proxy voting services, industry 
trade associations, or even academic institutions should be encourage to be 
established. They can help educate the general public and investors about 
governance-related legal requirements and common corporate governance practices. 
                                                              
71 See discussion in Chapter 5.3.1. 
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72 A point is worthy sounded here. It is suggested that the light-touched regulatory approach in the UK 
should also be backed with more rigorous legal provisions. For example, see R Tomasic, ‘Beyond 
‘Light Touch’ Regulation of British Banks after the Financial Crisis’ in I Macneil and Justin O'Brien 
(eds) The Future of Financial Regulation (Richard Hart, Oxford 2010) 111 and R Tomasic, ‘Towards A 
New Corporate Governance After the Global Financial Crisis’ in The Prospect of Structural Reform of 
Corporate Legal System (The 21st Century Commercial Law Forum-Tenth International Symposium 
2010) 213. 
Based on China’s situation, in order to ensure institutional shareholder engagement 
taking place, the Chinese regulatory framework should further enhance minority 
shareholders’ protection and increase their ability to discipline companies. There are 
some points to be emphasized here. First, currently, the Chinese Code has imposed a 
fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders towards minority shareholders for not 
abusing their power. Since the concept of fiduciary duty is not well established in 
China, it is proper for relevant rules to stipulate the full range of fiduciary obligations.  
Second, a transparent disclosure regime of large shareholders’ activities relevant to 
the interests of the listed companies is of critical importance to effective shareholder 
activism. The corporate governance regulatory framework must secure sufficient 
disclosure, both from listed companies and large shareholders, to enable institutional 
shareholder to effectively evaluate the performance of them, and exercise their rights 
when necessary. Such disclosure duties can be imposed on listed companies, if not in 
all cases, at least, when certain activities relevant to the controlling shareholders occur, 
such as related part transactions, corporate guarantees occurs.  
The above suggestions are still rather preliminary and might well change as Chinese 
markets become more sensitive to corporate governance mechanisms as a factor 
affecting the long term value of a corporation.  
10.2.4 Voting Policies  
The voting policy of institutional investors is an important factor in affecting the level 
of shareholder activism and their role in corporate governance, as evidenced by the 
UK experience. It guides institutional shareholders to cast their votes, enhances the 
transparency of how institutions make use of their shareholder rights and informs 
beneficiaries whether managers are consistent with their fiduciary duties. 
Notwithstanding its importance, the practice of establishing voting policies is now 
rare in China. To promote active and informed shareholder participation by 
institutional investors, Chinese government, regulators and institutional organizations 
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should encourage institutions to establish voting policies to make clear the way in 
which they exercise voting rights in investee companies.  
The contents of policies should be decided by each individual institution catering for 
its individual situation. However, as it is new to many Chinese institutions, trade 
associations and proxy voting service could provide guidelines to help institutions to 
establish their voting policies. The voting policies should clarify, for instance, issues 
such as the circumstances in which they will vote for, against or abstain in the 
meeting, how they measure the effect of the voting on the clients’ benefits and how 
the voting they use will influence the company management, detailing the process by 
which such decisions are made. Moreover, voting policies shall be regularly reviewed 
and to determine whether any change is needed based on market circumstances.  
Meanwhile, Chinese institutions could also look at UK’s approach to deal with voting 
activities. The UK Stewardship Code, for instance, states that ‘institutional investors 
should seek to vote all shares held. They shall not automatically support the board.’73 
If not, the policies should identify what specific types of general meeting agenda 
items it would ordinarily its vote. 
Apart from establishing voting policies, the Government should encourage 
institutional shareholders to disclose their voting policies. Rules can be applied 
similar as that in the UK Stewardship Code: ‘Institutional investors should disclose 
publicly voting records and if they do not explain why’74 
Or similarly as rules in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: 
‘Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their overall 
corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their investments, including 
the procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their voting rights’75 
                                                              
73 UK Stewardship Code, Principle 6, Guidance. 
74 Ibid. 
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The purpose of disclosure is to increase the transparency of institutional shareholders’ 
use of their shareholders rights through public scrutiny and enhance the confidence of 
beneficial owners in management. More importantly, it could protect investors against 
the potential for conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of shareholder rights 
regarding institutions’ investment. This purpose seems particularly relevant in the 
Chinese context, as the conflicts are often acute when the funds are a subsidiary or an 
affiliate of another financial institution, which is a common occurrence.76   
It is important to note here that the thesis is not suggesting a mandatory approach to 
require institutions to establish voting policies because of the risk of ‘box-ticking’ 
compliance involved. It will be more proper and workable to implement this proposal 
in the voluntary-based codes and guidance, and backed by the major business 
associations and authorities. 
10.2.4.1 Proxy Voting Service 
Another area that needs to be discussed is the development of proxy voting services. 
Chinese business industry can consider establishing its own proxy voting services, 
comprised of professional corporate staff, targeting corporate governance practice in 
Chinese listed companies. Or, it can invite existing foreign proxy voting services to 
develop their business on Chinese listed companies. Chinese investors and companies 
will become more familiar with the idea of proxy voting services as the development 
of QFIIs program in corporate governance evolves. Although there is lack of good 
evidence on whether QFIIs employ proxy voting agencies to vote their Chinese shares, 
the growth of Chinese investment by foreign owners will ultimately attract proxy 
voting agencies’ attention to Chinese corporate governance.  
The potential benefits are large. First, the use of proxy voting service can mitigate 
institutional investors’ resources restraints on exercising their governance rights. Most 
institutions do not have the resources to make voting judgments on every resolution at 
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every company in which they invest, nor to be present in person. As shown in the UK 
part, delegating third-party proxy advisory agencies can supply institutional investors 
with professional research, explicit voting guidance and other services on a range of 
corporate governance issues.  
Second, the development and application of proxy voting advisors would add to 
general awareness and understanding of governance issues in China. Third, voting 
opinions from independent third-party agencies are likely to be less prone to conflicts 
of interest from affiliated financial institutions. Also, they would be relatively free 
from major shareholders’ interferences. 
10.2.5 Improving Internal Corporate Governance  
Further liberalization of investment restrictions should accompany improved internal 
corporate governance of all financial institutions. Government and regulators should 
insist that institutional investors have the governance structure and incentives that 
encourage them to exercise their ownership rights in a more active way. Greater 
activism does suppose that the institutions are themselves subject to proper corporate 
governance structure and that there are no conflicts of interest with other members of 
the companies. As suggested in Part 2 and Part 3, the levels of shareholder activism 
by institutional investors are affected by their own corporate governance system.  
A well-organized and efficient internal corporate governance of financial institutions 
would include ensuring that appropriate internal controls and internal audit functions 
and risk management systems are all in place and work properly. In particular, given 
the magnitude of conflicts of interests within Chinese financial institutions, the focus 
of the internal system should be on the independence of institutional investors from 
their affiliated institutions. A minimalist approach would, for instance, include 
establishing policies on how they deal with conflicts of interest. They can set up a 
disclosure system to publicize conflict when occurs. 
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Moreover, the rapid evolution of China’s economic environment and complexity of 
corporate governance issues will demand institutional investors to establish specialists 
in dealing with engagement with their portfolio companies. Institutional investors 
operating in a global environment should be able to recognize, demand and suggest 
good corporate governance in the form of proper audit systems, timely information 
disclosure, quality of board and shareholders’ right protection.  
10.2.6 Fostering a Culture of Good Governance 
Apart from establishing a more effective legislative framework and a more 
sophisticated institutional investor base, another critical element in ensuring further 
development of corporate governance in China is the cultivation a corporate culture of 
good governance. Ultimately, China must develop a culture where institutional 
investors are aware of their power to exercise shareholder right as owners to 
discipline managers in ways that are aligned with the interests of ultimate 
beneficiaries. An encouraging culture will make ‘exit’ more costly. 
To build a culture can not be achieved overnight and neither is it simply a matter of 
laws and theory. It is far more a practical issue and demands long-term efforts. 
Through a study of UK institutional shareholders activism, the thesis suggests two 
points are critical to nurturing a good culture: academic supports and the 
Government’s advocacy. 
10.2.6.1 More Academic Support 
Academic work taken by scholars will undoubtedly be one of the most important 
factors to build a stronger engagement culture in China. At present, while there are 
considerable studies to explore avenues for the development of Chinese corporate 
governance, few of them have paid attention to the role of institutional shareholders in 
corporate governance. As we have seen, it is difficult to find any evidence regarding 
the level of institutional shareholder activism in Chinese listed companies. 
By contrast, in the UK, the topic of institutional shareholder activism has preoccupied 
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much debate in UK over the past few years. There has been a great amount of 
commentary in the academic research. In Part II, we have seen extensive studies 
conducted by many scholars to investigate UK institutional shareholders and their role 
in improving corporate governance. They helped to identify problems in current 
landscape, raise public awareness of the importance of shareholder engagement and 
offer feasible solutions to future development. It is fair to say that today’s more active 
shareholder engagement is partly the product of academic support in the UK. 
In the light of the UK approach, institutional shareholder engagement should become 
one of the central research interests of Chinese academic scholars in the corporate 
governance arena. Extensive efforts should be devoted to explore the institutional 
shareholder participation, identify obstacles that activism faces and make suggestions 
for further improvement.  
Moreover, similar to UK trade associations, Chinese counterparts can conduct annual 
reviews and surveys on their members in regard to their corporate governance and 
shareholders activities. In addition, studies from institutional investors themselves can 
also make considerable contribution to the subject of corporate governance. A good 
example of it is the work done by Hermes.77 Through its engagement approach, it 
found that there might be a positive link between corporate governance and corporate 
performance. 
The valuable information provided by scholars, associations and institutional 
investors will promote a better understanding of shareholder engagement among the 
public and accordingly, encourage a greater institutional shareholder participation in 
corporate governance.  
10.2.6.2 Government’s Advocacy 
The objective of nurturing good culture can not be achieved without the support of the 
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Government. The UK case well supports the view that if the Chinese government puts 
more effort to emphasise shareholders’ responsibilities, it is likely to see an increase 
in institutional shareholder engagement in the future.  
As already evidenced by some studies, today more active shareholder engagement in 
the UK could be seen very naturally as a response to the Government calls for 
‘responsible ownership’.78 After the Labour Government came into power in 1997, 
that Government consistently argued that shareholder oversight of corporate 
governance should be considered as a moral rather than merely an economic duty. The 
publication of Myners’ reports and Walker’s review, coupled with many Ministerial 
speeches and papers, transmitted the idea that responsible ownership, manifested 
through institutional shareholder activism, was the best way to achieve long-term 
value of investments and corporate development.79 The Government’s support raised 
the public’s awareness of the importance of shareholder engagement and promoted a 
more active shareholder voting level. Moreover, much effort from trade associations, 
as shown above, is largely attributable to the Government’s advocacy.  
China can learn from the UK’s approach to consistently emphasize the importance of 
institutional shareholder engagement in Governmental reports, media or speech, so as 
to promote the culture of active institutional ownership in listed companies. The 
Government should make every effort to encourage communications between 
institutional investors and corporate managers, and advocate institutional investors to 
make use of their governance rights in relation to their shares.   
In sum, extensive academic support, together with consistent advocacy by the 
Government, will promote a sense of ownership amongst institutional shareholders, 
and thus contribute to a significant improvement in shareholder participation in 
Chinese listed companies.  
                                                              
78 P Montagnon, ‘The Role of the Shareholder’ in K Rushton, The Business Case for Corporate 
Governance (Law practitioner series, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: New York 2008) 89.  
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Chapter 11 Conclusion 
The central aim of the thesis is to understand and compare the role of institutional 
shareholders in corporate governance in the UK and China. In pursuit of that aim, the 
thesis seeks to provide answers for four research questions specified in Introduction. 
By way of conclusion, it is necessary to review how and what the thesis has 
responded to these questions. 
11.1 Research Summary  
11.1.1 Question 1  
Is activism by shareholder rational? What factors determine the extent of institutional 
shareholder activism? Can these factors be ordered so they form a coherent model of 
shareholder activism?  
Chapter 1 developed a ‘model’ to explain when and why activism by shareholder is 
rational, collectively and individually. It called for a two-stage analysis. The first stage 
entailed asking whether collective action by shareholders would be collectively 
beneficial. The second stage was to explore whether activism is individually rational 
for an individual institutional investor. 
At the collective stage, this thesis found no solid basis for the theory that shareholder 
activism is detrimental to corporate governance. By contrast, this thesis argued that 
shareholder activism is collectively valuable as a means of reducing agency costs in 
listed companies. This was justified primarily by theoretical arguments, whilst noting 
that the empirical data are, at best, rather mixed and unclear about the consequences 
of institutional shareholder activism. Moreover, Chapter 1 showed that institutional 
monitoring fits within a broad tapestry of devices and market forces which operate to 
ensure managerial accountability. However, crucially, these other devices and market 
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forces are not an alternative to shareholder activism. Rather, they in part also depend 
on shareholder activism for their own effectiveness. The thesis therefore confirmed 
that shareholder activism should be encouraged as a means of improving corporate 
governance.  
Turning to the second, individual, stage, it was argued that individual action is likely 
to happen when two conditions are satisfied. First, the free-rider problem must be 
overcome, and second, the institutional shareholder’s own individual benefits must be 
calculated as likely to outweigh its own individual costs. In determining whether 
free-riding is likely to be avoided, fours factors were submitted as being of critical 
relevance: 
(a) whether the individual institutional shareholding will be decisive 
(b) whether concerted action is manageable and likely to be decisive 
(c) whether ‘in process’ benefits are likely to arise for the institutional 
shareholder 
(d) whether there is a strong moral/normative obligation to participate 
In respect of the benefits and costs involved in activism, the thesis broke these down 
into the following categories: 
  (a) Benefits: (i) share of total gains; plus (ii) personal in process benefits 
  (b) Costs:  (i) direct costs; plus (ii) indirect costs  
 
Taken together, the model established in Chapter 1 addressed the first of my four 
research questions. The thesis then moved on to the second question: to ‘prove’ this 
model by ‘applying it’ to empirical evidence concerning shareholder activism in both 
the UK and China. 
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11.1.2 Question 2  
What empirical evidence is there about the strength of these factors in the UK and 
China? 
The thesis first dealt with empirical realities in respect of corporate governance 
systems in the UK and China. Any comparative study of institutional shareholder 
activism in these two countries must take into account the fact that the systems of 
corporate ownership and governance in these two countries are in many ways 
different from each other, as Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 have shown, respectively. The 
UK is characterized by a relatively large number of listed companies, a liquid capital 
market where corporate ownership and control rights are frequently traded among 
dispersed investors, and the absence of a core shareholder capable of exercising, alone, 
‘internal’ control rights. The corporate sector of China is, in contrast, characterized by 
a relatively small number of listed companies, a less liquid capital market where 
ownership and control rights are often concentrated in the State as the ‘blockholder’ 
which can, and does, exercise control rights over management.  
As a reflection of the above differences, the regulatory frameworks employed to 
govern the internal structure of listed companies therefore present some quite different 
features in the two countries. First, whereas many matters concerning the governance 
system of companies are left to ‘private ordering’ in the UK, Chinese corporate 
legislation relies heavily on a mandatory approach to prescribe a clear allocation of 
decision-making powers between shareholder meetings and the board of directors. 
Second, much of the governance in the UK goes beyond the legislative framework, 
using instead other less formal bodies of rules such as governance codes with a 
‘comply or explain’ enforcement approach. By contrast, most regulations and rules 
concerning corporate governance in China, including stock listing rules, standards, 
compliance manuals and codes of conduct, are largely compulsory in nature, issued 
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by organs of the State, and backed by formal sanctions. Building on the foregoing 
analysis, along with enhancing managerial accountability, the distinctive systems of 
corporate ownership and governance in China created an additional demand for 
institutional shareholder engagement – to hold majority shareholders accountable to 
minority shareholders by means of activating the use of various corporate governance 
mechanisms already established in the Chinese regulatory framework, and enforcing 
good corporate governance as a way of replacing direct regulatory control from the 
State.  
Apart from corporate governance settings, the composition, the nature and the extent 
of institutional investment in each country were found to have important implications 
for the nature and level of a country’s institutional shareholder activism. Firstly, this 
thesis observed that both countries have seen sizeable increases in the proportion of 
equities held beneficially by institutions in the past few decades. However, 
comparatively, the portion of institutional ownership in China is considerably less than 
UK institutions’ holdings. Although institutional investors are large equity holders in 
China, and collectively represent nearly half of the tradable share market, owing to the 
presence of large state shareholder in China, their holdings only account for a 
relatively small portion of the total equity of Chinese listed companies. The second 
finding was concerned with the composition of institutional investors in the market. 
Whereas UK’s institutional ownership is mainly dominated by long-term investors, 
such as pension funds and insurance companies, (comparatively) short-term mutual 
funds prevail in the Chinese institutional market. The third conclusion manifests the 
fact that institutional shareholders in the UK are supported, in turn by a range of 
collective, representative bodies, such as associational organizations (ABI, NAPF, ISC 
etc) and proxy voting services. They serve to distinguish the UK institutional 
investment from its Chinese counterpart where similar organizations currently do not 
exist. 
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These findings regarding institutional ownership are clearly critically relevant in the 
context of shareholder activism as Chapter 4 found wide differentials in the behaviours 
of different types of institutional investors. We observed that the institutional investor 
most likely to intervene with a portfolio firm would be those large institutional 
shareholders with long-term investment horizon because (1) it is easier for them to 
overcome free-riding; and (2) they will receive a greater payback from activism and 
incur fewer financial costs for engagement. We also found that some institutional 
shareholders – and Hermes was the best example – have additional incentives for 
activism as they will receive some ‘in process’ benefits through engagement. We have 
also seen that trade associations played facilitating roles in organizing collective action 
among institutions as well as building good practice for institution shareholders 
concerning their engagement. All these factors, in conjunction with observations 
concerning different features of institutional landscape in the UK and China, were 
shown to be relevant in explaining the divergent levels of shareholder activism in these 
two countries. 
Chapters 5 and 8, were devoted mainly to an examination of the different forms of 
activism in the UK and China, respectively. Institutional shareholder engagement in 
the UK was found to consist of (a) routine meetings with company management, 
individually and collectively, or through trade associations; (b) an increasing level of 
voting at AGMs, and most large institutions all cast their votes; (c) infrequent 
intervention to change the management through the approach of submitting proposals; 
and (d) virtually no use of litigation.  
By contrast, shareholder monitoring in China was found to possess the following 
comparative features, namely (a) probably frequent private contact with company 
management; (b) an average voting level of 61.2% at AGMs, but only around 7.02% 
when the largest state shareholders’ votes were excluded, which suggests 17% of the 
remaining shareholders (mainly institutional investors) cast their votes; (c) infrequent 
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activism by submitting proposals, with most such proposals having been filed by the 
largest controlling shareholders. None of the proposals investigated in the sample were 
proposed by institutional shareholders; and (d) no use of derivative action.  
Building upon that empirical evidence, Chapters 5 and Chapter 9 then applied the 
activism model to show how the various factors that constituted the model of activism 
set out in Chapter 1 operated in practice. In Chapter 5, we found that private meetings 
have been the most commonly-used approach adopted by institutional shareholders 
because they enabled shareholders relatively easily to overcome free-riding, and also 
gave a positive trade-off between costs and benefits. The private meeting provides a 
good opportunity for institutional shareholders to be decisive, and to act in concert. 
Moreover, it can secure ‘in process’ benefits and was culturally preferred. Regulatory 
demands from regulators to require regular contact between the board and 
shareholders also forces both sides to take action. We also saw that the increasing 
voting level in UK listed companies was largely driven by strong normative 
obligations laid down by regulatory instruments, including the ‘soft law’ of voluntary 
codes of practice. The associated reputational ‘in-process’ benefits further push 
institutions to show the public that they do exercise rights as responsible owners. 
However, a note of caution must be sounded. Regulatory forces, including making 
voting compulsory for institutional shareholders may ensure a high voting level, but 
ultimately would be achieved at the expense of a properly considered use of 
shareholder rights. It might, in other words, produce ‘tick box’ responses. The rights to 
submit proposals and bring legal suits are infrequently exercised owing to the potential 
high costs involved. 
The application of the model to Chinese shareholder activism in Chapter 9 has been a 
more complex process on account of the multiplicity of voting systems that might be 
employed, depending on whether a usual or unusual voting system was adopted at 
AGMs. However, the message conveyed by the model was simply clear. The two 
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factors – decisiveness of individual shareholding and the possibility of a concerted 
action – depended, significantly, upon just whether the largest shareholders’ votes were 
cast. Minimal ‘in-process’ benefits and weak regulatory demands all worked together 
to give Chinese institutional shareholders fewer incentives to engage in activism. As 
we moved on to the second step of the model – namely the cost-benefit test – we found 
the pay-off from activism is a modest benefit arising from an increase in the value of 
their shares, with few personal benefits. We observed that some financial disincentives 
to activism were more or less similar to those in the UK, such as the litigation fee, 
shareholding disclosure rules and conflicts of interest, although their strength in 
deterring activism may vary between the two countries. Moreover, the traditional 
Confucian culture embedded in Chinese society, which impels people to rely on 
relationship rules and encourages high ‘power distance’, is undoubtedly a significant 
contributory reason for the passivity of institutional shareholders in engaging in 
corporate governance when activities were publicly-seen. 
11.1.3 Question 3 
What can be done to overcome factors that weigh against institutional shareholder 
activism, or to strengthen factors that encourage more shareholder activism?  
Besides offering a description of, and an explanation for, differing levels of 
institutional shareholder activism in the UK and China, the thesis also provided a 
number of normative prescriptions for achieving greater institutional monitoring. 
These were, of course (given the comparative focus of the thesis) predominately 
recommendations for improvement for China, based on the UK model. But the UK’s 
experience is by no means perfect. And I therefore included, in Chapter 5, a number 
of prescriptions for its future development in respect of shareholder activism too. 
These included, in particular, five measures that should be considered as possible 
means of increasing an active institutional shareholder involvement in an effective 
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way in the UK, namely, (1) to require the disclosure of securities lending when 
necessary; (2) to remove procedural barriers to voting; (3) to clarify regulations on 
insider dealing and acting in concert; (4) to require disclosure of voting policies and 
records and; and (5) to monitor the voting behavior of proxy agencies. 
In China, it was submitted that, the greatest obstacle to institutional investor activism 
is the dominance of the State as a shareholder in listed companies and the first and 
foremost reform I suggested was therefore to reduce state ownership, albeit in a 
gradual way. In the meantime, the Government should develop a stronger institutional 
investor base, not solely for the purpose of an increase of shareholder activism, but 
also for the long-term development of the Chinese securities market. This thesis 
proposed three approaches, including relaxing institutional investment restrictions, tax 
relief for institutional investors and a liberalization of investment opportunities for 
foreign institutional investors, to achieve the aim of enhancing institutional 
investment industry. Secondly, in light of the facilitating role played by trade industry 
associations in the UK, this thesis recommended establishing similar organizations in 
China, as they have the potential to make a significant contribution to increase the 
level of institutional shareholder engagement. In this regard, this aim could be 
achieved through the following four approaches: (1) promoting good practice 
concerning corporate governance and shareholder engagement; (2) establishing voting 
policies; (4) facilitating concerted action and; (4) encouraging institutional investment. 
In addition, trade associations may prove to be of regulatory importance since they 
can shift some of the less formal rule-making burden from the Government to relieve 
current resource constraints.  
The third approach that would be vital to create greater institutional shareholder 
monitoring is to enhance normative obligations via shareholder engagement guidance. 
China can learn from the newly-issued UK Stewardship Code with a full account of 
its specific conditions and needs, to build a set of benchmarks and principles relating 
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to the responsibilities of institutional shareholders in corporate governance. However, 
unlike a ‘comply-or-explain’ approach adopted by the UK Stewardship Code and the 
UK Corporate Governance Code, Chinese guidance should be subject to more 
mandatory enforcement given that the Chinese securities market still lacks the 
capabilities to generate sufficient sanctions. In the short term, it may prove to be the 
most effective way towards promoting good practice. It is also straightforward and 
easy to implement. But, in the long-run, the thesis suggested the Chinese government 
can gradually ease administrative intervention while relying more on market 
discipline, as the market itself becomes more sophisticated.  
Fourthly, public scrutiny will be an effective means to mitigate the risks resulting 
from conflicts of interest, which will accordingly require Chinese institutional 
shareholders to establish and disclose their voting policies. Meanwhile, various 
mechanisms, including internal control and disclosure systems and specialist teams on 
engagement, should be established to build a well-organized and efficient internal 
corporate governance structure for financial institutions. The last critical element in 
ensuring further institutional shareholder activism is the cultivation of a corporate 
culture of good governance to strengthen the normative obligation on institutional 
investors. This is admittedly, a long-term task, which cannot be fulfilled without 
consistent academic support from scholars and the Government’s advocacy.  
11.1.4 Question 4 
Comparatively, I am answering questions 1, 2 and 3 in respect of both the UK and 
China. 
As the summary above shows, the thesis has answered the first 3 questions for both 
countries. It did, however, in Chapter 10, note that that there are potential difficulties 
in a comparative study. Differing cultural, ideological and economic traditions 
beneath the law can set national system down a particular path, which would limit the 
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ability of a country to adapt elements of governance from other systems. This chapter 
proposed that a legal borrowing should be sensitive to, firstly, whether imported rules 
can fit into the broad corporate governance system of the receiving country, and 
secondly, whether there are any hurdles that would prevent new rules from achieving 
the same purposes in the receiving country as in the original country. The thesis 
therefore carefully evaluated the needs of Chinese corporate governance system, its 
potential for exportation, and its capacity for importing foreign experiences, so as to 
determine whether the UK’s approaches are desirable and workable. By doing so, the 
problems involved in legal borrowing can be largely alleviated. 
11.2 Issues for Future Research 
Indeed, the model developed in the thesis is hoped to provide a theoretical framework 
for the future study of institutional shareholder activism. A number of further avenues 
of research relevant to the subject study of this thesis can be envisaged. 
First, the conclusions on the Chinese part could be yet more compelling if still greater 
empirical evidence and data regarding the current level of institutional shareholder 
participation were available to determine how the activism model holds in the Chinese 
case. To be sure, some evidence of this nature was included in Chapter 8, drawn from 
the empirical evidence study conducted on the sample of Chinese listed companies. 
However, a much more extensive empirical evidence survey could be envisaged, 
which could in the future provide more robust Chinese data.  
The second avenue of research relates to the influence of foreign institutional investors 
in the corporate governance of domestic listed companies. In the UK, as was pointed 
out in Chapter 3, institutional ownership by foreign investors increased to roughly 40%
of the total UK equity shares. The decisions that foreign institutional investor makes – 
whether on their own behalf or on behalf of their beneficiaries – will have a profound 
effect on the governance and performance of the UK companies. In China, whilst the 
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current QFIIs’ holdings seem to account for only a small portion of institutional 
investment, their implications for future development of the corporate governance 
practice of Chinese companies is potentially far-reaching as the Chinese market 
liberalizes, and given increasing investment demand from foreigner institutions. Their 
influence over Chinese listed companies through activism will be of considerable 
practical and legal significance. Therefore, it also constitutes an interesting topic for 
the future research to explore the role of foreign institutional investors in domestic 
corporate governance practice.  
Last but not least, a more general avenue of research is to examine how, and to what 
extent, institutional shareholder activism is linked with other variables if possible, such 
as political views, fund managers’ personality traits and the characteristic of portfolio 
companies. They all offer fertile ground for future work. 
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